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INTRODUCTION 



STUDY OF HISTORY 



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in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



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INTRODUCTION 

TO THE 

STUDY OF HISTORY 



CH.^V. LANGLOIS 6? CH. SEIGNOBOS 

OF THE SORBONNE 

Translated by G. G. BERRY 
With a Preface by F. YORK POWELL 



NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 






Xo iwpi&ce lost copy 



PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN 



r 



X 



TO THE READER 



It is a pleasure to recommend this useful and well- 
written little book to English readers. It will both 
interest and help. There are, for instance, a few 
pages devoted to the question of evidence that will 
be an aid to every one desirous of getting at the 
truth respecting any series of facts, as well as to the 
student of history. No one can read it without find- 
ing out that to the historian history is not merely a 
pretty but rather difficult branch of literature, and 
that a history book is not necessarily good if it 
appears to the literary critic ' readable and interest- 
ing,' nor bad because it seems to him ' hard or heavy 
reading.' The literary critic, in fact, is beginning to 
find out that he reads a history as he might read a 
treatise on mathematics or linguistics, at his peril, 
and that he is no judge of its value or lack of value. 
Only the expert can judge that. It will probably 
surprise some people to find that in the opinion of 
our authors (who agree with Mr. Morse Stephens 
and with the majority of scholars here) the formation 
and expression of ethical judgments, the approval 
or condemnation of Caius Julius Caesar, or of Caesar 
Borgia, is not a thing within the historian's province. 
His business is to find out what can be known about 
the characters and situations with which he is en- 



To the Reader 

gaged, to put what he can ascertain before his readers 
in a clear form, and lastly to consider and attempt to 
ascertain what scientific use can be made of these 
facts he has ascertained. Ethic on its didactic side 
is outside his business altogether. In fact MM. 
Langlois and Seignobos write for those " who propose 
to deal with documents [especially written docu- 
ments] with a view to preparing or accomplishing 
historic work in a scientific way." They have the 
temerity to view history as a scientific pursuit, and 
they are endeavouring to explain to the student who 
intends to pursue this branch of anthropologic science 
the best and safest methods of observation open to 
him, hence they modestly term their little book " an 
essay on the method of historic sciences." They are 
bold enough to look forward to a day, as not far 
distant, when a sensible or honest man will no more 
dare to write history unscientifically than he would 
to-day be willing to waste his time and that of 
others on observing the heavens unscientifically, 
and registering as trustworthy his unchecked and 
untimed observations. 

Whether we like it or not, history has got to be 
scientifically studied, and it is not a question of style 
but of accuracy, of fulness of observation, and cor- 
rectness of reasoning, that is before the student. 
Huxley and Darwin and Clifford have shown that 
a book may be good science and yet good reading. 
Truth has not always been found repulsive although 
she was not bedizened with rhetorical adornments; 
indeed, the very pursuit of her has long been recog- 
nised as arduous but extremely fascinating. Toute 

vi 



To the Reader 

trouvaille, as our authors aptly remark, procure une 
jouissance. 

It will be a positive gain to have the road cleared of 
a mass of rubbish, that has hindered the advance of 
knowledge. History must be worked at in a scientific 
spirit, as biology or chemistry is worked at. As M. 
Seignobos says, " On ne s'arrete plus guere aujourd'hui 
a discuter, sous sa forme theologique la th^orie de la 
Providence dans l'Histoire. Mais la tendence a expli- 
quer les faits historiques par les causes transcendantes 
persiste dans des theories plus modernes ou la meta- 
physique se deguise sous des formes scientifiques." 
We should certainly get rid in time of those curious 
Hegelianisms " under which in lay disguise lurks the 
old theologic theory of final causes " ; or the pseudo- 
patriotic supposition of the " historic mission (Beruf) 
attributed to certain people or persons." The study 
of historic facts does not even make for the popular 
newspaper theory of the continuous and necessary 
progress of humanity, it shows only "partial and 
intermittent advances, and gives us no reason to 
attribute them to a permanent cause inherent in 
collective humanity rather than to a series of local 
accidents." But the historian's path is still like that 
of Bunyan's hero, bordered by pitfalls and haunted 
by hobgoblins, though certain of his giant adversaries 
are crippled and one or two slain. He has also his 
own faults to master, or at least to check, as MM. 
Langlois and Seignobos not infrequently hint, e.g. 
" Nearly all beginners have a .vexatious tendency to 
go off into superfluous digressions, heaping up re- 
flexion and information that have no bearing on the 

vii 



To the Reader 

main subject. They will recognise, if they think over 
it, that the causes of this leaning are bad taste, a kind 
of naive vanity, sometimes a disordered mind." Again : 
" The faults of historic works intended for the general 
public . . . are the results of the insufficient prepara- 
tion of the bad literary training of the popularisers." 
What an admirable criticism there is too of that 
peculiarly German shortcoming (one not, however, 
unknown elsewhere), which results in men "whose 
learning is ample, whose monographs destined for 
scholars are highly praiseworthy, showing themselves 
capable, when they write for the public, of sinning 
heavily against scientific methods," so that, in their 
determination to stir their public, " they who are so 
scrupulous and particular when it is a question of 
dealing with minutiae, abandon themselves like the 
mass of mankind to their natural inclinations when 
they come to set forth general questions. They take 
sides, they blame, they praise, they colour, they em- 
bellish, they allow themselves to take account of 
personal, patriotic, ethical, or metaphysical considera- 
tions. Above all, they apply themselves with what 
talent has fallen to their lot to the task of creating 
a work of art, and, so applying themselves, those of 
them who lack talent become ridiculous, and the 
talent of those who possess it is spoilt by their 
anxiety for effect." 

On the other hand, while the student is rejoicing 
at the smart raps bestowed upon the Teutonic offender, 
he is warned against the error of thinking that " pro- 
vided he can make himself understood, the historian 
has the right to use a faulty, low, careless, or clogged 

viii 



To the Reader 

style. . . . Seeing the extreme complexity of the 
phenomena he must endeavour to describe, he has 
not the privilege of writing badly. But he ought 
always to write well, and not to bedizen his prose 
with extra finery once a week." 

Of course much that is said in this book has been 
said before, but I do not know any book wherein the 
student of history will find such an organised collec- 
tion of practical and helpful instructions. There are 
several points on which one is unable to find one- 
self in agreement with MM. Langlois and Seignobos, 
but these occur mainly where they are dealing with 
theory ; as far as practical work goes, one finds one- 
self in almost perfect concurrence with them. That 
they know little of the way in which history is taught 
and studied in England or Canada or the United 
States is not at all an hindrance to the use of their 
book. The student may enjoy the pleasure of making 
his own examples out of English books to the rules 
they lay down. He may compare their cautions against 
false reasoning and instances of fallacy with those set 
forth in that excellent and concise essay of Bentham's, 
which is apparently unknown to them. He will 
not fail to see that we in England have much to 
learn in this subject of history from the French. 
The French archives are not so fine as ours, but 
they take care to preserve their local and pro- 
vincial documents, as well as their national ,and 
central records ; they give their archivists a regular 
training, they calendar and make accessible all 
that time and fate have spared of pre-revolutionary 
documents. We have not got farther than the pro- 

ix 



To the Reader 

vision of a fine central Record Office furnished with 
very inadequate means for calendaring the masses of 
documents already stored and monthly accumulating 
there, though we have lately set up at Oxford, Cam- 
bridge, and London the regular courses of palaeo- 
graphy, diplomatic, and bibliography, that constitute 
the preliminary training of the archivist or historical 
researcher. We want more: we must have county 
archives, kept by trained archivists. We must have 
more trained archivists at the disposal of the Deputy 
Keeper of the Rolls, we must have such means as 
the Biblioteque de I'Jficole des Chartes for full reports 
of special and minute investigations and discoveries, 
for hand-lists and the like, before we can be con- 
sidered as doing as much for history as the heavily 
taxed French nation does cheerfully, and with a sound 
confidence that the money it spends wisely in science 
is in the truest sense money saved. 

For those interested in the teaching of history, 
this book is one of the most suggestive helps that 
has yet appeared; With a blackboard, a text (such 
as are now cheap), or a text-book (such as Stubbs 
or Prothero or Gardiner), an atlas, and access to a 
decent public library and an average local museum, 
the teacher who has mastered its intent should never 
be at a loss for an interesting catechetical lecture 
or exposition to a class, whether of adults or of 
younger folk. 

Not the least practical part of the work of MM. 
Langlois and Seignobos has been the consideration 
they have given to such every-day issues as the 
teacher is constantly called upon to face. History 



To the Reader 

cannot safely be neglected in schools, though it is by 
no means necessary that the Universities should turn 
out large bodies of trained historians. It is possible 
indeed that the serious study of history might gain 
were there fewer external inducements at the Univer- 
sities to lead to the popularity of the History Schools. 
But in this very popularity there lies a great op- 
portunity for concerted efforts, not only to better 
the processes of study, but also to clear off the 
vast arrears of classification and examination of the 
erroneous historic material at our disposition in this 
country. 

The historian has been (as our authors hint) too 
much the ally of the politician ; he has used his 
knowledge as material for preaching democracy in 
the United States, absolutism in Prussia, Orleanist 
opposition in France, and so on (English readers will 
easily recall examples from their own countrymen's 
work) : in the century to come he will have to ally 
himself with the students of physical science, with 
whose methods his own have so much in common. 
It is not patriotism, nor religion, nor art, but the 
attainment of truth that is and must be the historian's 
single aim. 

But it is also to be borne in mind that history is 
an excellent instrument of culture, for, as. our authors 
point out, " the practice and method of historic in- 
vestigation is a pursuit extremely healthful for the 
mind, freeing it from the disease of ^credulity," and 
fortifying it in other ways as a discipline, though 
precisely how to best use history for this purpose is 
still in some ways uncertain, and after all it is a 

xi 



To the Reader 

matter which concerns Psedagogic and Ethic more 
than the student of history, though it is plain that 
MM. Langlois and Seignobos have not neglected to 
consider it. 

One can hardly help thinking, too, that, in schools 
and places where the young are trained, something 
might be gained by treating such books as Plutarch's 
Lives not as history (for which they were never in- 
tended) but as text-books of ethic, as examples of 
conduct, public or private. The historian very pro- 
perly furnishes the ethical student with material, 
though it is not right to reckon the ethical student's 
judgment upon the historian's facts as history in any 
sense. It is not an historian's question, for instance, 
whether Napoleon was right or wrong in his conduct 
at Jaffa, or Nelson in his behaviour at Naples ; that 
is a matter for the student of ethic or the religious 
dogmatist to decide : all that the historian has to do 
is to get what conclusion he can out of the conflict of 
evidence, and to decide whether Napoleon or Nelson 
actually did that of which their enemies accused them, 
or, if he cannot arrive at fact, to state probability, 
and the reasons that incline him to lean to the 
affirmative or negative. 

As to the possibility of a " philosophy of history," 
a real one, not the mockeries that have long been 
discredited by scientific students, the reader will find 
some pregnant remarks here in the epilogue and the 
chapters that precede it. There is an absence of un- 
reasonable optimism in our authors' views. "It is 
probable that hereditary differences have contributed 
to determine events ; so that in part historic evolution 

xii 



To the Reader 

is produced by physiological and anthropologic causes. 
But history furnishes no trustworthy process by which 
it may be possible to determine the action of those 
hereditary differences between man and man," i.e. 
she starts with races 'endowed' each with peculi- 
arities that make them ' disposed to act ' somewhat 
differently under similar pressure. " History is only 
able to grasp the conditions of their existence." And 
what M. Seignobos calls the final problem — Is evolu- 
tion 'produced merely by changed conditions ? — must 
according to him remain insoluble by the legitimate 
processes of history. The student may accept or 
reject this view as his notions of evidence prompt 
him to do. M. Seignobos has at all events laid down 
a basis for discussion in sufficiently clear terms. 

As to the composition of the joint Work we are 
told that M. Seignobos has been especially con- 
cerned with the chapters that touch theory, and M. 
Langlois with those that deal with practice. Both 
authors have already proved their competence — M. 
Seignobos' labours on Modern History have been 
widely appreciated, while M. Langlois' "Hand-book 
of Historic Bibliography " is already a standard text- 
book, and bids fair to remain so. We are grateful to 
both of them for the pains they have taken to be 
clear and definite, and for their determination to 
shirk none of the difficulties that have met them. 
They have produced a hand-book that students will 
use and value in proportion to their use of it, a book 
that will save much muddle of thought and much 
loss of time, a book written in the right spirit to 
inspire its readers. We are not bound to agree with 

xiii 



To the Reader 

all M. Seignobos' dogmas, and can hardly accept, for 
instance, M. Langlois' apology for the brutal methods 
of controversy that are an evil legacy from the theo- 
logian and the grammarian, and are apt to darken 
truth and to cripple the powers of those who engage 
in them. For though it is possible that the secondary 
effect of these barbarous scuffles may sometimes have 
been salutary in deterring impostors from 'taking 
up ' history, I am not aware of any positive examples 
to justify this opinion. There is this, however, to be 
said, that fully conscious of their own fallibility, M. 
Langlois and his excellent collaborator have supplied 
in their canons of criticism and maxims the best 
corrections of any mistakes into which they may 
have fallen by the way. Is not the House of Fame, 
as the poet tells us, a more wonderful and quaintly 
wrought habitation than Domus Dedali itself ? And 
may not honest historians be pardoned if they are 
sometimes confused for a brief moment by the never- 
ending noise and marvellous motion of that deceptive 
mint and treasury, and fatigued by the continual 
trial and examination of the material that issues 
therefrom? The student will, at least, learn from 
MM. Langlois and Seignobos to have no mercy on his 
own shortcomings, to spare no pains, to grudge no 
expenditure of time or energy in the investigation of 
a carefully chosen and important historical problem, 
to aim at doing the bit of work in hand so thoroughly 
that it will not need to be done again. 

It would be unjust to omit here to mention Dr. 
Bernheim's "Exposition of Historic Method," or 
Lekrbuch der historischen Methode, so justly praised 

xiv 



To the Reader 

and used by our authors, but I believe that as an 
introduction to the subject, intended for the use of 
English or North American students, this little volume 
will be found the handier and more practical work. 
Of its value to English workers I can speak from 
experience, and I know many teachers to whom it 
will be welcome in its present form. 

It would have been easy to * adapt ' this book by 
altering its examples, by modifying its excellent plan, 
by cutting here and carving there to the supposed 
convenience of an imaginary public, but the better 
part has been chosen of giving English readers this 
manual precisely as it appeared in French. And 
surely one would rather read what M. Langlois, an 
experienced teacher and a tried scholar, thought on a 
moot point, than be presented with the views of some 
English ' adaptor ' who had read his book, as to what 
he would have said had he been an Englishman 
lecturing to English students. That the present 
translator has taken much pains to faithfully report 
his authors, I know (though I have not compared 
English and French throughout every page), so that 
I can commend his honest work to the reader as I 
have already commended the excellent matter that 
he has been concerned in preparing for a wider public 
than the French original could command. 

F. YORK POWELL. 
Oriel College, Oxford, July 1898. 



xv 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

To the Reader v 



AUTHORS 1 PREFACE 

What this work is not meant to be — Works on the Philosophy 

of History ....-.;.... I 

What it is meant to be 2 

Existing works on Historical Methods — JDroysen, Freeman, 

Daunou, &c. . -. . , . . . . . 3 

Reasons why the study of method is useful .... 7 
Bernheim's Lehrbuch-^-ln what way it leaves room for another 

book 10 

Need of warning to students • . .11 

The general public . . . . .. . . - . .13 

Distribution of the work between the two authors . . .13 



BOOK I 

PRELIMINARY STUDIES 
CHAPTER I 

THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS 

Documents : their nature, use, necessity 17 

Utility of Heuristic, or the art of discovering documents . 18 
The difficulties of Heuristic — Ancient times— H. H. Bancroft 

— State of things at the Renaissance 19 

xvii b 



Contents 

PAOE 

Growth of libraries — Collectors — Effects of revolutionary 
confiscation in promoting the concentration and the 
accessibility of documents 20 

Possible future progress — Need for the cataloguing and index- 
ing of documents . . . . . . .27 

Students and bibliographical knowledge — Effect of present 

conditions in deterring men from historical work . . 32 

The remedies — Official cataloguing of libraries — Activity of 

learned societies — of governments . . . 34 

Different kinds of bibliographical works needed by students . 37 

Different degrees of difficulty of Heuristic in different parts of 
History— to be kept in view when choosing a subject of 
research 38 



CHAPTER II 

AUXILIARY SCIENCES 



Documents are raw material, and need a preliminary elabora- 
tion . . . . 42 

Obsolete views on the historian's apprenticeship — Mably, 

Daunou 43 

Commonplace and exaggeration on this subject — Freeman — 

Various futilities 45 

The scientific conception of the historian's apprenticeship — 

Palaeography — Epigraphy — Philology — Diplomatic . . 48 

History of Literature — Archaeology . . . . ; 5 1 

Criticism of phrase " auxiliary sciences " — The subjects not all 

sciences— None of them auxiliary to the whole of History . 52 

This scientific conception is of recent growth — The Ecole des 
Chartes — Modern manuals of Palaeography, Epigraphy, 
&c. — List of the chief of them 55 



XVlll 



Contents 
BOOK II 

ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS 
CHAPTER I 

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 

TA.OK 

Direct and indirect knowledge of facts 63 

History not a science of direct observation— Its data obtained 

by chains of reasoning 64 

Twofold division of Historical Criticism: External, investigat- 
ing the transmission and origin of documents and the 
statements in them ; Internal, dealing with the content 
of the statements and their probability .... 66 

Complexity of Historical Criticism 67 

Necessity of Criticism — The human mind naturally uncritical 6S 



SECTION I.— EXTERNAL CRITICISM 
CHAPTER II 

TEXTUAL CRITICISM 

Errors in the reproduction of documents : their frequency 
under the most favourable conditions — Mistakes of 
copyists— " Sound" and "corrupt " texts . . . 71 

Necessity of emendation — The method subject to fixed rules 73 

Methods of textual criticism : (a) original preserved ; (&)- a 
single copy preserved, conjectural emendation ; (c) several 
copies preserved, comparison of errors, families of manu- 
scripts m 75 

Different degrees of difficulty of textual criticism : its results 
negative — The " emendation game " — What still remains 
to be done 83 

xix 



Contents 
CHAPTER III 

CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP 

PAG* 

Natural tendency to accept indications of authorship — 
Examples of false attributions — Necessity of verification 
— Application of internal criticism . . . ' . .87 

Interpolations and continuations — Evidence of style . . 92 

Plagiarism and borrowings by authors from each other— The 

filiation of statements — The investigation of sources . 93 

Importance of investigations of authorship — The extreme of 

distrust to be avoided — Criticism only a means to an end 98 

CHAPTER IV 

CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES 

Importance of classification — The first impulse wrong — The 
note-book system not the best — Nor the ledger-system — 
Nor the (< system" of trusting the memory . . .101 

The system of slips the best — Its drawbacks — Means of 
obviating them — The advantage of good "private librarian- 
ship" 103 

Methods of work vary according to the object aimed at — The 
compiling of Regesta or of a Corpus — Classification by 
time, place, species, and form 105 

Chronological arrangement to be used when possible — Geogra- 
phical arrangement best for inscriptions — When these 
fail, alphabetical order of " incipit " — Logical order useful 
for some special purposes — Not for a Corpus or for Regesta 107 



CHAPTER V 

CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS 

Different opinions on the importance and dignity of external 
criticism — It is justified by its necessity — But is only 
preliminary to the higher part of historical work . . 1 1 
XX 



Contents 

PAGE 

Distinction between " historians " and " critical scholars " [Fr. 
" trudits"]— Expediency, within limits, of the division of 
labour in this respect — The exceptional skill acquired by 
specialists — Difference of work the corollary of difference 
of natural aptitudes 115 

The natural aptitudes required for external criticism — Fond- 
ness for the work, which is distasteful to the creative 
genius — The puzzle-solving instinct — Accuracy and its 
opposite — " Froude's Disease " — Patience, order, persever- 
ance 121 

The mental defects produced by devotion to external criticism 
— Its paralysing effect on the over-scrupulous — Hyper- 
criticism — Dilettantism 128 

The " organisation of scientific labour " 135 

The harshness of judgment attributed to scholars, not always 
rightly — Much of it a proper jealousy for historic truth — 
Bad work nowadays soon detected 136 



SECTION II.— INTERNAL CRITICISM 
CHAPTER VI 

INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM; (HERMENEUTIc) 

Internal criticism deals with the mental operations which 
begin with the observation of a fact and end with the 
writing of words in a document — It is divided into two 
stages : the first concerned with what the author meant, 
the second with the value of his statements . . .141 

Necessity of separating the two operations— Danger of reading 

opinions into a text 143 

The analysis of documents — The method of slips — Complete- 
ness necessary 145 

Necessity of linguistic study — General knowledge of a language 
not enough — Particular variety of a language as used at a 
given time, in' a given country, by a given author — The 
rule of context 146 

Different degrees of difficulty in interpretation . . . 149 

xxi 



Contents 

PAOK 

Oblique senses : allegory, metaphor, &c. — How to detect them 
— Former tendency to find symbolism everywhere — 
Modern tendency to find allusion everywhere . . 15 1 

Results of interpretation — Subjective inquiries . . . 153 



CHAPTER VII 

THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OP THE GOOD FAITH 
AND ACCURACY OF AUTHORS 

Natural tendency to trust documents— Criticism originally due 
to contradictions — The rule of methodical doubt— Defec- 
tive modes of criticism 155 

Documents to be analysed, and the irreducible elements 

criticised separately 159 

The "accent of sincerity" — No trust to be placed in impres- 
sions produced by the form of statements . . .161 

Criticism examines the conditions affecting ( 1 ) the composition 
of the document as a whole ; (2) the making of each par- 
ticular statement — In both cases using a previously made 
list of possible reasons for distrust or confidence . .162 

Reasons for doubting good faith: (1) the author's interest; 
(2) the force of circumstances, official reports; (3) sym- 
pathy and antipathy ; (4) vanity; (5) deference to public 
opinion ; (6) literary distortion 166 

Reasons for doubting accuracy : (1 ) the author a bad observer, 
hallucinations, illusions, prejudices ; (2) the author not 
well situated for observing ; (3) negligence and indiffer- 
ence ; (4) fact not of nature to be directly observed . .172 

Cases where the author is not the original observer of the 
fact — Tradition, written and oral — Legend — Anecdotes — 
Anonymous statements 177 

Special reasons without which anonymous statements are not 
to be accepted: (1) falsehood improbable because (a) the 
fact is opposed to interest or vanity of author, (J) the fact 
was generally known, (c) the fact was indifferent to the 
author;; (2) error improbable because the fact was too big 
to mistake ; (3) the fact seemed improbable or unintel- 
ligible to the author . . . . . . . .185 

How critical operations are shortened in practice . . .189 

xxii 



Contents 
CHAPTER VIII 

THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR PACTS 

PAGE 

The conceptions of authors, whether well or ill founded, are 
the subject-matter of certain studies — They necessarily 
contain elements of truth, which, under certain restric- 
tions, may sometimes be inferred from them . . . 191 

The statements of authors, taken singly, do not rise above 
probability — The only sure results of criticism are negative 
— To establish facts it is necessary to compare different 
statements 194 

Contradictions between statements, real and apparent . . 198 

Agreement of statements — Necessity of proving them to be 
independent — Perfect agreement not so conclusive as 
occasional coincidence — Cases where different observa- 
tions of the same fact are not independent — General facts 
the easiest to prove . 199 

Different facts, each imperfectly proved, corroborate each 

other when they harmonise 204 

Disagreement between documents and other sources of know- 
ledge—Improbable statements — Miracles — When science 
and history conflict, history should give way . . . 205 



BOOK III 

SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS 
CHAPTER I 

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION 

The materials of Historical Construction are isolated facts, 
of very different kinds, of very different degrees of 
generality, each belonging to a? definite time and place, 
of different degrees of certainty 211 

Subjectivity of History . . . . . . . 214 

xxiii 



Contents 



The facts learnt from documents relate to (i) living beings 
and material objects ; (2) actions, individual and collec- 
tive ; (3) motives and conceptions 217 

The facts of the past must be imagined on the model of those 
of the present — Danger of error especially in regard to 
mental facts 219 

Some of the conditions of human life are permanent — The 
study of these provides a framework into which details 
taken from documents are to be fitted — For this purpose 
systematic lists of questions are to be used, drawn up 
beforehand, and relating to the universal conditions of life 224 

Outline of Historical Construction — The division of labour — 
Historians must use the works of their colleagues and 
predecessors, but not without critical precautions . . 228 



CHAPTER II 

THE GROUPING OF FACTS 

Historical facts may be classified and arranged either accord- 
ing to their time and place, or according to their nature — 
Scheme for the logical classification of general historical 
facts 232 

The selection of facts for treatment — The history of civilisation 

and " battle-history " — Both needed 236 

The determination of groups of men — Precautions to be 

observed — The notion of " race " 238 

The study of institutions — Danger of being misled by meta- 
phors—The questions which should be asked . . .241 

Evolutions : operations involved in the study of them — The 
place of particular facts (events) in evolution — Important 
and unimportant facts 244 

Periods — How they should be defined . . . . . 249 



CHAPTER III 

CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING 

Incompleteness of the facts yielded by documents — Cautions 

to be observed in filling up the gaps by reasoning . . 252 
xxiv 



Contents 

PAGE 

The argument from silence — When admissible . . . 254 
Positive reasoning based on documents — The general principles 
employed must enter into details, and the particular 
facts to which they are applied must not be taken in 
isolation 256 



CHAPTER IV 

THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULAE 

History, like every science, needs formulae by which the facts 

acquired may be condensed into manageable form . . 262 

Descriptive formulae — Should retain characteristic features — 

Should be as concrete as possible 264 

Formulae describing general facts— How constructed — Con- 
ventional forms and realities — Mode of formulating an 
evolution 266 

Formulae describing unique facts — Principle of choice — 
"Character" of persons — Precautions in formulating 
them — Formulae describing events 270 

Quantitative formulae — Operations by which they may be 
obtained : measurement, enumeration, valuation, sampling, 
generalisation — Precautions to be observed in generalising 274 

Formulae expressing relations — General conclusions — Estima- 
tion of the extent and value of the knowledge acquired — 
Imperfection of data not to be forgotten in construction 279 

Groups and their classification 282 

The "solidarity" of social phenomena — Necessity of studying 
causes — Metaphysical hypothesis — Providence — Concep- 
tion of events as "rational" — The Hegelian "ideas"— 
The historical " mission "— The theory of the general 
progress of humanity 285 

The conception of society as an organism — The comparative 
method — Statistics — Causes cannot be investigated 
directly, as in other sciences — Causation as exhibited in 
the sequence of particular events 288 

The study of the causes of social evolution must look beyond 
abstractions to the concrete, acting and thinking men — 
The place of hereditary characteristics in determining 

evolution 292 

XXV 



Contents 
CHAPTER V 

EXPOSITION 

PAOB 

Former conceptions of history-writing — The ancient and 
mediaeval ideal — The "history of civilisation" — The 
modern historical " manual " — The romantic ideal at the 
beginning of the century — History regarded as a branch 
of literature up to 1850 296 

The modern scientific ideal — Monographs — Right choice of 
subject — References — Chronological order — Unambiguous 
titles — Economy of erudition ...... 303 

General works — A. meant for students and specialists-VWorks 
of reference or "repertories" and scientific manuals of 
special branches of history — Their form and style — 
Collaboration in their production — Scientific general 
histories 307 

B. Works intended for the public — The best kind of populari- 
sation — The inferior kind — Specialists who lower their 
standard when they write for the public— The literary 
style suitable for history 311 



CONCLUSION 

Summary description of the methods of history— The future 

of history 316 

The utility of history — Not directly applicable to present con- 
ditions — Affords an explanation of the present — Helps 
(and is helped by) the social sciences — A means of intel- 
lectual culture 319 



APPENDIX I 

THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE 

Late introduction of history as a subject of secondary instruc- 
tion — Defective methods employed up to the end of the 

Second Empire 325 

xxvi 



Contents 



The reform movement — Questions involved relating to general 
organisation — Choice of subjects — Order of teaching- 
Methods of instruction — These questions to be answered 
in the way that will make history most useful as a means 
of social culture 328 

Material aids — Engravings — Books — Methods of teaching . 332 



APPENDIX II 

THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN PRANCE 

The different institutions — The College de France — The 
Faculties of Letters — The Ecole Normale— The Ecole des 
Chartes — The Ecole pratique des hautes Etudes . . 335 

Reform of the Faculties — Preparation for degrees — The 
Examination question — Principles on which it is to be 
solved — The Dipldme d'itudes supirieures .... 340 

Influence of the movement on the other institutions — Co- 
operation of the institutions 345 

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES . . . . , .347 



XXV11 



AUTHORS' PREFACE 



The title of this work is clear. However, it is 
necessary to state succinctly both what our inten- 
tion has, and what it has not been ; for under this 
same title, " Introduction to the Study of History," 
very different books have already been published. 

It has not been our intention to give, as Mr. 
W. B. Boyce 1 has done, a summary of universal 
history for the use of beginners and readers of 
scanty leisure. 

Nor has it been our intention to add a new item 
to the abundant literature of what is ordinarily called 
the " Philosophy of History." Thinkers, for the most 
part not professed historians, have made history the 
subject of their meditations ; they have sought for 
its " analogies " and its " laws." Some have supposed 
themselves to have discovered " the laws which have 
governed the development of humanity," and thus 
to have "raised history to the rank of a positive 
science." 2 These vast abstract constructions inspire 
with an invincible a priori mistrust, not the general 
public only, but superior minds as well. Fustel de 
Coulanges, as his latest biographer tells us, was severe 

1 W. B, Boyce, "Introduction to the Study of History, Civil, 
Ecclesiastical, and Literary," London, 1894, 8vo. 

2 For example, P. J. B. Bachez, in his Introduction a la science de 
Vhistoire, Paris, 1842, 2 vols, 8vo. 

A 



Authors' Preface 

on the Philosophy of History ; these systems were as 
repugnant to him as metaphysics to the positivists. 
Rightly or wrongly (without doubt wrongly), the 
Philosophy of History, not having been cultivated ex- 
clusively by well-informed, cautious men of vigorous 
and sound judgment, has fallen into disrepute. The 
reader will be reassured — or disappointed, as the 
case may be — to learn that this subject will find no 
place in the present work. 1 

We propose to examine the conditions and the 
methods, to indicate the character and the limits, 
of historical knowledge. How do we ascertain, in 
respect of the past, what part of it it is possible, 
what part of it it is important, to know ? What is a 
document ? How are documents to be treated with a 
view to historical work ? What are historical facts ? 
How are they to be grouped to make history ? Who- 
ever occupies himself with history performs, more or 
less unconsciously, complicated operations of criti- 
cism and construction, of analysis and synthesis. But 
beginners, and the majority of those who have never 
reflected on the principles of historical methodology, 

1 The history of the attempts which have been made to under- 
stand and explain philosophically the history of humanity has been 
undertaken, as is well known, by Robert Flint. Mr. Flint has 
already given the history of the Philosophy of History in French- 
speaking countries : "Historical Philosophy in France and French 
Belgium and Switzerland," Edinburgh and London, 1893, 8vo. It is 
the first volume of the expanded re-edition of his " History of the 
Philosophy of History in Europe," published twenty-five years ago. 
Compare the retrospective (or historical) part of the work of N. 
Marselli, La scienza della storia, i., Torino, 1873. 

The most important original work which has appeared in France 
since the publication of the analytical reportory of R. Flint is that 
of P. Lacombe, De Vkistoire conside're'e comme science, Paris, 1894, 
8vo. Cf. Revue Critique, 1895, *• P- I 3 2 « 

2 



Authors' Preface 

make use, in the performance of these operations, 
of instinctive methods which, not being, in general, 
rational methods, do not usually lead to scientific 
truth. It is, therefore, useful to make known and 
logically justify the theory of the truly rational 
methods — a theory which is now settled in some 
parts, though still incomplete in some points of 
capital importance. 

The present "Introduction to the Study of History" 
is thus intended, not as a summary of ascertained facts 
or a system of general ideas on universal history, but 
as an essay on the method of the historical sciences. 

We proceed to state the reasons why we have 
thought such a work opportune, and to explain the 
spirit in which we have undertaken to write it. 



The books which treat of the methodology of the 
historical sciences are scarcely less numerous, and 
at the same time not in much better favour, than 
the books on the Philosophy of History. Specialists 
despise them. A widespread opinion is expressed 
in the words attributed to a certain scholar : " You 
wish to write a book on philology; you will do 
much better to produce a book with some good 
philology in it. When I am asked to define philo- 
logy, I always answer that it is what I work at." 1 
Again, in reference to J. G. Droysen's Precis of 
the Science of History, a certain critic expressed an 
opinion which was meant to be, and was, a common- 
place : " Generally speaking, treatises of this kind 

1 Bevue Critique d'histoire et de UtUwturc, 1892, i. p. 164. 

3 



Authors' Preface 

are of necessity both obscure and useless : obscure, 
because there is nothing more vague than their 
object; useless, because it is possible to be an 
historian without troubling oneself about the prin- 
ciples of historical methodology which they claim 
to exhibit." * The arguments used by these de- 
spisers of methodology are strong enough in all 
appearance. They reduce to the following. As 
a matter of fact, there are men who manifestly 
follow good methods, and are universally recognised 
as scholars or historians of the first order, without 
having ever studied the principles of method ; con- 
versely, it does not appear that those who have 
written on historical method from the logical point 
of view have in consequence attained any marked 
superiority as scholars or historians : some, indeed, 
have been known for their incompetence or medio- 
crity in these capacities. In this there is nothing 
that need surprise us. Who would think of post- 
poning original research in chemistry, mathematics, 
the sciences proper, until he had studied the methods 
employed in those sciences ? Historical criticism ! 
Yes, but the best way to learn it is to apply it; 
practice teaches all that is wanted. 2 Take, too, the 

1 Revue Critique d'histoire et de UtUrature, 1888, ii. p. 295. Cf. Le 
Moyen Age, x. (1897), p. 91 : "These books [treatises on historical 
method] are seldom read by those to whom they might be useful, 
amateurs who devote their leisure to historical research ; and as 
to professed scholars, it is from their masters' lessons that they 
have learnt to know and handle the tools of their trade, leaving 
out of consideration the fact that the method of history is the 
same as that of the other sciences of observation, the gist of which 
can be stated in a few words. 

2 In accordance with the principle that historical method can 
only be taught by example, L. Mariani has given the humorous 

4 



Authors' Preface 

extant works on historical method, even the most 
recent of them, those of J. G. Droysen, E. A. 
Freeman, A. Tardif, U. Chevalier, and others; the 
utmost diligence will extract from them nothing in 
the way of clear ideas beyond the most obvious and 
commonplace truisms. 1 

We willingly recognise that this manner of think- 
ing is not entirely wrong. The great majority of 
works on the method of pursuing historical inves- 
tigations and of writing history — what is called 
Historic in Germany and England — are superficial, 
insipid, unreadable, sometimes ridiculous. 2 To begin 

title Corso pratico di metodologia delta storia to a dissertation on a 
detail in the history of Fermo. See the A rchivio delta Societa 
romana di storia patria, xiii. {1890), p. 211. 

1 See an account of Freeman's work, u The Methods of Historical 
Study," in the Revue Critique, 1887, i. p. 376. This work, says the 
critic, is empty and commonplace. We learn from it "that history 
is not so easy a study as many fondly imagine, that it has points of 
contact with all the sciences, and that the historian truly worthy 
of the name ought to know everything; that historical certitude is 
unattainable, and that, in order to make the nearest approach to 
it, it is necessary to have constant recourse to the original sources ; 
that it is necessary to know and use the best modern historians, 
but never to take their word for gospel. That is all." -He con- 
cludes : Freeman " without a doubt taught historical method far 
better by example than he ever succeeded in doing by precept." 

Compare Bouvard et Pecuchct, by G. Flaubert. Here we have two 
simpletons who, among other projects, propose to write history. 
In order to help them, one of their friends sends them (p. 156) 
"rules of criticism taken from the Cours of Daunou," such as : "It 
is no proof to appeal to rumour and common opinion ; the witnesses 
cannot appear. Reject impossibilities : Pausanias was shown the 
stone swallowed by Saturn. Keep in mind the skill of forgers, the 
interest of apologists and calumniators." Daunou's work contains 
a number of truisms quite as obvious, and still more comic than 
the above. 

2 Flint (ibid. p. 15) congratulates himself on not having to study 
the literature of Historic, for "a very large portion of it is so trivial 
and superficial that it can hardly ever have been of use even to persons 

5 



Authors' Preface 

with, those prior to the nineteenth century, a full 
analysis of which is given by P. C. F. Daunou in 
the seventh volume of his Cours d'ttudes histo- 
riqucs, 1 are nearly all of them mere treatises on 
rhetoric, in which the rhetoric is antiquated, and 
the problems discussed are the oddest imaginable. 2 
Daunou makes merry over them, but he himself 
has shown good sense and nothing more in his 
monumental work, which at the present time seems 
little better, and certainly not more useful, than the 
earlier treatises. 3 As to the modern ones, it is true 

of the humblest capacity, and may certainly now be safely confined 
to kindly oblivion." Nevertheless, Flint has given in his book a 
summary list of the principal works of this kind published in 
French-speaking countries from the earliest times. A more general 
and complete account (though still a summary one) of the literature 
of this subject in all countries is furnished by the Lehrbuch der 
historischen Methode of E. Bernheim (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo), pp. 143 
sqq. Flint (who was acquainted with several works unknown to 
Bernheim) stops at 1893, Bernheim at 1894. Since 1889 the 
Jahresberichte der Gesckichtswissenschaft have contained a periodical 
account of recent works on historical methodology. 

1 This seventh volume was published in 1844. But Daunou's 
celebrated Cours was delivered at the College de France in the 
years 1819-30. 

2 The Italians of the Renaissance (Mylseus, Francesco Patrizzi, 
and others), and after them the writers of the last two centuries, 
ask what is the relation of history to dialectic and rhetoric ; to 
how many laws the historical branch of literature is subject ; 
whether it is right for the historian to relate treasons, acts of 
cowardice, crimes, disorders ; whether history is entitled to use 
any style other than the sublime ; and so on. The only books on 
Historic, published before the nineteenth century, which give evi- 
dence of any original effort to attack the real difficulties, are those 
of Lenglet de Fresnoy (Me'thode pour etudier Vhistoire, Paris, 1713), 
and of J. M. Chladenius (AUgemeinc Geschichtsioissenschaft, Leipzig, 
1752). The work of Chladenius has been noticed by Bernheim 
(ibid. p. 166). 

3 He has not always shown even good sense, for, in the Cours 
d'ttudes historiques (vii. p. 105), where he treats of a work, De 

6 



Authors' Preface 

that not all have been able to escape the two dangers 
to which works of this character are exposed — that 
of being obscure on the one hand, or commonplace 
on the other. J. G. Droysen's Grundriss der Historik 
is heavy, pedantic, and confused beyond all imagina- 
tion. 1 Freeman, Tardif, and Chevalier tell us nothing 
but what is elementary and obvious. Their followers 
may still be observed discussing at interminable 
length idle questions, such as : whether history is 
a science or an art ; what are the duties of history ; 
what is the use of history; and so on. On the 
other hand, there is incontestable truth in the re- 
mark that nearly all the specialists and historians 
of to-day are, as far as method goes, self-taught, 
with no training except what they have gained by 
practice, or by imitating and associating with the 
older masters of the craft. 

But though many works on the principles of method 
justify the distrust with which such works are gene- 
rally regarded, and though most professed historians 
have been able, apparently with no ill results, to 
dispense with reflection upon historical method, it 
would, in our opinion, be a strained inference to 
conclude that specialists and historians (especially 

Vhistoire, published in 1670 by Pere Le Moyne, a feeble production, 
to say the least, bearing evident traces of senility, he expresses 
himself as follows : " I cannot adopt all the maxims and precepts 
contained in this treatise ; but I believe that, after that of Lucian, 
it is the best we have yet seen, and I greatly doubt whether any of 
those whose acquaintance we have still to make has risen to the 
same height of philosophy and originality." Pere H. Che'rot has 
given a sounder estimate of the treatise Be Vhistoire in his Etude 
sur la vie et les ceuvres du P. Le Moyne (Paris, 1887, 8vo), pp. 406 sqq. 
1 Bernheim declares, however (ibid. p. 177), that this little work 
is, in his opinion, the only one which stands at the present level of 
science. 



Authors' Preface 

those of the future) have no need to make themselves 
acquainted with the processes of historical work. 
The literature of methodology is, in fact, not without 
its value : gradually there has been formed a treasury 
of subtle observations and precise rules, suggested 
by experience, which are something more than mere 
common sense. 1 And, admitting the existence of 
those who, without having ever learnt to reason, 
always reason well, by a gift of nature, it would be 
easy to set against these exceptions innumerable 
cases in which ignorance of logic, the Use of irra- 
tional methods, want of reflection on the conditions 
of historical analysis and synthesis, have robbed the 
work of specialists and historians of much of its 
value. 

The truth is, that, of all branches of study, his- 
tory is without a doubt the one in which it is most 
necessary for students to have a clear consciousness 
of the methods they use. The reason is, that. in 
history instinctive methods are, as we cannot too 
often repeat, irrational methods ; some preparation 
is therefore required to counteract the first impulse. 
Besides, the rational methods of obtaining historical 
knowledge differ so widely from the methods of all 
other sciences, that some perception of their distinc- 
tive features is necessary to avoid the temptation of 
applying to history the methods of those sciences 
which have already been systematised. This explains 
why mathematicians and chemists can, more easily 
than historians, dispense with an " introduction " to 

1 Flint says very well (ibid. p. 15) : "The course of Historic has 
been, on the whole, one of advance from commonplace reflection 
on history towards a philosophical comprehension of the conditions 
and processes on which the formation of historical science depends. 

8 



Authors' Preface 

their subject. There is no need to insist at greater 
length on the utility of historical methodology, for 
there is evidently nothing very serious in the attacks 
which have been made on it. But it behoves us to 
explain the reasons which have led to the composi- 
tion of the present work. For the last fifty years a 
great number of intelligent and open-minded men 
have meditated on the methods of the historical 
sciences. Naturally we find among them many his- 
torians, university professors, whose position enables 
them to understand better than others the intellec- 
tual needs of the young ; but at the same time 
professed logicians, and even novelists. In this 
connection, Fustel de Coulanges left a tradition 
behind him at the University of Paris. " He en- 
deavoured," we are told, 1 " to reduce the rules of 
method to very precise formulae . . . ; in his view 
no task was more urgent than that of teaching 
students how to attain truth." Among these men, 
some, like Renan, 2 have been content to insert 
scattered observations in their general works or 
their occasional writings ; 3 others, as Fustel de 

1 By P. Guiraud, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1896, 

P. 75- 

2 Renan has said some of the truest and best things that have 
ever been said on the historical sciences in L'Avenir de la science 
(Paris, 1890, 8vo), written in 1848. 

3 Some of the most ingenious, some of the most logical, and 
some of the most widely applicable observations, on the method 
of the historical sciences, have so far appeared, not in books on 
methodology, but in the reviews — of which the Revue Critique 
d'histoire et de UtUrature is the type — devoted to the criticism of 
new works of history and erudition. It is a very useful exercise to 
run through the file of the Revue Critique, founded, at Paris, in 
1867, "to enforce respect for method, to execute justice upon bad 
books, to check misdirected and superfluous work. " 

9 



Authors' Preface 

Coulanges, Freeman, Droysen, Laurence, Stubbs, De 
Smedt, Von Pflugk-Harttung, and so on, have taken 
the trouble to express their thoughts on the subject 
in special treatises. There are many books, "in- 
augural lectures," " academic orations," and review- 
articles, published in all countries, but especially in 
France, Germany, England, the United States, and 
Italy, both on the whole subject of methodology and 
on the different parts of it. It will occur to the 
reader that it would be a far from useless labour 
to collect and arrange the observations which are 
scattered, and, one might say, lost, in these numerous 
books and minor writings. But it is^ too late to 
undertake this pleasant task; it has been recently 
performed, and in the most painstaking manner. 
Professor Ernst Bernheim, of the University of 
Greifswald, has worked through nearly all the 
modern works on historical method, and the fruit 
of his labours is an arrangement under appropriate 
headings, most of them invented by himself, of a 
great number of reflections and selected references. 
His Lehrbuch der historischen Methode l (Leipzig, 1 894, 
8vo) condenses, in the manner of German Lehrbucher, 
the special literature of the subject of which it 
treats. It is not our intention to do over again 
what has already been done so well. But we are 
of opinion that even after this laborious and well- 
planned compilation something still remains to be 
said. In the first place, Professor Bernheim deals 
largely with metaphysical problems which we con- 
sider devoid of interest ; while, conversely, he entirely 
ignores certain considerations which appear to us to 

1 The first edition of the Lehrbuch is dated 1889. 
10 



Authors' Preface 

be, both theoretically and practically, of the greatest 
importance. In the second place, the teaching of 
the Lehrbuch is sound enough, but lacks vigour and 
originality. Lastly, the Lehrbuch is not addressed to 
the general public ; both the language in which it is 
written and the form in which it is composed render 
it inaccessible to the great majority of French 
readers. This is enough to justify our undertak- 
ing to write a book of our own, instead of simply 
recommending the book of Professor Bernheim. 1 



II 

This "Introduction to the Study of History" does 
not claim, like the Lehrhtch der historischen Methode, 
to be a treatise on historical methodology. 2 It is a 
sketch in outline. We undertook its composition, 
at the beginning of the scholastic year 1896-97, in 
order that the new students at the Sorbonne might 
be warned what the study of history is and ought 
to be. 

Long experience has taught us the necessity of 
such warnings. The greater part of those who enter 
upon a career of historical study do so, as a matter 
of fact, without knowing why, without having ever 
asked themselves whether they are fitted for his- 
torical work, of the true nature of which they are 

1 The best work that has hitherto been published (in French) on 
historical method is a pamphlet by MM. Ch. and V. Mortet, La 
Science de Vhistoire (Paris, 1894, 8vo), 88 pp., extracted from vol. xx. 
of the Grande Encyclopedic 

2 One of us, M. Seignobos, proposes to publish later on a com- 
plete treatise of Historical Methodology, if there appears to be a 
public for this class of work. 

II 



Authors' Preface 

often ignorant. Generally their motives for choosing 
an historical career are of the most futile character. 
One has been successful in history at college ; l 
another feels himself drawn towards the past by the 
same kind of romantic attraction which, we are told, 
determined the vocation of Augustin Thierry ; some 
are misled by the fancy that history is a compara- 
tively easy subject, It is certainly important that 
these irrational votaries should be enlightened and 
put to the test as soon as possible. 

Having given a course of lectures, to novices, by 
way of " Introduction to the Study of History," we 
thought that, with a little revision, these lectures 
might be made useful to others besides novices. 
Scholars and professed historians will doubtless 
have nothing to learn from this work ; but if they 
should find in it a stimulus to personal reflection, 
on the craft which some of them practise in a 
mechanical fashion, that would be something gained. 

1 It cannot be too often stated that the study of history, as it is 
prosecuted at school, does not presuppose the same aptitudes as 
the same study when prosecuted at the university or in after life. 
Julien Havet, who afterwards devoted himself to the (critical) 
study of history, found history wearisome at school. " I believe," 
says M. L. Havet, " that the teaching of history [in schools] is not 
organised in such a manner as to provide sufficient nourishment 
for the scientific spirit. ... Of all the studies comprised in our 
school curricula, history is the only one in which the pupil is not 
being continually called upon to verify something. When he is 
learning Latin or German, every sentence in a translation requires 
him to verify a dozen different rules. In the various branches of 
mathematics the results are never divorced from their proofs ; the 
problems, too, compel the pupil to think through the whole for 
himself. Where are the problems in history, and what schoolboy is 
ever trained to gain by independent effort an insight into the inter- 
connection of events?" {BibliotMque de VEcole des chartes, 1896, 
p. 84). 

12 



Authors' Preface 

As for the public, which reads the works of histo- 
rians, is it not desirable that it should know how 
these works are produced, in order to be able to 
judge them better ? 

We do not, therefore, like Professor Bernheim, 
write exclusively for present and future specialists, 
but also for the public interested in history. We 
thus lay ourselves under an obligation to be as 
concise, as clear, and as little technical as ' possible. 
But to be concise and clear on subjects of this kind 
often means to appear superficial. Commonplace 
on the one hand, obscurity on the other : these, as 
we have already seen, are the evils between' which 
we have the sorry privilege of choosing. We admit 
the difficulty. But we do not think it insurmount- 
able, and our endeavour has been to say what we 
had to say in the clearest possible manner. 

The first half of the book has been written by 
M. Langlois, the second by M. Seignobos; but the 
two collaborators have constantly aided, consulted, 
and checked each other. 1 

Paris, August 1897. 



1 M. Langlois wrote Book I., Book II. as far as Chapter VI., the 
second Appendix, and this Preface ; M. Seignobos the end of 
Book II., Book III., and the first Appendix. Chapter I. in the 
second book, Chapter V. of the third book, and the Conclusion, 
were written in common. 



13 



BOOK I 

PRELIMINARY STUDIES 



!5 



INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF HISTORY 

BOOK I 

PRELIMINARY STUDIES 

CHAPTER I 

THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS (HEURISTIC) 

The historian works with documents. Documents 
are the traces which have been left by the thoughts 
and actions of men of former times. Of these 
thoughts and actions, however, very few leave any 
visible traces, and these traces, when there are any, 
are seldom durable ; an accident is enough to efface 
them. Now every thought and every action that 
has left no visible traces, or none but what have 
since disappeared, is lost for history ; is as though it 
had never been. For want of documents the history 
of immense periods in the past of humanity is des- 
tined to remain for ever unknown. For there is no 
substitute for documents : no documents, no history. 
In order to draw legitimate inferences from a 
document to the fact of which it is the trace, numerous 
precautions are requisite which will be indicated in 

17 B 



Preliminary Studies 

the sequel. But it is clear that, prior to any critical 
examination or interpretation of -documents, the 
question presents itself whether there are any docu- 
ments at all, how many there are, and where they are. 
If I undertake to deal with a point of history, 1 of what- 
ever nature, my first step will be to ascertain the place 
or places where the documents necessary for its treat- 
ment, if any such exist, are to be found. The search 
for and the collection of documents is thus a part, 
logically the first and most important part, of the his- 
torian's craft. In Germany it has received the conve- 
nient, because short, name of JTeuristik. Is there any 
need to prove the capital importance of Heuristic ? 
Assuredly not. It is obvious that if it is neglected, 
if the student does not, before he sets to work on a 
point of history, place himself in a position to com- 
mand all accessible sources of information, his risk 
(no small one at the best) of working upon insuffi- 
cient data is quite unnecessarily increased : works of 
erudition or history constructed in accordance with 
the rules of the most exact method have been vitiated, 
or even rendered worthless, by the accidental circum- 
stance that the author was unacquainted with the 
documents by which those which he had within 
reach, and with which he was content, might have 
been illustrated, supplemented, or discredited. The 
scholars and historians of to-day, standing, as they 

1 In practice one does not as a rule resolve to treat a point of 
history before knowing whether there are or are not documents in 
existence which enable it to be studied. On the contrary, it is the 
accidental discovery of a document which suggests the idea of 
thoroughly elucidating the point of history to which it relates, and 
thus leads to the collection, for this purpose, of other documents of 
the same class. 

18 



The Search for Documents 

do, in other respects on an equality with their pre- 
decessors of the last few centuries, are only enabled 
to surpass them by their possession of more abun- 
dant means of information. 1 Heuristic is, in fact, 
easier to-day than it used to be, although the honest 
Wagner has still good grounds for saying : 

" Wie scliwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben, 
Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt ! " 2 

Let us endeavour to explain why the collection of 
documents, once so laborious, is still no easy matter, 
in spite of the progress made in the last century ; 
and how this essential operation may, in the course 
of continued progress, be still further simplified. 

I. Those who first endeavoured to write history 
from the sources found themselves in an embarrassing 
situation. Were the events they proposed to relate 
recent, so that all the witnesses of them were not yet 
dead ? They had the resource of interviewing the 
witnesses who survived. Thucydides, Froissart, and 
many others have followed this procedure. When 
Mr. H. H. Bancroft,* the historian of the Pacific Coast 
of California, resolved to collect materials for the 
history of events many of the actors in which were 
still alive, he mobilised a whole army of reporters 
charged to extract conversations from them. 3 But 

1 It is pitiable to see how the best of the early scholars struggled 
bravely, but vainly, to solve problems which would not even 
have existed for them if their collections had not been so incom- 
plete. This lack of material was a disadvantage for which the 
most brilliant ingenuity could not compensate. 

2 " How hard it is to gain the means whereby we mount to the 
sources" (Goethe, Faust, i. 3). 

3 See C. V. Langlois, H. H. Bancroft et Cic, in the Revue univer- 
sitaire, 1894, i. p. 233. 

19 



Preliminary Studies 

when the events to be related were ancient, so that no 
man then living could have witnessed them, and no 
account of them had been preserved by oral tradi- 
tion, what then ? Nothing was left but to collect 
documents of every kind, principally written ones, 
relating to the distant past which was to be studied. 
This was a difficult task at a time when libraries 
were rare, archives secret, and documents scattered. 
About the year i860, Mr. Bancroft, in California, 
was in a situation analogous to that of the earlier 
researchers in our part of the world. His plan was 
as follows : He was rich ; he cleared the market of 
all documents, printed or manuscript ; he negotiated 
with financially embarrassed families and corporations 
for the purchase of their archives, or the permission 
to have them copied by his paid agents. This done, 
he housed his collection in premises built for the 
purpose, and classified it. Theoretically there could 
not be a more rational procedure. But this rapid, 
American method has only once been employed with 
sufficient resources and sufficient consistency to ensure 
its success ; at any other time, and in any other 
place, it would have been out of the question. No- 
where else have the circumstances been so favour- 
able for it. 

At the epoch of the Renaissance the documents 
of ancient and modern history were scattered in in- 
numerable private libraries and in innumerable depo- 
sitories of archives, almost all of them inaccessible, 
not to mention those which lay hidden beneath the 
soil, their very existence as yet unsuspected. It was 
at that time a physical impossibility to procure a 
list of all the documents serving for the elucidation 

20 



The Search for Documents 

of a question (for example, a list of all the manu- 
scripts still preserved of an ancient work) ; and if, 
by a miracle, such a list was to be had, it was another 
impossibility to consult all these documents except 
at the cost of journeys, expenses, and negotiations 
without end. Consequences easy to foresee did, as 
a matter of fact, ensue. ^ Firstly, the difficulties of 
Heuristic being insurmountable, the earliest scholars 
and historians — employing, as they did, not all the 
documents, nor the best documents, but those docu- 
ments on which they could lay their hands — were 
nearly always ill-informed ; and their works are now 
without interest except so far as they are founded on 
documents which have since been lost. Secondly, 
the first scholars and historians to be relatively well- 
informed were those who, in virtue of their profes- 
sion, had access to rich storehouses of documents — 
librarians, keepers of archives, monks, magistrates, 
whose order or whose corporation possessed libraries 
or archives of considerable extent. 1 

It is true that collectors soon arose who, by money 
payments, or by more questionable expedients, such 
as theft, formed, with more or less regard for the 
interests of scientific study, " cabinets " of collec- 
tions of original documents, and of copies. But these 

1 The earlier scholars were conscious of the unfavourable cbar- 
acter of the conditions under which they worked. They suffered 
keenly from the insufficiency of the instruments of research and 
the means of comparison. Most of them made great efforts to 
obtain information. Hence these voluminous correspondences be- 
tween scholars of the last few centuries, of which our libraries pre- 
serve so many precious fragments, and these accounts of scientific 
searches, of journeys undertaken for the discovery of historical 
documents, which, under the name of Iter {Iter Italicum, Iter Oer- 
manicum, &c. ), were formerly fashionable. 

21 



Preliminary Studies 

European collectors, of whom there has been a great 
number since the fifteenth century, differ very notice- 
ably from Mr. Bancroft. The Californian, in fact, 
only collected documents relating to a particular 
subject (the history of certain Pacific states), and his 
ambition was to make his collection complete ; most 
European collectors have acquired waifs and strays 
and fragments of every description, forming, when 
combined, totals which appear insignificant by the 
side of the huge mass of historical documents which 
existed at the time. Besides, it was not, in general, 
with any purpose of making them generally accessible 
that collectors like Peiresc, Gaignieres, Clair ambau It, 
Colbert, and many others, withdrew from circulation 
documents which were in danger of being lost ; they 
were content (and it was creditable to do as much 
as this) to share them, more or less freely, with their 
friends. But collectors (and their heirs) are fickle 
people, and sometimes eccentric in their notions. 
Certainly it is better that documents should be pre- 
served in private collections, than that they should 
be entirely unprotected and absolutely inaccessible 
to the scientific worker ; but in order that Heuristic 
should be made really easier, the first condition is 
that all collections of documents should be public. 1 

1 We may remark, in passing, a delusion which is childish enough 
but very natural, and very common among collectors : they all tend 
to exaggerate the intrinsic value of the documents they possess, 
simply because they themselves are the possessors. Documents 
have been published with a sumptuous array of commentaries by 
persons who had accidentally acquired them, and who would, quite 
rightly, have attached no importance to them if they had met with 
them in public collections. This is, we may add, merely a manifesta- 
tion, in a somewhat crude form, of a general tendency against which 
it is always necessary to guard : a man readily exaggerates the 

22 



The Search for Documents 

Now the finest private collections of documents — 
libraries and museums combined — were naturally, in 
the Europe of the Renaissance, those possessed by 
kings. And "while other private collections were 
often dispersed upon the death of their founders, 
these, on the contrary, never ceased to grow; they 
were enriched, indeed, by the wreckage of all the 
others. The Cabinet des manuscrits de France, for 
example, formed by the French kings, and by them 
thrown open to the public, had, at the end of the 
eighteenth century, absorbed the best part of the 
collections which had been the personal work of the 
amateurs and scholars of the two preceding centuries. 1 
Similarly in other countries. The concentration of a 
great number of historical documents in vast public 
(or semi-public) establishments was the fortunate 
result of this spontaneous evolution. 

The arbitrary proceedings of the Revolution were 
still more favourable, and still more effective in 
securing the amelioration of the material conditions 
of historical research. The Revolution of 1789 in 
France, analogous movements in other countries, led 
to the violent confiscation, for the profit of the state 
(that is, of everybody), of a host of private archives 
and collections — the archives, libraries, and museums 
of the crown, the archives and libraries of monas- 
teries and suppressed corporations, and so on. In 

importance of the documents he possesses, the documents he has 
discovered, the texts he has edited, the ^persons and the questions 
he has studied. 

1 See L. Delisle, Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque nation- 
ale, Paris, 1868-81, 3 vols. 4to. The histories of ancient depositories 
of documents, which have been recently published in considerable 
number, have been modelled on this admirable work. 

23 



Preliminary Studies 

France, in 1790, the Constituent Assembly thus 
placed the state in possession of a great number of 
depositories of historical documents, previously scat- 
tered, and guarded more or less jealously from the 
curiosity of scholars ; these treasures have since 
been divided among four different national insti- 
tutions. The same phenomenon has been more 
recently observed, on a smaller scale, in Germany, 
Spain, and Italy. 

The confiscations of the revolutionary period, as 
well as the collections of the period which preceded 
it, have both been productive of serious damage. 
The collector is, or rather often was, a barbarian 
who did not hesitate, when he saw a chance of 
adding to his collection of specimens and rare 
remains, to mutilate monuments, to dissect manu- 
scripts, to break up whole archives, in order to 
possess himself of the fragments. On this score 
many acts of vandalism were perpetrated before the 
Revolution. Naturally, the revolutionary procedure 
of confiscation and transference was also productive 
of lamentable consequences ; besides the destruction 
which was the result of negligence and that which 
was due to the mere pleasure of destroying, the 
unfortunate idea arose that collections might be 
systematically weeded, those documents only to be 
preserved which were " interesting " or " useful," the 
rest to be got rid of. The task of weeding was 
entrusted to well-meaning but incompetent and 
overworked men, who were thus led to commit 
irreparable havoc in our ancient archives. At the 
present day there are workers engaged in the task, 
one requiring an extraordinary amount of time, 

24 



The Search for Documents 

patience, and care, of restoring 1 the dismembered 
collections, and replacing the fragments which were 
then isolated in so brutal a manner by these zealous 
but unreflecting manipulators of historical docu- 
ments. It must be recognised, moreover, that the 
mutilations due to revolutionary activity and the 
pre-revolutionary collectors are insignificant in com- 
parison with those which are the result of accident 
and the destructive work of time. But had they 
been ten times as serious, they would have been 
amply compensated by two advantages of the first 
importance, on which we cannot lay too much stress : 
(i) the concentration, in a relatively small number 
of depositories, of documents which were formerly 
scattered, and, as it were, lost, in a hundred different 
places; (2) the opening of these depositories to the 
public. The remnant of historical documents which 
has survived the destructive effects of accident and 
vandalism is now at last safely housed, classified, 
made accessible, and treated as public property. 

Ancient historical documents are now, as we have 
seen, collected and preserved chiefly in those public 
institutions which are called archives, libraries, and 
museums. It is true that this does not apply to all 
existing documents ; in spite of the unceasing acqui- 
sitions by purchase and gift which archives, libraries, 
and museums all over the world have been making 
every year for a 9 long time past, there still exist 
private collections, dealers who supply them, and 
documents in circulation. But the exceptions, which 
in this case are negligeable, do not affect the general 
rule. Besides, all the ancient documents which, in 
limited quantity, still range at large, are destined 

25 



Preliminary Studies 

sooner or later to find their way into the state in- 
stitutions, whose doors are always open to let in, 
but never to let out. 1 

It is to be desired, as a matter of principle, that 
the depositories of documents (archives, libraries, 
and museums) should not be too numerous ; and we 
have pointed out that, fortunately, they are now 
beyond comparison less numerous than they were 
a hundred years ago. Could not the centralisation 
of documents, with its evident advantages for re- 
searchers, be carried still further ? Are there not 
still collections of documents of which it would be 
hard to justify the separate existence ? Perhaps ; 2 
but the problem of the centralisation of documents 
is no longer urgent, now that the processes of re- 

1 Many of the ancient documents still in circulation are the pro- 
ceeds of ancient thefts from state institutions. The precautions 
now taken against a recurrence of such depredations are stringent, 
and, in nearly every instance, as effective as could be desired. 

As to modern (printed) documents, the rule of legal deposit 
[compulsory presentation of copies to specified libraries], which 
has now been adopted by nearly all civilised countries, guarantees 
their preservation in public institutions. 

2 It is known that Napoleon I. entertained the chimerical design 
of concentrating at Paris the archives of the whole of Europe, and 
that, for a beginning, he conveyed to that city the archives of the 
Vatican, the Holy Roman Empire, the crown of Castile, and others, 
which later on the French were compelled to restore. Confiscation 
is now out of the question. But the ancient archives of the notaries 
might be centralised everywhere, as in some countries they are 
already, in public institutions. It is not easy to explain why at 
Paris the departments of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Marine 
preserve ancient papers whose natural place would be at the 
Archives Nationales. A great many more anomalies of this kind 
might be mentioned, which in certain cases impede, where they do 
not altogether preclude, research ; for the small collections, whose 
existence is not required, are precisely those whose regulations are 
the most oppressive. 

26 



The Search for Documents 

production have been perfected, especially as the 
inconveniences arising from a multitude of deposi- 
tories are met by the expedient, now in general use, 
of allowing the documents to travel : it is now 
possible for the student to consult, without expense, 
in the public library of the city where he resides, 
documents belonging, say, to the libraries of St. 
Petersburg, Brussels, and Florence ; we now rarely 
meet with institutions like the Archives Nationales 
at Paris, the British Museum at London, and the 
Mejanes Library at Aix-en-Provence, whose statutes 
absolutely prohibit all lending-out of their contents. 1 

II. It being granted that the majority of historical 
documents are now preserved in public institutions 
(archives, libraries, and museums), Heuristic would 
be very easy if only good descriptive catalogues 
had been drawn up of all the existing collections 
of documents, if these catalogues were furnished 
with indexes, or if general repertories (alphabetical, 
systematic, &c.) had been made relating to them; 
lastly, if there were some place where it was pos- 
sible to consult the complete collection of all these 
catalogues and their indexes. But Heuristic is still 
difficult, because these conditions are, unfortunately, 
still very far from being adequately realised. 

1 The international exchange of documents is worked in Europe 
(without charge to the public) by the agency of the various Foreign 
Offices. Besides this, most of the great institutions have agreements 
with each other for mutual loans ; this system is as sure and some- 
times more rapid in its operation than the diplomatic system. The 
question of lending original documents for use outside the institu- 
tion where they are preserved has of late years been frequently 
mooted at congresses of historians and librarians. The results so 
far obtained are eminently satisfactory. 

2 7 



Preliminary Studies 

Firstly, there are depositories of documents 
(archives, libraries, and museums) whose contents 
have never been even partially catalogued, so that 
no one knows what is in them. The depositories of 
which we possess complete descriptive catalogues are 
rare ; there are many collections preserved in cele- 
brated institutions which have only been catalogued 
in part, and the bulk of which still remains to be 
described. 1 In the second place, what a variety there 
is among existing catalogues ! There are some old 
ones which do not now correspond to the present 
classification of documents, and which cannot be 
used without reference- tables ; there are new ones 
which are equally based on obsolete systems, too 
detailed or too summary ; some are printed, others 
in manuscript, on registers or slips ; some are care- 
fully executed and clear, many are scamped, in- 
adequate, and provisional. Taking printed catalogues 
alone, it requires a whole apprenticeship to learn to 
distinguish, in this enormous mass of confusion, 
between what is trustworthy and what is not; in 
other words, to make any use of them at all. Lastly, 
where are the existing catalogues to be consulted ? 
Most of the great libraries only possess incomplete 
collections of them ; there is no general guide to 
them anywhere. 

This is a deplorable state of things. In fact, the 
documents contained in uncatalogued depositories 

1 These are sometimes large collections of formidable bulk ; it is 
more natural to undertake the cataloguing of small accumulations 
which demand less labour. It is for the same reason that many 
insignificant but short cartulrries have been published, while 
several cantularies of the highest importance, being voluminous, 
have still to be edited. 

28 



The Search for Documents 

and collections are practically non-existent for re- 
searchers who have no leisure to work through the 
whole of their contents for themselves. We have 
said before : no documents, no history. But to 
have no good descriptive catalogues of collections 
of documents means, in practice, to be unable to 
ascertain the existence of documents otherwise than 
by chance. We infer that the progress of history 
depends in great measure on the progress of the 
general catalogue of historical documents which is 
still fragmentary and imperfect. On this point 
there is general agreement. Pere Bernard de 
Montfaucon considered his Bihliotheca bibliothecarum 
manuscriptarum nova, a collection of library cata- 
logues, as " the most useful and most interesting 
work he had produced in his whole life." 1 " In the 
present state of science," wrote Renan in 1848, 2 
" nothing is wanted more urgently than a critical 
catalogue of the manuscripts in the different libraries 
... a humble task to all appearance ; . . . and 
yet the researches of scholars are hampered and in- 
complete pending its definitive completion." " We 
should have better books on our ancient literature," 
says M. P. Meyer, 3 " if the predecessors of M. Delisle 
[in his capacity of administrator of the Bibliotheque 
Nationale at Paris] had applied themselves with 
equal ardour and diligence to the cataloguing of the 
treasures committed to their care." 

It will be well to indicate briefly the causes and 
state the exact consequences of a state of things 

1 See his autobibliography, published by E. de Broglie, Bernard 
de Montfaucon ct les Bernardins, ii. (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 323. 

2 E. Renan, UAvenir de la science, p. 217. 

3 Romania, xxi. (1892), p. 625. 

29 



Preliminary Studies 

which has been deplored as long as scholars have 
existed, and which is improving, though slowly. " I 
assure you," said Renan, 1 " that the few hundred 
thousand francs a Minister of Public Instruction 
might apply to the purpose [of preparing catalogues] 
would be better employed than three-quarters of 
the sum now devoted to literature." It is rare to 
find a minister, in France or elsewhere, convinced of 
this truth, and resolute enough to act accordingly. 
Besides, it has not always been true that, in order 
to obtain good catalogues, it is sufficient, as well as 
necessary, to make a pecuniary sacrifice : it is only 
recently that the best methods of describing docu- 
ments have been authoritatively fixed ; the task of 
recruiting competent workers — no great difficulty 
nowadays — would have been neither easy nor free 
from anxiety at an epoch when competent workers 
were rarer than they are now. So much for the 
material obstacles — want of money and want of men. 
A cause of another kind has not been without its 
influence. The functionaries charged with the 
administration of depositories of documents have 
not always displayed the zeal which they now 
display for making their collections accessible by 
means of accurate catalogues. To prepare a cata- 
logue (in the exact and at the same time summary 
form which is now used) is a laborious task, a task 
without joy and without reward. It has often 
happened that such a functionary, living, in virtue 
of his office, in the midst of documents which he is 
at liberty to consult at any moment, and placed in 
a much more favourable position than the general 

1 In the passage quoted above. 
30 



The Search for Documents 

public for utilising the collection without the aid of 
a catalogue, and making discoveries in the process, 
has preferred to work for himself rather than for 
others, and made the tedious construction of a 
catalogue a secondary matter compared with his 
personal researches. 

Who are the persons that in our own day have 
discovered, published, and annotated the greatest 
number of documents ? The functionaries attached 
to the depositories of documents. Without a doubt 
this circumstance has retarded the progress of the 
general catalogue of historical documents. The situa- 
tion has been this: the persons who were the best 
able to dispense with catalogues were precisely the 
persons whose duty it was to make them. 

The imperfection of descriptive catalogues has con- 
sequences which deserve our attention. On the one 
hand, we can never be sure that we have exhausted 
all the sources of information ; who knows what may 
be held in reserve by the uncatalogued collections? 1 

1 Mr. H. H. Bancroft, in his Memoirs,entitled " Literary Industries " 
(New York, 1891, i6mo), analyses with sufficient minuteness some 
practical consequences of the imperfection of the methods of re- 
search. He considers the case of an industrious writer proposing 
to write the history of California. He easily procures a few books, 
reads them, takes notes ; these books refer him to others, which he 
consults in the public libraries of the city where he resides. Several 
years are passed in this manner, at the end of which he perceives 
that he has not a tenth part of the resources in his hands ; he 
travels, maintains correspondences, but, finally despairing of exhaust- 
ing the subject, he comforts his conscience and pride with the 
reflection that he has done much, and that many of the works he 
has not seen, like many of those he has, are probably of very slight 
historic value. As to newspapers and the myriads of United States 
government reports, all of them containing facts bearing on Cali- 
fornian history ; being a sane man, he has never dreamed of 
searching them from beginning to end : he has turned over a few 

31 



Preliminary Studies 

On the other hand, in order to obtain the maximum 
amount of information, it is necessary to be thoroughly 
acquainted with the resources furnished by the exist- 
ing literature of Heuristic, and to devote a great deal 
of time to preliminary researches. In point of fact, 
every one who proposes to collect documents for the 
treatment of a point of history begins by consulting 
indexes and catalogues. 1 Novices set about this im- 
portant operation so slowly, with so little skill, and 
with so much effort, as to move more experienced 
workers to mirth or pity, according to their dis- 
position. Those who find amusement in watching 
novices stumble and strain and waste their time in 
the labyrinth of catalogues, neglecting those which 
are valuable, and thoroughly exploring those which 
are useless, remember that they also have passed 

of them, that is all ; he knows that each of these fields of research 
would afford a labour of several years, and that all of them would 
fill the better part of his life with drudgery. As for oral testimony 
and manuscripts, he will gather a few unpublished anecdotes in 
chance conversations ; he will obtain access to a few family papers ; 
all this will appear in his book as notes and authorities. Now and 
again he will get hold of a few documentary curiosities among the 
state archives, but as it would take fifteen years to master the 
whole collection, he will naturally be content to glean a little here 
and there. Then he begins to write. He does not feel called upon 
to inform the public that he has not seen all the documents ; on 
the contrary, he makes the most of what he has been able to pro- 
cure in the course of twenty-five years of industrious research. 

1 Some dispense with personal search by invoking the assistance 
of the functionaries charged with the administration of depositories 
of documents ; the indispensable search is, in these cases, con- 
ducted by the functionaries instead of by the public. Cf. Bouvard 
ct Pecuchct, p. 158. Bouvard and Pecuchet resolve to write the 
life of the Duke of Angouleme ; for this purpose "they determined 
to spend several days at the municipal library of Caen to make 
researches. The librarian placed general histories and pamphlets 
at their disposal. ..." 

32 



The Search for Documents 

through similar experiences: let every one have his 
turn. Those who observe with regret this waste of 
time and strength consider that, while inevitable up 
to a certain point, it serves no good purpose ; they 
ask whether something might not be done to miti- 
gate the severity of this apprenticeship to Heuristic, 
which at one time cost them so dear. Besides, is 
not research, in the present condition of its material 
aids, difficult enough whatever the experience of 
the researcher ? There are scholars and historians 
who devote the best part of their powers to material 
searches. Certain branches of historical work, re- 
lating chiefly to mediseval and modern subjects (the 
documents of ancient history are fewer, have been 
more studied, and are better catalogued than the 
others), imply not merely the assiduous use of 
catalogues, not* all furnished with indexes, but also 
the personal inspection of the whole contents of 
immense collections which are either badly cata- 
logued or not catalogued at all. Experience proves 
beyond a doubt that the prospect of these long 
searches, which must be performed before the more 
intellectual part of the work can be begun, has 
deterred, and continues to deter, men of excellent 
abilities from undertaking historical work. They 
are, in fact, confronted with a dilemma : either they 
must work on a supply of documents which is in 
all probability incomplete, or they must spend 
themselves in unlimited searches, often fruitless, the 
results of which seldom appear worth the time they 
have cost. It goes against the grain to spend a 
great part of one's life in turning over catalogues 
without indexes, or in passing under review, one 

33 c 



Preliminary Studies 

after another, all the items which go to form 
accumulations of uncatalogued miscellanea, in order 
to obtain information (positive or negative) which 
might have been obtained easily and instantane- 
ously if the collections had been catalogued and 
if the catalogues had been indexed. The most 
serious consequence of the present imperfection 
of the material aids to Heuristic is the discourage- 
ment which is sure to be felt by many able men 
who know their worth, and have some sense of the 
due proportion of effort and reward. 1 

If it lay in the nature of things that the search 
for historical documents, in public depositories, 
must necessarily be as laborious as it still is, we 
might resign ourselves to the inconvenience : no 
one thinks of regretting the inevitable expenditure 
of time and labour which is demanded by archaeo- 
logical research, whatever the results may prove to 
be. But the imperfection of the modern instru- 
ments of Heuristic is quite unnecessary. The state 
of things which existed for some centuries has now 
been reformed indifferently; there is no valid reason 
why it should not some day be reformed altogether. 
We are thus led, after treating of the causes and 
the effects, to say a few words about the remedies. 

The instruments of Heuristic are being con- 
tinually perfected, before our eyes, in two ways. 
Every year witnesses an increase in the number 
of descriptive catalogues of archives, libraries, and 
museums, prepared by the functionaries attached to 
these institutions. In addition to this, powerful 

1 These considerations have already been presented and deve- 
loped in the Revue universitairc, 1894, i. p. 321 sqq. 

34 



The Search for Documents 

learned societies employ experts to pass from one 
depository to another cataloguing the documents 
there, in order to pick out all the documents of a 
particular class, or relating to a special subject: thus 
the society of Bollandists caused a general catalogue 
of hagiographical documents to be prepared by its 
emissaries, and the Imperial Academy of Vienna 
catalogued in a similar manner the monuments of 
patristic literature. The society of the Monumenta 
Germanice Historica has for a long time been con- 
ducting vast searches of the same kind ; and it was 
by the same process of exploring the museums and 
libraries of the whole of Europe that the construc- 
tion of the Corpus Iiiscriptionum Latinarum was 
lately rendered possible. Lastly, several govern- 
ments have taken the initiative in sending abroad 
persons charged to catalogue, on their behalf, docu- 
ments in which they are interested : thus England, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, 
and other governments, grant regular subsidies to 
agents of theirs occupied in cataloguing and tran- 
scribing, in the great depositories of Europe, the 
documents which relate to the history of England, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, 
and the rest. 1 With what rapidity and with what 

1 It is well known that, since the opening of the Papal Archives, 
several governments and learned societies have established In- 
stitutes at Rome, the members of which are, for the most part, 
occupied in cataloguing and making known the documents of these 
archives, in co-operation with the functionaries of the Vatican. 
The French School at Rome, the Austrian Institute, the Prussian 
Institute, the Polish Mission, the Institute of the " Goerresgesell- 
schaft," Belgian, Danish, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and other 
scholars, have performed, and are performing, cataloguing work of 
considerable extent in the archives of the Vatican. 

35 



Preliminary Studies 

perfection these useful labours can be conducted, 
provided that a competent staff, suitably directed, 
can be had as well as the money to pay it, is 
shown by the history of the general catalogue of the 
manuscripts in the public libraries of France. This 
excellent descriptive catalogue was begun in 1885, 
and now, in 1897, it extends to nearly fifty volumes, 
and will soon be completed. The Corpus Inscrip- 
tionum Latinarum will have been produced in less 
than fifty years. The results obtained by the 
Bollandists and the Imperial Academy of Vienna 
are not less conclusive. Assuredly nothing is now 
lacking, except funds, to secure the speedy en- 
dowment of historical study with the indispensable 
instruments of research. The methods employed 
in the construction of these instruments are now 
permanently fixed, and it is an easy matter to 
recruit a trained staff. Such a staff must evidently 
be largely composed of keepers of archives and 
professional librarians, but it would also contain 
unattached workers with a decided vocation for 
the construction of catalogues and indexes. Such 
workers are more numerous than one would at 
first be inclined to think. Not that cataloguing 
is easy : it requires patience, the most scrupulous 
attention, and the most varied learning ; but many 
minds are attracted by tasks which, like this, are at 
once determinate, capable of being definitely com- 
pleted, and of manifest utility. In the large and 
heterogeneous family of those who labour to pro- 
mote the progress of historical study, the makers 
of descriptive catalogues and indexes form a section 
to themselves. When they devote themselves ex- 

36 



The Search for Documents 

clusively to their art they acquire by practice, as 
one might expect, a high degree of dexterity. 

While waiting for the fact to be clearly recognised 
that the time is opportune for pushing vigorously in 
every country the construction of a general catalogue 
of historical documents, we may indicate a palliative : 
it is important that scholars and historians, especially 
novices, should be accurately informed of the state 
of the instruments of research which are at their 
disposal, and be regularly apprised of any improve- 
ments that from time to time may be made in 
them. Experience and accident have been for a 
long time trusted to supply this information; but 
empirical knowledge, besides being costly, as we 
have already pointed out, is almost always imper- 
fect. Recently the task has been undertaken of 
constructing catalogues of catalogues — critical and 
systematic lists of all the catalogues in existence. 
There can be no doubt that few bibliographical 
enterprises have possessed, in so great a degree, the 
character of general utility. 

But scholars and historians often need, in respect 
of documents, information not usually supplied by 
descriptive catalogues ; they wish, for example, to 
know whether such and such a document is known 
or not, whether it has already been critically dealt 
with, annotated, or utilised. 1 This information can 
only be found in the works of former scholars and 

1 Catalogues of documents sometimes, but not always, mention 
the fact that such and such a document has been edited, dealt with 
critically, utilised. The generally received rule is that the compiler 
mentions circumstances of this kind when he is aware of them, . 
without imposing on himself the enormous task of ascertaining the 
truth on this head in every instance where he is ignorant of it. 

37 



Preliminary Studies 

historians. In order to become acquainted with 
these works, recourse must be had to those " biblio- 
graphical repertories," properly so called, of all kinds, 
compiled from very different points of view, which 
have already been published. Among the indis- 
pensable instruments of Heuristic must thus be 
reckoned bibliographical repertories of historical 
literature, as well as repertories of catalogues of 
original documents. 

To supply the classified list of all those repertories 
(repertories of catalogues, bibliographical repertories, 
properly so called), together with other appropriate 
information, in order to save students from mistakes 
and waste of time, is the object of what we are at 
liberty to call the " science of repertories," or " his- 
torical bibliography." Professor Bernheim has pub- 
lished a preliminary sketch 1 of it, which we have 
endeavoured to expand. 2 The expanded sketch bears 
date April 1896: numerous additions, not to speak 
of revision, would already be necessary, for the biblio- 
graphical apparatus of the historical sciences is being 
renewed, at the present time, with astonishing rapidity. 
A book on the repertories for the use of scholars 
and historians is, as a general rule, out of date the 
day after it has been completed. 

III. The knowledge of repertories is useful to all; 
the preliminary search for documents is laborious to 
all; but not in the same degree. Certain parts of 
history, which have been long cultivated, now enjoy 

1 E. Bernheim, Lehrbuch tier historischcn Methode, 2nd ed., pp. 
196-202. 

2 C. V. Langlois, Manuel de Bibliographie historique : I. Instru- 
ments libliographiques, Paris, 1896, i6mo. 

38 



The Search for Documents 

the advantage of having all their documents described, 
collected, and classified in large publications devoted 
to the purpose, so that, in dealing with these sub- 
jects, the historian can do all that need be done at 
his desk. The study of local history does not gene- 
rally require more than local search. Some important 
monographs are based on a small number of docu- 
ments, all belonging to the same collection, and of 
such a nature that it would be superfluous to look 
for others elsewhere. On the other hand, a humble 
piece of work, such as a modest edition of a text of 
which the ancient copies are not rare, and are to be 
found scattered in several libraries of Europe, may 
have involved inquiries, negotiations, and journeys 
without end. Since the majority of the documents 
of mediaeval and modern history are still unedited, 
or badly edited, it may be laid down as a general 
principle that, in order to write a really new chapter 
of mediseval or modern history, it is necessary to 
have long haunted the great depositories of original 
documents, and to have, if we may use the expres- 
sion, worried their catalogues. 

It is thus incumbent on every one to choose the 
subject of his labours with the greatest care, instead 
of leaving it to be determined by pure chance. 
There are some subjects which, in the present state 
of the instruments of research, cannot be treated 
except at the cost of enormous searches in which 
life and intellect are consumed without profit. 
These subjects are not necessarily more interesting 
than others, and some day, perhaps to-morrow, im- 
provements in the aids to research will make them 
easily manageable. It is necessary for the student 

39 



Preliminary Studies 

consciously and deliberately to make his choice 
between different historical subjects depend on the 
existence or non-existence of particular catalogues 
of documents and bibliographical repertories; on 
his relative inclination for desk work on the one 
hand, and the labour of exploring depositories on 
the other ; even on the facilities he has for making 
use of particular collections. " Is it possible to do 
work in the provinces ? " Renan asked at the con- 
gress of learned societies at the Sorbonne in 1889; 
and gave a very good answer to his own question : 
" At least half one's scientific work can be done at 
one's, own desk. . . . Take comparative philology, 
for example : with an initial outlay of some thou- 
sands of francs, and subscriptions to three or four 
special publications, a student would command all 
the tools of his trade. . . . The same applies to 
universal philosophy. . . . Many branches of study 
can thus be prosecuted quite privately, and in 
the closest retirement." l Doubtless, but there are 
"rarities, specialities, researches which require the 
aid of powerful machinery." One half of historical 
work may now be done in private, with limited 
resources, but only half; the other half still pre- 
supposes the employment of such resources, in the 
way of repertories and documents, as can only be 
found in the great centres of study; often, indeed, 
it is necessary to visit several of these centres in 
succession. In short, the case stands with history 
riluch as it does with geography : in respect of some 
portions of the globe, we possess documents pub- 
lished in manageable form sufficiently complete and 

1 E. Renan, Feuilles detaches (Paris, 1892, 8vo), pp. 96 sqq. 
40 



The Search for Documents 

sufficiently well classified to enable us to reason 
about them to good purpose without leaving our 
fireside; while in the case of an unexplored or 
badly explored region, the slightest monograph 
implies a considerable expenditure of time and 
physical strength. It is dangerous to choose a 
subject of study, as many do, without having first 
realised the nature and extent of the preliminary 
researches which it demands; there are instances 
of men struggling for years with such researches, 
who might have been occupied to better advantage 
in work of another character. As precautions 
against this danger, which is the more formidable 
to novices the more active and zealous they are, an 
examination of the present conditions of Heuristic 
in general, and positive notions of Historical Biblio- 
graphy, are certainly to be warmly recommended. 



4i 



CHAPTER II 

"AUXILIARY SCIENCES" 

Let us suppose that the preliminary searches, 
treated of in the preceding chapter, have been 
made methodically and successfully; the greater 
part, if not the whole, of the documents bearing on 
a given subject have been discovered and made 
available. Of two things one : either these docu- 
ments have been already subjected to critical 
elaboration, or they are in the condition of raw 
material ; this is a point which must be settled by 
" bibliographical " researches, which also, as we have 
already observed, form part of the inquiries which 
precede the logical part of the work. In the first 
case, where the documents have already gone 
through a process of elaboration, it is necessary to 
be in a position to verify the accuracy of the critical 
work ; in the second case, where the documents are 
still raw material, the student must do the critical 
work himself. In both cases certain antecedent 
and auxiliary knowledge of a positive kind, Vor- 
und Hillfskenntnisse, as they are called, are every 
whit as indispensable as the habit of accurate rea- 
soning ; for if, in the course of critical work, it is 
possible to go wrong through reasoning badly, it is 
also possible to go wrong out of pure ignorance. 

42 



" Auxiliary Sciences " 

The profession of a scholar or historian is, moreover, 
similar in this respect to all other professions ; it is 
impossible to follow it without possessing a certain 
equipment of technical notions, whose absence neither 
natural aptitude nor even method can make good. 
In what, then, does the technical npprenticeship of 
the scholar or the historian consist ? Or, to employ 
language which, though inappropriate, as we shall 
endeavour to show, is in more common use : what, 
in addition to the knowledge of repertories, are the 
" auxiliary sciences " of history ? 
^ Daunou, in his Gours d'dtudes historiqves, 1 has 
proposecf a question of the same kind. " What 
studies," says he, " will the intending historian need 
to have gone through, what kinds of knowledge ought 
he to have acquired, in order to begin writing a work 
with any hope of success ? " Before him, Mably, in 
his Traits de Vttude de Vhistoire, had also recognised 
that " there are preparatory studies with which no 
historian can dispense." But on this subject Mably 
and Daunou entertained views which nowadays seem 
singular enough. It is instructive to mark the exact 
distance which separates their point of view from 
ours. " First of all," said Mably, " study the law of 
nature, public law, moral and political science." 
Daunou, a man of great judgment, permanent secre- 
tary to the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles- 
Lettres, writing about 1820, divides the studies 
which, in his opinion, constitute "the apprentice- 
ship of the historian," into three classes — literary, 
philosophical, historical. On the " literary ' studies 
he expatiates at great length : to begin with, the 

1 vii. p. 228 sqq. 

43 



Preliminary Studies 

historian must " have read with attention the great 
models." Which great models ? Daunou " does not 
hesitate " to place in the front rank " the master- 
pieces of epic poetry ; " for " it is the poets who have 
created the art of narrative, and whoever has not 
learnt it from them cannot have more than an im- 
perfect knowledge of it." He further recommends 
the reading of modern novels ; " they will teach the 
method of giving an artistic pose to persons and 
events, of distributing details, of skilfully carrying 
on the thread of the narrative, of interrupting it, 
of resuming it, of sustaining the attention and pro- 
voking the curiosity of the reader." Finally, good 
historical works should be read : " Herodotus, Thucy- 
dides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Plutarch among the 
Greeks ; Caesar, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus among 
the Latins; and among the moderns, Macchiavelli, 
Guicciardini, Giannone, Hume, Robertson, Gibbon, 
the Cardinal de Retz, Vertot, Voltaire, Raynal, and 
Rulhiere. Not that I would exclude the others, but 
these will suffice to provide all the styles which are 
suitable for history ; for a great diversity of form is 
to be met with in the works of these writers." In the 
second place come philosophical studies ; a thorough 
mastery of " ideology, morals, and politics " is re- 
quired. " As to the works from which knowledge 
of this kind is to be obtained, Daguesseau has in- 
stanced Aristotle, Cicero, Grotius : I should add the 
best ancient and modern moralists, treatises on poli- 
tical economy published since the middle of the last 
century, the writings on political science in general, 
and on its details and application, of Macchiavelli, 
Bod in, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mably, and the 

44 



"Auxiliary Sciences" 

most enlightened of their disciples and commenta- 
tors." In the third place, before writing history, 
" it is evidently necessary to know it." " A writer 
will not give the world new information on a subject 
like this unless he begins by making himself master 
of what is already known of it." The future historian 
has alreadjr made the acquaintance of the best his- 
torical works, and studied them as models of style ; 
" it will be to his advantage to read them a second 
time, but endeavouring more particularly to grasp 
all the facts which they contain, and to let them 
make so deep an impression on his mind that they 
may be permanently fixed in his memory." 

These are the "positive" notions which, eighty 
years ago, were considered indispensable to the 
general historian. At the same time there was a 
confused idea that " in order to acquire a profound 
knowledge of' particular subjects " there were yet 
other useful branches of study. "The subjects of 
which historians treat," says Daunou, " the details 
which they occasionally light upon, require very 
extensive and varied attainments." He goes on to 
particularise, observe in what terms : " very often a 
knowledge of several languages, sometimes too some 
notion of physics and mathematics." And he adds : 
" On these subjects, however, the general education 
which we may assume to be common to all men of 
letters is sufficient for the writer who devotes himself 
to historical composition. . . ." 

All the authors who, like Daunou, have attempted 
to enumerate the preliminary attainments, as well 
as the moral or intellectual aptitudes, necessary for 
" writing history," have either fallen into common- 

45 



Preliminary Studies 

place or pitched their requirements ridiculously high. 
According to Freeman, the historian ought to know 
everything — philosophy, law, finance, ethnography, 
geography, anthropology, natural science, and what 
not ; is not an historian, in point of fact, likely 
enough in the course of his study of the past to 
meet with questions of philosophy, law, finance, and 
the rest of the series ? And if financial science, for 
example, is necessary to a writer who treats of con- 
temporary finance, is it less so to the writer who 
claims to express an opinion on the financial questions 
of the past ? " The historian," Freeman declares, 
" may have incidentally to deal with any subject 
whatever, and the more branches of knowledge he 
is master of, the better prepared he is for his own 
work." True, all branches of human knowledge are 
not equally useful ; some of them are only service- 
able on rare occasions, and accidentally : " We could 
hardly make it even a counsel of perfection to the 
historian to make himself an accomplished chemist, 
on the chance of an occasion in which chemistry 
might be of use to him in his study ; " but other 
special subjects are more closely related to history : 
" for example, geology and a whole group of sciences 
which have a close connection with geology . . . The 
historian will clearly do his own regular work better 
for being master of them . . ." * The question has 

1 E. A. Freeman, The Methods of Historical Study (Loudon, 1885, 
8vo), p. 45. 

In France geography has lona; been regarded as a science closely 
related to history. An Agregation, which combines history and 
geography, exists at the present day, and in the lycees history and 
geography arc taught by the same professors. Many people persist 
in asserting the legitimacy of this combination, and even take 

46 



"Auxiliary Sciences" 

also been asked whether "history is one of those 
studies anciently called umbratiles, for which all that 
is wanted is a quiet mind and habits of industry," or 
whether it is a good thing for the historian to have 
mingled in the turmoil of active life, and to have 
helped to make the history of his own time before 
sitting down to write that of the past. Indeed, what 
questions have not been asked ? Floods of ink have 
been poured out over these uninteresting and un- 
answerable questions, the long and fruitless debating 
of which has done not a little to discredit works on 
methodology. Our opinion is that nothing relevant 
can be added to the dictates of mere common sense 
on the subject of the apprenticeship to the "art of 
writing history," unless perhaps that this apprentice- 
ship should consist, above everything, in the study, 
hitherto so generally neglected, of the principles of 
historical method. 

Besides, it is not the "literary historian," the 
moralising and quill-driving "historians," as con- 
ceived by Daunou and his school, that we have 
had in view; we are here only concerned with 

umbrage when it is proposed to separate two branches of knowledge 
united, as they say, by many essential connecting links. But it 
would be hard to find any good reason, or any facts of experience, 
to prove that a professor of history, or an historian, is so much the 
better the more he knows of geology, oceanography, climatology, 
and the whole group of geographical sciences. In fact, it is with 
some impatience, and to no immediate advantage, that students of 
history work through the courses of geography which their curricula 
force upon them; and those students who have a real taste for 
geography would be very glad to throw history overboard. The 
artificial union of history with geography dates back, in France, to 
an epoch when geography was an ill-defined and ill-arranged subject, 
regarded by all as a negligeable branch of study. It is a relic of 
antiquity that we ought to get rid of at once. 

47 



Preliminary Studies 

those scholars and historians who intend to deal 
with documents in order to facilitate or actually 
perform the scientific work of history. These stand 
in need of a technical apprenticeship. What meaning 
are we to attach to this term ? 

Let us suppose we have before us a written docu- 
ment. What use can we make of it if we cannot 
read it ? Up to the time of Francois Champollion, 
Egyptian documents, being written in hieroglyphics, 
were, without metaphor, a dead-letter. It will be 
readily admitted that in order to deal with ancient 
Assyrian history it is necessary to have learnt to 
decipher cuneiform inscriptions. Similarly, whoever 
desires to do original work from the sources, in 
ancient or mediaeval history, will, if he is prudent, 
learn to decipher inscriptions and manuscripts. 
We thus see why Greek and Latin epigraphy and 
mediaeval palaeography — that is, the sum of the 
various kinds of knowledge required for the deci- 
phering of ancient and mediaeval manuscripts and 
inscriptions — are considered as " auxiliary sciences " 
to history, or rather, the historical study of antiquity 
and the middle ages. It is evident that mediaeval 
Latin palaeography forms part of the necessary 
outfit of the mediae valist, just as the palaeography 
of hieroglyphics is essential to the Egyptologist. 
There is, however, a difference to be observed. 
No one will ever think of devoting himself to 
Egyptology without having first studied the appro- 
priate palaeography. On the other hand, it is not 
very rare for a man to undertake the study of local 
documents of the middle ages without having learnt 
to date their forms approximately, and to decipher 

4 8 



" Auxiliary Sciences " 

their abbreviations correctly. The resemblance which 
most mediaeval writing bears to modern writing is 
sufficiently close to foster the illusion that ingenuity 
and practice will be enough to carry him through. 
This illusion is dangerous. Scholars who have 
received no regular palaaographical initiation can 
almost always be recognised by the gross errors which 
they commit from time to time in deciphering — 
errors which are sometimes enough to completely 
ruin the subsequent operations of criticism and 
interpretation. As for the self-taught experts who 
acquire their skill by dint of practice, the orthodox 
palaBographic initiation which they have missed 
would at least have saved them much groping in 
the dark, long hours of labour, and many a dis- 
appointment. 

Suppose a document has been deciphered. How 
is it to be turned to account, unless it be first 
understood ? Inscriptions in Etruscan and the 
ancient language of Cambodia have been read, but 
no one understands them. As long as this is the 
case they must remain useless. It is clear that 
in order to deal with Greek history it is necessary 
to consult documents in the Greek language, and 
therefore necessary to know Greek. Kank truism, 
the reader will say. Yes, but many proceed as if 
it had never occurred to them. Young students 
attack ancient history with only a superficial tincture 
of Greek and Latin. Many who have never studied 
mediaeval French and Latin think they know them 
because they understand classical Latin and modern 
French, and they attempt the interpretation of texts 
whose literal meaning escapes them, or appears to 

49 d 



Preliminary Studies 

be obscure when in reality perfectly plain. Innu- 
merable historical errors owe their origin to false 
or inexact interpretations of quite straightforward 
texts, perpetrated by men who were insufficiently 
acquainted with the grammar, the vocabulary, or 
the niceties of ancient languages. Solid philological 
study ought logically to precede historical research 
in every instance where the documents to be 
employed are not to be had in a modern lan- 
guage, and in a form in which they can be easily 
understood. 

Suppose a document is intelligible. It would not 
be legitimate to take it into consideration without 
having verified its authenticity, if its authenticity 
has not been already settled beyond a doubt. Now 
in order to verify the authenticity or ascertain the 
origin of a document two things are required — reason- 
ing power and knowledge. In other words, it is 
necessary to reason from certain positive data which 
represent the condensed results of previous research, 
which cannot be improvised, and must, therefore, be 
learnt. To distinguish a genuine from a spurious 
charter would, in fact, be often an impossible task 
for the best trained logician, if he were unacquainted 
with the practice of such and such a chancery, at 
such and such a date, or with the features common 
to all the admittedly genuine charters of a particular 
class. He would be obliged to do what the first 
scholars did — ascertain for himself, by the comparison 
of a great number of similar documents, what features 
distinguish the admittedly genuine documents from 
the others, before allowing himself to pronounce judg- 
ment in any special instance. Will not his task be 

5o 



" Auxiliary Sciences " 

enormously simplified if there is in existence a body 
of doctrine, a treasury of accumulated observations, 
a system of results obtained by workers who have 
already made, repeated, and checked the minute com- 
parisons he would otherwise have been obliged to 
make for himself ? This body of doctrines, observa- 
tions, and results, calculated to assist the criticism 
of diplomas and charters, does exist; it is called 
Diplomatic. We shall, therefore, assign to Diplomatic, 
along with Epigraphy, Palaeography, and Philology, 
the character of a subject auxiliary to historical 
research. 

Epigraphy and Paleography, Philology, and Diplo- 
matic with its adjuncts (technical Chronology and 
Sphragistic) are not the only subjects of study 
which subserve historical research. It would be 
extremely injudicious to undertake to deal critically 
with literary documents on which no critical work 
has as yet been done without making oneself familiar 
with the results obtained by those who have already 
dealt critically with documents of the same class: 
the sum of these results forms a department to 
itself, which has a name — the History of Literature. 1 
The critical treatment of illustrative documents, 
such as the productions of architecture, sculpture, 
and painting, objects of all kinds (arms, dress, utensils, 
coins, medals, armorial bearings, and so forth), pre- 
supposes a thorough acquaintance with the rules and 
observations which constitute Archaeology properly so 

1 " Historiography " is a branch of the " History of Literature ; " 
it is the sum of the results obtained by the critics who have 
hitherto studied ancient historical writings, such as annals, me- 
moirs, chronicles, biographies, and so forth. 

51 



Preliminary Studies 

called and its detached branches — Numismatic and 
Heraldry. 

We are now in a position to examine to some 
purpose the hazy notion expressed by the phrase, 
" the sciences auxiliary to history." We also read 
of " ancillary sciences," and, in French, " sciences 
satellites." None of these expressions is really satis- 
factory. 

First of all, the so-called " auxiliary sciences " are 
not all of them sciences. Diplomatic, for example, 
and the History of Literature are only systematised 
accumulations of facts, acquired by criticism, which 
are of a nature to facilitate the application of critical 
methods to documents hitherto untouched. On the 
other hand, Philology is an organised science, and 
has its own laws. 

In the second place, among the branches of know- 
ledge auxiliary — properly speaking, not to history, 
but to historical research — we must distinguish be- 
tween those which every worker in the field ought 
to master, and those in respect of which he needs 
only to know where to look when he has occasion 
to make use of them ; between knowledge which 
ought to become part of a man's self, and informa- 
tion which he may be content to possess only in 
potentiality. A medievalist should know how to 
read and understand medieval texts ; he would gain 
no advantage by accumulating in his memory the 
mass of particular facts pertaining to the History 
of Literature and Diplomatic which are to be found, 
in their proper place, in well-constructed works of 
reference. 

Lastly, there are no branches of knowledge which 
52 



" Auxiliary Sciences " 

are auxiliary to History (or even historical research) 
in general — that is, which are useful to all students 
irrespectively of the particular part of history on 
which they are engaged. 1 It appears, then, that 
there is no general answer possible to the question 
raised at the beginning of this chapter : in what 
should the technical apprenticeship of the scholar 
or historian consist ? In what does it consist ? 
That depends. It depends on the part of history 
he proposes to study. A knowledge of paleo- 
graphy is quite useless for the purpose of investi- 

1 This is only true under reservation ; there is an instrument of 
research which is indispensable to all historians, to all students, 
whatever be the subject of their special study. History, moreover, 
is here in the same situation as the majority of the other sciences : 
all who prosecute original research, of whatever kind, need to 
know several living languages, those of countries where men think 
and work, of countries which, from the point of view of science, 
stand in the forefront of contemporary civilisation. 

In our days the cultivation of the sciences is not confined to* any 
single country, or even to Europe. It is international. All pro- 
blems, the same problems, are being studied everywhere simul- 
taneously. It is difficult to-day, and to-morrow it will be impossible, 
to find a subject which can be treated without taking cognisance 
of works in a foreign language. Henceforth, for ancient history, 
Greek and Roman, a knowledge of German will be as imperative as 
a knowledge of Greek and Latin. Questions of strictly local history 
are the only ones still accessible to those who do not possess the 
key to foreign literatures. The great problems are beyond their 
reach, for the wretched and ridiculous reason that works on these 
problems in any language but their own are sealed books to them. 

Total ignorance of the languages which have hitherto been the 
ordinary vehicles of science (German, English, French, Italian) is 
a disease which age renders incurable. It would not be exacting 
too much to require every candidate for a scientific profession to 
be at least trilinguis — that is, to be able to understand, fairly easily, 
two languages besides his mother-tongue. This is a requirement 
to which scholars were not subject formerly, when Latin was still 
the common language of learned men, but which the conditions of 

53 



Preliminary Studies 

gating the history of the French Revolution, and a 
knowledge of Greek is equally useless for the treat- 
ment of a question in mediaeval French history. 1 
But we may go so far as to say that the preliminary 
outfit of every one who wishes to do original work in 
history should consist (in addition to the " common 
education," that is, general culture, of which Daunou 
writes) in the knowledge calculated to aid in the 

modern scientific work will henceforth cause to press with increas- 
ing weight upon the scholars of every country.* 

The French scholars who are unable to read German and English 
are thereby placed in a position of permanent inferiority as com- 
pared with their better ins meted colleagues in France and abroad ; 
whatever their merit, they are condemned to work with insufficient 
means of information, to work badly. They know it. They do 
their best to hide their infirmity, as something to be ashamed of, 
except when they make a cynical parade of it and boast of it ; but 
this boasting, as we can easily see, is only shame showing itself in 
a different way. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the fact 
that a practical knowledge of foreign languages is auxiliary in the 
first degree to all historical work, as indeed it is to scientific work 
in general. 

1 When the "auxiliary sciences" were first inserted in the curri- 
cula of French universities, it was observed that some students 
whose special subject was the French Revolution, and who had no 
interest whatever in the middle ages, took up palaeography as an 
"auxiliary science," and that some students of geography, who 
were in no way interested in antiquity, took up epigraphy. Evi- 
dently they had failed to understand that the study of the " auxi- 
liary sciences " is recommended, not as an end in itself, but 
because it is of practical utility to those who devote themselves 
to certain special subjects. See the Revue universitaire, 1895, "• 
p. 123. 



* Perhaps a day will come when it will be necessary to know the 
most important Slavonic language ; there are already scholars who 
are setting themselves to learn Russian. The idea of restoring 
Latin to its old position of universal language is chimerical. See 
the file of the Phoenix, seu nuntius latinus universalis (London, 
1 89 1, 4to). 

54 



"Auxiliary Sciences" 

discovery, the understanding, and the criticism of 
documents. The exact nature of this knowledge 
varies from case to case according as the student 
specialises in one or another part of universal 
history. The technical apprenticeship is relatively 
short and easy for those who occupy themselves 
with modern or contemporary history, long and 
laborious for those who occupy themselves with 
ancient and inediseval history. 

This reform of the historian's technical apprentice- 
ship, which consists in substituting the acquisition 
of positive knowledge, truly auxiliary to historical 
research, for the study of the " great models," lite- 
rary and philosophical, is of quite recent date. In 
France, for the greater part of the present century, 
students of history received none but a literary 
education, after Daunou's pattern. Almost all of 
them were contented with such a preparation, and 
did not look beyond it; some few perceived and 
regretted, when it was too late for a remedy, the 
insufficiency of their early training; with a few 
illustrious exceptions, the best of them never rose 
to be more than distinguished men of letters, in- 
capable of scientific work. There was at that time 
no organisation for teaching the " auxiliary sciences " 
and the technique of research except in the case of 
French mediaeval history, and that in a special school, 
the Nicole des chartes. This simple fact, moreover, 
secured for this school during a period of fifty years 
a marked superiority over all the other French (or 
even foreign) institutions of higher education; ex- 
cellent workers were there trained who contributed 
many new results, while elsewhere people were idly 

55 



Preliminary Studies 

discussing problems. 1 To-day it is still at the ficole 
des chartes that the medievalist has the opportunity 
of going through his technical apprenticeship in the 
best and most complete manner, thanks to the com- 
bined and progressive three-years courses of Romance 
philology, palaeography, archaeology, historiography, 
and mediaeval law. But the " auxiliary sciences " are 
now taught everywhere more or less adequately ; they 
have been introduced into' the university curricula. 
On the other hand, students' handbooks of epigraphy, 
palaeography, diplomatic, and so forth, have multi- 
plied during the last twenty-five years. Twenty-five 
years ago it would have been vain to look for a 
good book which should supply the want of oral in- 
struction on these subjects ; since the establishment 
of professorships " manuals " have appeared 2 which 

1 On this point note the opinions of T. von Sickel and J. Havet, 
quoted in the Bibliotheque de V Ecole des chartes, 1896, p. 87. In 
1854 the Austrian Institute "fur osterreichische Geschichtsfor- 
schung " was organised on the model of the French Ecole des chartes. 
Another institution of the same type has lately been created in the 
" Istituto di studi superiori " at Florence. "We are accustomed," 
we read in England, " to hear the complaint that there is not in this 
country any institution resembling the Ecole des chartes " {Quar- 
terly Review, July 1896, p. 122). 

2 This is a suitable place to enumerate the principal "manuals" 
published in the last twenty-five years. But a list of them, ending 
at 1894, will be found in Bernheim's Lehrbuch, pp. 206 sqq. We will 
only refer to the great "manuals" of "Philology" (in the com- 
prehensive sense of the German "Philologie," which includes the 
history of language and literature, epigraphy, palaeography, and 
all that pertains to textual criticism) now in course of publication : 
the Orundriss der indo-arischen Philologie und AltertumsJcunde, edited 
by G. Biihler ; the Orundriss der iranischen Philologie, edited by W. 
Geiger and E. Kuhn ; the Handbuch der classischen Alterbumswis- 
senschaft, edited .by I. von Miiller ; the Grundriss der gcrmanischen 
Philologie, edited by H. Paul, the second edition of which began to 
appear in 1896 ; the Grundriss der romanischen Philologie, edited 

56 



" Auxiliary Sciences " 

would almost make them superfluous were it not 
that oral instruction, based on practical exercises, 
has here an exceptional value. Whether a student 
does or does not enjoy the advantage of a regular 
drilling in an institution for higher education, he has 
henceforth no excuse for remaining in ignorance of 
those things which he ought to know before entering 
upon historical work. There is, in fact, less of this 
kind of neglect than there used to be. On this 
head, the success of the above-mentioned " manuals," 
with their rapid succession of editions, is very 
significant. 1 

Here, then, we have the future historian armed 
with the preliminary knowledge, the neglect of which 
would have condemned him to powerlessness or to 
continual mistakes. We suppose him protected from 
the errors without number which have their origin 
in an imperfect knowledge of the writing and the 
language of documents, in ignorance of previous work 
and the results obtained by textual criticism ; he has 
an irreproachable cognitio cogniti et cognoscmdi. A 
very optimistic supposition, by the way, as we are 
bound to admit. We know but too well that to have 
gone through a regular course of " auxiliary sciences," 
or to have read attentively the best treatises on 

by G. Grober. In these vast repertories there will be found, along 
with a short presentment of the subject, complete bibliographical 
references, direct as well as indirect. 

1 The French "manuals" of MM. Prou (Palaeography), Giry 
(Diplomatic), Cagnat (Latin Epigraphy), and others, have diffused 
among the public the idea and knowledge of the auxiliary subjects 
of study. New editions have enabled, and will enable, them to be 
kept up to date — a very necessary operation, for most of these sub- 
jects, though now settled in the main, are being enriched and made 
more precise every day. Cf. supr^ p. 38. 

57 



Preliminary Studies 

bibliography, palaeography, philology, and so on, or 
even to have acquired some personal experience by 
practical exercises, is not enough to ensure that a 
man shall always be well informed, still less to make 
him infallible. In the first place, those who have 
for a long time studied documents of a given class 
or of a given period possess, in regard to these, 
incommunicable knowledge in virtue of which they 
are able to deal better than others with new docu- 
ments which they may meet with of the same class 
or period ; nothing can replace the "special erudition " 
which is the specialist's reward for hard work. 1 And 
secondly, specialists themselves make mistakes : 
palaeographers must be perpetually on their guard 
not to decipher falsely; is there a philologist who 
has not some faults of construing on his conscience ? 
Scholars usually well informed have printed as un- 
edited texts which had already been published, and 
have neglected documents it was their business to 
know. Scholars spend their lives in incessantly 
perfecting their " auxiliary " knowledge, which they 
rightly regard as never perfect. But all this does 

1 What exactly are we to understand by this "incommunicable 
knowledge," of which we speak ? When a specialist is very 
familiar with the documents of a given class or period, associations 
of ideas are formed in his brain ; and when he examines a new 
document of the same class or species, analogies suddenly dawn 
upon him which would escape any one of less experience, however 
well furnished he might be with the most perfect repertories. The 
fact is, that not all the peculiarities of documents can be isolated ; 
there are some which cannot be classified under any intelligible 
head, and which, therefore, cannot be found in any tabulated list. 
But the human memory, when it is good, retains the impression of 
these peculiarities, and even a faint and distant stimulus suffices 
to revive the apprehension of them. 

58 



" Auxiliary Sciences " 

not prevent us from maintaining our hypothesis. 
Only let it be understood that in practice we do 
not postpone work upon documents till we shall 
have gained a serene and absolute mastery over 
all the " auxiliary branches of knowledge : " we 
should never dare to begin. 

It remains to know how to treat documents 
supposing one has successfully passed through the 
preliminary apprenticeship. 



59 



BOOK II 

ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS 



BOOK II 

ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS 

CHAPTER I 

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 

We have already stated that history is studied from 
documents, and that documents are the traces of 
past events. 1 This is the place to indicate the 
consequences involved in this statement and this 
definition. 

Events can be empirically known in two ways 
only: by direct observation while they are in pro- 
gress ; and indirectly, by the study of the traces 
which they leave behind them. Take an earth- 
quake, for example. I have a direct knowledge of 
it if I am present when the phenomenon occurs; 
an indirect knowledge if, without having been thus 
present, I observe its physical effects (crevices, 
ruins), or if, after these effects have disappeared, 
I read a description written by some one who has 
himself witnessed the phenomenon or its effects. 
Now, the peculiarity of "historical facts" 2 is this, 

1 Supra, p. 17. 

2 This expression, which frequently occurs, needs explanation. 
It is not to be taken to apply to a species of facts. There are no 

63 



Analytical Opeeations 

that they are only known indirectly by the help 
of their traces. Historical knowledge is essentially 
indirect knowledge. The methods of historical 
science ought, therefore, to be radically different 
from those of the direct sciences; that is to say, 
of all the other sciences, except geology, which are 
founded on direct observation. Historical science, 
whatever may be said, 1 is not a science of observa- 
tion at all. 

The facts of the past are only known to us by the 
traces of them which have been preserved. These 
traces, it is true, are directly observed by the his- 
torian, but, after that, he has nothing more to 
observe ; what remains is the work of reasoning, 
in which he endeavours to infer, with the greatest 
possible exactness, the facts from the traces. . The 
document is his starting-point, the fact his goal. 2 
Between this starting-point and this goal he has 
to pass through a complicated series of inferences, 
closely interwoven with each other, in which there 
are innumerable chances of error ; while the least 
error, whether committed at the beginning, middle, 
or end of the work, may vitiate all his conclusions. 

historical facts in the sense in which we speak of chemical facts. 
The same fact is or is not historical according to the manner in 
which it is known. It is only the mode of acquiring knowledge 
that is historical. A sitting of the Senate is a fact of direct 
observation for one who takes part in it ; it becomes historical 
for the man who reads about it in a report. The eruption of 
Vesuvius in the time of Pliny is a geological fact which is known 
historically. The historical character is not in the facts, but in the 
manner of knowing them. 

1 Fustel de Coulanges has said it. Cf. supra, p. 4, note 1. 

2 In the sciences of observation it is the fact itself, observed 
directly, which is the starting-point. 

64 



General Conditions of Historical Knowledge 

The " historical," or indirect, method is thus ob- 
viously inferior to the method of direct observation ; 
but historians have no choice : it is the only method 
of arriving at past facts, and we shall see later on 1 
how, in spite of these disadvantages, it is possible 
for this method to lead to scientific knowledge. 

The detailed analysis of the reasonings which lead 
from the inspection of documents to the knowledge 
of facts is one of the chief parts of Historical 
Methodology. It is the domain of criticism. The 
seven following chapters will be devoted to it. 
We shall endeavour, first of all, to give a very 
summary sketch of the general lines and main 
divisions of the subject. 

I. We may distinguish two species of documents. 
Sometimes the past event has left a material trace 
(a monument, a fabricated article). Sometimes, and 
more commonly, the trace is of the psychological 
order — a written description or narrative. The first 
case is much simpler than the second. For there 
is a fixed relation between certain physical appear- 
ances and the causes which produced them ; and 
this relation, governed by physical laws, is known 
to us. 2 But a psychological trace, on the other 
hand, is purely symbolic: it is not the fact itself; 
it is not even the immediate impression made by 
the fact upon the witness's mind, but only a con- 
ventional symbol of that impression. Written 
documents, then, are not, as material documents 

1 Infra, ch. vii. 

2 We shall not treat specially of the criticism of material docu- 
ments (objects, monuments, &c.) where it differs from the criticism 
of written documents. 

65 E 



Analytical Operations 

are, valuable by themselves ; they are only valuable 
as signs of psychological operations, which are often 
complicated and hard to unravel. The immense 
majority of the documents which furnish the 
historian with starting-points for his reasonings 
are nothing else than traces of psychological opera- 
tions. 

This granted, in order to conclude from a written 
document to the fact which was its remote cause 
— that is, in order to ascertain the relation which 
connects the document with the fact — it is necessary 
to reproduce the whole series of intermediate causes 
which have given rise to the document. It is 
necessary to revive in imagination the whole of 
that series of acts performed by the author of 
the document which begins with the fact observed 
by him and ends with the manuscript (or printed 
volume), in order to arrive at the original event. 
Such is the aim and such the process of critical 
analysis. 1 

First of all we observe the document. Is it now 
in the same state as when it was produced ? Has 
it deteriorated since ? We endeavour to find out 
how it was made in order to restore it, if need 
be, to its original form, and to ascertain its origin. 
The first group of preliminary investigations, bear- 
ing upon the writing, the language, the form, the 
source, constitutes the special domain of External 
Criticism, or critical scholarship. Next comes 
Internal Criticism : it endeavours, by the help of 

1 For the details and the logical justification of this method see 
Seignobos, Les Conditions psychologiques de la connaissance en histoire, 
in the Revue philosophique, 1887, ii. pp. 1, 168. 

66 



Geneeal Conditions of Historical Knowledge 

analogies mostly borrowed from general psychology, 
to reproduce the mental states through which the 
author of the document passed. Knowing what 
the author of the document has said, we ask (i) 
What did he mean ? (2) Did he believe what 
he said ? (3) Was he justified in believing what- 
ever he did believe ? This last step brings the 
document to a point where it resembles the data 
of the objective sciences : it becomes an observa- 
tion; it only remains , to treat it by the methods 
of the objective sciences. Every document is valu- 
able precisely to the extent to which, by the study 
of its origin, it has been reduced to a well-made 
observation. 

II. Two conclusions may be drawn from what we 
have just said : the extreme complexity and the 
absolute necessity of Historical Criticism. 

Compared with other students the historian is in 
a very disagreeable situation. It is not merely that 
he cannot, as the chemist does, observe his facts 
directly ; it very rarely happens that the documents 
which he is obliged to use represent precise observa- 
tions. He has at his disposal none of those systematic 
records of observations which, in the established 
sciences, can and do replace direct observation. He 
is in the situation of a chemist who should know a 
series of experiments only from the report of his 
laboratory-boy. The historian is compelled to turn 
to account rough and ready reports, such as no man 
of science would be content with. 1 All the more 



1 The most favourable case, that in which the document has 
been drawn up by what is called an ocular " witness," is still far 
short of the ideal required for scientific knowledge. The notion 

67 



Analytical Operations 

necessary are the precautions to be taken in utilising 
these documents, the only materials of historical 
science. It is evidently most important to elimi- 
nate those which are worthless, and to ascertain 
the amount of correct observation represented by 
those which are left. 

All the more necessary, too, are cautions on this 
subject, because the natural inclination of the human 
mind is to take no precautions at all, and to treat 
these matters, which really demand the utmost 
obtainable precision, with careless laxity. It is true 
that every one admits the utility of criticism in 
theory; but this is just one of those principles 
which are more easily admitted than put into 
practice. Many centuries and whole eras of brilliant 
civilisation had to pass away before the first dawn 
of criticism was visible among the most intellectual 
peoples in the world. Neither the orientals nor the 
middle ages ever formed a definite conception of it. 1 
Up to our own day there have been enlightened 
men who, in employing documents for the purpose 
of writing history, have neglected the most elemen- 
tary precautions, and unconsciously assumed false 

of witness has been borrowed from the procedure of the law-courts ; 
reduced to scientific terms, it becomes that of an observer. A testi- 
mony is an observation. But, in point of fact, historical testimony 
differs materially from scientific observation. The observer pro- 
ceeds by fixed rules, and clothes his report in language of rigorous 
precision. On the other hand, the "witness "observes without 
method, and reports in unprecise language ; it is not known whether 
he has taken the necessary precautions. It is an essential attribute 
of historical documents that they come before us as the result of 
work which has been done without method and without guarantee. 
1 See B. Lasch, Das Erwachen und die Entwickelung der historischen 
Kritik im Mittdcdtcr (Breslau, 1887, 8vo). 

68 



General Conditions of Historical Knowledge 

generalisations. Even now most young students 
would, if left to themselves, fall into the old errors. 
For criticism is antagonistic to the normal bent of 
the mind. The spontaneous tendency of man is to 
yield assent to affirmations, and to reproduce them, 
without even clearly distinguishing them from the 
results of his own observation. In everyday life do 
we not accept indiscriminately, without any kind of 
verification, hearsay reports, anonymous and un- 
guaranteed statements, "documents" of indifferent 
or inferior authority ? It takes a special reason to 
induce us to take the trouble to examine into the 
origin and value of a document on the history of 
yesterday ; otherwise, if there is no outrageous im- 
probability in it, and as long as it is not contradicted, 
we swallow it whole, we pin our faith to it, we hawk 
it about, and, if need be, embellish it in the process. 
Every candid man must admit that it requires 
a violent effort to shake off ignavia critica, that 
common form of intellectual sloth, that this effort 
must be continually repeated, and is often accom- 
panied by real pain. 

The natural instinct of a man in the water is to 
do precisely that which will infallibly cause him to 
be drowned; learning to swim means acquiring the 
habit of suppressing spontaneous movements and 
performing others instead. Similarly, criticism is 
not a natural habit ; it must be inculcated, and only 
becomes organic by dint of continued practice. 

Historical work is, then, pre-eminently critical ; 
whoever enters upon it without having first been 
put on his guard against his instinct is sure to be 
drowned in it. In order to appreciate the danger it 

6 9 



Analytical Operations 

is well to examine one's conscience and analyse the 
causes of that ignavia which must be fought against 
till it is replaced by a critical attitude of mind. 1 It 
is also very salutary to familiarise oneself with the 
principles of historical method, and to analyse the 
theory of them, one by one, as we propose to do 
in the present volume. " History, like every other 
study, is chiefly subject to errors of fact arising from 
inattention, but it is more exposed than any other 
study to errors due to that mental confusion which 
produces incomplete analyses and fallacious reason- 
ings. . . . Historians would advance fewer affirma- 
tions without proof if they had to analyse each one 
of their affirmations ; they would commit themselves 
to fewer false principles if they made it a rule to 
formulate all their principles ; they would be guilty 
of fewer fallacies if they were obliged to set out all 
their arguments in logical form." 2 

1 Natural credulity is deeply rooted in indolence. It is easier to 
believe than to discuss, to admit than to criticise, to accumulate 
documents than to weigh them. It is also pleasanter; he who 
criticises documents must sacrifice some of them, and such a 
sacrifice seems a dead loss to the man who has discovered or 
acquired the document. 

2 Revue philosophique, I.e., p. 178. 



70 



SECTION I.— EXTERNAL CRITICISM 
CHAPTER II 

TEXTUAL CRITICISM 

Let us suppose that an author of our own day has 
written a book: he sends his manuscript to the 
printer ; with his own hand he corrects the proofs, 
and marks them " Press." A book which is printed 
under these conditions comes into our hands in what 
is, for a document, a very good condition. Whoever 
the author may be, and whatever his sentiments and 
intentions, we can be certain — and this is the only 
point that concerns us at present — that we have 
before us a fairly accurate reproduction of the text 
which he wrote. We are obliged to say " fairly 
accurate," for if the author has corrected his proofs 
badly, or if the printers have not paid proper atten- 
tion to his corrections, the reproduction of the original 
text is imperfect, even in this specially favourable 
case. Printers not unfrequently make a man say 
something which he never meant to say, and which 
he does not notice till too late. 

Sometimes it is required to reproduce a work the 
author of which is dead, and the autograph manu- 
script of which cannot be sent to the printer. This 
was the case with the Mdmoires d'outre-tombe of 

7i 



Analytical Operations 

Chateaubriand, for example ; it is of daily occurrence 
in regard to the familiar correspondence of well- 
known persons which is printed in haste to satisfy 
the curiosity of the public, and of which the original 
manuscript is very fragile. First the text is copied ; 
it is then set up by the compositor from the copy, 
which comes to the same thing as copying it again ; 
this second copy is lastly, or ought to be, collated 
(in the proofs) with the first copy, or, better still, 
with the original, by some one who takes the place 
of the deceased author. The guarantees of accuracy 
are fewer in this case than in the first ; for between 
the original and the ultimate reproduction there is 
one intermediary the more (the manuscript copy), 
and it may be that the original is hard for anybody 
but the author to decipher. And, in fact, the text 
of memoirs and posthumous correspondence is often 
disfigured by errors of transcription and punctuation 
occurring in editions which at first sight give the 
impression of having been carefully executed. 1 

Turning now to ancient documents, let us ask in 
what^ state they have been preserved. In nearly 
every case the originals have been lost, and we have 
nothing but copies. Have these copies been made 
directly from the originals ? No ; they are copies 
of copies. The scribes who executed them were not 
by any means all of them capable and conscientious 

1 A member of the SociiU des humanistes franqais (founded at 
Paris in 1894) amused himself by pointing out, in. the Bulletin of 
this society, certain errors amenable to verbal criticism which 
occur in various editions of posthumous works, especially the 
Mtmoires d'outre-tombe. He showed that it is possible to remove 
obscurities in the most modern documents by the same methods 
which are used in restoring ancient texts. 

72 



Textual Criticism 

men; they often transcribed texts which they did 
not understand at all, or which they understood 
incorrectly, and it was not always the fashion, as it 
was in the time of the Carlovingian Renaissance, to 
compare the copies with the originals. 1 

If our printed books, after the successive revisions 
of author and printers reader, are still but imperfect 
reproductions, it is only to be expected that ancient 
documents, copied and recopied as they have been 
for centuries with very little care, and exposed at 
every fresh transcription to new risk of alteration, 
should have reached us full of inaccuracies. 

There is thus an obvious precaution to be taken. 
Before using a document we must find out whether 
its text is " sound" — that is, in as close agreement as 
possible with the original manuscript of the author ; 
and when the text is " corrupt " we must emend 
it. In using a text which has been corrupted in 
transmission, we run the risk of attributing to the 
author what really comes from the copyists. There 
are actual cases of theories which were based on 
passages falsified in transmission, and which collapsed 
as soon as the true readings were discovered or re- 
stored. Printers' errors and mistakes in copying are 
not always innocuous or merely diverting ; they are 
sometimes insidious and capable of misleading the 
reader. 2 

One would naturally suppose that historians of 

1 On the habits of the mediaeval copyists, by whose intermediate 
agency most of the literary works of antiquity have come down to 
us, see the notices collected by W. Wattenbach, Das Schriftwesen 
im Mittelalter, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1896, 8vo). 

2 See, for example, the Coquilles lexicographiques which have been 
collected by A. Thomas, in Romania, xx. (1891), pp. 464 sqq. 

73 



Analytical Operations 

repute would always make it a rule to procure 
" sound " texts, properly emended and restored, of 
the texts they have to consult. That is a mistake. 
For a long time historians simply used the texts 
which they had within easy reach, without verifying 
their accuracy. And, what is more, the very scholars 
whose business it is to edit texts did not discover 
the art of restoring them all at once ; not so very 
long ago, documents were commonly edited from the 
first copies, good or bad, that came to hand, com- 
bined and corrected at random. Editions of ancient 
texts are nowadays mostly " critical ; " but it is not 
yet thirty years since the publication of the first 
" critical editions " of the great works of the middle 
ages, and the critical text of some ancient classics 
(Pausanias, for example) has still to be constructed. 

Not all historical documents have as yet been 
published in a form calculated to give historians the 
security they need, and some historians still act as 
if they had not realised that an unsettled text, as 
such, requires cautious handling. Still, considerable 
progress has been made. From the experience 
accumulated by several generations of scholars there 
has been evolved a recognised method of purifying 
and restoring texts. No part of historical method 
has a more solid foundation, or is more generally 
known. It is clearly explained in several works of 
popular philology. 1 For this reason we shall here 
be content to give a general view of its essential 
principles, and to indicate its results. 

1 See E. Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, 2nd ed., pp. 
341-54. Also consult F. Blass, in the Handbuch der klassischcn 
Altertumswissenschqft, edited by I. von Muller, I., 2nd ed. (1892), pp. 

74 



Textual Criticism 



I. We will suppose a document has not been 
edited in conformity with critical rules. How are 
we to proceed in order to construct the best possible 
text ? Three cases present themselves. 

(a) The most simple case is that in which we pos- 
sess the original, the author's autograph itself. There 
is then nothing to do but to reproduce the text 
of it with absolute fidelity. 1 Theoretically nothing 
can be easier ; in practice this elementary operation 
demands a sustained attention of which not every 
one is capable. If any one doubts it, let him try 
Copyists who never make mistakes and never allow 
their attention to be distracted are rare even amous: 
scholars. 

(b) Second case. The original has been lost ; only 

249-89 (with a detailed bibliography) ; A. Tobler, in the Grundriss 
der romanischen Philologie, I. (1888), pp. 253-63; H. Paul, in the 
Grundriss der germanischen Philologie, I., 2nd ed. (1896), pp. 184-96. 

In French read the section Critique des textes, in Minerva, Intro- 
duction a Vitude des classiques scolaires grecs et latins, by J. Gow and 
S. Reinach (Paris, 1890, i6mo), pp. 50-65. 

The work of J. Taylor, " History of the Transmission of Ancient 
Books to Modern Times" (Liverpool, 1889, i6mo), is of no value. 

1 This rule is not absolute. The editor is generally accorded the 
right of unifying the spelling of an autograph document — provided 
that he informs the public of the fact — wherever, as in most modern 
documents, the orthographical vagaries of the author possess no 
philological interest. See the Instructions pour la publication des 
textes historiques, in the Bulletin de la Commission royale d'kistoire de 
Belgique, 5th series, vi. (1896) ; and the Grundsdtze fur die Herausgube 
von ActenstilcTcen zur neueren Geschichte, laboriously discussed by the 
second and third Congresses of German historians, in 1894 and 1895, 
in the Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswisscnschaft, xi. p. 200, xii. 
p. 364. The last Congresses of Italian historians, held at Genoa 
(1893) an ^ at Rome (1895), have also debated this question, but 
without result. What are the liberties which it is legitimate to 
take in reproducing autograph texts ? The question is more diffi- 
cult than is imagined by those who are not professionally concerned 
with it. 

75 




Analytical Operations 

a single copy of it is known. It is necessary to be 
cautious, for the probability is that this copy con- 
tains errors. 

Texts degenerate in accordance with certain laws. 
A great deal of pains has been taken to discover and 
classify the causes and the ordinary forms of the 
differences which are observed between originals and 
copies; and hence rules have been deduced which 
may be applied to the conjectural restoration of 
those passages in a unique copy of a lost original 
which are certainly corrupt (because unintelligible), 
or are so in all probability. 

Alterations of an original occurring in a copy — 
" traditional variants," as they are called — are due 
either to fraud or to error. Some copyists have 
deliberately modified or suppressed passages. 1 Nearly 
all copyists have committed errors of judgment or 
accidental errors. Errors of judgment when half- 
educated and not wholly intelligent copyists have 
thought it their duty to correct passages and words 
in the original which they could not understand. 2 
Accidental errors when they misread while copying, 
or misheard while writing from dictation, or when 
they involuntarily made slips of the pen. 

Modifications arising from fraud or errors of judg- 
ment are often very difficult to rectify, or even to 
discover. Some accidental errors (the omission of 
several lines, for example) are irreparable in the 

1 Interpolations will be treated of in chapter iii. p. 92. 

2 The scribes of the Carlovingian Renaissance and of the 
Renaissance proper of the fifteenth century endeavoured to furnish 
intelligible texts. They therefore corrected everything they did 
not understand. Several ancient works have been in this manner 
irretrievably ruined. 

76 



Textual Criticism 

case we are considering, that of a unique copy. But 
most accidental errors can be detected by any one 
who knows the ordinary forms : confusions of sense, 
letters, and words, transpositions of words, letters, 
and syllables, dittography (unmeaning repetition of 
letters or syllables), haplography (syllables or words 
written once only where they should have been 
written twice), false divisions between words, badly 
punctuated sentences, and other mistakes of the 
same kind. Errors of these various types have been 
made by the scribes of every country and every age, 
irrespectively of the handwriting and language of the 
originals. But some confusions of letters occur fre- 
quently in copies of uncial originals, and others in 
copies of minuscule originals. Confusions of sense 
and of words are explained by analogies of vocabulary 
or pronunciation, which naturally vary from language 
to language and from epoch to epoch. The general 
theory of conjectural emendation reduces to the sketch 
we have just given ; there is no general apprentice- 
ship to the art. What a man learns is not to restore 
any text that may be put before him, but Greek 
texts, Latin texts, French texts, and so on, as the 
case may be; for the conjectural emendation of a 
text presupposes, besides general notions on the 
processes by which texts degenerate, a profound 
knowledge of (i) a special language; (2) a special 
handwriting ; (3) the confusions (of sense , letters, and 
words) ivhich were habitual to those who copied texts of 
that language written in that style of handwriting. To 
aid in the apprenticeship to the conjectural emenda- 
tion of Greek and Latin texts, tabulated lists (alpha- 
betical and systematic) of various readings, frequent 

77 



Analytical Operations 

confusions, and probable corrections, have been drawn 
up. 1 It is true that they cannot take the place of 
practical work, done under the guidance of experts, 
but they are of very great use to the experts 
themselves. 2 

It would be easy to give a list of happy emen- 
dations. The most satisfactory are those whose 
correctness is obvious palseographically, as is the 
case with the classical emendation by Madvig of 
the text of Seneca's Letters (89, 4). The old read- 
ing was : " Philosophia unde dicta sit, apparet ; ipso 
enim nomine fatetur. Quidam et sapientiam ita 
quidam finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et huruan- 
orum sapientiam . . ." — which does not make sense. 
It used to be supposed that words had dropped 
out between ita and quidam, Madvig pictured to 
himself the text of the lost archetype, which was 
written in capitals, and in which, as was usual 
before the eighth century, the words were not 
separated (scriptio continue/,), nor the sentences punc- 
tuated ; he asked himself whether the copyist, with 
such an archetype before him, had not divided 
the words at random, and he had no difficulty 

1 The principal of these are, for the classical languages, besides 
the above-mentioned work of Blass (supra, p. 74, note), the Adver- 
saria critica of Madvig (Copenhagen, 1871-74, 3 vols. 8vo). For 
Greek, the celebrated Commentatio palaographica of F. J. Bast, pub- 
lished as an appendix to an edition of the grammarian Gregory 
of Corinth (Leipzig, 181 1, 8vo), and the Variaz lectiones of Cobet 
(Leiden, 1873, 8vo). For Latin, H. Hagen, Gradus ad criticcn 
(Leipzig, 1879, 8vo), and W. M. Lindsay, "An Introduction to Latin 
Textual Emendation based on the Text of Plautus " (London, 1896, 
i6mo). A contributor to the Bulletin de la Societe des humanistes 
francais has expressed, in this publication, a wish that a similar 
collection might be compiled for modern French. 

2 Cf. Revue Critique, 1895, ii. p. 358. 

78 



Textual Criticism 

in reading : " . . . ipso enim nomine fatetur quid 
amet. Sapientiam ita quidam finierunt . . ." Blass, 
Reinach, and Lindsay, in the works referred to in 
the note, mention several other masterly and elegant 
emendations. Nor have the Hellenists and Latinists 
any monopoly ; equally brilliant emendations might 
be culled from the works of Orientalists, Romancists, 
and Germanists, now that texts of Oriental, Romance, 
and Germanic languages have been subjected to 
verbal criticism. We have already stated that 
scholarly corrections are possible even in the text 
of quite modern documents, reproduced typographi- 
cally under the most favourable conditions. 

Perhaps no one, in our day, has equalled Madvig 
in the art of conjectural emendation. But Madvig 
himself had no high opinion of the work of modern 
scholarship. He thought that the humanists of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were, in 
this respect, better trained than modern scholars. 
The conjectural emendation of Greek and Latin 
texts is, in fact, a branch of sport success in which 
is proportionate not only to a man's ingenuity and 
palseographical instinct, but also to the corrrectness, 
rapidity, and delicacy of his appreciation of the 
niceties of the classical languages. Now, the early 
scholars were undoubtedly too bold, but they were 
more intimately familiar with the classical languages 
than our modern scholars are. 

However that may be, there can be no doubt 
that numerous texts which have been preserved, in 
corrupt form, in unique copies, have resisted, and 
will continue to resist, the efforts of criticism. Very 
often criticism ascertains the fact of the text having 

79 



Analytical Operations 

been altered, states what the sense requires, and 
then prudently stops, every trace of the original 
reading having been obscured by a confused tangle 
of successive corrections and errors which it is 
hopeless to attempt to unravel. The scholars who 
devote themselves to the fascinating pursuit of con- 
jectural criticism are liable, in their ardour, to 
suspect perfectly innocent readings, and, in desperate 
passages, to propose adventurous hypotheses. They 
are well aware of this, and therefore make it a rule 
to draw a very clear distinction, in their editions, 
between readings found in manuscripts and their 
own restorations of the text. 

(c) Third case. We possess several copies, which 
differ from, each other, of a document whose original 
is lost. Here modern scholars have a marked 
advantage over their predecessors: besides being 
better informed, they set about the comparison of 
copies more methodically. The object is, as in 
the preceding case, to reconstruct the archetype as 
exactly as possible. 

The scholars of earlier days had to struggle, as 
novices have to struggle now, in a case of this kind, 
against a very natural and a very reprehensible 
impulse — to use the first copy that comes to hand, 
whatever its character may happen to be. The 
second impulse is not much better — to use the 
oldest copy out of several of different date. In 
theory, and very often in practice, the relative age 
of the copies is of no importance ; a sixteenth- 
century manuscript which reproduces a good lost 
copy of the eleventh century is much more valu- 
able than a faulty and retouched copy made in the 

80 



Textual Criticism 

twelfth or thirteenth century. The third impulse 
is still far from being good ; it is to count the 
attested readings and decide by the majority. Sup- 
pose there are twenty copies of a text ; the reading 
A is attested eighteen times, the reading B twice. 
To make this a reason for choosing A is to make the 
gratuitous assumption that all the manuscripts have 
the same authority. This is an error of judgment ; 
for if seventeen of the eighteen manuscripts which 
give the reading A have been copied from the 
eighteenth, the reading A is in reality attested only 
once ; and the only question is whether it is intrinsi- 
cally better or worse than the reading B. 

It has been recognised that the only rational pro- 
cedure is to begin by determining in what relation 
the copies stand to each other. For this purpose 
we adopt as our starting-point the incontrovertible 
axiom that all the copies which contain the same 
mistakes in the same passages must have been either 
copied from each other or all derived from a copy 
containing those mistakes. It is inconceivable that 
several copyists, independently reproducing an original 
free from errors, should all introduce exactly the 
same errors ; identity of errors attests community of 
origin. We shall cast aside without scruple all the 
copies derived from a single manuscript which has 
been preserved. Evidently they can have no value 
beyond what is possessed by their common source ; 
if they differ from it, it can only be in virtue of new 
errors; it would be waste of time to study their 
variations. Having eliminated these, we have before 
us none but independent copies, which have been 
made directly from the archetype, or secondary 

81 F 



Analytical Operations 

copies whose source (a copy taken directly from the 
archetype) has been lost. In order to group the 
secondary copies into families, each of which shall 
represent what is substantially the same tradition, 
we again have recourse fro the comparison of errors. 
By this method we can generally draw up without 
too much trouble a complete genealogical table 
(stemma codicum) of the preserved copies, which will 
bring out very clearly their relative importance. 
This is not the place to discuss the difficult cases 
where, in consequence of too great a number of inter- 
mediaries having been lost, or from ancient copyists 
having arbitrarily blended the texts of different tradi- 
tions, the operation becomes extremely laborious or 
impracticable. Besides, in these extreme cases there 
is no new method involved : the comparison of corre- 
sponding passages is a powerful instrument, but it is 
the only one which criticism has at its disposal for 
this task. 

When the genealogical tree of the manuscripts 
has been drawn up, we endeavour to restore the text 
of the archetype by comparing the different tradi- 
tions. If these agree and give a satisfactory text, 
there is no difficulty. If they differ, we decide be- 
tween them. If they accidentally agree in giving 
a defective text, we have recourse to conjectural 
emendation, as if there were only one copy. 

It is, theoretically, much more advantageous to 
have several independent copies of a lost original 
than to have only one, for the mere mechanical com- 
parison of the different readings is often enough 
to remove obscurities which the uncertain light of 
conjectural criticism would never have illuminated. 

82 



Textual Criticism 

However, an abim dance of manuscripts is an em- 
barrassment rather than a help when the work of 
grouping them has been left undone or done badly ; 
nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the arbitrary 
and hybrid restorations which are founded on copies 
whose relations to each other and to the archetype 
have not been ascertained beforehand. On the other 
hand, the application of rational methods requires, in 
some cases, a formidable expenditure of time and 
labour. Some works are preserved in hundreds of 
copies all differing from each other ; sometimes 
(as in the case of the Gospels) the variants of a 
text of quite moderate extent are to be counted 
by thousands ; several years of assiduous labour are 
necessary for the preparation of a critical edition of 
some mediaeval romances. And after all this labour, 
all these collations and comparisons, can we be sure 
that the text of the romance is sensibly better than 
it would have been if there had been only two 
or three manuscripts to work upon ? No. Some 
critical editions, owing to the apparent wealth of 
material applicable to the work, demand a mechanical 
effort which is altogether out of proportion to the 
positive results which are its reward. 

" Critical editions " founded on several copies of a 
lost original ought to supply the public with the means 
of verifying the " stemma codicum " which the editor 
has drawn up, and should give the rejected variants in 
the notes. By this means competent readers are, at 
the worst, put in possession, if not of the best possible 
text, at least of the materials for constructing it. 1 

1 Quite recently our scholars used to neglect this elementary 
precaution, in order, as they said, to avoid an " air of pedantry." 

83 



Analytical Operations 

II. The results of textual criticism — a kind of 
cleaning and mending — are purely negative. By the 
aid of conjecture, or by the aid of conjecture and 
comparison combined, we are enabled to construct, 
not necessarily a good text, but the best text pos- 
sible, of documents whose original is lost. What 
we thus effect is the elimination of corrupt and 
adventitious readings likely to cause error, and the 
recognition of suspected passages as such. But it is 
obvious that no new information is supplied by this 
process. The text of a document which has been 
restored at the cost of infinite pains is not worth 
more than that of a document whose original has 
been preserved; on the contrary, it is worth less. 
If the autograph manuscript of the iEneid had not 
been destroyed, centuries of collation and conjecture 
would have been saved, and the text of the iEneid 
would have been better than it is. This is intended 
for those who excel at the " emendation game," 1 
who are in consequence fond of it, and would really 
be sorry to have no occasion to play it. 

III. There will, however, be abundant scope for 
textual criticism as long as we do not possess the 

M. B. Haureau has published, in his Notices et extraits de quelques 
manuscrits latins de la Bibliotheque nationale (vi. p. 310), a piece of 
rhythmic verse, "De presbytero et logico." "It is not unedited," 
says he ; " Thomas Wright has already published it. . . . But this 
edition is very defective ; the text is occasionally quite unintelligible. 
We have, therefore, considerably amended it, making use, for this 
purpose, of two copies, which, it must be conceded, are neither 
of them faultless. . . ." The edition follows, with no variants. 
Verification is impossible. 

1 " Textual emendation too often misses the mark through want 
of knowledge of what may be called the rides of the game" (W. M. 
Lindsay, p. v. in the work referred to above). 

84 



Textual Criticism 

exact text of every historical document. In the 
present state of science few labours are more useful 
than those which bring new texts to light or im- 
prove texts already known. It is a real service to 
the study of history to publish unedited or badly 
edited texts in a manner conformable to the rules 
of criticism. In every country learned societies 
without number are devoting the greater part of 
their resources and activity to this important work. 
But the immense number of the texts to be criti- 
cised, 1 and the minute care required by the opera- 
tions of verbal criticism, 2 prevent the work of 

1 It has often been asked whether all texts are worth the trouble 
of "establishing" and publishing them. "Among our ancient 
texts," says M. J. Bddier, referring to French mediaeval literature, 
" which ought we to publish ? Every one. But, it will be asked, 
are we not already staggering under the weight of documents ? 
. . . The following is the reason why publication should be ex- 
haustive. As long as we are confronted by this mass of sealed and 
mysterious manuscripts, they will appeal to us as if they contained 
the answer to every riddle ; every candid mind will be hampered 
by them in its flights of induction. It is desirable to publish them, 
if only to get rid of them and to be able, for the future, to work 
as if they did not exist. . . ." (Revue des Deux Mondes, February 
15, 1894, p. 910). All documents ought to be catalogued, as we 
have already pointed out (p. 31), in order that researchers may be 
relieved of the fear that there may be documents, useful for their 
purposes, of which they know nothing. But in every case where 
a summary analysis of a document can give a sufficient idea of its 
contents, and its form is of no special interest, there is nothing 
gained by publishing it in extenso. We need not overburden our- 
selves. Every document will be analysed some day, but many 
documents will never be published. 

2 Editors of texts often render their task still longer and more 
difficult than it need be by undertaking the additional duty of 
commentators, under the pretext of explaining the text. It would 
be to their advantage to spare themselves this labour, and to dis- 
pense with all annotation which does not belong to the "apparatus 
criticus " proper. See, on this point, T. Lindner, Ueber die Heraus- 

85 



Analytical Operations 

publication and restoration from advancing at any 
but a slow pace. Before all the texts which are of 
interest for mediaeval and modern history shall have 
been edited or re-edited secundum artem, a long 
period must elapse, even supposing that the rela- 
tively rapid pace of the last few years should be 
still further accelerated. 1 

gabe von geschichtlichen Quellen, in the Mitiheilungcn dcs Instituts ficr 
bsterreicJiische Geschichtsforschung, xvi., 1 895, pp. 501 sqq. 

1 To realise this it is enough to compare what has hitherto been 
done by the most active societies, such as the Society of the Monu- 
menta Germanise historica and the Istituto storlco italiano, with what 
still remains for them to do. The greater part of the most ancient 
documents and the hardest to restore, which have long taxed the 
ingenuity of scholars, have now been placed in a relatively satis- 
factory condition. But an immense amount of mechanical work 
has still to be done. 



86 



CHAPTER III 

CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP 

It would be absurd to look for information about a 
fact in the papers of some one who knew nothing, 
and could know nothing, about it. The first ques- 
tions, then, which we ask when we are confronted 
with a document is : Where does it come from ? 
who is the author of it ? what is its date ? A 
document in respect of which we necessarily are in 
total ignorance of the author, the place, and the 
date is good for nothing. 

This truth, which seems elementary, has only 
been adequately recognised in our own day. Such 
is the natural aicpicria of man, that those who were 
the first to make a habit of inquiring into the 
authorship of documents prided themselves, and 
justly, on the advance, they had made. 

Most modern documents contain a precise indica- 
tion of their authorship : in our days, books, news- 
paper articles, official papers, and even private 
writings, are, in general, dated and signed. Many 
ancient documents, on the other hand, are anony- 
mous, without date, and have no sufficient indication 
of their place of origin. 

The spontaneous tendency of the human mind is 
to place confidence in the indications of author- 
ship, when there are any. On the cover and in the 

8 7 



Analytical Operations 

preface of the Chdtiments, Victor Hugo is named as 
the author ; therefore Victor Hugo is the author of 
the Chdtiments. In such and such a picture gallery 
we see an unsigned picture whose frame has been 
furnished by the management with a tablet bearing 
the name of Leonardo da Vinci ; therefore Leonardo 
da Vinci painted this picture. A poem with the 
title Philomena is found under the name of Saint 
Bonaventura in M. Clement's Extraits des pontes 
chre'tiens, in most editions of Saint Bonaventura's 
" works," and in a great number of mediaeval manu- 
scripts ; therefore Philomena was written by Saint 
Bonaventura, and "we may gather thence much 
precious knowledge of the very soul " of this holy 
man. 1 Vrain-Lucas offered to M. Chasles auto- 
graphs of Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Saint Mary 
Magdalene, duly signed, and with the nourishes 
complete : 2 here, thought M. Chasles, are auto- 
graphs of Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Saint Mary 
Magdalene. This is one of the most universal, and 
at the same time indestructible, forms of public 
credulity. 

Experience and reflection have shown the neces- 
sity of methodically checking these instinctive 
impulses of confiding trust. The autographs of 
Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Mary Magdalene had 
been manufactured by Vrain-Lucas. The Philomena, 
attributed by mediaeval scribes now to Saint Bona- 
ventura, now to Louis of Granada, now to John 
Hoveden, now to John Peckham, is perhaps by none 

1 R. de Gourmont, Le Latin mystique (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 258. 

2 See these alleged autographs in the Bibliotheque nationale, 
nouv. acq. fr., No. 709. 

88 



Critical Investigation of Authorship 

of these authors, and certainly not by the first- 
named. Paintings in which there is not the least 
gleam of talent have, in the most celebrated galleries 
of Italy, been tricked out, without the least shadow 
of proof, with the glorious name of Leonardo. On 
the other hand, it is perfectly true that Victor Hugo 
is the author of the Chdtiments. The conclusion is, 
that the most precise indications of authorship are 
never sufficient by themselves. They only afford a 
presumption, strong or weak — very strong, in general, 
where modern documents are concerned, often very 
weak in the case of ancient documents. False 
indications of authorship exist, some foisted upon 
insignificant works in order to enhance their value, 
some appended to works of merit in order to serve 
the reputation of a particular person, or to mystify 
posterity; and there are a hundred other motives 
which may easily be imagined, and of which a 
list has been drawn up: 1 the " pseudepigraphic " 
literature of antiquity and the middle ages is enor- 
mous. There are, in addition, documents which are 
forged from beginning to end; the forgers have 
naturally furnished them with very precise indica- 
tions of their alleged authorship. Verification is 
therefore necessary. But how is it to be had ? 
When the apparent authorship of a document is 
suspected, we use for its verification the same 
method which serves to fix, as far as possible, the 
origin of documents which are furnished with no 
indications at all on this head. As the procedure 

1 F. Blass has enumerated the chief of these motives with refer- 
ence to the pseudepigraphic literature of antiquity (pp. 269 sqq. in 
the work already quoted). 

89 



Analytical Operations 

is the same in both cases, it is not necessary to dis- 
tinguish further between them. 

I. The chief instrument used in the investigation 
of authorship is the internal analysis of the docu- 
ment under consideration, performed with a view to 
bring out any indications it may contain of a nature 
to supply information about the author, and the 
time and place in which he lived. 

First of all we examine the handwriting of the 
document. Saint Bonaventura was born in 1221 ; 
if poems attributed to him are contained in manu- 
scripts executed in the eleventh century, we have in 
this circumstance an excellent proof that the attri- 
bution is ill-founded : no document of which there 
exists a copy in eleventh-century handwriting can 
be posterior in date to the eleventh century. Then 
we examine the language. It is known that certain 
forms have only been used in certain places and at 
certain dates. Most forgers have betrayed them- 
selves by ignorance of facts of this kind ; they let 
slip modern words or phrases. It has been possible 
to establish the fact that certain Phoenician inscrip- 
tions, found in South America, were earlier than a 
certain German dissertation on a point of Phoenician 
syntax. In the case of official instruments we 
examine the formulae. If a document which pur- 
ports to be a Merovingian charter does not exhibit 
the ordinary formulae of genuine Merovingian 
charters it must be spurious. Lastly, we note all 
the positive data which occur in the document — 
the facts which are mentioned or alluded to. When 
these facts are otherwise known, from sources which 
a forger could not have had at his disposal, the 

90 



Critical Investigation of Authorship 

bona fides of the document is established, and the 
date fixed approximately between the most recent 
event of which the author shows knowledge, and 
the next following event which he does not mention 
but would have done if he had known of it. Argu- 
ments may also be founded on the circumstance 
that particular facts are mentioned with approval, or 
particular opinions expressed, and help us to make 
a conjectural estimate of the status, the environ- 
ment, and the character of the author. 

When the internal analysis of a document is care- 
fully performed, it generally gives us a tolerably 
accurate notion of its authorship. By means of a 
methodical comparison, instituted between the various 
elements of the documents analysed and the cor- 
responding elements of similar documents whose 
authorship was known with certainty, the detection 
of many a forgery * has been rendered possible, and 
additional information acquired about the circum- 
stances under which most genuine documents have 
been produced. 

The results obtained by internal analysis are sup- 
plemented and verified by collecting all the external 
evidence relative to the document under criticism 
which can be found scattered over the documents 
of the same or later epochs — quotations, biographical 
details about the author, and so on. Sometimes 

1 E. Bernheim (Lehrbuch, pp. 243 sqq.) gives a somewhat lengthy- 
list of spurious documents, now recognised as such. Here it will 
be enough to recall a few famous hoaxes : Sarchoniathon, Clotilde 
de Surville, Ossian. Since the publication of Bernheim's book 
several celebrated documents, hitherto exempt from suspicion, have 
been struck off the list of authorities. See especially A. Piaget, 
La Chronique des chanoines de Neuchdtel (Neuchatel, 1896, 8vo). 

91 



Analytical Operations 

there is a significant absence of any such informa- 
tion : the fact that an alleged Merovingian charter 
has not been quoted by anybody before the seven- 
teenth century, and has only been seen by a seven- 
teenth-century scholar who has been convicted of 
fraud, suggests the thought that it is modern. 

II. Hitherto we have considered only the simplest 
case, in which the document under examination is 
the work of a single author. But many documents 
have, at different times, received additions which it 
is important to distinguish from the original text, in 
order that we may not attribute to X, the author 
of the text, what really belongs to Y or Z, his 
unforeseen collaborators. 1 There are two kinds of 
additions — interpolations and continuations. To in- 
terpolate is to insert into the text words or sen- 
tences which were not in the author's manuscript. 2 
Usually interpolations are accidental, due to the 
negligence of the copyist, and explicable as the 
introduction into the text of interlinear glosses or 
marginal notes; but there are cases where some 
one has deliberately added to (or substituted for) 
the author's text words or sentences out of his own 
head, for the sake of completeness, ornament, or 
emphasis. If we had before us the manuscript in 
which the deliberate interpolation was made, the 
appearance of the added matter and the traces of 
erasure would make the case clear at once. But 
the first interpolated copy has nearly always been 

1 When the modifications of the primitive text are the work of 
the author himself, they are " alterations." Internal analysis, and 
the comparison of different editions, bring them to light. 

2 See F. Blass, ibid., pp. 254 sqq. 

92 



Critical Investigation of Authorship 

lost, and in the copies derived from it every trace of 
addition or substitution has disappeared. There is 
no need to define " continuations." It is well known 
that many chronicles of the middle ages have been 
" continued " by various writers, none of whom took 
the trouble to indicate where his own work began 
or ended. 

Sometimes interpolations and continuations can 
be very readily distinguished in the course of the 
operations for restoring a text of which there are 
several copies, when it so happens that some of these 
copies reproduce the primitive text as it was before 
any addition was made to it. But if all the copies 
are founded on previous copies which already con- 
tained the interpolations or continuations, recourse 
must be had to internal analysis. Is the style 
uniform throughout the document ? Does the book 
breathe one and the same spirit from cover to cover ? 
Are there no contradictions, no gaps in the sequence 
of ideas ? In practice, when the continuators or in- 
terpolators have been men of well-marked personality 
and decided views, analysis will separate the original 
from the additions as cleanly as a pair of scissors. 
When the whole is written in a level, colourless style, 
the lines of division are not so easy to see ; it is then 
better to confess the fact than to multiply hypotheses. 

III. The critical investigation of authorship is 
not finished as soon as a document has been 
accurately or approximately localised in space and 
time, and as much information as possible obtained 
about the author or authors. 1 Here is a book : we 

1 As a rule it matters little whether the name of the author has 
or lias not been discovered. We read, however, in the Histoire 

93 



Analytical Operations 

wish to ascertain the origin of the information con- 
tained in it, that is, to be in a position to appreciate 
its value ; is it enough to know that it was written 
in 1890, at Paris, by So-and-so? Perhaps So-and-so 
copied slavishly, without mentioning the fact, an 
earlier work, written in 1850. The responsible 
guarantor of the borrowed parts is not So-and-so, 
but the author of 1850. Plagiarism, it is true, is 
now rare, forbidden by the law, and considered dis- 
honourable ; formerly it was common, tolerated, and 
unpunished. Many historical documents, with every 
appearance of originality, are nothing but unavowed 
repetitions of earlier documents, and historians occa- 
sionally experience, in this connection, remarkable 
disillusions. Certain passages in Eginhard, a ninth- 
century chronicler, are borrowed from Suetonius: 
they have nothing to do with the history of the 
ninth century; how if the fact had not been dis- 
covered ? An' event is attested three times, by three 
chroniclers; but these three attestations, which agree 
so admirably, are really only one if it is ascertained 
that two of the three chroniclers copied the third, 
or that the three parallel accounts have been drawn 
from one and the same source. Pontifical letters 
and Imperial charters of the middle ages contain 
eloquent passages which must not be taken seriously ; 
they are part of the official style, and were copied 
word for word from chancery formularies. 

It belongs to the investigation of authorship to 

litleraire de la France (xxvi. p. 388) : " We have ignored anonymous 
sermons : writings of this facile character are of no importance for 
literary history when their authors are unknown." Are they of 
any more importance when we know the authors' names ? 

94 



Critical Investigation of Authorship 

discover, as far as possible, the sources utilised by 
the authors of documents. 

The problem thus presented to us has some 
resemblance to that of the restoration of texts of 
which we have already spoken. In both cases we 
proceed on the assumption that identical readings 
have a common source : a number of different scribes, 
in transcribing a text, will not make exactly the 
same mistakes in exactly the same places; a number 
of different writers, relating the same facts, will not 
have viewed them from exactly the same stand- 
point, nor will they say the same things in exactly 
the same language. The great complexity of his- 
torical events makes it extremely improbable that 
two independent observers should narrate them in 
the same manner. We endeavour to group the 
documents into families in the same way as we 
make families of manuscripts. Similarly, we are 
enabled in the result to draw up genealogical tables. 
The examiners who correct the compositions of can- 
didates for the bachelor's degree sometimes notice 
that the papers of two candidates who sat next 
each other bear a family likeness. If they have a 
mind to find out which is derived from the other, 
they have no difficulty in doing so, in spite of the 
petty artifices (slight modifications, expansions, ab- 
stracts, additions, suppressions, transpositions) which 
the plagiarist multiplies in order to throw suspicion 
off the scent. The two guilty ones are sufficiently 
betrayed by their common errors ; the more culpable 
of the two is detected by the slips he will have 
made, and especially by the errors in his own 
papers which are due to peculiarities in those of 

95 



Analytical Opekations 

his accommodating friend. Similarly when two 
ancient documents are in question : when the 
author of one has copied directly from the other, 
the filiation is generally easy to establish ; the pla- 
giarist, whether he abridges or expands, nearly always 
betrays himself sooner or later. 1 

When there are three documents in a family 
their mutual relationships are sometimes harder to 
specify. Let A, B, and C be the documents. 
Suppose A is the common source : perhaps B and 
C copied it independently ; perhaps C only knew 
A through the medium of B, or B knew it only 
through C. If B and C have abridged the common 
source in different ways, they are evidently inde- 
pendent. When B depends on C, or vice versa, 
we have the simplest case, treated in the preceding 
paragraph. But suppose the author of C combined 
A and B, while B had already used A : the genealogy 
begins to get complicated. It is more complicated 
still when there are four, five, or more documents 
in a family, for the number of possible combina- 
tions increases with great rapidity. However, if too 
many intermediate links have not been lost, criti- 
cism succeeds in disentangling the relationships by 
persistent and ingenious applications of the method 
of repeated comparisons. Modern scholars (Krusch, 
for example, who has made a speciality of Mero- 
vingian hagiography) have recently constructed, by 

1 In very favourable cases the examination of the plagiarist's 
mistakes has made it possible to determine even this style of 
handwriting, the size, and the manner of arrangement of the 
manuscript source. The deductions of the investigation of sources, 
like those of textual criticism, are sometimes supported by obvious 
palseographical considerations. 

96 



Critical Investigation of Authorship 

the use of this method, precise genealogies of the 
utmost solidity. 1 The results of the critical in- 
vestigation of authorship, as applied to the filiation 
of documents, are of two kinds. Firstly, lost docu- 
ments are reconstructed. Suppose two chroniclers, 
B and C, have used, each in his own way, a common 
source X, which has now disappeared. We may 
form an idea of X by piecing together the fragments 
of it which occur imbedded in B and C, just as we 
form an idea of a lost manuscript by comparing the 
partial copies of it which have been preserved. On 
the other hand, criticism destroys the authority of a 
host of " authentic " documents — that is, documents 
which no one suspects of having been falsified — by 
showing that they are derivative, that they are worth 
whatever their sources may be worth, and that, when 
•they embellish their sources with imaginary details 
and rhetorical flourishes, they are worth just nothing 
at all. In Germany and England editors of docu- 
ments have introduced the excellent system of 
printing borrowed passages in small characters, and 
original passages whose source is unknown in larger 
characters. Thanks to this system it is possible to 
see at a glance that celebrated chronicles, which are 
often (very wrongly) quoted, are mere compilations, 
of no value in themselves : thus the Flores historiarum 
of the self-styled Matthew of Westminster, perhaps 
the most popular of the English mediseval chronicles, 

1 The investigations of Julien Havet {Questions me'rovingiennes, 
Paris, 1896, 8vo) are regarded as models. Very difficult problems 
are there solved with faultless elegance. It is also well worth 
while to read the memoirs in which M. L. Delisle has discussed 
questions of origin. It is in the treatment of these questions that 
the most accomplished scholars win their triumphs. 

97 g 



Analytical Operations 

are almost entirely taken from original works by 
Wendover and Matthew of Paris. 1 

IV. The critical investigation of authorship saves 
historians from huge blunders. Its results are 
striking. By eliminating spurious documents, by 
detecting false ascriptions, by determining the con- 
ditions of production of documents which had been 
defaced by time, and by connecting them with their 
sources, 2 it has rendered services of such magnitude 
that to-day it is regarded as having a special right 
to the name of " criticism." It is usual to say of an 
historian that he " fails in criticism " when he neglects 
to distinguish between documents, when he never 
mistrusts traditional ascriptions, and when he accepts, 
as if afraid to lose a single one, all the pieces of 
information, ancient or modern, good or bad, which 
come to him, from whatever quarter. 3 

This view is perfectly just. We must not, how- 
ever, be satisfied with this form of criticism, and we 
must not abuse it. 

1 See the edition of H. R. Luard (vol. i., London, 1890, 8vo) in 
the Rerum Britannicarum medii cevi scriptores. Matthew of West- 
minster's Flores historiarum figure in the Roman " Index," because 
of the passages borrowed from the Chronica majora of Matthew of 
Paris, while the Chronica majora themselves have escaped censure. 

2 It would be instructive to draw up a list of the celebrated his- 
torical works, such as Augustin Thierry's Histoire de la Conquete de 
V Angleterre par les Normands, whose authority has been completely 
destroyed after the authorship of their sources has been studied. 
Nothing amuses the gallery more than to see an historian convicted 
of having built a theory on falsified documents. Nothing is more 
calculated to cover an historian with confusion than to find that he 
has fallen into the error of treating seriously documents which are 
no documents at all. 

3 One of the crudest (and commonest) forms of "uncritical 
method " is that which consists in employing as if they were docu- 
ments, and placing on the same footing as documents, the utterances 

98 



Critical Investigation of Authorship 

We must not abuse it. The extreme ot distrust, 
in these matters, is almost as mischievous as the 
extreme of credulity. Pere Hardouin, who attributed 
the works of Vergil and Horace to mediaeval monks, 
was every whit as ridiculous as the victim of Vrain- 
Lucas. It is an abuse of the methods of this species 
of criticism to apply them, as has been done, indis- 
criminately, for the mere pleasure of it. The 
bunglers who have used this species of criticism to 
brand as spurious perfectly genuine documents, such 
as the writings of Hroswitha, the Ligurinus, and the 
bull Unam Sanctam, 1 or to establish imaginary 
filiations between certain annals, on the strength 
of superficial indications, would have discredited 
criticism before now if that had been possible. It 
is praiseworthy, certainly, to react against those 
who never raise a doubt about the authorship of a 
document ; but it is carrying the reaction too far to 
take an exclusive interest in periods of history which 
depend on documents of uncertain authorship. The 
only reason why the documents of modern and con- 
temporary history are found less interesting than 
those 6f antiquity and the early middle ages, is that 
the identity which nearly always obtains between 
their apparent and their real authorship leaves no 
room for those knotty problems of attribution in 
which the virtuosi of criticism are accustomed to dis- 
play their skill. 2 

of modern authors on the subject of documents. Novices do not 
make a sufficient distinction, in the works of modern authors, 
between what is added to the original source and what is taken 
from it. 

* See a list of examples in Bernheim's Handbuch, pp. 283, 289. 

2 It is because it is necessary to subject documents of mediaeval 

99 



Analytical Operations 

Nor must we be content with it. The critical 
investigation of authorship, like textual criticism, is 
preparatory, and its results negative. Its final aim 
and crowning achievement is to get rid of documents 
which are not documents, and which would have 
misled us ; that is all. " It teaches us not to use bad 
documents ; it does not teach us how to turn good 
ones to account." * It is not the whole of " historical 
criticism ; " it is only one stone in the edifice. 2 

and ancient history to the most searching criticism in respect of 
authorship that the study of antiquity and the middle ages passes 
for more " scientific " than that of modern times. The truth is, that 
it is merely hampered by more preliminary difficulties. 

1 Revue philosophique, 1887, ii. p. 170. 

2 The theory of the critical investigation of authorship is now 
settled, ne varietur ; it is given in detail in Bernheim's Lehrbuch, 
pp. 242-340. For this reason we have had no scruple in dismissing 
it with a short sketch. In French, the introduction of M. G. Monod 
to his Etudes critiques sur les sources de Vkistoire me'rovingienne 
(Paris, 1872, 8vo) contains elementary considerations on the subject. 
Cf. Revue Critique, 1873, *• P« 3°§- 



IOO 



CHAPTER IV 

CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES 

By the help of the preceding operations the docu- 
ments, all the documents, let us suppose, of a given 
class, or relating to a given subject, have been found. 
We know where they are ; the text of each has been 
restored, if necessary, and each has been critically 
examined in respect of authorship. We know where 
they have come from. It remains to combine and 
classify the materials thus verified. This is the 
last of the operations which may be called prepa- 
ratory to the work of higher (or internal) criticism 
and construction. 

Whoever studies a point of history is obliged, 
first of all, to classify his sources. To arrange, in a 
rational and convenient manner, the verified mate- 
rials before making use of them, is an apparently 
humble, but really very important, part of the his- 
torian's profession. Those who have learnt how 
to do it possess, on that account alone, a marked 
advantage : they give themselves less trouble, and 
they obtain better results ; the others waste their 
time and labour ; they are smothered sometimes 
under the disorderly mass of notes, extracts, copies, 
scraps, which they themselves have accumulated. 
Who was it spoke of those busy people who spend 
their lives lifting building-stones without knowing 

IOI 



Analytical Operations 

where to place them, raising as they do so clouds 
of blinding dust ? 

I. Here, again, we have to confess that the first, 
the natural impulse, is not the right one. The 
first impulse of most men who have to utilise a 
number of texts is to make notes from them, one 
after another, in the order in which they study 
them. Many of the early scholars (whose papers 
we possess) worked on this system, and so do most 
beginners who are not warned beforehand ; the latter 
keep, as the former kept, notebooks, which they fill 
continuously and progressively with notes on the 
texts they are interested in. This method is utterly 
wrong. The materials collected must be classified 
sooner or later ; otherwise it would be necessary, 
when occasion arose, to deal separately with the 
materials bearing on a given point, to read right 
through the whole series of notebooks, and this 
laborious process would have to be repeated every 
time a new detail was wanted. If this method 
seems attractive at first, it is because it appears to 
save time. But this is false economy; the ulti- 
mate result is, an enormous addition to the labour 
of search, and great difficulty in combining the 
materials. 

Others, well understanding the advantages of 
systematic classification, have proposed to fit their 
materials, as fast as collected, into their appropriate 
places in a prearranged scheme. For this purpose 
they use notebooks of which every page has first 
been provided with a heading. Thus all the entries 
of the same kind are close to one another. This 
system leaves something to be desired; for addi- 

102 



Critical Classification of Sources 

tions will not always fit without inconvenience into 
their proper place ; and the scheme of classification, 
once adopted, is rigid, and can only be modified 
with difficulty. Many librarians used to draw up 
their catalogues on this plan, which is now uni- 
versally condemned. 

There is a still more barbarous method, which 
need not receive more than passing mention. This 
is simply to register documents in the memory 
without taking written notes. This method has 
been used. Historians endowed with excellent 
memories, and lazy to boot, have indulged this 
whim, with the result that their quotations and 
references are mostly inexact. The human memory 
is a delicate piece of registering apparatus, but it is 
so little an instrument of precision that such pre- 
sumption is inexcusable. 

Every one admits nowadays that it is advisable to 
collect materials on separate cards or slips of paper. 
The notes from each document are entered upon a 
loose leaf furnished with the precisest possible in- 
dications of origin. The advantages of this artifice 
are obvious : the detachability of the slips enables 
us to group them at will in a host of different com- 
binations ; if necessary, to change their places : it is 
easy to bring texts of the same kind together, and 
to incorporate additions, as they are acquired, in the 
interior of the groups to which they belong. As for 
documents which are interesting from several points 
of view, and which ought to appear in several groups, 
it is sufficient to enter them several times over on 
different slips ; or they may be represented, as often 
as may be required, on reference-slips. Moreover, 

103 



Analytical Operations 

the method of slips is the only one mechanically 
possible for the purpose of forming, classifying, and 
utilising a collection of documents of any great 
extent. Statisticians, financiers, and men of letters 
who observe, have now discovered this as well as 
scholars. 

The method of slips is not without its drawbacks. 
Each slip ought to be furnished with precise refer- 
ences to the source from which its contents have 
been derived ; consequently, if a document has been 
analysed upon fifty different slips, the same refer- 
ences must be repeated fifty times. Hence a slight 
increase in the amount of writing to be done. It 
is certainly on account of this trivial complication 
that some obstinately cling to the inferior notebook 
system. Again, in virtue of their very detachability, 
the slips, or loose leaves, are liable to go astray ; and 
when a slip is lost how is it to be replaced ? To 
begin with, its disappearance is not perceived, and, 
if it were, the only remedy would be to go right 
through all the work already done from beginning 
to end. But the truth is, experience has suggested 
a variety of very simple precautions, which we need 
not here explain in detail, by which the draAvbacks 
of the system are reduced to a minimum. It is 
recommended to use slips of uniform size and tough 
material, and to arrange them at the earliest oppor- 
tunity in covers or drawers or otherwise. Every 
one is free to form his own habits in these matters. 
But it is well to realise beforehand that these 
habits, according as they are more or less rational 
and practical, have a direct influence on the results 
of scientific work. Renan speaks of " these points 

104 



Critical Classification of Sources 

of private librarianship which make up the half of 
scientific work." x This is not too strong. One 
scholar will owe a good part of his well-deserved 
reputation to his method of collecting, while another 
will be, so to speak, paralysed by his clumsiness in 
that particular. 2 

After having collected the documents, whether 
copied in extenso or abridged, on slips or loose leaves, 
we classify them. On what scheme ? In what order ? 
Clearly different cases must be treated differently, 
and it would not be reasonable to lay down precise 
formulae to govern them. all. However, we may give 
a few general considerations. 

II. We distinguish between the historian who 
classifies verified documents for the purposes of 
historical work, and the scholar who compiles 
" Regesta" By the words " Regesta " and " Corpus " 
we understand methodically classified collections of 
historical documents. In a " Corpus " documents 
are reproduced in extenso ; in " Regesta " they are 
analysed and described. 

The use of these compilations is to assist re- 
searchers in collecting documents. Scholars set 
themselves to perform, once for all, tasks of search 
and classification from which, thanks to them, the 
public will henceforth be free. 

Documents may be grouped according to their 

1 Renan, Feuilles ditacMes, p. 103. 

2 It would be very interesting to have information on the methods 
of work of the great scholars, particularly those who undertook 
long tasks of collection and classification. Some information of 
this kind is to be found in their papers, and occasionally in their 
correspondence. On the methods of Du Cange, see L. Feugere, Etude 
sur la vie et les ouvrages de Du Cange (Paris, 1858, 8vo), pp. 62 sqq. 

105 



Analytical Operations 

date, according to their place of origin, according to 
their contents, according to their form. 1 Here we 
have the four categories of time, place, species, and 
form; by superposing, then, we obtain divisions of 
smaller extent. We may undertake, for example, to 
make a group of all the documents having a given 
form, of a given country, and lying between two 
given dates (French royal charters of the reign 
of Philip Augustus) ; or of all the documents of a 
given form (Latin inscriptions) ; or of a given species 
(Latin hymns) ; of a given epoch (antiquity, the 
middle ages). We may recall, by way of illustra- 
tion, the existence of a Corpus Inscriptionum Grse- 
carum, of a Corpus Inscriptionum Zatinarum, of a 
Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, the 
Regesta Imperii of J. F. Bohmer and his continuators, 
the Regesta Pontificum Romanorum of P. Jaffe and 
A. Potthast. 

Whatever the division chosen, there are two 

1 See J. G. Droysen, Grundriss cler Hitiorik, p. 19 : " Critical 
classification does not exclusively adopt the chronological point 
of view. . . . The more varied the points of view which criticism 
uses to group materials, the more solid are the results yielded by 
converging lines of inquiry." 

The system has now been abandoned of grouping documents in a 
Corpus or in regesta, as was done formerly, because they have the 
common characteristic of being unedited, or possibly for the exactly 
opposite reason. At one time the compilers of Analecta, Reliquioz 
manuscriptorum, "treasuries of anecdota," spicilegia, and so on, used 
to publish all the documents of a certain class which had the com- 
mon feature of being unedited and of appearing interesting to them ; 
on the other hand, Georgisch {Regesta Chronologico-diplomatica), Bre- 
quigny {Table chronologique des dipldmes, chartes et actes imprimis 
concemant Vhistoire de France), Wauters {Table chronologique des 
chartes et dipldmes imprimis concemant Vhistoire de Belgique), have 
grouped together all the documents of a certain species which had 
the common character of having been printed. 

I06 



Critical Classification of Sources 

alternatives : either the documents to be placed in 
this division are dated or they are not. 

If they are dated, as is the case, for example, 
with the charters issued from the chancery of a 
prince, care will have been taken to place at the 
head of each slip the date (expressed in modern 
reckoning) of the document entered upon it. No- 
thing is then easier than to group in chronological 
order all the slips, that is, all the documents, which 
have been collected. The rule is to use chrono- 
logical classification whenever possible. There is 
only one difficulty, and that is of a practical order. 
Even in the most favourable circumstances some 
of the documents will have accidentally lost their 
dates ; these dates the compiler is bound to restore, 
or at least to attempt to restore; long and patient 
research is necessary for the purpose. 

If the documents are not dated, a choice must 
be made between the alphabetical, the geographical, 
and the systematic order. The history of the Corpus 
of Latin inscriptions bears witness to the difficulty 
of this choice. "The arrangement according to 
date was impossible, seeing that most of the inscrip- 
tions are not dated. From the time of Smetius it 
was usual to divide them into classes, that is, a 
distinction was made, resting solely on the contents 
of the inscription, and having no regard to their 
place of origin, between religious, sepulchral, mili- 
tary, and poetical inscriptions, those which have 
a public character, and those which only concern 
private persons, and so on. Boeckh, although he 
had preferred the geographical arrangement for his 
Corpus Inscriptionum Grsecarum, was of opinion that 

107 



Analytical Operations 

the arrangement by subjects, which had been hitherto 
employed, was the only possible one for a Latin 
Corpus. . . ." [Even those who, in France, proposed 
the geographical arrangement] " wished to make an 
exception of texts relating to the general history of 
a country, certainly, at any rate, in the case of the 
Empire; in 1 845 Zumpt defended a very complicated 
eclectic system of this kind. In 1847 Mommsen 
still rejected the geographical arrangement except 
for municipal inscriptions, and in 1852, when he 
published the Inscriptions of the Kingdom of Naples, 
he had not entirely changed his opinion. It was 
only on being charged by the Academy of Berlin 
with the publication of the Corpus Inscriptionum 
Latinarum, that, grown wise by experience, he re- 
jected even the exceptions proposed by Egger in 
the case of the general history of a province, and 
thought it his duty to keep to the geographical 
arrangement pure and simple." x And yet, consider- 
ing the nature of epigraphic documents, the arrange- 
ment according to place was the only rational one. 
This has been amply demonstrated for more than 
fifty years ; but collectors of inscriptions did not 
come to an agreement on the subject till after two 
centuries of tentative efforts in different directions. 
For two centuries collections of Latin inscriptions 
have been made without any perception of the fact 
that "to group inscriptions according to their sub- 
jects is much the same thing as to publish an 
edition of Cicero in which his speeches, treatises, 
and letters should be cut up and the fragments 

1 J. P. Waltzing, Recueil g4n4ral des inscriptions latines (Louvain, 
1892, 8vo), p. 41. 

108 



Critical Classification of Sources 

arranged according to their subject-matter ; " that 
" epigraphic monuments belonging to the same 
territory mutually explain each other when placed 
side by side ; " and, lastly, that " while it is all but 
impossible to range in order of subject-matter a 
hundred thousand inscriptions nearly all of which 
belong to several categories ; on the other hand, 
each monument has but one place, and a very 
definite place, in the geographical order." 1 

The alphabetical arrangement is very convenient 
when the chronological and geographical arrange- 
ments are unsuitable. There are documents, such 
as the sermons, the hymns, and the secular songs 
of the middle ages, which are not precisely dated 
or localised. They are arranged in the alphabetical 
order of their incipit — that is, the words with which 
they begin. 2 

The systematic order, or arrangement by sub- 
jects, is not to be recommended for the compilation 
of a Corpus or of regesta. It is always arbitrary, and 

1 Ibid. When the geographical order is adopted, a difficulty 
arises from the fact that the origin of certain documents is un- 
known ; many inscriptions preserved in museums have been brought 
there no one knows whence. The difficulty is analogous to that 
which results, for chronological regesta, from documents without 
date. 

2 Here the only difficulty arises in the case of documents whose 
incipit has been lost. In the eighteenth century Siguier devoted 
a great part of his life to the construction of a catalogue, in the 
alphabetical order of the incipit, of the Latin inscriptions, to the 
number of 50,000, which had at that time been published : he 
searched through some twelve thousand works. This vast compila- 
tion has remained unpublished and useless. Before undertaking 
work of such magnitude it is well to make sure that it is on a 
rational plan, and that the labour — the hard and thankless labour — 
will not be wasted. 

109 



Analytical Operations 

leads to inevitable repetition and confusion. Be- 
sides, given collections arranged in chronological, 
geographical, or alphabetical order, nothing more 
than the addition of a good table of contents is 
needed to make them available for all the purposes 
which would be served by a systematic arrange- 
ment. One of the chief rules of the art of Corpus 
and 7'egesta-mak.mg, that great art which has been 
carried to such perfection in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, 1 is to provide these collections, 
whatever the grouping adopted, with a variety of 
tables and indexes of a kind to facilitate the use 
of them : incipit tables in chronological regesta which 
lend themselves to such treatment, indexes of names 
and dates in regesta arranged by order of incipit, and 
so on. 

Corpus and regesta-m.Sik.eYS collect and classify for 
the use of others documents in which, at any rate 
in all of which, they have no direct interest, and 
are absorbed in this labour. Ordinary workers, on 
the other hand, only collect and classify materials 
useful for their individual studies. Hence certain 
differences arise. For example, the arrangement by 
subjects, on a predetermined system, which is so 
little to be recommended for great collections, often 
provides those who are composing monographs on 
their own account with a scheme of classification 
preferable to any other. But it will always be well 
to cultivate the mechanical habits of which pro- 
fessional compilers have learnt the value by experi- 
ence : to write at the head of every slip its date, 

1 See G. Waitz, Ueber die Herausgabe und Bearbeitung von Begesten, 
in the Historische Zeitschrift, xl. (1878), pp. 280-95. 

IIO 



Ckitical Classification of Sources 

if there is occasion for it, and a heading 1 in any 
case ; to multiply cross-references and indices ; to 
keep a record, on a separate set of slips, of all the 
sources utilised, in order to avoid the danger of 
having to work a second time through materials 
already dealt with. The regular observance of these 
maxims goes a great way towards making scientific 
historical work easier and more solid. The posses- 
sion of a well- arranged, though incomplete, collection 
of slips has enabled M. B. Haureau to exhibit to 
the end of his life an undeniable mastery over the 
very special class of historical problems which he 
studied. 2 

1 In the absence of a predetermined logical order, and when the 
chronological order is not suitable, it is sometimes an advantage to 
provisionally group the documents (that is, the slips) in the alpha- 
betical order of the words chosen as headings (ScMagworter). This 
is what is called the " dictionary system." 

2 See Langlois, Manuel de bibliographie historiquc, i. p. 88. 



Ill 



CHAPTER V 

CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS 

The sum of the operations described in the pre- 
ceding chapters (restoration of texts, investigation 
of authorship, collection and classification of verified 
documents) constitutes the vast domain of external 
criticism, or critical scholarship. 

The public at large, with its vulgar and super- 
ficial standards, has nothing but disdain for the 
whole of critical scholarship. Some of its votaries, 
on the other hand, are inclined to exalt it unduly. 
But there is a happy medium between these extremes 
of over-appreciation and contempt. 

The crude opinion of those who pity and despise 
the minute analysis of external criticism hardly 
deserves refutation. There is only one argument 
for the legitimacy and honourable character of 
the obscure labours of erudition, but it is a de- 
cisive argument: it rests on their indispensability. 
No erudition, no history. " Non sunt contemnenda 
quasi parva" says St. Jerome, u sine quibus magna 
const are non possunt." 1 

On the other hand, scholars by profession, in their 
zeal to justify their pride in their work, are not con- 

1 This argument is easy to develop, and often has been, recently 
by M. J. Bddier, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, February 15, 1894, 
pp. 932 sqq. 

There are some who willingly admit that the labours of erudition 
112 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

tent with maintaining its necessity; they allow them- 
selves to be carried away into an exaggeration of its 
merit and importance. It has been said that the 
sure methods of external criticism have raised 
history to the dignity of a science, " of an exact 
science ; " that critical investigations of authorship 
"enable us, better than any other study, to gain 
a profound insight into past ages;" that the habit 
of criticising texts refines or even confers the 
" historical sense." It has been tacitly assumed 
that external criticism is the whole of historical 
criticism, and that beyond the purgation, emenda- 
tion, and classification of documents there is nothing 
left to do. This illusion, common enough among 
specialists, is too crude to need express refutation; 
the fact is, that it is the psychological criticism 
which deals with interpretation and examines into 
the good faith and accuracy of authors that has, 
better than any other study, enabled us to gain a pro- 
found insight into past ages, not external criticism. 1 
An historian who should be fortunate enough to 
find all the documents bearing on his studies 
already edited correctly, classified, and critically 

are useful, but ask impatiently whether " the editing of a text " or 
"the deciphering of a Gothic parchment" is "the supreme effort 
of the human mind," and whether the intellectual ability implied 
by the practice of external criticism does or does not justify " all 
the fuss made over those who possess it." On this question, 
obviously devoid of importance, a controversy was held between 
M. Brunetiere, who recommended scholars to be modest, and M. 
Boucherie, who insisted on their reasons for being proud, in the 
pages of the Revue des langucs romanes, 1880, vols. i. and ii. 

1 There have been men who were critics of the first water where 
external criticism alone was concerned, but who never rose to 
the conception of higher criticism, or to a true understanding 
of history. 

113 H 



Analytical Operations 

examined as to authorship, would be in just as 
good a position to use thern for writing history 
as if he had performed all the preliminary opera- 
tions himself. It is quite possible, whatever may 
be said, to have the historical sense in full measure 
without having ever, both literally and figuratively, 
wiped away the dust from original documents — that 
is, without having discovered and restored them for 
oneself. We need not interpret in the Jewish or 
etymological sense the dictum of Renan : " I do not 
think it possible for any one to acquire a clear 
notion of history, its limits, and the amount of 
confidence to be placed in the different categories 
of historical investigation, unless he is in the habit 
of handling original documents." l This is to be 
understood as simply referring to the habit of 
going direct to the sources, and treating definite 
problems. 2 Without doubt a day will come when 
ail the documents relating to the history of classical 
antiquity shall have been edited and treated criti- 
cally. There will then be no more room, in this 
department of study, for textual criticism or the 
investigation of sources ; but, for all that, the condi- 
tions for the treatment of general ancient history, 
or special parts of it, will be then eminently favour- 
able. External criticism, as we cannot too often 
repeat, is entirely preparatory; it is a means, not 
an end ; the ideal state of things would be that 
it should have been already sufficiently practised 

1 Renan, Essais de morale et de critique, p. 36. 

2 " If it were only for the sake of the severe mental discipline, 
I should not think very highly of the philosopher who had not, at 
least once in his life, worked at the elucidation of some special 
point " (L'Avenir de la science, p. 136). 

II 4 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

that we might dispense with it for the future ; it 
is only a temporary necessity. Theoretically, not 
only is it unnecessary for those who wish to make 
historical syntheses to do for themselves the pre- 
paratory work on the materials which they use, 
but we have a right to ask, as has been often 
asked, whether there is any advantage in their 
doing it. 1 Would it not be preferable that workers 
in the field of history should specialise ? On the 
one class — the specialists — would devolve the ab- 
sorbing tasks of external or erudite criticism; the 
others, relieved of the weight of these tasks, would 
have greater liberty to devote themselves to the 
work of higher criticism, of combination and con- 
struction. Such was the opinion of Mark Pattison, 
who said, History cannot he written from manuscripts, 
which is as much as to say : " It is impossible for 
a man to write history from documents which he 
is obliged to put for himself into a condition in 
which they can be used." 

Formerly the professions of " critical scholar " 
and " historian " were, in fact, clearly distinguished. 
The " historians " cultivated the empty and pompous 
species of literature which then was known as " his- 
tory," without considering themselves bound to keep 
in touch with the work of the scholars. The latter, 
for their part, determined by their critical researches 
the conditions under which history must be written, 
but were at no pains to write it themselves. Content 
to collect, emend, and classify historical documents, 

1 On the question whether it is necessary for every one to do 
"all the preliminary grubbing for himself," cf. J. M. Robertson, 
"Buckle and His Critics" (London, 1895, 8vo), p. 299. 

115 



Analytical Operations 

they took no interest in history, and understood the 
past no better than did the mass of their contem- 
poraries. The scholars acted as though erudition 
were an end in itself, and the historians as if they 
had been able to reconstruct vanished realities by 
the mere force of reflection and ingenuity applied to 
the inferior documents, which were common pro- 
perty. So complete a divorce between erudition 
and history seems to-day almost inexplicable, and 
it was in truth mischievous enough. We need not 
say that the present advocates of the division of 
labour in history have nothing of the kind in view. 
It is admittedly necessary that close relations should 
obtain between the world of historians and that of 
critical scholars, for the work of the latter has no 
reason for existence beyond its utility to the former. 
All that is meant is, that certain analytical and all 
synthetic operations are not necessarily better per- 
formed when they are performed by the same 
person ; that though the characters of historian and 
scholar may be combined, there is nothing illegi- 
timate in their separation; and that perhaps this 
separation is desirable in theory, as, in practice, it is 
often a necessity. 

In practice, what happens is as follows. What- 
ever part of history a man undertakes to study, 
there are only three possible cases. In the first the 
sources have already been emended and classified; 
in the second the preliminary work on the sources, 
which has been only partially done, or not at all, 
offers no great difficulty; in the third the sources 
are in a very bad state, and require a great deal 
of labour to fit them for use. We may observe, in 

116 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

passing, that there is naturally no proportion be- 
tween the intrinsic importance of the subject and 
the amount of preliminary work which must be 
done before it can be treated : there are some sub- 
jects of the highest interest, for example the history 
of the origin and early development of Christianity, 
which could not be properly attacked till after the 
completion of investigations which occupied several 
generations of scholars; but the material criticism 
of the sources of the history of the French Revolu- 
tion, another subject of the first rank, gave much 
less trouble ; and there are comparatively unimpor- 
tant problems in mediaeval history which will not 
be solved till after an immense amount of external 
criticism shall have been performed. 

In the two first cases the expediency of a division 
of labour does not come in question. But take the 
third case. A man of ability discovers that the 
documents which are necessary for the treatment 
of a point of history are in a very bad condition ; 
they are scattered, corrupt, and untrustworthy. He 
must take his choice ; either he must abandon the 
subject, having no taste for the mechanical opera- 
tions which he knows to be necessary, but which, 
as he foresees, would absorb the whole of his energy ; 
or else he resolves to enter upon the preparatory 
critical work, without concealing from himself that 
in all probability he will never have time to utilise 
the materials he has verified, and that he will there- 
fore be working for those who will come after him. 
If he adopts the second alternative he becomes a 
critical scholar by profession, as it were in spite of 
himself. A priori, it is true, there is nothing to 

117 



Analytical Operations 

prevent those who make great collections of texts 
and publish critical editions from using their own 
compilations and editions for the writing of history ; 
and we see, as a matter of fact, that several men 
have divided themselves between the preparatory 
tasks of external criticism and the more exalted 
labours of historical construction: it is enough to 
mention the names of Waitz, Mommsen, and 
Haur^au. But this combination is very rare, for 
several reasons. The first is the shortness of life ; 
there are catalogues, editions, regesta on a great scale, 
the construction of which entails so much mecha- 
nical labour as to exhaust the strength of the most 
zealous worker. The second is the fact that, for 
many persons, the tasks of critical scholarship are 
not without their charm ; nearly every one finds 
in them a singular satisfaction in the long run ; 
and some have confined themselves to these tasks 
who might, strictly speaking, have aspired to higher 
things. 

Is it a good thing in itself that some workers 
should, voluntarily or not, confine themselves to 
the researches of critical scholarship ? Yes, without 
a doubt. In the study of history, the results of the 
division of labour are the same as in the industrial 
arts, and highly satisfactory — more abundant, more 
successful, better regulated production. Critics who 
have been long habituated to the restoration of texts 
restore them with incomparable dexterity and sure- 
ness ; those who devote themselves exclusively to 
investigations of authorship and sources have in- 
tuitions which would not occur to others less versed 
in this difficult and highly specialised branch ; those 

118 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

who have spent their lives in the construction of 
catalogues and the compilation of regesta construct 
and compile them more easily, more quickly, and 
better than the man in the street. Thus, not only 
is there no special reason for requiring every " his- 
torian" to be at the same time an active worker 
in the field of critical scholarship, but even those 
scholars who are engaged in the operations of ex- 
ternal criticism come under different categories. 
Similarly, in a stoneyard there is no point in the 
architect being at the same time a workman, nor 
have all the workmen the same functions. Although 
most critical scholars have not rigorously specialised 
so far, and although they vary their pleasures by 
voluntarily executing different kinds of critical work, 
it would be easy to name some who are specialists 
in descriptive catalogues and indexes (archivists, 
librarians, and the like), others who are more parti- 
cularly " critics " (purifiers, restorers, and editors of 
texts), and others who are pre-eminently compilers 
of regesta. " The moment it is admitted that erudi- 
tion is only valuable for the sake of its results, it 
becomes impossible to carry the division of scientific 
labour too far ; " * and the progress of the historical 
sciences corresponds to the narrower and narrower 
specialisation of the workers. It was possible, not 
very long ago, for the same man to devote himself 
successively to all the operations of historical in- 
quiry, but that was because he appealed to a not 
very exacting public : nowadays we require of those 
who criticise documents a minute accuracy and an 
absolute perfection which presuppose real professional 

1 Renan, UAvenir de la science, p. 230. 
IIO 



Analytical Opeeations 

skill. The historical sciences have now reached a 
stage in their evolution at which the main lines 
have been traced, the great discoveries made, and 
nothing remains but a more precise treatment of 
details. We feel instinctively that any further 
advance must be by dint of investigations of such 
extent, and analyses of such depth, as none but 
specialists are capable of. 

But the best justification of the division of workers 
into " scholars " and " historians " (and of the distri- 
bution of the former among the various branches of 
external criticism) is to be found in the fact that 
different persons have a natural vocation for dif- 
ferent tasks. One of the chief justifications of the 
institution of higher historical teaching is, in our 
opinion, the opportunity afforded the teachers (pre- 
sumably men of experience) of discerning in the 
students, in the course of their university career, 
either the germ of a vocation for critical scholar- 
ship, or fundamental unfitness for critical work, 
as the case may be. 1 Criticus non fit, sed nascitur. 
For one who is not endowed by nature with certain 
aptitudes, a career of technical erudition has nothing 
but disappointments in store : the greatest service 
that can be rendered to young men hesitating 
whether to adopt such a career or not is to warn 
them of the fact. Those who hitherto have devoted 
themselves to the preparatory tasks of criticism have 
either chosen them in preference to others because 

1 A university professor is in a very good position for discouraging 
and encouraging vocations ; but "it is by personal effort that the 
goal (critical skill) must be attained by the students, as Waitz well 
said in an academic oration ; the teacher's part in this work is 
small . . ." (Revue Critique, 1874, ii. p. 232). 

I20 



Ceitical Scholarship and Scholars 

they had a taste for them, or else have submitted to 
them because they knew they were necessary ; those 
who engaged in them by choice have less merit, from 
the ethical point of view, than those who submitted 
to them, but, for all that, they have mostly obtained 
better results, because they have worked, not as a 
matter of duty, but joyfully and whole-heartedly. 
It is important that every one should realise the 
situation, and, in his own as well as the general 
interest, embrace the special work which suits him 
best. 

We now propose to examine the natural aptitudes 
which fit, and the truly prohibitory defects which 
disqualify, for the labours of external criticism. We 
shall, then, devote a few words to the effects pro- 
duced on the character by professional habituation 
to the labours of critical scholarship. 

The chief condition of success in these labours is 
to like them. Those who are exceptionally gifted 
as poets or thinkers — that is, those who are endowed 
with creative power — have much difficulty in adapt- 
ing themselves to the technical drudgery of prepara- 
tory criticism: they are far from despising it; on 
the contrary, they hold it in honour, if they are 
clear-sighted ; but they shrink from devoting them- 
selves to it, for fear of using a razor, as is said, 
to cut stones. "I have no mind," wro*3 Leibnitz 
to Basnage, who had exhorted him to compile an 
immense Corpus of unpublished and printed docu- 
ments relating to the history of the law of nations ; 
" I have no mind to turn transcriber. . . . Does it not 
occur to you that the advice you give me resembles 
that of a man who should wish to marry his friend 

121 



Analytical Operations 

to a shrew ? For to engage a man in a lifelong 
work is much the same as to find him a wife." 1 
And Renan, speaking of those immense preliminary 
labours " which have rendered possible the researches 
of the higher criticism " and attempts at historical 
construction, says : " The man who, with livelier 
intellectual needs [than those of the men who per- 
formed these labours], should now accomplish such 
an act of abnegation, would be a hero. . . ." 2 Al- 
though Renan directed the publication of the Corpus 
Inscri-ptionum Semiticaribm, and Leibnitz was the 
editor of the Scrijotorcs rerum Brunsvicensium, neither 
Leibnitz, nor Renan, nor their peers have, fortunately, 
had the heroism to sacrifice their higher faculties to 
purely critical learning. 

Outside the class of superior men (and the in- 
finitely more numerous class of those who wrongly 
think themselves such), nearly every one, as we have 
already said, finds in the long run a kind of satisfac- 
tion in the minutiae of preparatory criticism. The 
reason is, that the practice of this criticism appeals 
to and develops two very widespread tastes — the 
taste for collecting and the taste for puzzles. The 
pleasure of collecting is one which is felt not by 
children only, but by adults as well, no matter 
whether the collection be one of various readings 
or of postage-stamps. The deciphering of rebuses, 
the solution of small problems of strictly definite 
scope, are occupations which attract many able 
minds. Every find brings pleasure, and in the 

1 Quoted by Fr. X. von Wegele, Geschichte der deutschen Historio- 
graphie (Munchen, 1 885, 8vo), p. 653. 

2 Renan, ibid., p. 125. 

122 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

field of erudition there are innumerable finds — some 
lying exposed and obvious, some guarded by all but 
impenetrable barriers — to reward both those who do 
and those who do not delight in surmounting diffi- 
culties. All the scholars of any distinction have 
possessed in an eminent degree the instincts of the 
collector and the puzzle-solver, and some of them 
have been quite conscious of the fact. " The more 
difficulties we encountered in our chosen path," says 
M. Haur^au, " the more the enterprise pleased us. 
This species of labour, which is called bibliography 
[investigations of authorship, principally from the 
point of view of pseudepigraphy], could not aspire 
to the homage of the public, but it has a great 
attraction for those who devote themselves to it. 
Yes, it is doubtless a humble study, but how many 
others are there which so often compensate the 
trouble they give by affording us opportunity to 
cry Eureka." 1 Julien Havet, when he was " already 
known to the learned men of Europe," used to 
divert himself "by apparently frivolous amuse- 
ments, such as guessing square words or decipher- 
ing cryptograms." 2 Profound instincts, and, for all 
the childish or ridiculous perversions which they 
may exhibit in certain individuals, of the highest 
utility ! After all, these are forms, the most rudi- 
mentary forms, of the scientific spirit. Those who 
are devoid of them have no place in the world of 

1 B. Haureau, Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la 
Bibliotldque nationals, i. (Paris, 1890, 8vo), p. v. 

2 Bibliotheque de V Ecole des chartes, 1896, p. 88. Compare analogous 
traits in the interesting intellectual biography of the Hellenist, 
palaeographer, and bibliographer, Charles Graux, by E. Lavisse 
(Questions d'enseignement national, Paris, 1885, j8mo, pp. 265 sqq.). 

123 



Analytical Operations 

critical scholarship. But those who aspire to be 
critical scholars will always be numerous; for the 
labours of interpretation, construction, and exposi- 
tion require the rarest gifts : all those whom chance 
has thrown into the study of history, who desire to 
do useful work in that department, but are wanting 
in psychological tact, or find composition irksome, 
will always allow themselves to be fascinated by the 
simple and calm pleasures of the preliminary tasks. 

But in order to succeed in critical labours it is 
not enough to like them. It is necessary to pos- 
sess qualifications " for which zeal is no substitute." 
What qualifications ? Those who have asked this 
question have answered vaguely : " Qualifications of 
the moral rather than the intellectual order, patience, 
intellectual honesty. . . ." Is it not possible to be 
more precise ? 

There are young students with no a priori repug- 
nance for the labours of external criticism, who 
perhaps are even disposed to like them, who yet 
are — experience has shown it — totally incapable of 
performing them. There would be nothing perplex- 
ing in this if these persons were intellectually feeble ; 
this incapacity would then be but one manifestation 
of their general weakness ; nor yet if they had gone 
through no technical apprenticeship. But we are 
concerned with men of education and intelligence, 
sometimes of exceptional ability, who do not labour 
under the above disadvantages. These are the people 
of whom we hear : " He works badly, he has the 
genius of inaccuracy." Their catalogues, their edi- 
tions, their regesta, their monographs swarm with 
imperfections, and never inspire confidence; try as 

124 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

they may, they never attain, I do not say abso- 
lute accuracy, but any decent degree of accuracy. 
They are subject to " chronic inaccuracy," a 
disease of which the English historian Froude is a 
typical and celebrated case. Froude was a gifted 
writer, but destined never to advance any statement 
that was not disfigured by error ; it has been said 
of him that he was constitutionally inaccurate. For 
example, he had visited the city of Adelaide in 
Australia : " We saw," says he, " below us, in a basin 
with a river winding through it, a city of 1 5 0,000 
inhabitants, none of whom has ever known or will 
ever know one moment's anxiety as to the recurring 
regularity of his three meals a day." Thus Froude, 
now for the facts : Adelaide is built on an eminence ; 
no river runs through it ; when Froude visited it the 
population did not exceed 75,000, and it was suffer- 
ing from a famine at the time. And more of the 
same kind. 1 Froude was perfectly aware of the 
utility of criticism, and he was even one of the first 
in England to base the study of history on that of 
original documents, as well unpublished as published ; 
but his mental conformation rendered him altogether 
unfit for the emendation of texts; indeed, he mur- 
dered them, unintentionally, whenever he touched 
them. Just as Daltonism (an affection of the organs 
of sight which prevents a man from distinguishing 
correctly between red and green signals) incapacitates 
for employment on a railway, so chronic inaccuracy, 
or " Froude's Disease " (a malady not very difficult to 
diagnose) ought to be regarded as incompatible with 
the professional practice of critical scholarship. 

1 See H. A. L. Fisher in the Fortnightly Review, Dec. 1894, p. 815. 

i"<5 



Analytical Operations 

Froude's Disease does not appear to have ever 
been studied by the psychologists, nor, indeed, is it 
to be considered as a separate pathological entity. 
Every one makes mistakes " out of carelessness," 
" through inadvertence," and in many other ways. 
What is abnormal is to make many mistakes, to be 
always making them, in spite of the most persever- 
ing efforts to be exact. Probably this phenomenon 
is connected with weakness of the attention and 
excessive activity of the involuntary (or subcon- 
scious) imagination which the will of the patient, 
lacking strength and stability, is unable sufficiently 
to control. The involuntary imagination intrudes 
upon intellectual operations only to vitiate them ; its 
part is to fill up the gaps of memory by conjecture, 
to magnify and attenuate realities, and to confuse 
them with the products of pure invention. Most 
children distort everything by inexactitude of this 
kind, and it is only after a hard struggle that they 
ever attain to a scrupulous accuracy — that is, learn 
to master their imagination. Many men remain 
children, in this respect, the whole of their lives. 

But, let the psychological causes of Froude's 
Disease be what they may, another point claims our 
attention. The man of the sanest and best-balanced 
mind is liable to bungle the simplest kinds of critical 
work if he does not allow them the necessary time. 
In these matters precipitancy is the source of in- 
numerable errors. It is rightly said that patience 
is the cardinal virtue of the scholar. Do not work 
too fast, act as if there were always something to be 
gained by waiting, leave work undone rather than 
spoil it: these are maxims easy enough to pro- 

126 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

nounce, but not to be followed in practice by any 
but persons of calm temperament. There are ner- 
vous, excitable persons, who are always in a hurry 
to get to the end, always seeking variety in their 
occupations, and always anxious to dazzle and 
astonish : these may possibly find honourable em- 
ployment in other careers; but if they embrace 
erudition, they are doomed to pile up a mass of 
provisional work, which is likely to do more harm 
than good, and is sure in the long run to cause them 
many a vexation. The true scholar is cool, reserved, 
circumspect. In the midst of the turmoil of life, 
which flows past him like a torrent, he never hurries. 
Why should he hurry ? The important thing is, 
that the work he does should be solid, definitive, 
imperishable. Better " spend weeks polishing a 
masterpiece of a score of pages" in order to con- 
vince two or three among the scholars of Europe 
that a particular charter is spurious, or take ten 
years to construct the best possible text of. a cor- 
rupt document, than give to the press in the same 
interval volumes of moderately accurate anccdota 
which future scholars will some day have to put 
through the mill again from beginning to end. 

Whatever special branch of critical scholarship a 
man may choose, he ought to be gifted with prudence, 
an exceptionally powerful attention and will, and, 
moreover, to combine a speculative turn of mind with 
complete disinterestedness and little taste for action ; 
for he must make up his mind to work for distant 
and uncertain results, and, in nearly every case, for 
the benefit of others. For textual criticism and the 
investigation of sources, it is, moreover, very useful 

127 



Analytical Operations 

to have the puzzle-solving instinct — that is, a nimble, 
ingenious mind, fertile in hypotheses, prompt to seize 
and even to guess the relations of things. For tasks 
of description and compilation (the preparation of 
inventories and catalogues, corpus and regesta-m.Sik.mg) 
it is absolutely necessary to possess the collector's 
instinct, together with an exceptional appetite for 
Avork, and the qualities of order, industry, and perse- 
verance. 1 These are the aptitudes required. The 
labours of external criticism are so distasteful to 
those who lack these aptitudes, and the results 
obtained are, in their case, so small in comparison 
with the time expended, that it is impossible for a 
man to make too sure of his vocation before entering 
upon a career of critical scholarship. It is pitiful to 
see those who, for want of a wise word spoken in 
due season, lose their way and vainly exhaust them- 
selves in such a career, especially when they have 
good reason for believing that they might have 
employed their talents to better advantage in other 
directions. 2 

II. As critical and preparatory tasks are remark- 
ably well suited to the temperament of a very large 

1 Most of those who have a vocation for critical scholarship 
possess both the power of solving problems and the taste for 
collecting. It is, however, easy to divide them into two categories 
according as they show a marked preference for textual criticism 
and investigation of authorship on the one hand, or for the more 
absorbing and less intellectual labours of collection on the other. 
J. Havet, a past-master in the study of erudite problems, always 
declined to undertake a general collection of Merovingian royal 
charters, a work which his admirers expected from him. In this 
connection he readily admitted his "want of taste for feats of 
endurance" {Bibliotheque de Vficole des chartes, 1896, p. 222). 

2 It is common to hear the opposite of this maintained, namely, 
that the labours of critical scholarship (external criticism) have this 

128 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

number of Germans, and as the activity of German 
erudition during the present century has been enor- 
mous, it is to Germany that we must go for the best 
cases of those mental deformations which are pro- 
duced, in the long run, by the habitual practice 
of external criticism. Hardly a year passes but 
complaints are heard, in and about the German 
universities, of the ill effects produced on scholars 
by the tasks of criticism. 

In 1 890, Herr Philippi, as Rector of the University 
of Giessen, forcibly deplored the chasm which, as he 
said, is opening between preparatory criticism and 
general culture : textual criticism loses itself in 
insignificant minutiae ; scholars collate for the mere 
pleasure of collating ; infinite precautions are em- 
ployed in the restoration of worthless documents ; 
it is thus evident that " more importance is attached 
to the materials of study than to its intellectual 
results." The Rector of Giessen sees in the diffuse 
style of German scholars and in the bitterness of 
their polemical writings an effect of the habit they 
have contracted of " excessive preoccupation with 
little things." 1 In the same year the same note 

advantage over other labours in the field of history that they are 
within the range of average ability, and that the most moderate 
intellects, after a suitable preliminary drilling, may be usefully 
employed in them. It is quite true that men with no elevation of 
soul or power of thought can make themselves useful in the field of 
criticism, but then they must have special qualities. The mistake 
is to think that with good will and a special drilling every one 
without exception can be fitted for the operations of external 
criticism. Among tho.-e who are incapable of these operations, as 
well as among those who are fitted for them, there are both men of 
sense and blockheads. 

1 A. Philippi, Einige Bemerlungen ilber den philologischen Unter- 
richt, Giessen, 1890, 4to. Cf. Revue Critique, 1892, i. p. 25. 

129 I 



Analytical Operations 

was sounded, at the University of Bale, by Herr J. v. 
Pflugk-Harttung. " The highest branches of historical 
science are despised," says this author in his Geschichts- 
betrachtungen 1 : " all that is valued is microscopic 
observations and absolute accuracy in unimportant 
details. The criticism of texts and sources has 
become a branch of sport : the least breach of the 
rules of the game is considered unpardonable, while 
conformity to them is enough to assure the approval 
of connoisseurs, irrespectively of the intrinsic value 
of the results obtained. Scholars are mostly male- 
volent and discourteous towards each other; they 
make molehills and call them mountains; their 
vanity is as comic as that of the citizen of Frankfort 
who used complacently to observe, '■ All that you can 
see through yonder archway is Frankfort territory.' " 2 
We, for our part, are inclined to draw a distinction 
between three professional risks to which scholars 
are subject : dilettantism, hypercriticism, and loss of 
the power to work. 

To take the last first : the habit of critical analysis 
has a relaxing and paralysing action on certain 
intelligences. Men, of naturally timid dispositions, 
discover that whatever pains they take with their 
critical work, their editing or classifying of docu- 
ments, they are \ery apt to make slight mistakes, 
and these slight mistakes, as a result of their critical 
education, fill them with horror and dread. To 
discover blunders in their signed work when the 
time for correction is past, causes them acute suffer- 
ing. They reach at length a state of morbid anxiety 

1 J. von Pflugk-Harttung, Geschichtsbetrachtungen, Gotha, 1890, 8vo 

2 Ibid., p. 21. 

130 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

and scrupulosity which prevents them from doing 
anything at all, for fear of possible imperfections. 
The examen rigorosum to which they are continually 
subj ecting themselves brings them to a standstill. 
They give the same measure to the productions of 
others, and in the end they see in historical works 
nothing but the authorities and the notes, the appa- 
ratus criticus, and in the apparatus criticus they see 
nothing but the faults in it which require correction. 
Hyper criticism. — The excess of criticism, just as 
much as the crudest ignorance, leads to error. It 
consists in the application of critical canons to cases 
outside their jurisdiction. It is related to criticism 
as logic- chopping is to logic. There are persons 
who scent enigmas everywhere, even where there 
are none. They take perfectly clear texts and sub- 
tilise on them till they make them doubtful, under 
the pretext of freeing them from imaginary corrup- 
tions. They discover traces of forgery in authentic 
documents. A strange state of mind S By constantly 
guarding against the instinct of credulity they come 
to suspect everything. 1 It is to be observed that 
in proportion as the criticism of texts and sources 
makes positive progress, the danger of hypercriticism 
increases. When all the sources of history have 
been properly criticised (for certain parts of ancient 
history this is no distant prospect), good sense will 
call a halt. But scholars will refuse to halt ; they 
will refine, as they do already on the best established 
texts, and those who refine will inevitably fall into 
hypercriticism. " The peculiarity of the study of 
history and its auxiliary philological sciences," says 

1 Cf. supra, p. 99. 

J 3i 



Analytical Operations 

Renan, " is that as soon as they have attained their 
relative perfection they begin to destroy themselves." * 
Hypercriticisrn is the cause of this. 

Dilettantism. — Scholars by profession and voca- 
tion have a tendency to treat the external criti- 
cism of documents as a game of skill, difficult, but 
deriving an interest, much as chess does, from the 
very complication of its rules. Some of them are 
indifferent to the larger questions — to history itself, 
in fact. They criticise for the sake of criticism, 
and, in their view, the elegance of the method of 
investigation is much more important than the 
results, whatever they may be. These virtuosi are 
not concerned to connect their labours with some 
general idea — to criticise systematically, for example, 
all the documents relating to a question, in order to 
understand it ; they criticise indiscriminately texts 
relating to all manner of subjects, on the one con- 
dition of being sufficiently corrupt. Armed with 
their critical skill, they range over the whole of 
the domain of history, and stop wherever a knotty 
problem invites their services ; this problem solved, 
or at least discussed, they go elsewhere to look for 
others. They leave behind them no coherent work, 
but a heterogeneous collection of memoirs on every 
conceivable subject, which resembles, as Carlyle 
says, a curiosity shop or an archipelago of small 
islands. 

Dilettanti defend their dilettantism by sufficiently 
plausible arguments. To begin with, say they, 
everything is important ; in history there is no 
document which has not its value : " No scientific 

1 Renan, L'Avenir de la science, p. xiv. 
132 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

work is barren, no truth is without its use for 
science . . . ; in history there is no such thing as 
a trivial subject ; " consequently, "it is not the 
nature of the subject which makes work valuable, 
but the method employed." 1 The important thing 
in history is not " the ideas one accumulates ; it is 
the mental gymnastics, the intellectual training — in 
short, the scientific spirit." Even supposing that 
there are degrees of importance among the data of 
history, no one has a right to maintain a priori 
that a document is " useless." What, pray, is the 
criterion of utility in these matters ? How many 
documents are there not which, after being long 
despised, have been suddenly placed in the fore- 
ground by a change of standpoint or by new dis- 
coveries ? " All exclusion is rash ; there is no 
research which it is possible to brand beforehand 
as necessarily sterile. That which has no value in 
itself may become valuable as a necessary means." 
Perhaps a day may come when, science being in 
a sense complete, indifferent documents and facts 
may be safely thrown overboard ; but we are not at 
present in a position to distinguish the superfluous 
from the necessary, and in all probability the line 
of demarcation will never be easy to trace. This 
justifies the most special researches and the most 
futile in all appearance. And, if it come to the 
worst, what does it matter if there is a certain 
amount of work wasted ? " It is a law in science, 
as in all human effort," and indeed in all the opera- 
tions of nature, " to work in broad outlines, with a 
wide margin of what is superfluous." 

1 Revue historique, lxiii. (1897), p. 320. 
133 



Analytical Operations 

We shall not undertake to refute these argu- 
ments to the full extent in which this is possible. 
Besides, Renan, who has put the case for both sides 
of the question with equal vigour, definitively closed 
the debate in the following words : " It may be said 
that some researches are useless in the sense of 
taking up time which would have been better spent 
on more serious questions. . . . Although it is not 
necessary for an artisan to have a complete know- 
ledge of the work he is employed to execute, it is 
still to be desired that those who devote themselves 
to special labours should have some notion of the 
more general considerations which alone give value 
to their researches. If all the industrious workers 
to whom modern science owes its progress had had 
a philosophical comprehension of what they were 
doing, how much precious time would have been 
saved ! ... It is deeply to be regretted that there 
should be such an immense waste of human effort, 
merely for want of guidance, and a clear conscious- 
ness of the end to be pursued." * 

Dilettantism is incompatible with a certain eleva- 
tion of mind, and with a certain degree of " moral 
perfection," but not with technical proficiency. 
Some of the most accomplished critics merely make 
a trade of their skill, and have never reflected on 
the ends to which their art is a means. It would, 
however, be wrong to infer that science itself has 
nothing to fear from dilettantism. The dilettanti 

1 Renan, ibid., pp. 122, 243. The same thought has been more 
than once expressed, in different language, by E. Lavisse, in his 
addresses to the students of Paris (Questions d'enseiguement national, 
pp. 14, 86, &c). 

134 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

of criticism who work as fancy or curiosity bids 
them, who are attracted to problems not by their 
intrinsic importance, but by their difficulty, do not 
supply historians (those whose work it is to combine 
materials and use them for the main purposes of 
history) with the materials of which the latter have 
the most pressing need, but with others which might 
have waited. If the activity of specialists in external 
criticism were exclusively directed to questions whose 
solution is important, and if it were regulated and 
guided from above, it would be more fruitful. 

The idea of providing against the dangers of 
dilettantism by a rational "organisation of labour" 
is already ancient. Fifty years ago it was common 
to hear people talking of " supervision," of " con- 
centrating scattered forces ; " dreams were rife of 
" vast workshops " organised on the model of those 
of modern industry, in which the preparatory labours 
of critical scholarship were to be performed on a 
great scale, in the interests of science. In nearly 
all countries, in fact, governments (through the 
medium of historical committees and commissions), 
academies, and learned societies have endeavoured 
in our day, much as monastic congregations did of 
old, to group professed scholars for the purposes of 
vast collective enterprises, and to co-ordinate their 
efforts. But this banding of specialists in external 
criticism for the service and under the supervi- 
sion of competent men presents great mechanical 
difficulties. The problem of the " organisation of 
scientific labour " is still the order of the day. 1 

1 One of us (M. Langlois) poposes to give elsewhere a detailed 
account of all that has been done in the last three hundred years, 

135 



Analytical Operations 

III. Scholars are often censured for pride and 
excessive harshness in the judgments which they 
pass on the labours of their colleagues; and these 
faults, as we have seen, are often attributed to their 
excessive "preoccupation with little things," espe- 
cially by persons whose attempts have been severely 
judged. In reality there do exist modest and 
kindly scholars : it is a question of character : pro- 
fessional "preoccupation with little things" is not 
enough to change natural disposition in this respect. 
" Ce bon monsieur Du Cange," as the Benedictines 
said, was modest to excess. "Nothing more is 
required," says he, in speaking of his labours, "but 
eyes and fingers in order to do as much and more ; " 
he never blamed any one, on principle. " If I study 
it is for the pleasure of studying, and not to give 
pain to any one else, any more than to myself." 1 
It is, however, true that most scholars have no com- 
punction in exposing each other's mistakes, and 
that their austere zeal sometimes finds expression 
in harsh and overbearing language. Barring the 
harshness they are quite right. Like physicians, 
chemists, and other members of learned and scien- 
tific professions, they have a keen appreciation of 
the value of scientific truth, and it is for this 
reason that they make a point of calling offenders 

but especially in the nineteenth century, for the organisation of 
historical work in the principal countries of the world. Some 
information has already been collected on this subject by J. 
Franklin Jameson, "The Expenditures of Foreign Governments in 
behalf of History," in the "Annual Report of the American His- 
torical Association for 1891," pp. 38-61. 

1 L. Feugere, tltude sur la vie et les ouvrages de Du Cange, pp. 

55, 58. 

136 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

to account. They are thus enabled to bar the door 
against the tribe of incapables and charlatans who 
once infested their profession. 

Among the youths who propose to devote them- 
selves to the study of history there are some in 
whom the commercial spirit and vulgar ambition are 
stronger than the love of science. These are apt to 
say to themselves : " Historical work, if it is to be 
done according to the rules of method, requires an 
infinite amount of labour and caution. But do we 
not see historical writings whose authors have more 
or less seriously violated the rules ? Are these 
authors thought any the less of on this account ? Is 
it always the most conscientious writer who enjoys 
the highest consideration ? Cannot tact supply the 
place of knowledge ? " If tact really could supply the 
place of knowledge, then, as it is easier to do bad 
work than good, and as the important thing with 
these people is success, they might be tempted to 
conclude that it does not matter how badly they 
work as long as they succeed. Why should not 
things go in these matters as they do in life, where 
it is not necessarily the best men that get on best ? 
Well, it is due to the pitiless severity of the critics 
that calculations of this kind would be as disastrous 
as they are despicable. 

Towards the end of the Second Empire there was 
in France no enlightened public opinion on the sub- 
ject of historical work. Bad books of historical 
erudition were published with impunity, and some- 
times even procured undeserved rewards for their 
authors. It was then that the founders of the Revue 
Critique- d'histoire et delitUrature undertook to combat 

137 



Analytical Operations 

a state of things which they rightly deemed demo- 
ralising. With this object they administered public 
chastisement to those scholars who showed lack of 
conscience or method, in a manner calculated to 
disgust them with erudition for ever. They per- 
formed sundry notable executions, not for the pleasure 
of it, but with the firm resolve to establish a censor- 
ship and a wholesome dread of justice, in the domain 
of historical study. Bad workers henceforth received 
no quarter, and though the Revue did not exert any 
great influence on the public at large, its police- 
operations covered a wide enough radius to impress 
most of those concerned with the necessity of sincerity 
and respect for method. During the last twenty- 
five years the impulse thus given has spread beyond 
all expectation. 

It is now a matter of great difficulty to impose on 
the world of scholars, in matters connected with their 
studies, or at least to keep up the deception for any 
length of time. In the case of the historical sciences, 
as well as the sciences proper, it is now too late to 
found a new error or to discredit an old truth. It 
may be a few months, possibly a few years, before 
a bungled experiment in chemistry or a scamped 
edition is recognised as such; but inexact results, 
though temporarily accepted under reserve, are always 
sooner or later, and generally very soon, discovered, 
denounced, and eliminated. The theory of the 
operations of external criticism is now so well estab- 
lished, the number of specialists thoroughly versed 
in them is now so great in every country, that, 
with rare exceptions, descriptive catalogues of docu- 
ments, editions, regesta, monographs, are scrutinised, 

138 



Critical Scholarship and Scholars 

dissected, and judged as soon as they appear. It is 
well to be warned. It will for the future be the 
height of imprudence to risk publishing a work of 
erudition without having first done everything pos- 
sible to make it unassailable ; otherwise it will im- 
mediately, or after brief delay, be attacked and 
demolished. Not knowing this, certain well-meaning 
persons still show themselves, from time to time, 
simple enough to enter the lists of critical scholar- 
ship insufficiently prepared ; they are filled with a 
desire to be useful, and are apparently convinced 
that here, as in politics and elsewhere, it is possible 
to work by extemporised and approximate methods 
without any " special knowledge." They are sorry 
afterwards. The knowing ones do not take the risk ; 
the tasks of critical scholarship have no seductions 
for them, for they are aware that the labour is great 
and the glory moderate, and that the field is en- 
grossed by clever specialists not too well disposed 
towards intruders. They see plainly there is no 
room for them here. The blunt uncompromising 
honesty of the scholars thus delivers them from un- 
desirable company of a kind which the " historians " 
proper have still occasionally to put up with. 

Bad workers, in fact, on the hunt for a public 
less closely critical than the scholars, are very ready 
to take refuge in historical exposition. The rules of 
method are here less obvious, or, rather, not so well 
known. While the criticism of texts and sources 
has been placed on a scientific basis, historical syn- 
thesis is still performed haphazard. Mental con- 
fusion, ignorance, negligence — faults which stand 
out so clearly in works of critical scholarship — may 

139 



Analytical Operations 

in historical works be disguised up to a certain point 
by literary artifices, and the public at large, which is 
not well educated in this respect, is not shocked. 1 
In short, there is still, in this department, a cer- 
tain chance of impunity. This chance, however, is 
diminishing, and a day will come, before so very long, 
when the superficial writers who make incorrect syn- 
theses will be treated with as little consideration 
as is now received by those who show themselves 
unscrupulous or unskilful in the technique of pre- 
paratory criticism. The works of the most cele- 
brated historians of the nineteenth century, those 
who died but yesterday, Augustin Thierry, Ranke, 
Fustel de Coulanges, Taine, and others, are already 
battered and riddled with criticism. The faults of 
their methods have already been seen, denned, and 
condemned. 

Those who are insensible to other considerations 
ought to be moved to honesty in historical work by 
the reflection that the time is now past, or nearly so, 
when it was possible to do bad work without having 
to suffer for it. 

1 Even the specialists in external criticism themselves, when they 
do not take the line of despising all synthesis a priori, are almost 
as easily dazzled as anybody else by incorrect syntheses, by a show 
of "general ideas," or by literary artifices, in spite of their clear- 
sightedness where works of critical scholarship are concerned. 



140 



SECTION II.— INTERNAL CRITICISM 
CHAPTER VI 

INTERPEETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC) 

I. When a zoologist describes the form and situation 
of a muscle, when a physiologist gives the curve of 
a movement, we are able to accept their results 
without reserve, because we know by what method, 
by what instruments, by what system of notation 
they have obtained them. 1 But when Tacitus says 
of the Germans, Arva per annos mutant, we do not 
know beforehand whether he took the right method 
to inform himself, nor even in what sense he used 
the words arva and mutant ; to ascertain this a pre- 
liminary operation is required. 2 This operation is 
internal criticism. 

The object of criticism is to discover what, in a 
document may be accepted as true. Now the docu- 
ment is only the final result of a long series of 
operations, on the details of which the author gives 

1 The sciences of observation do, however, need a species of 
criticism. We do not accept without verification results obtained 
by anybody, but only results obtained by those who know how to 
work. But this criticism is made once for all, and applies to the 
author, not to his works ; historical criticism, on the contrary, is 
obliged to deal separately with every part of a document. 

2 Cf. supra, book ii. chap. i. p. 67. 

I 4 I 



Analytical Operations 

us no information. He had to observe or collect 
facts, to frame sentences, to write down words ; and 
these operations, which are perfectly distinct one 
from another, may not all have been performed 
with the same accuracy. It is therefore necessary 
to analyse the product of the author's labour in 
order to distinguish which operations have been 
incorrectly performed, and reject their results . 
Analysis is thus necessary to criticism ; all criticism 
begins with analysis. 

In order to be logically complete, the analysis 
ought to reconstruct all the operations which the 
author must have performed, and to examine them 
one by one, to see whether each has been performed 
correctly. It would be necessary to pass in review 
all the successive acts by which the document was 
produced, from the moment when the author ob- 
served the fact which is its subject up to the move- 
ments of his hand by which he traced the letters of 
the document ; or, rather, it would be necessary to 
proceed in the opposite direction, step by step, from 
the movements of the hand back to the observation. 
This method would be so long and so tedious that 
no one would ever have the time or the patience 
to apply it. 

Internal criticism is not, like external criticism, 
an instrument used for the mere pleasure of using 
it ; * it yields no immediate satisfaction, because it 
does not definitively solve any problem. It is only 
applied because it is necessary, and its use is re- 
stricted to a bare minimum. The most exacting 
historian is satisfied with an abridged method which 

1 Cf. supra, p. 122. 
I 4 2 



Interpretative Criticism 

concentrates all the operations into two groups : ( i ) 
the analysis of the contents of the document, and 
the positive interpretative criticism which is neces- 
sary for ascertaining what the author meant ; (2) 
the analysis of the conditions under which the 
document was produced, and its negative criticism, 
necessary for the verification of the author's state- 
ments. This twofold division of the labour of 
criticism is, moreover, only employed by a select 
few. The natural tendency, even of historians who 
work methodically, is to read the text with the 
object of extracting information directly from it, 
without any thought of first ascertaining what 
exactly was in the author's mind. 1 This procedure 
is excusable at most in the case of nineteenth-century 
documents, written by men whose language and 
mode of thought are familiar to us, and then only 
when there is not more than one possible inter- 
pretation. It becomes dangerous as soon as the 
author's habits of language or thought begin to 
differ from those of the historian who reads him, 
or when the meaning of the text is not obvious 
and indisputable. Whoever, in reading a text, is 
not exclusively occupied with the effort to under- 
stand it, is sure to read impressions of his own 
into it; he is struck by phrases or words in the 
document which correspond to his own ideas, or 
agree with his own a priori notion of the facts ; 
unconsciously he detaches these phrases or words, 

1 Taine appears to have proceeded thus in vol. ii., La Revolution, 
of hig Origines de la France conUmporaine^ He had made extracts 
from unpublished documents and inserted a great number of them 
in his work, but it would seem that he did not first methodically 
analyse them in order to determine their meaning. 

143 



Analytical Operations 

and forms out of them an imaginary text which he 
puts in the place of the real text of the author. 1 

1 Fustel de Coulanges explains very clearly the danger of this 
method: "Some students begin by forming an opinion . . . and 
it is not till afterwards that they begin to read the texts. They 
run a great risk of not understanding them at all, or of understand- 
ing them wrongly. What happens is that a kind of tacit contest 
goes on between the text and the preconceived opinions of the 
reader ; the mind refuses to grasp what is contrary to its idea, and 
the issue of the contest commonly is, not that the mind surrenders 
to the evidence of the text, but that the text yields, bends, and 
accommodates itself to the preconceived opinion. . . . To bring one's 
personal ideas into the study of texts is the subjective method. 
A man thinks he is contemplating an object, and it is his own idea 
that he is contemplating. He thinks he is observing a fact, and 
the fact at once assumes the colour and the significance his mind 
wishes it to have. He thinks he is reading a text, and the words 
of the text take a particular meaning to suit a ready-made opinion. 
It is this subjective method which has done most harm to the 
history of the Merovingian epoch. ... To read the texts was not 
enough ; what was required was to read them before forming any 
convictions . . ." (Monarchic franque, p. 31). For the same reason 
Fustel de Coulanges deprecated the reading of one document in 
the light of another ; he protested against the custom of explaining 
the Germania of Tacitus by the barbaric laws. In the Revue des 
questions historiques, 1897, vol. i., a lesson on method, De V analyse 
des textes historiques, is given apropos of a commentary by M. 
Monod on Gregory of Tours : " The historian ought to begin his 
work with an exact analysis of each document. ... The analysis 
of a text . . . consists in determining the sense of each word, and 
eliciting the true meaning of the writer. . . . Instead of searching 
for the sense of each of the historian's words, and for the thought 
he has expressed in them, he [M. Monod] comments on each sen- 
tence in the light of what is found in Tacitus or the Salic law. . . . 
We should understand what analysis really is. Many talk about 
it, few use it. . . . The use of analysis is, by an attentive study 
of every detail, to elicit from a text all that is in it ; not to intro- 
duce into the text what is not there." 

After reading this excellent advice it will be instructive to read 
M. Monod's reply (in the Revue historique) ; it will be seen that 
Fustel de Coulanges himself did not always practise the method 
he recommended. 

I44 



Interpretative Criticism 

II. Here, as always in. history, method consists 
in repressing the first impulse. It is necessary to 
be penetrated by the principle, sufficiently obvious 
but often forgotten, that a document only contains 
the ideas of the man who wrote it, and to make 
it a rule to begin by understanding the text by 
itself, before asking what can be extracted from it 
for the purposes of history. We thus arrive at this 
general rule of method : the study of every docu- 
ment should begin with an analysis of its contents, 
made with the sole aim of determining the real 
meaning of the author. 

This analysis is a preliminary operation, distinct 
and independent. Experience here, as in the tasks 
of critical scholarship, 1 has decided in favour of the 
system of slips. Each slip will contain the analysis 
of a document, of a separate part of a document, 
or of an episode in a narrative ; the analysis ought 
to indicate not only the general sense of the text, 
but also, as far as possible, the object and views of 
the author. It will be well to reproduce verbally 
any expressions which may seem characteristic of 
the author's thought. Sometimes it will be enough 
to have analysed the text mentally : it is not always 
necessary to put down in black and white the whole 
contents of a document ; in such cases we simply 
enter the points of which we intend to make use. 
But against the ever-present danger of substituting 
one's personal impressions for the text there is only 
one real safeguard ; it should be made an invariable 
rule never on any account to make an extract from 
a document, or a partial analysis of it, without 

1 Cf. supra, p. 103. 

145 K 



Analytical Operations 

having first made a comprehensive analysis x of it 
mentally, if not on paper. 

To analyse a document is to discern and isolate 
all the ideas expressed by the author. Analysis 
thus reduces to interpretative criticism. 

Interpretation passes through two stages ; the first 
is concerned with the literal, the second with the 
real meaning. 

III. The determination of the literal meaning of 
a document is a linguistic operation; accordingly, 
Philology (in the narrow sense) has been reckoned 
among the auxiliary sciences of history. To under- 
stand a text it is first necessary to know the lan- 
guage. But a general knowledge of the language is 
not enough. In order to interpret Gregory of Tours, 
it is not enough to know Latin in a general way ; it 
is necessary to add a special study of the particular 
kind of Latin written by Gregory of Tours. 

The natural tendency is to attribute the same 
meaning to the same word wherever it occurs. We 
instinctively treat a language as if it were a fixed 
system of signs. Fixity, indeed, is a characteristic 
of the signs which have been expressly invented for 
scientific use, such as algebraical notation or the 
nomenclature of chemistry. Here every expression 
has a single precise meaning, which is absolute and 
invariable ; it expresses an accurately analysed and 
defined idea, only one such idea, and that always the 
same in whatever context the expression may occur, 

1 The work of analysis may be entrusted to a second person ; 
this is what happens in the case of regesta and catalogues of 
records ; if the analysis has been correctly performed by the com- 
piler of regesta, there is no need to do it over again. 

I46 



Interpretative Criticism 

and by whatever author it may be used. But ordi- 
nary language, in which documents are written, 
fluctuates : each word expresses a complex and ill- 
defined idea; its meanings are manifold, relative, 
and variable ; the same word may stand for several 
different things, and is used in different senses by 
the same author according to the context ; lastly, 
the meaning of a word varies from author to author, 
and is modified in the course of time. Vel, which 
in classical Latin only has the meanings or and even, 
means and in certain epochs of the middle ages ; 
suffragium, which is classical Latin for suffrage, takes 
in mediaeval Latin the sense of help. We have, then, 
to learn to resist the instinct which leads us to ex- 
plain all the expressions of a text by their classical 
or ordinary meanings. The grammatical interpre- 
tation, based on the general rules of the language, 
must be supplemented by an historical interpreta- 
tion founded on an examination of the particular 
case. 

The method consists in determining the special 
meaning of the words in the document ; it rests on 
a few very simple principles. 

(i) Language changes by continuous evolution. 
Each epoch has a language of its own, which must 
be treated as a separate system of signs. In order 
to understand a document Ave must know the lan- 
guage of the time — that is, the meanings of words and 
forms of expression in use at the time when the text 
was written. The meaning of a word is to be deter- 
mined by bringing together the passages where it is 
employed : it will generally be found that in one or 
other of these the remainder of the sentence leaves 

H7 



Analytical Operations 

no doubt as to the meaning of the word in ques- 
tion. 1 Information of this kind is given in historical 
dictionaries, such as the Thesaurus Linguae Latinm ; 
or the glossaries of Du Cange. In these compila- 
tions the article devoted to each word is a collection 
of the passages in which the word occurs, accom- 
panied by indications of authorship which fix the 
epoch. 

When the author wrote in a dead language which 
he had learnt out of books — this is the case with 
the Latin texts of the earlier middle ages— we must 
be on our guard against words used in an arbitrary 
sense, or selected for the sake of elegance : for 
example, consul (count, earl), capite census (censitary), 
agellus (grand domain). 

(2) Linguistic usage may vary from one region 
to another ; we have, then, to know the language of 
the country where the document was written — that is, 
the peculiar meanings current in the country. 

(3) Each author has his own manner of writing; 
we have, then, to study the language of the author, 
the peculiar senses in which he used words. 2 This 
purpose is served by lexicons to a single author, as 
Meusel's Lexicon Ccesarianum, in which are brought 

1 Practical examples of this procedure will be found in Deloche, 
La Truslis et Vantrustion royal (Paris, 1873, 8vo), and, above all, in 
E'ustel de Coulanges. See especially the study of the words marca 
(Recherches sur quelques problemcs dliistoire, pp. 322-56), mallus (ibid., 
372-402), alien {U Alien et le domaine rural, pp. 149-70), portio (ibid., 
pp. 239-52). 

2 The theory and an example of this procedure will be found 
in Fustel de Coulanges, Recherches sur quelques problimes d'histoire 
(pp. 189-289), with reference to the statements of Tacitus about 
the Germans. See especially pp. 263-89, the discussion of the 
celebrated passage on the German mode of culture. 

I48 



Interpretative Criticism 

together all the passages in which the author used 
each word. 

(4) An expression changes its meaning according 
to the passage in which it occurs ; we must there- 
fore interpret each word and sentence not as if it 
stood isolated, but with an eye to the general sense 
of the context. This is the rule of context, 1 a funda- 
mental rule of interpretation. Its meaning is that, 
before making use of a phrase taken from a text, 
we must have read the text in its entirety ; it pro- 
hibits the stuffing of a modern work with quota- 
tions — that is, shreds of phrases torn from passages 
without regard to the special sense given to them 
by the context. 2 

These rules, if rigorously applied, would con- 
stitute an exact method of interpretation which 
would hardly leave any chance of error, but would 
require an enormous expenditure of time. What 
an immense amount of labour would be necessary 
if, in the case of each word, we had to determine by 
a special operation its meaning in the language of 

1 Fustel de Coulanges formulates it thus : " It is never safe to 
separate two words from their context ; this is just the way to 
mistake their meaning" {Monarchic franque, p. 228, note 1). 

2 This is how Fustel de Coulanges condemns this practice : " I 
am not speaking of pretenders to learning who quote second-hand, 
and at most take the trouble to verify whether the phrase they have 
seen quoted really occurs in the passage indicated. To verify 
quotations is one thing and to read texts quite another, and the 
two often lead to opposite results " [Revue des questions historiques, 
1887, vol. i.). See also (L'Alleu et le domaine rural, pp. 171-98) the 
lesson given to M. Giasson on the theory of the community of land : 
forty-five quotations are studied in the light of their context, with 
the object of proving that none of them bears the meaning M. Gias- 
son attributed to it. We may also compare the reply : Giasson, 
Les ConiiMinaux et le domaine rural a Vlpoque franque, Paris, 1890. 

I49 



Analytical Operations 

the time, of the country, of the author, and in the 
context ! Yet this is the labour demanded by a 
well-made translation : in the case of some ancient 
works of great literary value it has been submitted 
to ; for the mass of historical documents we content 
ourselves, in practice, with an abridged method. 

All words are not equally subject to variations 
of meaning; most of them keep a fairly uniform 
meaning in all authors and in all periods. We 
may therefore be satisfied to study specially those 
expressions which, from their nature, are liable to 
take different meanings : first, ready-made expres- 
sions which, being fixed, do not follow the evolution 
of the words of which they are composed ; secondly, 
and chiefly, words denoting things which are in their 
nature subject to evolution ; classes of men (miles, 
colonics, servus); institutions (conventus, justitia, judex); 
usages (alien, hdntfice, tlectiori) ; feelings, common 
objects. In the case of all words of such classes 
it would be imprudent to assume a fixed meaning ; 
it is an absolutely necessary precaution to ascertain 
what is the sense in which they are used in the text 
to be interpreted. " These studies of words," said 
Fustel de Coulanges, "have a great importance in 
historical science. A badly interpreted term may 
be the source of serious error." l And, in fact, simply 
by a methodical application of interpretative criti- 
cism to a hundred words or so, he succeeded in 
revolutionising the study of the Merovingian epoch. 

1 All that is original in Fustel de Coulanges rests on his inter- 
pretative criticism ; he never did personally any work in external 
criticism, and his critical examination of authors' good faith and 
accuracy was hampered by a respect for the statements of ancient 
authors which amounted to credulity. 

150 



Interpretative Criticism 

IV. When we have analysed the document and 
determined the literal meaning of its phrases, we 
cannot even yet be sure that we have reached the 
real thoughts of the author. It is possible that he 
may have used some expressions in an oblique sense ; 
there are several kinds of cases where this occurs : 
allegory and symbolism, jests and hoaxes, allusion 
and implication, even the ordinary figures of speech, 
metaphor, hyperbole, litotes. 1 In all these cases it 
is necessary to pierce through the literal meaning 
to the real meaning, which the author has purposely 
disguised under an inexact form. 

Logically the problem is very embarrassing : there 
is no fixed external criterion by which we can make 
sure of detecting an oblique sense ; in the case of 
the hoax, which in the present century has become 
a branch of literature, it is an essential part of the 
author's plan to leave no indication which would 
betray the jest. In practice we may be morally 
certain that an author is not using an oblique sense 
wherever his prime object is to be understood ; we 
are therefore not likely to meet with difficulties of 
this kind in official documents, in charters, and in 
historical narratives. In all these cases the general 
form of the document permits us to assume that it 
is written in the literal sense of the words. 

On the other hand, we must be prepared for 

1 A parallel difficulty occurs in the interpretation of illustra- 
tive monuments ; the representations are not always to be taken 
literally. In the Behistun monument Darius tramples the van- 
quished chiefs under foot : this is a metaphor. Mediaeval miniatures 
show us persons lying in bed with crowns on their heads : this is to 
symbolise their royal rank ; the painter did not mean that they wore 
their crowns to sleep in. 



Analytical Operations 

oblique senses when the author had other interests 
than that of being understood, or when he wrote 
for a public which could understand his allusions 
and read between the lines, or when his readers, 
in virtue of a religious or literary initiation, might 
be expected to understand his symbolisms and 
figures of speech. This is the case with religious 
texts, private letters, and all those literary works 
which form so large a part of the documents on 
antiquity. Thus the art of recognising and deter- 
mining hidden meanings in texts has always occu- 
pied a large space in the theory of hermeneutic 1 
(which is Greek for interpretative criticism), and 
in the exegesis of the sacred texts and of classical 
authors. 

The different modes of introducing an oblique 
sense behind the literal sense are too varied, and 
depend too much on special circumstances, for it 
to be possible to reduce the art of detecting them 
to definite rules. Only one general principle can 
be laid down, and that is, that when the literal 
sense is absurd, incoherent, or obscure, or in con- 
tradiction with the ideas of the author or the facts 
known to him, then we ought to presume an oblique 
sense. 

In order to determine this sense, the procedure 
is the same as for studying the language of an 
author : we compare the passages in which the 
expressions occur in which we suspect an oblique 
sense, and look to see whether there is not one 

1 A. Boeckh, in the Encyclopaedic und Methodoloyie der philolo- 
gischen Wissenschaften, second edition (1886), has given a theory of 
hermeneutic to which Bernheim has been content to refer. 

152 



Interpretative Criticism 

where the meaning may be guessed from the eon- 
text. A celebrated instance of this procedure is the 
discovery of the allegorical meaning of the Beast in 
the Apocalypse. But as there is no certain method 
of solving these problems, we never have a right to 
say we have discovered all the hidden meanings or 
seized all the allusions contained in a text ; and 
even when we think we have found the sense, we 
shall do well to draw no inferences from a necessarily 
conjectural interpretation. 

On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against 
the temptation to look for allegorical meanings every- 
where, as the neo-Platonists did in Plato's works and 
the Swedenborgians in the Bible. This attack of 
hyper-hermeneutic is now over, but we are not yet 
safe from the analogous tendency to look for allusions 
everywhere. Investigations of this kind are always 
conjectural, and are better calculated to natter the 
vanity of the interpreter than to furnish results of 
which history can make use. 

V. When we have at length reached the real 
sense of the text, the operation of positive analysis 
is concluded. Its result is to make us acquainted 
with the author's conceptions, the images he had 
in his mind, the general notions in terms of which 
he represented the world to himself. This informa- 
tion belongs to a Yery important branch of know- 
ledge, out of which is constituted a whole group ol 
historical sciences: 1 the history of the illustrative 
arts and of literature, the history of science, the 

1 The method of extracting information on external facts from 
a writer's conceptions forms part of the theory of constructive 
reasoning. See book iii. 

153 



Analytical Operations 

history of philosophical and moral doctrine, mythology 
and the history of dogmas (wrongly called religious 
beliefs, because here we are studying official doctrines 
without inquiring whether they are believed), the 
history of law, the history of official institutions (so 
far as we do not inquire how they were applied in 
practice), the assemblage of popular legends, tradi- 
tions, opinions, conceptions (inexactly called beliefs) 
which are comprised under the name of folk-lore. 

All these studies need only the external criticism 
which investigates authorship and origin and inter- 
pretative criticism ; they require one degree less 
elaboration than the history of objective facts, and 
accordingly they have been earlier established on a 
methodical basis. 



154 



CHAPTER VII 

THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD 
FAITH AND ACCURACY OF AUTHORS 

I. Analysis and positive interpretative criticism 
only penetrate as far as the inward workings of the 
mind of the author of a document, and only help us 
to know his ideas. They give no direct information 
about external facts. Even when the author was 
able to observe them, his text only indicates how he 
wished to represent them, not how he really saw 
them, still less how they really happened. What 
an author expresses is not always what he believed, 
for he may have lied ; what he believed is not neces- 
sarily what happened, for he may have been mistaken. 
These propositions are obvious. And yet a first and 
natural impulse leads us to accept as true every 
statement contained in a document, which is equi- 
valent to assuming that no author ever lied or was 
deceived; and this spontaneous credulity seems to 
possess a high degree of vitality, for it persists in 
spite of the innumerable instances of error and men- 
dacity which daily experience brings before us. 

Reflection has been forced on historians in the 
course of their work by the circumstance of their 
finding documents which contradicted each other ; 
in such cases they have been obliged to doubt, and, 

l 5S 



Analytical Operations 

after examination, to admit the existence of error or 
mendacity ; thus negative criticism has appeared as 
a practical necessity for the purpose of eliminating 
statements which are obviously false or erroneous. 
But the instinct of confidence is so indestructible 
that it has hitherto prevented even those profession- 
ally concerned from systematising the internal criti- 
cism cf statements in the same way as the external 
criticism which deals with the origin of documents 
has been systematised. Historians, in their works, 
and even theoretical writers on historical method, 1 
have been satisfied with common notions and vague 
formulae in striking contrast with the precise ter- 
minology of the critical investigation of sources. 
They are content to examine whether the author 
was roughly contemporary with the events, whether 
he was an ocular witness, whether he was sincere and 
well-informed, whether he knew the truth and desired 
to tell it, or even — summing up the whole question 
in a single formula — whether he was trustworthy. 

This superficial criticism is certainly better than 
no criticism at all, and has sufficed to give those 
who have applied it the consciousness of incontest- 
able superiority. But it is only a halfway-house 
between common credulity and scientific method. 
Here, as in every science, the starting-point must be 
methodical doubt. 2 All that has not been proved 
must be temporarily regarded as doubtful ; no pro- 

1 For example, Pere de Smedt, Tardif, Droysen, and even 
Bernheim. 

2 Descartes, who came at a time when history still consisted in 
the reproduction of pre-existing narratives, did not see how to 
apply methodical doubt to the subject ; he therefore refused to 
allow it a place among the sciences. 

156 



Negative Internal Criticism 

position is to be affirmed unless reasons can be 
adduced in favour of its truth. Applied to the 
statements contained in documents, methodical doubt 
becomes methodical distrust. 

The historian ought to distrust a priori every 
statement of an author, for he cannot be sure that 
it is not mendacious or mistaken. At the best it 
affords a presumption. For the historian to adopt 
it and affirm it afresh on his own account implies 
that he regards it as a scientific truth. To take 
this decisive step is what he has no right to do 
without good reasons. But the human mind is so 
constituted that this step is often taken unconsciously 
(cf. book ii. chap. i.). Against this dangerous ten- 
dency criticism has only one means of defence. We 
must not postpone doubt till it is forced upon us by 
conflicting statements in documents ; we must begin 
by doubting. We must never forget the interval 
which separates a statement made by any author 
whatsoever from a scientifically established truth, 
so that we may continually keep in mind the 
responsibility which we assume when we reproduce 
a statement. 

Even after we have accepted the principle and 
resolved to apply this unnatural distrust in practice, 
we tend instinctively to free ourselves from it as 
soon as possible. The natural impulse is to perform 
the criticism of the whole of an author, or at least 
of the whole of a document, in the lump ; to divide 
authorities into two categories, the sheep on the 
right, the goats on the left ; on the one side trust- 
worthy authors and good documents, on the other 
suspected authors and bad documents. Having thus 

*57 



Analytical Operations 

exhausted our powers of distrust, we proceed to 
reproduce without discussion all the statements con- 
tained in the "good document." We consent to 
distrust suspected authors such as Suidas or Aimo, 
but we affirm as established truth everything that 
has been said by Thucydides or Gregory of Tours. 1 
We apply to authors that judicial procedure which 
divides witnesses into admissible and inadmissible : 
having once accepted a witness, we feel ourselves 
bound to admit all his testimony ; we dare not doubt 
any of his statements without a special reason. In- 
stinctively we take sides with the author on whom 
we have bestowed our approval, and we go so far as 
to say, as in the law courts, that the burden of proof 
rests with those who reject valid testimony. 2 

1 Fustel de Coulanges himself did not rise above this kind of 
timidity. With reference to a speech attributed to Clovis by 
Gregory of Tours, he says : " Doubtless we are unable to affirm that 
these words were ever pronounced. But, all the same, we ought not 
to affirm, in contradiction to Gregory of Tours, that they were not. 
. . . The wisest course is to accept Gregory's text " (Monarchic 
franque, p. 66). The wisest, or rather the only scientific course, is 
to admit that we know nothing about the words of Clovis, for 
Gregory himself had no knowledge of them. 

2 Quite recently, E. Meyer, one of the most critically expert his- 
torians of antiquity, has in his work, Die Entstehung des Judenthums 
(Halle, 1896, 8vo), revived this strange juridical argument in favour 
of the narrative of Nehemiah. M. Bouche-Leclercq, in a remarkable 
study on "The Reign of Seleucus II. (Callinicus) and Historical 
Criticism " (Revue des Universitis du Midi, April-June 1897), seems, by 
way of reaction against the hypercriticism of Niebuhr and Droysen, 
to incline towards an analogous theory : " Historical criticism, if it 
is not to degenerate into agnosticism — which would be suicidal — or 
into individual caprice, must place a certain amount of trust in 
testimony which it cannot verify, as long as it is not flatly contra- 
dicted by other testimony of equal value." M. Bouche-Leclercq is 
right as against the historian who, " after having discredited all his 
witnesses, claims to put himself in their place, and sees with their 

158 



Negative Internal Criticism 

The confusion is still further increased by the use 
of the word authentic, borrowed from judicial lan- 
guage. It has reference to the origin only, not to 
the contents ; to say that a document is authentic is 
merely to say that its origin is certain, not that its 
contents are free from error. But authenticity 
inspires a degree of respect which disposes us to 
accept the contents without discussion. To doubt 
the statements of an authentic document would 
seem presumptuous, or at least we think ourselves 
bound to wait for overwhelming proof before we 
impeach the testimony of the author. 

II. These natural instincts must be methodically 
resisted. A document (still more a literary work) 
is not all of a piece ; it is composed of a great 
number of independent statements, any one of which 
may be intentionally or unintentionally false, while 
the others are bond fide and accurate, or conversely, 
since each statement is the outcome of a mental 
operation which may have been incorrectly per- 
formed, while others were performed correctly. It is 
not, therefore, enough to examine a document as a 
whole; each of the statements in it must be examined 
separately ; criticism is impossible without analysis. 

Thus internal criticism conducts us to two general 
rules. 

(i) A scientific truth is not established by testi- 
mony. In order to affirm a proposition we must 

eyes something quite different from what they themselves saw." 
But when the " testimony " is insufficient to give us the scientific 
knowledge of a fact, the only correct attitude is " agnosticisni," 
that is, a confession of ignorance ; we have no right to shirk this 
confession because chance has permitted the destruction of the 
documents which might have contradicted the testimony. 

l S9 



Analytical Operations 

have special reasons for believing it true. It may 
happen in certain cases that an authors statement 
is a sufficient reason for belief; but we cannot know 
that beforehand. The rule, then, will be to examine 
each separate statement in order to make sure 
whether it is of a nature to constitute a sufficient 
reason for belief. 

(2) The criticism of a document is not to be per- 
formed en bloc. The rule will be to analyse the 
document into its elements, in order to isolate the 
different statements of which it is composed and 
to examine each of them separately. Sometimes a 
single sentence contains several statements ; they 
must be separated and criticised one by one. In a 
sale, for example, we distinguish the date, the place, 
the vendor, the purchaser, the object, the price, and 
each one of the conditions. 

In practice, criticism and analysis are performed 
simultaneously, and, except in the case of texts in 
a difficult language, may proceed 'pari passu with 
interpretative analysis and criticism. As soon as 
we understand a phrase we analyse it and criticise 
each of its elements. 

It thus appears that logically criticism comprises 
an enormous number of operations. In describing 
them, with all the details necessary for the under- 
standing of their mechanism and the reasons for 
their employment, we are likely to give the impres- 
sion of a procedure too slow to be practicable. Such 
an impression is inevitably produced by every verbal 
description of a complicated process. Compare the 
time occupied in describing a movement in fenc- 
ing with that required to execute it ; compare the 

160 



Negative Internal Criticism 

tedium of the grammar and dictionary with the 
rapidity of reading. Like every practical art, criti- 
cism consists in the habit of performing certain acts. 
In the period of apprenticeship, before the habit is 
acquired, we are obliged to think of each act separ- 
ately before performing it, and to analyse the move- 
ments ; accordingly we perform them all slowly and 
with difficulty ; but the habit once acquired, the acts, 
which have now become instinctive and unconscious, 
are performed with ease and rapidity. The reader 
must therefore not be uneasy about the slowness of 
the critical processes ; he will see later on how they 
are abridged in practice. 

III. The problem of criticism may be stated as 
follows. Given a statement made by a man of 
whose mental operations we have no experience, and 
the value of the statement depending exclusively on 
the manner in which these operations were per- 
formed ; to ascertain whether these operations were 
performed correctly. The mere statement of the 
problem shows that we cannot hope for any direct 
or definitive solution of it ; we lack the essential 
datum, namely, the manner in which the author 
performed the mental operations concerned. Criti- 
cism therefore does not advance beyond indirect and 
provisional solutions, and does no more than furnish 
data which require a final elaboration. 

A natural instinct leads us to judge of the value 
of statements by their form. We think we can tell 
at a glance whether an author is sincere or a narra- 
tive accurate. We seek for what is called "the 
accent of sincerity," or " an impression of truth." 
This impression is almost irresistible, but it is none 

161 L 



Analytical Operations 

the less an illusion. There is no external criterion 
either of good faith or of accuracy. " The accent of 
sincerity " is the appearance of conviction ; an orator, 
an actor, an habitual liar will put more of it into his 
lies than an undecided man into his statement of 
what he believes to be the truth. Energy of affirma- 
tion does not always mean strength of conviction, 
but sometimes only cleverness or effrontery. 1 Simi- 
larly, abundance and precision of detail, though they 
produce a vivid impression on unexperienced readers, 
do not guarantee the accuracy of the facts ; 2 they 
give us no information about anything but the 
imagination of the author when he is sincere, or his 
impudence when he is the reverse. We are apt to 
say of a circumstantial narrative : " Things of this 
kind are not invented." They are not invented, but 
they are very easy to transfer from one person, 
country, or time to another. There is thus no ex- 
ternal characteristic of a document which can relieve 
us of the obligation to criticise it. 

The value of an author's statement depends solely 
on the conditions under which he performed certain 
mental operations. Criticism has no other resource 

1 The "Memoirs. of Cardinal de Retz" furnish a conclusive in- 
stance : the anecdote of the ghosts met by Retz and Turenne. 
A. Feillet, who edited Retz in the Collection des Grands itcrivains de 
la France, has shown (vol. i. p. 192) that this story, so vividly nar- 
rated, is false from beginning to end. 

2 A good example of the fascination exerted by a circumstantial 
narrative is the legend respecting the origin of the League of the 
three primitive Swiss cantons (Gessler and the Griitli conspirators), 
which was fabricated by Tschudi in the sixteenth century, became 
classical on the production of Schiller's "William Tell," and has 
only been extirpated with the greatest difficulty. (See Rilliet, 
Origines de la Confederation Suisse, Geneva, 1869, 8vo.) 

l62 



Negative Internal Criticism 

than the examination of these conditions. But it is 
not a case of reconstructing all of them ; it is enough 
to answer a single question : did the author perform 
these operations correctly or not ? The question 
may be approached on two sides. 

(i) The critical investigation of authorship has 
often taught us the general conditions under which 
the author operated. It is probable that some of 
these influenced each one of the operations. We 
ought therefore to begin by studying the informa- 
tion we possess about the author and the com- 
position of the document, taking particular pains 
to look in the habits, sentiments, and personal 
situation of the author, or in the circumstances in 
which he composed, for all the reasons which could 
have existed for incorrectness on the one hand, or 
exceptional accuracy on the other. In order to 
perceive these reasons it is necessary to be on the 
lookout for them beforehand. The only method, 
therefore, is to draw up a general set of questions 
having reference to the possible causes of in- 
accuracy. We shall then apply it to the general 
conditions under which the document was com- 
posed, in order to discover those causes which may 
have rendered the author's mental operations in- 
correct and vitiated the results. But all that we 
shall thus obtain — even in the exceptionally favour- 
able cases in which the conditions of origin are well 
known — will be general indications, which will be 
insufficient for the purposes of criticism, for criticism 
must always deal with each separate statement. 

(2) The criticism of particular statements is con- 
fined to the use of a single method, which, by a 

163 



Analytical Operations 

curious paradox, is the study of the universal 
conditions under which documents are composed. 
The information which is not furnished by the 
general study of the author may be sought for by 
a consideration of the necessary processes of the 
human mind ; for, since these are universal, they 
must appear in each particular case. We know 
what are the cases in which men in general are 
inclined to alter or distort facts. What we have 
to do in the case of each statement is to examine 
whether it was made under such circumstances as 
to lead us to suspect, from our knowledge of the 
habits of normal humanity, that the operations 
implied in the making of it were incorrectly per- 
formed. The practical procedure will be to draw 
up a set of questions relating to the habitual 
causes of inaccuracy. 

The whole of criticism thus reduces to the draw- 
ing up and answering of two sets of questions : 
one for the purpose of bringing before our minds 
those general conditions affecting the composition 
of the document, from which we may deduce general 
motives for distrust or confidence ; the other for 
the purpose of realising the special conditions of 
each statement, from which special motives may 
be drawn for distrust or confidence. These two 
sets of questions ought to be drawn up before- 
hand in such a form as may enable us to examine 
methodically both the document in general and 
each statement in particular ; and as they are the 
same for all documents, it is useful to formulate 
them once for all. 

IV. The critical process comprises two series of 
164 



Negative Internal Criticism 

questions, which correspond to the two series of 
operations by which the document was produced. 
All that interpretative criticism tells us is what the 
author meant ; it remains to determine ( i ) what he 
really believed, for he may not have been sincere ; 
(2) what he really knew, for he may have been 
mistaken. We may therefore distinguish a critical 
examination of the author s good faith, by which we 
seek to determine whether the author of the docu- 
ment lied or not, and a critical examination of his 
accuracy, by which we seek to determine whether he 
was or was not mistaken. 

In practice we rarely need to know what an 
author believed, unless we are making a special 
study of his character. We have no direct interest 
in the author ; he is merely the medium through 
which we reach the external facts he reports. The 
aim of criticism is to determine whether the author 
has reported the facts correctly. If he has given 
inexact information, it is indifferent whether he did 
so intentionally or not ; to draw a distinction would 
complicate matters unnecessarily. There is thus 
little occasion to make a separate examination of an 
author's good faith, and we may shorten our labours 
by including in a single set of questions all the 
causes which lead , to misstatement. But for the 
sake of clearness it will be well to discuss the ques- 
tions to be asked in two separate series. 

The questions in the first series will help us 
to inquire whether we have any reason to distrust 
the sincerity of a statement. We ask whether the 
author was in any of those situations which normally 
incline a man to be insincere. We must ask what 

165 



Analytical Operations 

these situations are, both as affecting the general com- 
position of a document, and as affecting each par- 
ticular statement. Experience supplies the answer. 
Every violation of truth, small or great, is due to a wish 
on the part of the author to produce a particular 
impression upon the reader. Our set of questions 
thus reduces to a list of the motives which may, 
in the general case, lead an author to violate truth. 
The following are the most important cases : — 

(i) The author seeks to gain a practical advan- 
tage for himself; he wishes to deceive the reader of 
the document, in order to persuade him to an action, 
or to dissuade him from it ; he knowingly gives 
false information : we then say the author has an 
interest in deceiving. This is the case with most 
official documents. Even in documents which have 
not been composed for a practical purpose, every 
interested statement has a chance of being men- 
dacious. In order to determine which statements 
are to be suspected, we are to ask what can have 
been the general aim of the author in writing the 
document as a whole ; and again, what can have 
been his particular purpose in making each of the 
separate statements which compose the document. 
But there are two natural tendencies to be resisted. 
The first is, to ask what interest the author could 
have had in lying, meaning what interest should 
we have had in his place ; we must ask instead what 
interest can he have thought he had in lying, and 
we must look for the answer in his tastes and ideals. 
The other tendency is to take sole account of the 
individual interest of the author; we ought, how- 
ever, to remember that the author may have given 

166 



Negative Internal Criticism 

false information in order to serve a collective in- 
terest. This is one of the difficulties of criticism. 
An author is a member at one and the same time 
of several different groups, a family, a province, a 
country, a religious denomination, a political party, 
a class in society, whose interests often conflict ; we 
have to discover the group in which he took most 
interest, and for which he worked. 

(2) The author was placed in a situation which 
compelled him to violate truth. This happens 
whenever he has to draw up a document in con- 
formity with rule or custom, while the actual cir- 
cumstances are in some point or other in conflict 
with rule or custom ; he is then obliged to state 
that the conditions were normal, and thus make 
a false declaration in respect of all the irregularities. 
In nearly every report of proceedings there is some 
slight deviation from truth as to the day, the hour, 
the place, the number or the names of those 
present. Most of us have observed, if not taken 
part in, some of these petty fictions. But we are 
too apt to forget them when we come to criticise 
documents relating to the past. The authentic char- 
acter of the documents contributes to the illusion ; 
we instinctively make authentic a synonym of sincere. 
The rigid rules which govern the composition of 
every authentic document seem to guarantee sin- 
cerity ; they are, on the contrary, an incentive to 
falsify, not the main facts, but the accessory circum- 
stances. From the fact of a person having signed a 
report we may infer that he agreed to it, but not 
that he was actually present at the time when the 
report mentions him as having been present. 

167 



Analytical Operations 

(3) The author viewed with sympathy or anti- 
pathy a group of men (nation, party, denomination, 
province, city, family), or an assemblage of doctrines 
or institutions (religion, school of philosophy, poli- 
tical theory), and was led to distort facts in such a 
manner as to represent his friends in a favourable 
and his opponents in an unfavourable light. These 
are instances of a general bias which affects all the 
statements of an author, and they are so obvious 
that the ancients perceived them and gave them 
names {stadium and odium) ; from ancient times it 
has been a literary commonplace for historians to 
protest that they have steered clear of both. 

(4) The author was induced by private or collec- 
tive vanity to violate truth for the purpose of 
exalting himself or his group. He made such 
statements as he thought likely to give the reader 
the impression that he and his possessed qualities 
deserving of esteem. We have therefore to inquire 
whether a given statement may not be influenced 
by vanity. But we must take care not to represent 
the author's vanity to ourselves as being exactly 
like our own vanity or that of our contemporaries. 
Different people are vain for different reasons ; we 
must inquire what was our author's particular 
vanity ; he may have lied in order to attribute to 
himself or his friends actions which we should con- 
sider dishonourable. Charles IX. falsely boasted of 
having organised the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. 
There is, however, a kind of vanity which is universal, 
and that is, the desire to appear to be a person of 
exalted rank playing an important part in affairs. 
We must, therefore, always distrust a statement 

168 



Negative Internal Criticism 

which attributes to the author or his group a high 
place in the world. 1 

(5) The author desired to please the public, or at 
least to avoid shocking it. He has expressed senti- 
ments and ideas in harmony with the morality or the 
fashion of his public ; he has distorted facts in order 
to adapt them to the passions and prejudices of his 
time, even those which he did not share. The 
purest types of this kind of falsehood are found 
in ceremonial forms, official formulae, declarations 
prescribed by etiquette, set speeches, polite phrases. 
The statements which come under this head are so 
open to suspicion that we are unable to derive from 
them any information about the facts stated. We 
are all aware of this so far as relates to the contem- 
porary formulae of which we see instances every day, 
but we often forget it in the criticism of documents, 
especially those belonging to an age from which 
few documents have come down to us. No one 
would think of looking for the real sentiments 
of a man in the assurances of respect with which 
he ends his letters.. But people believed for a 
long time in the humility of certain ecclesiastical 
dignitaries of the middle ages, because, on the 
day of their election, they began by refusing an 
office of which they declared themselves un- 
worthy, till at last comparison showed that this 
refusal was a mere conventional form. And there 
are still scholars who, like the Benedictines of the 
eighteenth century, look in the chancery- formulae 

1 Striking examples of falsehoods due to vanity are to be found 
in abundance in the Economies royales of Sully and the Memoires of 
Retz. 

169 



Analytical Operations 

of a prince for information as to his piety or his 
liberality. 1 

In order to recognise these conventional declara- 
tions there are two lines of general study to be 
pursued : the one is directed to the author, and 
seeks to discover what was the public he addressed, 
for in one and the same country there are usually 
several different publics, each of which has its own 
code of morals or propriety; the other is directed 
towards the public, and seeks to determine its 
morals or its manners. 

(6) The author endeavoured to please the public 
by literary artifices.. He distorted facts in order 
to embellish them according to his own aesthetic 
notions. We have therefore to look for the ideal of 
the author or of his time, in order to be on our guard 
against passages distorted to suit that ideal. But 
without special study we may calculate on the 
common kinds of literary distortion. Rhetorical 
distortion consists in attributing to persons noble 
attitudes, acts, sentiments, and, above all, words: 
this is a natural tendency in young boys who are 
beginning to practise the art of composition, and in 
writers still in a semi-barbarous stage ; it is the 
common defect of the mediaeval chroniclers. 2 Epic 

1 Fustel de Coulanges himself went to the formulae of the inscrip- 
tions in honour of the emperors for a proof that the peoples liked 
the imperial regime. "If we read the inscriptions, the sentiment 
which they exhibit is always one of satisfaction and gratitude. . . . 
See the collection of Orelli, the most frequent expressions are . . ." 
And the enumeration of the titles of respect given to the emperors 
ends with this strange aphorism : " It would show ignorance of 
human nature to see nothing but flattery in all this." There is not 
even flattery here ; there is nothing but formulae. 

2 Suger, in his life of Louis VI., is a model of this type. 

I70 



Negative Internal Criticism 

distortion embellishes the narrative by adding pic- 
turesque details, speeches delivered by the persons 
concerned, numbers, sometimes names of persons ; 
it is dangerous, because the precision of the details 
produces an illusive appearance of truth. 1 Dramatic 
distortion consists in grouping the facts in such a 
way as to enhance the dramatic effect by concen- 
trating facts, which in reality were separate, upon a 
single moment, a single person, or a single group. 
Writing of this kind is what we call " truer than the 
truth." It is the most dangerous form of distortion, 
the form employed by artistic historians, by Hero- 
dotus, Tacitus, the Italians of the Renaissance. 
Lyrical distortion exaggerates the intensity of the 
sentiments and the emotions of the author and his 
friends : we should remember this when we attempt 
to reconstruct " the psychology " of a person. 

Literary distortion does not much affect archives 
(though instances of it are found in most charters of 
the eleventh century) ; but it profoundly modifies all 
literary texts, including the narratives of historians. 
Now, the natural tendency is to trust writers more 
readily when they 'have talent, and to admit state- 
ments with less difficulty when they are presented 
in good literary form. Criticism must counteract 
this tendency by the application of the paradoxical 
rule, that the more interesting a statement is from 
the artistic point of view, 2 the more it ought to be 
suspected. We must distrust every narrative which 

1 The Ohronicon Helveticum of Tschudi is a striking instance. 

2 Aristophanes and Demosthenes are two striking examples of 
the power great writers have of paralysing critics and obscuring 
facts. Not till the close of the nineteenth century has any one 
ventured to recognise frankly their lack of good faith. 

171 



Analytical Operations 

is very picturesque or very dramatic, in which the 
personages assume noble attitudes or manifest great 
intensity of feeling. 

This first series -of questions will yield the pro- 
visional result of enabling us to note the statements 
which have a chance of being mendacious. 

Y. The second series of questions will be of use 
in determining whether there is any reason to dis- 
trust the accuracy of a statement. Was the author 
in one of those situations which cause a man to 
make mistakes ? As in dealing with good faith, we 
must look for these conditions both as affecting the 
document as a whole, and as affecting each of the 
particular statements in it. 

The practice of the established sciences teaches 
us the conditions of an exact knowledge of facts. 
There is only one scientific procedure for gaining 
knowledge of a fact, namely, observation ; every state- 
ment, therefore, must rest, directly or indirectly, 
upon an observation, and this observation must have 
been made correctly. 

The set of questions by the aid of which we 
investigate the probabilities of error may be drawn 
up in the light of experience, which brings before 
us the most common cases of error. 

(i) The author was in a situation to observe the 
fact, and supposed he really had observed it ; he 
was, however, prevented from doing so by some 
interior force of which he was unconscious, an 
hallucination, an illusion, or a mere prejudice. It 
would be useless, as well as impossible, to determine 
which of these agencies was at work ; it is enough 
to ascertain whether the author had a tendency to 

172 



Negative Internal Criticism 

observe badly. It is scarcely possible in the case 
of a particular statement to recognise that it was 
the result of an hallucination or an illusion. At 
the most we may learn, either from information 
derived from other sources or by comparison, that 
an author had a general propensity to this kind of 
error. 

There is a better chance of recognising whether a 
statement was due to prejudice. In the life or the 
works of an author we may find the traces of his 
dominant prejudices. With reference to each of his 
particular statements, we ought to ask whether it is 
not the result of a preconceived idea of the author 
on a class of men or a kind of facts. This inquiry 
partly coincides with the search for motives of false- 
hood : interest, vanity, sympathy, and antipathy give 
rise to prejudices which alter the truth in the same 
manner as wilful falsehood. We therefore employ 
the questions already formulated for the purpose of 
testing good faith. But there is one to be added. 
In putting forward a statement has the author been 
led to distort it unconsciously by the circumstance 
that he was answering a question ? This is the case 
of all statements obtained by interrogating witnesses. 
Even apart from the cases where the person interro- 
gated seeks to please the proposer of the question by 
giving an answer which he thinks will be agreeable 
to him, every question suggests its own answer, or 
at least its form, and this form is dictated before- 
hand by some one unacquainted with the facts. It 
is therefore necessary to apply a special criticism to 
every statement obtained by interrogation ; we must 
ask what was the question put, and what were the 

i-73 



Analytical Operations 

preconceptions to which it may have given rise in 
the mind of the person interrogated. 

(2) The author was badly situated for observing. 
The practice of the sciences teaches us what are 
the conditions for correct observation. The observer 
ought to be placed where he can see correctly, and 
should have no practical interest, no desire to obtain 
a particular result, no preconceived idea about the 
result. He ou^ht to record the observation im- 
mediately, in a precise system of notation ; he ought 
to give a precise indication of his method. These 
conditions, which are insisted on in the sciences of 
observation, are never completely fulfilled by the 
authors of documents. 

It would be useless, therefore, to ask whether 
there have been chances of inaccuracy ; there always 
have been, and it is just this that distinguishes a 
document from an observation. It only remains to 
look for the obvious causes of error in the conditions 
of observation : to inquire whether the observer was 
in a place where he could not see or hear well, as 
would be the case, for example, with a subordinate 
who should presume to narrate the secret delibera- 
tions of a council of dignitaries ; whether his atten- 
tion was greatly distracted by the necessity for action, 
as it would be on the field of battle, for example; 
whether he was inattentive because the facts had 
little interest for him ; whether he lacked the 
special experience or general intelligence necessary 
for understanding the facts; whether he analysed 
his impressions badly, or confused different events. 
Above all, we must ask when he ivrote down what he 
saw or heard. This is the most important point : 

*74 



Negative Internal Criticism 

the only exact observation is the one which is re- 
corded immediately it is made ; such is the constant 
procedure in the established sciences ; an impression 
committed to writing later on is only a recollection, 
liable to be confused in the memory with other 
recollections. Memoirs written several years after 
the facts, often at the very end of the author's 
career, have introduced innumerable errors into his- 
tory. It must be made a rule to treat memoirs with 
special distrust, as second-hand documents, in spite of 
their appearance of being contemporary testimony. 

(3) The author states facts which he could have 
observed, but to which he did not take the trouble 
to attend. From idleness or negligence he reported 
details which he has merely inferred, or even imagined 
at random, and which turn out to be false. This is 
a common source of error, though it does not readily 
occur to one, and is to be suspected wherever the 
author was obliged to procure information in which 
he took little interest, in order to fill up a blank form. 
Of this kind are answers to questions put by an 
authority (it is enough to observe how most official 
inquiries are conducted in our own day), and detailed 
accounts of ceremonies or public functions. There 
is too strong a temptation to write the account from 
the programme, or in agreement with the usual order 
of the proceedings. How many accounts of meetings 
of all kinds have been published by reporters who were 
not present at them ! Similar efforts of imagina- 
tion are suspected — sometimes, it is thought, clearly 
recognised — in the writings of medineval chroniclers. 1 

1 For example, the account of the election of Otto I. in the Qeata 
Ottonis of Wittekind. 

175 



Analytical Operations 

The rule, then, will be to distrust all narratives 
conforming too closely to a set formula. 

(4) The fact stated is of such a nature that it 
could not have been learnt by observation alone. 
It may be a hidden fact — a private secret, for ex- 
ample. It may be a fact relating to a collectivity, 
and applying to an extensive area or a long period 
of time ; for example, the common act of a whole 
army, a custom common to a whole people or a whole 
age, a statistical total obtained by the addition of 
numerous items. It may be a comprehensive judg- 
ment on the character of a man, a group, a custom, 
an event. Here we have to do with propositions 
derived from observations by synthesis or inference : 
the author can only have arrived at them indirectly ; 
he began with data furnished by observation, and 
elaborated them by the logical processes of abstraction, 
generalisation, reasoning, calculation. Two questions 
arise. Does it appear that the author had sufficient 
data to work upon ? Was he accurate, or the reverse, 
in his use of the data he had ? 

On the probable inaccuracies of an author, general 
indications may be obtained from an examination of 
his writings. This examination will show us how 
he worked : whether he was capable of abstraction, 
reasoning, generalisation, and what were the mis- 
takes he was in the habit of making. In order to 
determine the value of the data, we must criticise 
each statement separately; we must imagine the 
conditions under which the author observed, and 
ask ourselves whether he was able to procure the 
necessary data for his statement. This is an in- 
dispensable precaution in dealing with large totals 

176 



Negative Internal Criticism 

in statistics and descriptions of popular usages ; for 
it is possible that the author may have obtained the 
total he gives by a process of conjectural valuation 
(this is the ordinary practice in stating the number 
of combatants or killed in a battle), or by combining 
subsidiary totals, all of which were not accurate ; it 
is possible that he may have extended to a whole 
people, a whole country, a whole period, that which 
was true only of a small group known to him. 1 

VI. These two first series of questions bearing on 
the good faith and the accuracy of the statements 
in the document are based on the supposition that 
the author has observed the fact himself, This is a 
feature common to all reports of observations in the 
established sciences. But in history there is so 
great a dearth of direct observations, of even moderate 
value, that we are obliged to turn to account docu- 
ments which every other science would reject. 2 
Take any narrative at random, even if it be the 
work of a contemporary, it will be found that the 
facts observed by the author are never more than a 
part of the whole number. In nearly every docu- 
ment the majority of the statements do not come 
from the author at first hand, but are reproductions 
of the statements of others. Even where a general 
relates a battle in which he commanded, he does 
not communicate his own observations, but those of 

1 For example, the statistics on the population, the commerce, 
and the wealth of European countries given by the Venetian 
ambassadors of the sixteenth century, and the descriptions of the 
usages of the Germans in the Germania of Tacitus. 

2 It would be interesting to examine how much of Roman or 
Merovingian history would be left if we rejected all documents 
but those which represent direct observation. 

177 M 



Analytical Operations 

his officers; his narrative is in a large measure a 
" second-hand document." 1 

In order to criticise a second-hand statement it is 
no longer enough to examine the conditions under 
which the author of the document worked : this 
author is, in such a case, a mere agent of trans- 
mission ; the true author is the person who supplied 
him the information. The critic, therefore, must 
change his ground, and ask whether the informant 
observed and reported correctly ; and if he too had 
the information from some one else (the commonest 
case), the chase must be pursued from one inter- 
mediary to another, till the person is found who 
first launched the statement on its career, and with 
regard to him the question must be asked : Was he 
an accurate observer ? 

Logically such a search is not inconceivable; 
ancient collections of Arab traditions give lists of 
their successive guarantors. But, in practice, lack of 
documents nearly always prevents us from getting 
as far as the observer of a fact ; the observation 
remains anonymous. A general question then pre- 
sents itself: How are we to criticise an anonymous 
statement ? It is not only " anonymous documents " 

1 It will be seen why we have not separately defined and studied 
"first-hand documents." The question has not been raised in the 
proper manner in historical practice. The distinction ought to 
apply to statements, not to documents. It is not the document 
which comes to us at first, second, or third hand; it is the state- 
ment. What is called a "first-hand document" is nearly always 
composed in part of second-hand statements about facts of which 
the author had no personal knowledge. The name " second-hand 
document 1 ' is given to those which, like the work of Livy, contain 
nothing first-hand ; but the distinction is too crude to serve as a 
guide in the critical examination of statements. 

178. 



Negative Internal Criticism 

with which we are concerned, where the composition 
as a whole is the work of an unknown author ; even 
when the author is known, this question arises with 
respect to each statement of his drawn from an 
unknown source. 

Criticism works by reproducing the conditions 
under which an author wrote, and has hardly any- 
thing to take hold of where a statement is anony- 
mous. The only method left is to examine the 
general conditions of the document. We may in- 
quire whether there is any feature common to all 
the statements of a document indicating that they 
all proceed from persons having the same prejudices 
or passions: in this case the tradition followed by 
the author is biassed ; the tradition followed by 
Herodotus has both an Athenian bias and a 
Delphic bias. In respect of each fact derived from 
such a tradition we must ask whether it has not 
been distorted by the interest, the vanity, or the 
prejudices of the group concerned. We may even 
ignore the author, and ask whether there was any- 
thing likely to make for or against correct observa- 
tion, common to all the men of the time and 
country in which the observation must have been 
made : for example, what means of information, and 
what prejudices, had the Greeks of Herodotus' time 
with respect to the Scythians. 

The most useful of all these general inquiries has 
reference to that mode of transmitting anonymous 
statements which is called tradition. No second- 
hand statement has any value except in so far as it 
reproduces its source ; every addition is an alteration, 
and ought to be eliminated. Similarly, all the inter- 

x 79 



Analytical Operations 

mediary sources are valueless except as copies of the 
original statement founded directly on observation. 
The critic needs to know whether this transmission 
from hand to hand has preserved or distorted the 
original statement ; above all, whether the tradition 
embodied in the document was written or oral. 
Writing fixes a statement, and ensures its being 
transmitted faithfully ; when a statement is com- 
municated orally, the impression in the mind of the 
hearer is apt to be modified by confusion with other 
impressions ; in passing from one intermediary to 
another the statement is modified at every step, 1 
and as these modifications arise from different 
causes, there is no possibility of measuring or cor- 
recting them. 

Oral tradition is by its nature a process of con- 
tinual alteration ; hence in the established sciences 
only written transmission is accepted. Historians 
have no avowable motive for proceeding differently, 
at any rate when it is a case of establishing a parti- 
cular fact. We must therefore search documents 
for statements derived from oral tradition in order 
that we may suspect them. We rarely have direct 
information as to statements being thus derived ; 
authors who borrow from oral tradition are not 
anxious to proclaim the fact. 2 There is thus only 

1 There is much less modification where the oral tradition assumes 
a regular or striking form, as is the case with verses, maxims, 
proverbs. 

2 Sometimes the form of the phrase tells its own tale, when, in 
the midst of a detailed narrative, obviously of legendary origin, we 
come across a curt, dry entry in annalistic style, obviously copied 
from a written document. That is what we find in Livv (see Nitzsch, 
Die romische Annulistih, Leipzig, 1873, 8vo), and in Gregory of Tours 
(see Loebell, Grcgor von Tours, Leipzig, 1868, 8vo). 

l80 



Negative Internal Criticism 

an indirect method, and that is to ascertain that 
written transmission was impossible ; we may then be 
sure that the fact reached the author only by oral 
tradition. We have therefore to ask the question : 
In this period and in this group of men was it custo- 
mary to commit to writing facts of this kind ? If 
the answer is negative, the fact considered rests on 
oral tradition alone. 

The most striking form of oral tradition is legend. 
It arises among groups of men with whom the spoken 
word is the only means of transmission, in barbarous 
societies, or in classes of little culture, such as pea- 
sants or soldiers. In this case it is the whole group 
of facts which is transmitted orally and assumes the 
legendary form. There is a legendary period in the 
early history of every people : in Greece, at Rome, 
among the Germanic and Slavonic races, the most 
ancient memories of the people form a stratum of 
legend. In periods of civilisation popular legends 
continue to exist in reference to events which strike 
the imagination of the people. 1 Legend is exclusively 
oral tradition. 

When a people has emerged from the legendary 
period and begun to commit its history to writing, 
oral tradition does not come to an end, but only 
applies to a narrower sphere ; it is now restricted to 

1 The events which strike the popular imagination and are trans- 
mitted by legend are not generally those which seem to us the most 
important. The heroes of the chansons de gestes are hardly known 
historically. The Breton epic songs relate, not to the great histo- 
rical events, as Villemarque's collection led people to believe, but to 
obscure local episodes. The same holds of the Scandinavian sagas ; 
for the most part they relate to quarrels among the villagers of 
Iceland or the Orkneys. 

181 



Analytical Operations 

facts which are not registered, whether because they 
are by their nature secret, or because no one takes 
the trouble to record them, such as private actions, 
words, the details of events. Thus arise anecdotes, 
which have been named " the legends of civilised 
society." Like legends they have their origin in 
confused recollections, allusions, mistaken interpreta- 
tions, imaginings of all kinds which fasten upon 
particular persons and events. 

Legends and anecdotes are at bottom mere 
popular beliefs, arbitrarily attached to historical 
personages ; they belong to folk-lore, not to history. 1 
We must therefore guard against the temptation to 
treat legend as an alloy of accurate facts and errors 
out of which it is possible by analysis to extract 
grains of historical truth. A legend is a conglome- 
rate in which there may be some grains of truth, 
and which may even be capable of being analysed 
into its elements; but there is no means of dis- 
tinguishing the elements taken from reality from 
those which are the work of imagination. To 
use Niebuhr's expression, a legend is "a mirage 
produced by an invisible object according to an 
unknown law of refraction." 

The crudest analytical procedure consists in 
rejecting those details in the legendary narrative 
which appear impossible, miraculous, contradictory, 
or absurd, and retaining the rational residue as his- 
torical. This is how the Protestant rationalists of 
the eighteenth century treated biblical narratives. 

1 The theory of legend is one of the most advanced parts of 
criticism. Bernheim (in his Lehrbuch, pp. 380-90) gives a good 
summary and a bibliography of it. 

182 



Negative Internal Criticism 

One might as well amputate the marvellous part of 
a fairy tale, suppress Puss in Boots, and keep the 
Marquis of Carabas as an historical character. A 
more refined but r "ss dangerous method is to 
compare different legends in order to deduce their 
common historical basis. Grote 1 has shown, with 
reference to Greek tradition, that it is impossible to 
extract any trustworthy information from legend by 
any process whatever. 2 We must make up our 
minds to treat legend as a product of imagination; 
we may look in it for a people's conceptions, not for 
the external facts in that people's history. The rule 
will be to reject every statement of legendary origin ; 
nor does this apply only to narratives in legendary 
form : a narrative which has an historical appear- 
ance, but is founded on the data of legend, the 
opening chapters of Thucydides for example, ought 
equally to be discarded. 

In the case of written transmission it remains to 
inquire whether the author reproduced his source 
without altering it. This inquiry forms part of the 
critical investigation of the sources, 3 so far as it can 
be pursued by a comparison of texts. But when the 
source has disappeared we are reduced to internal 
criticism. We ask, first of all, whether the author 
can have had exact information, otherwise his state- 



1 " History of Greece," vols. i. and ii. Compare Renan, Histoire 
du peuple d Israel, vol. i. (Paris, 1887, 8vo), Introduction. 

2 And yet Niebuhr made use of the Roman legends to construct 
a theory, which it was afterwards necessary to demolish, of the 
struggle between the patricians and the plebeians ; and Curtius, 
twenty years after Grote, looked for historical facts in the Greek 
legends. 

3 See supra, pp. 93 sqq. 

183 



Analytical Operations 

ineiit is valueless. We next put to ourselves the 
general question : Was the author in the habit of 
altering his sources, and in what manner ? And in 
regard to each separate second-hand statement we 
ask whether it has the appearance of being an exact 
reproduction or an arrangement. We judge by the 
form : when we meet with a passage whose style is 
out of harmony with the main body of the com- 
position, we have before us a fragment of an earlier 
document; the more servile the reproduction the 
more valuable is the passage, for it can contain no 
exact information beyond what was already in the 
source. 

VII. In spite of all these investigations, criticism 
never succeeds in determining the parentage of all 
the statements to the extent of finding out who it 
was that observed, or even recorded, each fact. In 
most cases the inquiry ends in leaving the state- 
ment anonymous. 

We are thus confronted with a fact, observed we 
know not by whom nor how, recorded we know not 
when nor how. No other science accepts facts 
which come in such a condition, without possibi- 
lity of verification, subject to incalculable chances 
of error. But history can turn them to account, 
because it does not, like the other sciences, need a 
supply of facts which are difficult to ascertain. 

The notion of a fact, when we come to examine 
it precisely, reduces to an affirmative judgment 
having reference to external reality. The operations 
by which we arrive at such a judgment are more 
or less difficult, and the risk of error is greater 
or smaller according to the nature of the realities 

184 



Negative Internal Criticism 

investigated and the degree of precision with which 
we wish to formulate them. Chemistry and biology 
need to discern facts of a delicate order, rapid move- 
ments, transient states, and to measure them in 
exact figures. History can work with facts of a 
much coarser kind, spread over a large extent of 
space or time, such as the existence of a custom, 
of a man, of a group, even of a people ; and these 
facts may be roughly expressed in vague words 
conveying no idea of accurate measurement. With 
such easily observed facts as these to deal with, 
history can afford to be much less exacting with 
regard to the conditions of observation. The im- 
perfection of the means of information is compen- 
sated by a natural faculty of being satisfied with 
information which can easily be obtained. 

Documents supply little else besides ill-verified 
facts, subject to many risks of falsehood or error. 
But there are some facts in respect of which it is 
very difficult to lie or be mistaken. The last series 
of questions which the critic should ask is intended 
to distinguish, in the mass of alleged facts, those 
which by their nature are little subject to the risk 
of alteration, and which are therefore very probably 
correct. We know what, in general, are the classes 
of facts which enjoy this privilege; we are thus 
enabled to draw up a list of questions for general 
use, and in applying them to any particular case we 
ask whether the fact in question comes under any 
of the heads specified in advance. 

(i) The fact is of a nature to render falsehood 
improbable. A man lies in order to produce an 
impression, and has no motive to lie in a case 

i8 5 



Analytical Operations 

where he believes that the false impression would 
be of no use, or that the falsehood would be in- 
effectual. In order to determine whether the author 
was in such a situation there are several questions 
to be asked. 

(a) Is the fact stated manifestly prejudicial to the 
effect which the author wished to produce ? Does 
it run counter to the interest, the vanity, the senti- 
ments, the literary tastes of the author and his 
group ; or to the opinions which he made a point 
of not offending ? In such a case there is a pro- 
bability of good faith. But in the application of 
this criterion there is danger; it has often been 
wrongly used, and in two ways. One of these is 
to take for a confession what was meant for a boast, 
as the declaration of Charles IX. that he was re- 
sponsible for the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Or 
again, we trust without examination an Athenian 
who speaks ill of the Athenians, or a Protestant 
who accuses other Protestants. But it is quite 
possible the author's notions of his interest or 
honour were very different from ours ; 2 or he may 
have wished to calumniate fellow-citizens who did 
not belong to his own party, or co-religionists who 
did not belong to his own sect. This criterion 
must therefore be restricted to cases where we 
know exactly what effect he wished to produce, and 
in what group he was mainly interested. 

(b) Was the fact stated so obviously known to the 
public that the author, even if tempted to falsehood, 
would have been restrained by the certainty of being 
detected ? This is the case with facts which are 

1 Of. supra, p. 1 66. 

186 



Negative Internal Criticism 

easy to verify, which are not remote in point of time 
or space, which apply to a wide area or a long period, 
especially if the public had any interest in verifying 
them. But the fear of detection is only an intermittent 
check, opposed by interest whenever the author has 
any motive for deceiving. It acts unequally on 
different minds — strongly on men of culture and 
self-control who understand their public, feebly in 
barbarous ages and on passionate men. 1 This 
criterion, therefore, is to be restricted to cases where 
we know what idea the author had of his readers, 
and whether he was, dispassionate enough to keep 
them in mind. 

(c) Was the fact stated indifferent to the author, 
so that he had no temptation to misrepresent it ? 
This is the case with facts of a general kind, usages, 
institutions, objects, persons, which the author men- 
tions incidentally. A narrative, even a false one, 
cannot be composed exclusively of falsehoods; the 
author must localise his facts, and needs to surround 
them with a framework of truth. The facts which 
form this framework had no interest for him; at 
that time every one knew them. But for us they 
are instructive, and we can depend on them, for 
the author had no intention of deceiving us. 

(2) The fact was of a kind to render error 
improbable. Numerous as the chances of error 
are, still there are facts so " big " it is hard to 
be mistaken about them. We have, then, to ask 

1 It is often said, " The author would not have dared to write this 
if it had not been true." This argument does not apply to societies 
in a low state of civilisation. Louis VIII. dared to write that John 
Lackland had been condemned by the verdict of his peers. 

187 



Analytical Opekations 

whether the alleged fact was easy to ascertain : 
(a) Did it cover a long period of time, so that it 
must have been frequently observed ? Take, for 
example, the case of a monument, a man, a custom, 
an event which was in progress for a considerable 
time, (b) Did it cover a wide area, so that many 
people observed it ? — as, for example, a battle, a 
war, a custom common to a whole people. (c) Is 
it expressed in such general terms that superficial 
observation was enough to discover it ? — as the 
mere existence of a man, a city, a people, a custom. 
Facts of this large and general kind make up the 
bulk of historical knowledge. 

(3) The fact was of such a nature that it would 
not have been stated unless it was true. A man 
does not declare that he has seen, something con- 
trary to his expectations and habits of mind unless 
observation has compelled him to admit it. A fact 
which seems very improbable to the man who relates 
it has a good chance of being true. We have, then, 
to ask whether the fact stated was in contradiction 
with the author's opinions, whether it is a phenomenon 
of a kind unknown to him, an action or a custom 
which seems unintelligible to him; whether it is a 
saying whose import transcends his intelligence, such 
as the sayings of Christ reported in the Gospels, or 
the answers made by Joan of Arc to questions put 
to her in the course of her trial. But we must guard 
against judging of the author's ideas by our own 
standards : when men who are accustomed to believe 
in the marvellous speak of monsters, of miracles, of 
wizards, there is nothing in these to contradict their 
expectations, and the criterion does not apply. 

188 



Negative Internal Criticism 

VIII. We have at last reached the end of this 
description of the critical operations ; its length is due 
to the necessity of describing successively operations 
which are performed simultaneously. We will now 
consider how these methods are applied in practice. 

If the text be one whose interpretation is debat- 
able, the examination is divided into two stages : the 
first comprises the reading of the text with a view 
to the determination of the meaning, wichout at- 
tempting to draw any information from it ; the second 
comprises the critical study of the facts contained in 
the document. In the case of documents whose 
meaning is clear, we may begin the critical examina- 
tion on the first reading, reserving for separate study 
any individual passages of doubtful meaning. 

We begin by collecting the general information we 
possess about the document and the author, with the 
special purpose of discovering the conditions which 
may have influenced the production of the docu- 
ment — the epoch, the place, the purpose, the cir- 
cumstances of its composition ; the author's social 
status, country, party, sect, family, interests, passions, 
prejudices, linguistic habits, methods of work, means 
of information, culture, abilities, and mental defects; 
the nature of the facts and the mode of their trans- 
mission. Information on all these points is supplied 
by the preparatory critical investigation of author- 
ship and sources. We now combine the different 
heads, mentally applying the set of general critical 
questions ; this should be done at the outset, and 
the results impressed on the memory, for they will 
need to be present to the mind during the remainder 
of the operations. 

189 



Analytical Operations 

Thus prepared, we attack the document. As we 
read we mentally analyse it, destroying all the 
author's combinations, discarding all his literary 
devices, in order to arrive .at the facts, which we 
formulate in simple and precise language. We thus 
free ourselves from the deference imposed by artistic 
form, and from all submission to the author's ideas 
— an emancipation without which criticism is im- 
possible. 

•The document thus analysed resolves into a long 
series of the author's conceptions and statements as 
to facts. 

With regard to each statement, we ask ourselves 
whether there is a probability of their being false or 
erroneous, or whether, on the other hand, there are 
exceptional chances in favour of good faith and 
accuracy, working through the list of critical ques- 
tions prepared for particular cases. This list of 
questions must be always present to the mind. At 
first it may seem cumbersome, perhaps pedantic ; 
but as it will be applied more than a hundred times 
in each page of the document, it will in the end 
be used unconsciously. As we read a text, all 
the reasons for distrust or confidence will occur to 
the mind simultaneously, combined into a single 
impression. 

Analysis and critical questioning will then have 
become a matter of instinct, and we shall have 
acquired for ever that methodically analytical, dis- 
trustful, not too respectful turn of mind which is 
often mystically called " the critical sense," but 
which is nothing else than an unconscious habit of 
criticism. 

190 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS 

Critical analysis yields in the result a number of 
conceptions and statements, accompanied by com- 
ments on the probability of the facts stated being 
accurate. It remains to examine how we can 
deduce from these materials those particular his- 
torical facts which are to form the basis of scientific 
knowledge. Conceptions and statements are two 
different kinds of results, and must be treated by 
different methods. 

I. Every conception which is expressed in writing 
or by any illustrative representation is 'in itself a 
definite, unimpeachable fact. That which is ex- 
pressed must have first been present in the mind 
of some one— if not in that of the author, who may 
have reproduced a formula he did not understand 
then m the mind of the man who originated the 
formula. The existence of a conception may be 
learnt from a single instance and proved from a 
single document. Analysis and interpretation are 
thus sufficient for the purpose of drawing up the 
complete list of those facts which form the basis of 
the history of the arts, the sciences, or of doctrines. 1 
1 See above, p. 153. Similarly, the particular facts which com- 

lw ^Ir^ ?u f T 8 ^a^P^ Hustle science) are 
directly established by the analysis of the document 

191 



Analytical Operations 

It is the task of external criticism to localise these 
facts by determining the epoch, the country, the 
author of each conception. The duration, geo- 
graphical distribution, origin, and filiation of con- 
ceptions belong to historical synthesis. Internal 
criticism has nothing to do here ; the fact is taken 
directly from the document. 

We may advance a step farther. In themselves 
conceptions are nothing but facts in psychology ; 
but imagination does not create its objects, it takes 
the elements of them from reality. Descriptions of 
imaginary facts are constructed out of the real facts 
which the author has observed in his experience. 
These elements of knowledge, the raw material of 
the imaginary description, may be sought for and 
isolated. In dealing with periods and with classes 
of facts for which documents are rare — antiquity, for 
example, and the usages of private life — the attempt 
has been made to lay under contribution works of 
literature, epic poems, novels, plays. 1 The method 
is legitimate, but only within the limits of certain 
restrictions which one is very apt to forget. 

(i) It does not apply to social facts of a psy- 
chological order, the moral or artistic standards 
of a society ; the moral and sesthetic conceptions 
in a document give at most the individual stan- 
dards of the author ; we have no right to conclude 
from these to the morals or the aesthetic tastes 
of the age. We must at least wait till we have 

1 Primitive Greece has been studied in the Homeric poems. 
Mediaeval private life has been reconstructed principally from the 
chansons de gestes. (See C. V. Langlois, Lcs Traditions sur Vhistoire de 
la societe francaise au vwyen dye d'apres lcs sources litteraires, in the 
Revue historique, March- April, 1897.) 

192 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

compared several different authors of the same 
period. 

(2) Descriptions even of physical facts and objects 
may be products of the author's imagination. It 
is only the elements of them which we know to be 
certainly real ; all that we can assert is the separate 
existence of the irreducible elements, form, material, 
colour, number. When the poet speaks of golden 
gates or silver bucklers, we cannot infer that golden 
gates and silver bucklers ever existed in reality; 
nothing is certain beyond the separate existence 
of gates, bucklers, gold, and silver. The analysis 
must therefore be carried to the point of distin- 
guishing those elements which the author must 
necessarily have taken from experience : objects, 
their purpose, ordinary actions. 

(3) The conception of an object or an action 
proves that it existed, but not that it was common ; 
the object or action may have been unique, or re- 
stricted to a very small circle; poets and novelists 
are fond of taking their models from an exceptional 
world. 

(4) The facts yielded by this method are not 
localised in space or time ; the author may have 
taken them from a time or country not his own. 

All these restrictions may be summarised as fol- 
lows ; before drawing any inference from a work 
of literature as to the state of the society in which 
the author lived, we should ask ourselves what 
would be the worth of a similar inference as to con- 
temporary manners drawn from a modern novel. 

With the facts yielded by conceptions we may join 
those indifferent facts of an obvious and elementary 

193 N 



Analytical Operations 

character which the author has stated almost with- 
out thinking. Logically we have no right to call 
them certain, for we do sometimes meet with men 
who make mistakes about obvious and elementary 
facts, and others who lie even on indifferent matters. 
But such cases are so rare that there is not much 
danger in admitting as certain facts of this kind 
which are supported by a single document, and this 
is how we deal, in practice, with periods of which 
little is known. The institutions of the Gauls and 
Germans are described from the unique texts of 
Cresar and Tacitus. Facts so easy to discover are 
forced upon the authors of descriptions much as 
realities are forced upon poets. 

II. On the other hand, a statement in a document 
as to an objective fact is never enough to establish 
that fact. The chances of falsehood or error are 
so many, the conditions which gave rise to the 
statement are so little known, that we cannot be 
sure that none of these chances has taken effect. 
The critical examination provides no definitive solu- 
tion ; it is indispensable if we are to avoid error, 
but it is insufficient to conduct us to truth. 

Criticism can prove no fact ; it only yields proba- 
bilities. Its end and result is to decompose docu- 
ments into statements, each labelled with an estimate 
of its value — worthless statement, statement open 
to suspicion (strong or weak), statement probably 
(or, very probably) true, statement of unknown 
value. 

Of all these different kinds of results one only is 
definitive — the statement of an author who can have had 
no information on the fact he states is null and void ; 
194 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

it is to be rejected as we reject an apocryphal docu- 
ment. 1 But criticism here merely destroys illusory 
sources of information ; it supplies nothing certain to 
take their place. The only sure results of criticism 
are negative. All the positive results are subject to 
doubt ; they reduce to propositions of the form : 
" There are chances for or against the truth of such 
and such a statement." Chances only. A statement 
open to suspicion may turn out to be true , a state- 
ment whose truth is probable may, after all, be false. 
Instances occur continually, and we are never suffi- 
ciently well acquainted with the conditions under 
which the observation was made to know whether 
it was made ill or well. 

In order to obtain a definitive result we require a 
final operation. After passing through the ordeal of 
criticism, statements present themselves as probable 
or improbable. But even the most probable of them, 
taken by themselves, remain mere probabilities : to 
pass from them to categorical propositions in scien- 
tific form is a step we have no right to take; a 
proposition in a science is an assertion not open 
to debate, and that is what the statements we have 
before us are not. It is a principle common to all 
sciences of observation not to base a scientific con- 
clusion on a single observation ; the fact must have 
been corroborated by several independent observa- 
tions before it is affirmed categorically. History, 

1 Most historians refrain from rejecting a legend till its falsity 
has been proved, and if by chance no document has been pre- 
served to contradict it, they adopt it provisionally. This is how 
the first five centuries of Rome are still dealt with. This method, 
unfortunately still too general, helps to prevent history from being 
established as a science. 

l 95 



Analytical Operations 

with its imperfect modes of acquiring information, has 
less right than any other science to claim exemp- 
tion from this principle. An historical statement 
is, in the most favourable case, but an indifferently 
made observation, and needs other observations to 
corroborate it. 

It is by combining observations that every science 
is built up : a scientific fact is a centre on which 
several different observations converge. 1 Each obser- 
vation is subject to chances of error which cannot 
be entirely eliminated; but if several observations 
agree, this can hardly be in virtue of a common error : 
the more probable explanation of the agreement is 
that the observers have all seen the same reality 
and have all described it correctly. Errors are per- 
sonal and tend to diverge ; it is the correct observa- 
tions that agree. 

Applied to history, this principle leads to a last 
series of operations, intermediate between purely 
analytical criticism and the synthetic operations — 
the comparison of statements. 

We begin by classifying the results yielded by 
critical analysis in such a way as to bring together 
those statements which relate to the same fact. The 
operation is facilitated mechanically by the method 
of slips. Either each statement has been entered 
on a separate slip, or else a single slip has been 
assigned for each fact, and the different statements 
relating to it entered upon the slip as met with in 

1 For the logical justification of this principle in history see C. 
Seignobos, Revue Philosophique, July- August 1887. Complete scien- 
tific certitude is only produced by an agreement between observa- 
tions made on different methods; it is to be found at the junction 
of two different paths of research. 

I96 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

the course of reading. By bringing the statements 
together we learn the extent of our information on 
the fact; the definitive conclusion depends on the 
relation between the statements. We have, then, to 
study separately the different cases which may occur. 
I. Most frequently, except in contemporary his- 
tory, the documents only supply a single statement 
on a given fact. In such a case all the other sciences 
follow an invariable rule : an isolated observation is 
not admitted into science ; it is quoted (with the 
observer's name), but no conclusions are drawn from 
it. Historians have no avowable motive for pro- 
ceeding otherwise. When a fact is supported by no 
more than the statement of a single man, however 
honest he may be, historians ought not to assert it, 
but to do as men of science do — give the reference 
(Thucydides states, Caesar says that . . . ) ; this is 
all they have a right to affirm. In reality they all 
retain the habit of stating facts, as was done in the 
middle ages, on the authority of Thucydides or of 
Caesar ; many are simple enough to do so in express 
terms. Thus, allowing themselves to be guided by 
natural credulity, unchecked by science, historians 
end by admitting, on the insufficient presumption 
afforded by a unique document, any statement which 
does not happen to be contradicted by another docu- 
ment. Hence the absurd consequence that history 
is more positive, and seems better established in 
regard to those little known periods which are re- 
presented by a single writer than in regard to facts 
known from thousands of documents which con- 
tradict each other. The wars of the Medes known 
to Herodotus alone, the adventures of Fredegonda 

197 



Analytical Operations 

related by none but Gregory of Tours, are less sub- 
ject to discussion than the events of the French Re- 
volution, which have been described by hundreds 
of contemporaries. This is a discreditable state of 
things which cannot be ended except by a revolution 
in the minds of historians. 

IV. When we have several statements relating to 
the same fact, they may contradict each other or 
they may agree. In order to be certain that they 
really do contradict each other, we have to make 
sure that they do actually relate to the same fact. 
Two apparently contradictory statements may be 
merely parallel ; they may not relate exactly to the 
same moment, the same place, the same persons, 
the same episodes of an event, and they may be 
both correct. 1 We must not, however, infer that 
they confirm each other ; each comes under the 
category of unique statements. 

If the contradiction is real, at least one of the 
statements is false. In such cases it is a natural 
tendency to seek to reconcile them by a compro- 
mise — to split the difference. This peace-making 
spirit is the reverse of scientific. A says two and 
two make four ; B says they make five. We are 
not to conclude that two and two make four and 
a half; we must examine and see which is right. 
This examination is the work of criticism. Of two 
contradictory statements, it nearly always happens 
that one is open to suspicion ; this should be re- 
jected if the competing statement has been judged 
very probably true. If both are open to suspicion, 

1 This case is studied and a good example given by Bernheim. 
Lehrbuch, p. 421. 

I98 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

we abstain from drawing any conclusion. We do 
the same if several statements open to suspicion 
agree together as against a single statement which 
is not suspected. 1 

V. When several statements agree, it is still 
necessary to resist the natural tendency to believe 
that the fact has been demonstrated. The first 
impulse is to count each document as one source of 
information. We are well aware in matters of every- 
day life that men are apt to copy each other, that 
a single narrative often serves the turn of several nar- 
rators, that several newspapers sometimes happen to 
publish the same correspondence, that several re- 
porters sometimes agree to let one of their number do 
the work for all. We have, in such a case, several 
documents, several statements — have we the same 
number of observations ? Obviously not. When 
one statement reproduces another, it does not con- 
stitute a new observation, and even if an observation 
were to be reproduced by a hundred different authors, 
these hundred copies would amount to no more than 
one observation. To count them as a hundred would 
be the same thing as to count a hundred printed 
copies of the same book as a hundred different 
documents. But the respect paid to "historical 
documents " is sometimes stronger than obvious 
truth. The same statement occurring in several 
different documents by different authors has an illu- 

1 It is hardly necessary to enter a caution against the childish 
method of counting the documents on each side of a question and 
deciding by the majority. The statement of a single author who 
was acquainted with a fact is evidently worth more than a hundred 
statements made by persons who knew nothing about it. The rule 
has been formulated long ago : Ne numcrcntur, scd pondercntur. 

199 



Analytical Operations 

sory appearance of multiplicity; an identical fact 
related in ten different documents at once gives 
the impression of being established by ten agreeing 
observations. This impression is to be distrusted. 
An agreement is only conclusive when the agreeing 
statements represent observations which are inde- 
pendent of each other. Before we draw any con- 
clusion from an agreement we must examine whether 
it is an agreement between independent observations. 
Two operations are thus required. 

(i) We begin by inquiring whether the state- 
ments are independent, or are reproductions of one 
and the same observation. This inquiry is partly 
the work of that part of external criticism which 
deals with the investigation of sources; 1 but that 
investigation only touches the relations between 
written documents, and stops short when it has 
determined which passages of an author are bor- 
rowed from other authors. Borrowed passages are 
to be rejected without discussion. But the same 
work remains to be done in reference to statements 
which were not committed to writing. We have to 
compare the statements which relate to the same 
fact, in order to find out whether they proceeded 
originally from different observers, or at least from 
different observations. 

The principle is analogous to that employed in 
the investigation of sources. The details of a social 
fact are so manifold, and there are so many different 
ways of looking at the same fact, that two inde- 
pendent observers cannot possibly give completely 
coincident accounts ; if two statements present the 

1 Cf. supra, p. 94. 
200 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

same details in the same order, they must be derived 
from a common observation; different observations 
are bound to diverge somewhere. We may often 
apply an a priori principle : if the fact was of such a 
nature that it could only be observed or reported by 
a single observer, then all the accounts of it must 
be derived from a single observation. These prin- 
ciples 1 enable us to recognise many cases of different 
observations, and still more numerous cases of obser- 
vations being reproduced. 

There remains a great number of doubtful cases. 
The natural tendency is to treat them as if they 
were cases of independent observation. But the 
scientific procedure would be the exact reverse of 
this : as long as the statements are not proved to be 
independent we have no right to assume that their 
agreement is conclusive. 

It is only after we have determined the relations 
between the different statements that we can begin 
to count them and examine into their agreement. 
Here again we have to distrust the first impulse; 
the kind of agreement which is really conclusive 
is not, as one would naturally imagine, a perfect 
similarity between two narratives, but an occasional 
coincidence between two narratives which only par- 
tially resemble each other. The natural tendency 
is to think that the closer the agreement is, the 
greater is its demonstrative power ; we ought, on 
the contrary, to adopt as a rule the paradox that 

1 It is hardly possible to study here the special difficulties which 
arise in the application of these principles, as when the author, 
wishing to conceal his indebtedness, has introduced deviations in 
order to put his readers off the scent, or when the author has com- 
bined statements taken from different documents. 
20I 



Analytical Operations 

an agreement proves more when it is confined to a 
small number of circumstances, It is at such points 
of coincidence between diverging statements that 
we are to look for scientifically established historical 
facts. 

(2) Before drawing any conclusions it remains to 
make sure whether the different observations of the 
same fact are entirely independent ; for it is possible 
that one may have influenced another to such a 
degree that their agreement is inconclusive. We 
have to guard against the following cases : : — 

(a) The different observations have been made by 
the same author, who has recorded them either in 
the same or in different documents ; special reasons 
must then be had before it can be assumed that the 
author really made the observation afresh, and did 
not content himself with merely repeating a single 
observation. 

(b) There were several observers, but they com- 
missioned one of their number to write a single 
document. We have to ascertain whether the docu- 
ment merely gives the statements of the writer, or 
whether the other observers checked his work. 

(c) Several observers recorded their observations 
in different documents, but under similar conditions. 
We must apply the list of critical questions in order 
to ascertain whether they were not all subject to the 
same influences, predisposing to falsehood or error; 
whether, for example, they had a common interest, 
a common vanity, or common prejudices. 

The only observations which are certainly inde- 
pendent are those which are contained in different 
documents, written by different authors, who be- 
202 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

longed to different groups, and worked under dif- 
ferent conditions. Cases of perfectly conclusive 
agreement are thus rare, except in reference to 
modern periods. 

The possibility of proving an historical fact de- 
pends on the number of independent documents 
relating to it which have been preserved, and the 
preservation of the documents is a matter of chance ; 
this explains the share which chance has in the 
formation of historical science. 

The facts which it is possible to establish are 
chiefly those which cover a large extent of space or 
time (sometimes called general facts), customs, doc- 
trines, institutions, great events ; they were easier to 
observe than the others, and are now easier to prove. 
Historical method is not, however, essentially power- 
less to establish facts of short duration and limited 
extent (those which are called particular facts), such 
as a saying, a momentary act. It is enough that 
several persons should have been present when the 
fact occurred, that they should have recorded it, 
and that their writings should have come down to 
us. We know what were the words which Luther 
uttered at the Diet of Worms ; we know that he 
did not say what tradition puts in his mouth. This 
concurrence of favourable conditions becomes more 
and more frequent with the organisation of news- 
papers, of shorthand writers, and of depositories of 
documents. 

In the case of antiquity and the middle ages 
historical knowledge is limited ,to general facts by 
the scarcity of documents. In dealing with con- 
temporary history it is possible to include more and 

203 



Analytical Operations 

more particular facts. The general public supposes 
the opposite of this ; it is suspicious about contem- 
porary facts, with reference to which it sees contra- 
dictory narratives circulating, and believes without 
hesitation ancient facts, which it does not see con- 
tradicted anywhere. Its confidence is at its greatest 
in respect of that history which we have not the 
means of knowing, and its scepticism increases with 
the means of knowledge. 

VI. Agreement between documents leads to conclu- 
sions which are not all of them definitive. In order 
to complete and rectify our conclusions we have 
still to study the harmony of the facts. 

Several facts which, taken in isolation, are only 
imperfectly proved, may confirm each other in such 
a manner as to produce a collective certainty. The 
facts which the documents present in isolation have 
sometimes been in reality sufficiently near each other 
to be connected. Of this kind are the successive 
actions of the same man or of the same group 
of men, the habits of the same group at different 
epochs separated by short intervals, or of similar 
groups at the same epoch. It is no doubt possible 
that one of several analogous facts may be true 
and another false ; the certainty of the first does not 
justify the categorical assertion of the second. . But 
yet the harmony of several such facts, each proved 
imperfectly, yields a kind of certainty ; the facts do 
not, in the strict sense of the word, prove, but they 
confirm 1 each other. The doubt which attached to 
each one of them disappears ; we obtain that species 

1 Here we merely indicate the principle of the method of con- 
firmation ; its applications would require a very lengthy study. 
204 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

of certainty which is produced by the interconnec- 
tion of facts. Thus the comparison of conclusions 
which are separately doubtful yields a whole which 
is morally certain. In an itinerary of a sovereign, 
the days and the places confirm each other when 
they harmonise so as to form a coherent whole. 
An institution or a popular usage is established by 
the harmony of accounts, each of which is no more 
than probable, relating to different times and places. 

This method is a difficult one to apply. The 
notion of harmony is a much vaguer one than that 
of agreement. We cannot assign any precise general 
rules for distinguishing facts which are sufficiently 
connected to form . a whole, the harmony of whose 
parts would be conclusive ; nor can we determine 
beforehand the duration and extent of that which 
may be taken to form a whole. Facts separated by 
half a century of time and a hundred leagues of 
space may confirm each other in such a way as to 
establish a popular usage (for example, among the 
ancient Germans) ; but they would prove nothing if 
they were taken from a heterogeneous society subject 
to rapid evolution (take, for example, French society 
in 1750, and again in 1800, in Alsace and in 
Provence). Here we have to study the relation 
between the facts. This brings us to the beginnings 
of historical construction ; here is the transition 
from analytical to synthetic operations. 

VII. But it remains to consider cases of discord- 
ance between facts established by documents and 
other facts established by other methods. It happens 
sometimes that a fact obtained as an historical con- 
clusion is in contradiction with a body of known 

205 



Analytical Operations 

historical facts, or with the sum of our knowledge of 
humanity founded on direct observation, or with a 
scientific law established by the regular method of 
an established science. In the first two cases the 
fact is only in conflict with history, psychology, or 
sociology, all imperfectly established sciences; we 
then simply call the fact improbable. If it is in 
conflict with a true science it becomes a miracle. 
What are we to do with an improbable or miracu- 
lous fact ? Are we to admit it after examination of 
the documents, or are we to pass on and shelve the 
question ? 

Improbability is not a scientific notion ; it varies 
with the individual. Each person finds improbable 
what he is not accustomed to see : a peasant would 
think the telephone much more improbable than a 
ghost ; a king of Siam refused to believe in the 
existence of ice. It is important to know who 
precisely it is to whom the fact appears to be im- 
probable. Is it to the mass who have no scientific 
culture ? For these, science is more improbable 
than miracle, physiology than spiritualism ; their 
notions of improbability are worthless. Is it to 
the man who possesses scientific culture ? If so, we 
have to deal with that which seems improbable to 
a scientific mind, and it would be more accurate to 
say that the fact is contrary to the results of science 
— that there is disagreement between the direct 
observations of men of science and the indirect 
testimony of the documents. 

How is this conflict to be decided ? The question 
has no great practical interest ; nearly all the docu- 
ments which relate miraculous facts are already open 
206 



The Determination of Particular Facts 

to suspicion on other grounds, and would be dis- 
carded by a sound criticism. But the question of 
miracles has raised such passions that it may be 
well to indicate how it affects the historian. 1 

The general tendency to believe in the marvellous 
has filled with miraculous facts the documents of 
nearly every people. Historically the existence of 
the devil is much better proved than that of Pisis- 
tratus : there has not been preserved a single word of 
a contemporary of Pisistratus saying that he has seen 
him ; thousands of " ocular witnesses " declare they 
have seen the devil ; few historical facts have been 
established by so great a number of independent 
testimonies. However, we do not hesitate to reject 
the devil and to accept Pisistratus. For the existence 
of the devil would be irreconcilable with the laws of 
all the established sciences. 

For the historian the solution of the problem is 
obvious. 2 The observations whose results are con- 
tained in historical documents are never of equal 
value with those of contemporary scientists ; we have 
already shown why. The indirect method of history 
is always inferior to the direct methods of the sciences 
of observation. If its results do not harmonise with 

1 Pere de Srnedt has devoted to this question a part of his 
Principes de la critique histoire (Paris, 1887, i2mo). 

2 The solution of the question is different in the case of the 
sciences of direct observation, especially the biological sciences. 
Science knows nothing of the possible and the impossible ; it only 
recognises facts which have been correctly or incorrectly observed : 
facts which had been declared impossible, as the existence of 
aerolites, have been discovered to be genuine. The very notion of 
a miracle is metaphysical ; it implies a conception of the universe 
as a whole which transcends the limits of observation. (See Wallace, 
"Miracles and Modern Spiritualism.") 

207 



Analytical Operations 

theirs, it is history which must give way ; historical 
science, with its imperfect means of information, 
cannot claim to check, contradict, or correct the 
results of other sciences, but must rather use their 
results to correct its own. The progress of the 
direct sciences sometimes modifies the results of 
historical interpretation ; a fact established by direct 
observation aids in the comprehension and criticism 
of documents. Cases of stigmata and nervous anaes- 
thesia which have been scientifically observed have 
led to the admission as true of historical narratives 
of analogous facts, as in the case of the stigmata of 
certain saints and the possessed nuns of Loudun. 
But history cannot aid the progress of the direct 
sciences. It is kept at a distance from reality by 
its indirect means of information, and must accept 
the laws that are established by those sciences which 
come into immediate contact with reality. In order 
to reject one of these laws new direct observations 
are necessary. Such revolutions are possible, but 
they must be brought about from within. History 
has no power to take the initiative in them. 

The solution is not so clear in the case of facts 
which do not harmonise with a body of historical 
knowledge or with the sciences, still in the embryonic 
stage, which deal with man. It depends on the 
opinion we form as to the value of such knowledge. 
We can at least lay down the practical rule that in 
order to contradict history, psychology, or sociology, 
we must have very strong documents, and this is a 
case which hardly ever occurs. 



208 



BOOK III 

SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS 



209 



BOOK III 

SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS 

CHAPTER I 

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION 

The criticism of documents only yields isolated facts. 
In order to organise them into a body of science it is 
necessary to perform a series of synthetic operations. 
The study of these processes of historical construction 
forms the second half of Methodology. 

The mode of construction cannot be regulated by 
the ideal plan of the science we desire to construct ; 
it depends on the materials we have at our disposal. 
It would be chimerical to formulate a scheme which 
the materials would not allow us to carry out ; it 
would be like proposing to construct an Eiffel tower 
with building-stones. The fundamental defect of 
philosophies of history is that they forget this prac- 
tical necessity. 

I. Let us begin by considering the materials of 
history. What is their form and their nature? How 
do they differ from the materials of other sciences? 

Historical facts are derived from the critical ana- 
lysis of documents. They issue from this process 
in the form to which analysis has reduced them, 

211 



Synthetic Operations 

chopped small into individual statements ; for a 
single sentence contains several statements: we have 
often accepted some and rejected others ; each of 
these statements represents a fact. 

Historical facts have the common characteristic of 
having been taken from documents ; but they differ 
greatly among themselves. 

(i) They represent phenomena of very different 
nature. From the same document we derive facts 
bearing on handwriting, language, style, doctrines, 
customs, events. The Mesha inscription furnishes 
facts bearing on Moabite handwriting and language, 
the belief in the god Chemosh, the practices belong- 
ing to his cult, the war between the Moabites and 
Israel. Thus the facts reach us pell-mell, without 
distinction of nature. This mixture of heterogeneous 
facts is one of the characteristics which differentiate 
history from the other sciences. The sciences of 
direct observation choose the facts to be studied, 
and systematically limit themselves to the observa- 
tion of facts of a single species. The documentary 
sciences receive the facts, already observed, at the 
hands of authors of documents, who supply them in 
disorder. For the purpose of remedying this dis- 
order it is necessary to sort the facts and group 
them by species. But, for the purpose of sorting 
them, it is necessary to know precisely what it is 
that constitutes a species of historical facts ; in order 
to group them we need a principle of classification 
applicable to them. But on these two questions 
of capital importance historians have not as yet 
succeeded in formulating precise rules. 

(2) Historical facts present themselves in very 
212 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

different degrees of generality, from the highly 
general facts which apply to a whole people and 
which lasted for centuries (institutions, customs, 
beliefs), down to the most transient actions of a 
single man (a word, a movement). Here again 
history differs from the sciences of direct observa- 
tion, which regularly start from particular facts and 
labour methodically to condense them into general 
facts. In order to form groups the facts must be 
reduced to a common degree of generality, which 
makes it necessary to inquire to what degree of 
generality we can and ought to reduce the different 
species of facts. And this is what historians do not 
agree about among themselves. 

(3) Historical facts are localised; each belongs 
to a given time and a given country. If we sup- 
press the time and place to which they belong, they 
lose their historical character; they now contribute 
only to the knowledge of universal humanity, as is 
the case with facts of folk-lore whose origin is un- 
known. This necessity of localisation is also foreign 
to the general sciences; it is confined to the descrip- 
tive sciences, which deal with the geographical dis- 
tribution and with the evolution of phenomena. It 
obliges the historian to study separately the facts 
belonging to different countries and different epochs. 

(4) The facts which have been extracted from 
documents by critical analysis present themselves 
accompanied by a critical estimate of their proba- 
bility. 1 In every case where we have not reached 
complete certainty, whenever the fact is merely 
probable — still more when it is open to suspicion — 

1 See above, p. 194. 
213 



Synthetic Operations 

criticism supplies the fact to the historian accom- 
panied by a label which he has no right to remove, 
and which prevents the fact from being definitively- 
admitted into the science. Even those facts which, 
after comparison with others, end by being estab- 
lished, are subject to temporary exclusion, like the 
clinical cases which accumulate in the medical re- 
views before they are considered sufficiently proved 
to be received as scientific facts. 

Historical construction has thus to be performed 
with an incoherent mass of minute facts, with detail- 
knowledge reduced as it were to a powder. It must 
utilise a heterogeneous medley of materials, relating 
to different subjects and places, differing in their 
degree of generality and certainty. No method of 
classifying them is provided by the practice of his- 
torians ; history, which began by being a form of 
literature, has remained the least methodical of the 
sciences. 

IT. In every science the next step after observing 
the facts is to formulate a series of questions accord- 
ing to some methodical system ; l every science is 
composed of the answers to such a series of ques- 
tions. In all the sciences of direct observation, even 
if the questions to be answered have not been put 
down in advance, the facts which are observed 
suggest questions, and require them to be formulated 
precisely. But historians have no discipline of this 
kind ; many of them are accustomed to imitate 
artists, and do not even think of asking themselves 
what they are looking for. They take from their 

1 In the experimental sciences an hypothesis is a form of question 
accompanied by a provisional answer. 

2I 4 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

documents those parts which strike them, often for 
purely personal reasons, and reproduce them, chang- 
ing the language and adding any miscellaneous re- 
flections which come into their minds. 

If history is not to be lost in the confusion of its 
materials, it must be made a rule to proceed here, 
as in the other sciences, by way of question and 
answer. 1 But how are the questions to be chosen 
in a science so different from the others ? This 
is the fundamental problem of method. The only 
way to solve it is to begin by determining the 
essential characteristic of historical facts by which 
they are differentiated from the facts of the other 
sciences. 

The sciences of direct observation deal with 
realities, taken in their entirety. The science which 
borders most closely on history in respect of its 
subject-matter, descriptive zoology, proceeds by the 
examination of a real and complete animal. This 
animal is first observed, as a whole, by actual vision; 
it is then dissected into its parts ; this dissection is 
analysis in the original sense of the word (avaXvew, 
to break up into parts). It is then possible to put 
the parts together again in such a way as to exhibit 
the structure of the whole ; this is real synthesis. 
It is possible to watch the real movements which 
are the functions of the organs in such a way as 
to observe the mutual actions and reactions of the 
different parts of the organism. It is possible to 

1 Fustel de Coulanges saw the necessitv of this. In the preface 
to his Rechcrches sur quelques problemes d'histoire (Paris, 1885, 8vo) 
he announces his intention of presenting his researches "in the 
form which all my works have, that is, in the form of questions 
which I ask myself, and on which I endeavour to throw light." 

215 



Synthetic Operations 

compare real wholes and see what are the parts 
in which they resemble each other, so as to be 
able to classify them according to real points of 
resemblance. The science is a body of objective 
knowledge founded on real analysis, synthesis, and 
comparison; actual sight of the things studied 
guides the scientific researcher and dictates the 
questions he is to ask himself. 

In history there is nothing like this. One is 
apt to say that history is the " vision " of past 
events, and that it proceeds by '" analysis " : these 
are two metaphors, dangerous if we suffer ourselves 
to be misled by them. 1 ' In history we see nothing 
real except paper with writing on it — and some- 
times monuments or the products of art or industry. 
The historian has nothing before him which he can 
analyse physically, nothing which he can destroy 
and reconstruct. "Historical analysis" is no more 
real than is the vision of historical facts; it is 
an abstract process, a purely intellectual operation. 
The analysis of a document consists in a mental 
search for the items of information it contains, with 
the object of criticising them one by one. The 
analysis of a fact consists in the process of dis- 
tinguishing mentally between its different details (the 
various episodes of an event, the characteristics of 

1 Fustel de Coulanges himself seems to have been misled by 
them : " History is a science ; it does not imagine, it only sees " 
(Monarchic franque, p. i). "History, like every science, consists 
in a process of discerning facts, analysing them, comparing them, 
and noting their connections. . . . The historian . . . seeks facts 
and attains them by the minute observation of texts, as the 
chemist finds his in the course of experiments conducted with 
minute precision" (Ibid., p. 39). 

2l6 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

an institution), with the object of paying special 
attention to each detail in turn; that is what is 
called examining the different " aspects " of a fact, — 
another metaphor. The human mind is vague by 
nature, and spontaneously revives only vague collec- 
tive impressions ; to impart clearness to these it is 
necessary to ask what individual impressions go to 
form a given collective impression, in order that 
precision may be attained by a successive considera- 
tion of them. This is an indispensable operation, 
but we must not exaggerate its scope. It is not 
an objective method which yields a knowledge of 
real objects; it is only a subjective method which 
aims at detecting those abstract elements which 
compose our impressions. 1 From the very nature 
of its materials history is necessarily a subjective 
science. It would be illegitimate to extend to this 
intellectual analysis of subjective impressions the 
rules which govern the real analysis of real objects. 

History, then, must guard against the temptation 
to imitate the method of the biological sciences. 
Historical facts are so different from the facts of 
the other sciences that their study requires a 
different method. 

III. Documents, the sole source of historical know- 
ledge, give information on three categories of facts : 

(i) Living beings and material objects. Docu- 
ments make us acquainted with the existence of 
human beings, physical conditions, products of art 
and industry. In all -these cases physical facts 

1 The subjective character of history has been brought out into 
strong relief by the philosopher G. Simmel, Die Probleme der 
Oeschichtsphilosophie (Leipzig, 1892, 8vo). 

217 



Synthetic Operations 

have been brought before the author by physical 
perception. But we have before us nothing but 
intellectual phenomena, facts seen " through the 
author's imagination," or, to speak accurately, mental 
images representative of the author's impressions — 
images which we form on the analogy of the images 
which were in his mind. The Temple at Jerusalem 
was a material object which men saw, but we cannot 
see it now ; all we can now do is to form a mental 
image of it, analogous to that which existed in the 
minds of those who saw and described it. 

(2) Actions of men. Documents relate the 
actions (and words) of men of former times. Here, 
too, are physical facts which were known to the 
authors by sight and hearing, but which are now 
for us no more than the author's recollections, sub- 
jective images which are reproduced in our minds. 
When Caesar was stabbed the dagger-thrusts were 
seen, the words of the murderers were heard ; 
we have nothing but mental images. Actions and 
words all have this characteristic, that each was 
the action or the word of an individual ; the 
imagination can only represent to itself individual 
acts, copied from those which are brought before 
us by direct physical observation. As these are 
the actions of men living in a society, most of 
them are performed simultaneously by several in- 
dividuals, or are directed to some common end. 
These are collective acts ; but, in the imagination 
as in direct observation, they always reduce to a 
sum of individual actions. The "social fact," as 
recognised by certain sociologists, is a philosophical 
construction, not an historical fact. 

218 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

(3) Motives and conceptions. Human actions 
do not contain their own cause within themselves ; 
they have motives. This vague word denotes both 
the stimulus which occasions the performance of 
an action, and the representation of the action which 
is in the mind of a man at the moment when 
he performs it. We can imagine motives only as 
existing in a man's mind, and in the form of vague 
interior representations, analogous to those which 
we have of our own inward states ; we can express 
them only by words, generally metaphorical. Here 
we have psychic facts, generally called feelings and 
ideas. Documents exhibit three kinds of such facts : 
(a) motives and conceptions in the authors 5 minds 
and expressed by them ; (b) motives and ideas attri- 
buted by the authors to contemporaries of theirs 
whose actions they have seen ; (c) motives which we 
ourselves may suppose to have influenced the actions 
related in the documents, and which we represent 
to ourselves on the model of our own motives. , 

Physical facts, human actions (both individual and 
collective), psychic facts — these form the objects of 
historical knowledge ; they are none of them observed 
directly, they are all imagined. Historians — nearly 
all of them unconsciously and under the impression 
that they are observing realities — are occupied solely 
with images. 

IV. How, then, is it possible to imagine facts 
without their being wholly imaginary ? The facts, 
as they exist in the historian's mind, are necessarily 
subjective ; that is one of the reasons given for re- 
fusing to recognise history as a science. But sub- 
jective is not a synonym of unreal. A recollection 

219 



Synthetic Opeeations 

is only an image ; but it is not therefore a chimera, 
it is the representation of a vanished reality. It 
is true that the historian who works with docu- 
ments has no personal recollections of which he can 
make direct use; but he forms mental images on 
the model of his own recollections. He assumes 
that realities (objects, actions, motives), which have 
now disappeared, but were formerly observed by the 
authors of the documents, resembled the realities of 
his own day which he has himself seen and which 
he retains in his memory. This is the postulate of 
all the documentary sciences. If former humanity 
did not resemble the humanity of to-day, documents 
would be unintelligible. Starting from this assumed 
resemblance, the historian forms a mental repre- 
sentation of the bygone facts of history similar to 
his own recollection of the facts he has witnessed. 

This operation, which is performed unconsciously, 
is one of the principal sources of error in history. 
The things of the past which are to be pictured in 
imagination were not wholly similar to the things 
of the present which we have seen ; we have never 
seen a man like Caesar or Clovis, and we have never 
experienced the same mental states as they. In 
the established sciences it is equally true that one 
man will work on facts which another has observed, 
and which he must therefore represent to himself 
by analogy; but these facts are defined by precise 
terms which indicate what invariable elements ought 
to appear, in the image. Even in physiology the 
notions which occur are sufficiently clear and fixed 
for the same word to evoke in the minds of all 
naturalists similar images of an organ or a move- 

220 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

ment. The reason is that each notion which has 
a name has been formed by a method of observa- 
tion and abstraction in the course of which all the 
characteristics which belong to the notion have been 
precisely determined and described. 

But in proportion as a body of knowledge is 
more nearly concerned with the invisible facts of 
the mind, its notions become more confused and its 
language less precise. Even the most ordinary facts 
of human life, social conditions, actions, motives, 
feelings, can only be expressed by vague terms (king, 
warrior, to fight, to elect). In the case of more com- 
plex phenomena, language is so indefinite that there 
is no agreement even as to the essential elements of 
the phenomena. What are we to understand by a 
tribe, an army, an industry, a market, a revolution ? 
Here history shares the vagueness common to all 
the sciences of humanity, psychological or social. 
But its indirect method of representation by mental 
images renders this vagueness still more dangerous. 
The historical images in our minds ought, then, to 
reproduce at least the essential features of the 
images which were in the minds of the direct 
observers of past facts ; but the terms in which 
they expressed their mental images never tell us 
exactly what these essential elements were. 

Facts which we did not see, described in language 
which does not permit us to represent them in our 
minds with exactness, form the data of history. The 
historian, however, is obliged to picture the facts 
in his imagination, and he should make it his con- 
stant endeavour to construct his mental images out 
of none but correct elements, so that he may imagine 

221 



Synthetic Operations 

the facts as he would have seen them if he had 
been able to observe them personally. 1 But the 
formation of a mental image requires more elements 
than the documents supply, Let any one endeavour 
to form a mental representation of a battle or a 
ceremony out of the data of a narrative, however 
detailed ; he will see how many features he is com- 
pelled to add, This necessity becomes physically 
perceptible in attempts to restore monuments in 
accordance with descriptions (for example, the 
Temple at Jerusalem), in pictures which claim to 
be representations of historical scenes, in the draw- 
ings of illustrated newspapers. 

Every historical image contains a large part of 
fancy. The historian cannot get rid of it, but he 
can take stock of the real elements which enter 
into his images and confine his constructions to 
these ; they are the elements which he has derived 
from the documents. If, in order to understand 
the battle between Csesar and Ariovistus, he finds 
it necessary to make a mental picture of the two 
opposing armies, he will be careful to draw no 
conclusions from the general aspect under which 
he imagines them ; he will base his reasonings 
exclusively on the real details furnished by the 
documents. 

V. The problem of historical method may be 
finally stated as follows. Out of the different 
elements we find in documents we form mental 
images. Some of these, relating entirely to physical 

1 This has been eloquently put by Carlyle and Michelet. It is 
also the substance of the famous expression of Ranke : " I wish 
to state how that really was " (wie es cigentlich gewesen). 

222 



Conditions of Histoeical Construction 

objects, are furnished to us by illustrative monu- 
ments, and they directly represent some of the 
physical aspects of the things of the past. Most 
of them, however, including all the images we form 
of psychic facts, are constructed on the model either 
of ancient representations, or, more frequently, of 
the facts we have observed in our own experience. 
Now, the things of the past were only partially 
similar to the things of the present, and it is pre- 
cisely the points of difference which make history 
interesting. How are we to represent to ourselves 
these elements of difference for which we have no 
model ? We have never seen a company of men 
resembling the Frankish warriors, and we have 
never personally experienced the feelings which 
Clovis had when settiDg out to fight against the 
Visigoths. How are we to make our imagination 
of facts of this kind harmonise with the reality ? 

Practically, what happens is as follows. Imme- 
diately on the reading of a sentence in a document 
an image is formed in our minds by a spontaneous 
operation beyond our control. This image is based 
on a superficial analogy, and is, as a rule, grossly 
inaccurate. Any one who searches his memory may 
recall the absurd manner in which he first repre- 
sented to himself the persons and scenes of the past. 
It is the task of history to rectify these images 
gradually, by eliminating the false elements one by 
one, and replacing them by true ones. We have 
seen red-haired people, bucklers, and Frankish battle- 
axes (or at least drawings of these objects) ; we bring 
these elements together, in order to correct our 
first mental image of the Frankish warriors. The 

223 



Synthetic Operations 

historical image thus ends by becoming a combination 
of features borrowed from different experiences. 

It is not enough to represent to oneself isolated 
persons, objects, and actions. Men and their actions 
form part of a whole, of a society and of a process of 
evolution. It is, therefore, further necessary to re- 
present to oneself the relations between different 
men and different actions (nations, governments, 
laws, wars). 

But in order to imagine relations it is necessary 
to have a conception of collectivities or wholes, and 
the documents only give isolated elements. Here 
again the historian is obliged to use a subjective 
method. He imagines a society or a process of 
evolution, and in this imaginary framework he dis- 
poses the elements furnished by the documents. 
Thus, whereas biological classification is guided by 
the objective observation of physical units, historical 
classification can only be effected upon subjective 
units existing in the imagination. 

The realities of the past are things which we do 
not observe, and which we can only know in virtue 
of their resemblance to the realities of the present. 
In order to realise the conditions under which past 
events happened, we must observe the humanity of 
to-day, and look for the conditions under which 
analogous events happen now. History thus be- 
comes an application of the descriptive sciences 
which deal with humanity, descriptive psychology, 
sociology or social science ; but all these sciences are 
still but imperfectly established, and their defects 
retard the establishment of a science of history. 

Some of the conditions of human life are, how- 
224 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

ever, so necessary and so obvious that the most 
superficial observation is enough to establish them. 
These are the conditions common to all humanity; 
they have their origin either in the physiological 
organisation which determines the material needs of 
men, or in the psychological organisation which de- 
termines their habits in matters of conduct. These 
conditions can therefore be provided for by the use 
of a set of general questions applicable to all the 
cases that may occur. It is with historical construc- 
tion as with historical criticism — the impossibility of 
direct observation compels the use of prearranged 
sets of questions. 

The human actions which form the subject-matter 
of history differ from age to age and from country 
to country, just as men and societies have differed 
from each other ; and, indeed, it is the special aim 
of history to study these differences. If men had 
always had the same form of government or spoken 
the same language, there would be no occasion to 
write the history of forms of government or the 
history of languages. But these differences are 
comprised within limits imposed by the general 
conditions of human life ; they are but varieties of 
certain modes of being and doing which are com- 
mon to the whole of humanity, or at least to the 
great majority of men. We cannot know a priori 
what was the mode of government or the language 
of an historical people ; it is the business of history 
to tell us. But that a given people had a language 
and had a form of government is something which 
we are entitled to assume, before examination, in 
every possible case. 

225 p 



Synthetic Operations 

By drawing up the list of the fundamental pheno- 
mena which we may expect to find in the life of 
every individual and every people, we shall have 
suggested to us a set of general questions which 
will be summary, but still sufficient to enable us 
to arrange the bulk of historical facts in a certain 
number of natural groups, each of which will form a 
special branch of histoiy. This scheme of general 
classification will supply the scaffolding of historical 
construction. 

The set of general questions will only apply to 
phenomena of constant occurrence : it cannot anti- 
cipate the thousands of local or accidental events 
which enter into the life of an individual or a nation ; 
it will, therefore, not contain all the questions which 
the historian must answer before he can give a com- 
plete picture of the past. The detailed study of the 
facts will require the use of lists of questions entering 
more into detail, and differing according to the nature 
of the events, the men, or the societies studied. In 
order to frame these lists, we begin by setting down 
those questions or matters of detail which are sug- 
gested by the mere reading of the documents; but 
for the purpose of arranging these questions, often 
indeed for the purpose of making the list complete, 
recourse must be had to the systematic a priori 
method. Among the classes of facts, the persons, 
and the societies with which we are well acquainted 
(either from direct observation or from history), we 
look for those which resemble the facts, the persons, 
or the societies which we wish to study. By analysing 
the scheme of arrangement used in the scientific 
treatment of these familiar cases we shall learn what 

226 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

questions ought to be asked in reference to the 
analogous cases which we propose to investigate. Of 
course the model must be chosen intelligently; we 
must not apply to a barbarous society a list of ques- 
tions framed on the study of a civilised nation, and 
ask with regard to a feudal domain what agents 
corresponded to each of our ministers of state — as 
Boutaric did in his study of the administration of 
Alphonse of Poitiers. 

This method of drawing up lists of questions 
which bases all historical construction on an a priori 
procedure, would be objectionable if history really 
were a science of observation ; and perhaps some 
will think it compares very unfavourably with the 
a posteriori methods of the natural sciences. But its 
justification is simple : it is the only method which 
it is possible to employ, and the only method which, 
as a matter of fact, ever has been employed. The 
moment an historian attempts to put in order the 
facts contained in documents, he constructs out of 
the knowledge he has (or thinks he has) of human 
affairs a scheme of arrangement which is the equi- 
valent of a list of questions — unless, perhaps, he 
adopts a scheme which one of his predecessors has 
constructed in a similar manner. But when this 
Avork has been performed unconsciously, the scheme 
of arrangement remains incomplete and confused. 
Thus it is not a case of deciding whether to work 
with or without an a priori set of questions — we 
must work with such a set in any case — the choice 
merely lies between the unconscious use of an in- 
complete and confused set of questions and the * 
conscious use of a precise and complete set. 

227 



Synthetic Operations 

VI. We can now sketch the plan of historical con- 
struction in a way which will determine the series of 
synthetic operations necessary to raise the edifice. 

The critical analysis of the documents has sup- 
plied the materials — historical facts still in a state 
of dispersion. We begin by imagining these facts 
on the model of what we suppose to be the analo- 
gous facts of the present ; by combining elements 
taken from reality at different points, we endea- 
vour to form a mental image which shall resemble 
as nearly as possible that which would have been 
produced by direct observation of the past event. 
This is the first operation, inseparable in practice 
from the reading of the documents. Considering 
that it will be enough to have indicated its nature 
here, 1 we have refrained from devoting a special 
chapter to it. 

The facts having been thus imagined, we group 
them according to schemes of classification devised 
on the model of a body of facts which we have 
observed directly, and which we suppose analogous 
to the body of past facts under consideration. This 
is the second operation; it is performed by the aid 
of systematic questions, and its result is to divide the 
mass of historical facts into homogeneous portions 
which we afterwards form into groups until the entire 
history of the past has been systematically arranged 
according to a general scheme. 

When we have arranged in this scheme the facts 
taken from the documents, there remain gaps whose 
extent is always considerable, and is enormous for 
those parts of history in regard to which documents 

1 Cf. pp. 219-23. 

228 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

are scanty. We endeavour to fill some of these gaps 
by reasoning based on the facts which are known. This 
is (or should be) the third operation ; it increases the 
sum of historical knowledge by an application of logic. 

We still possess nothing but a mass of facts placed 
side by side in a scheme of classification. We have 
to condense them into formula?, in order to deduce 
their general characteristics and their relation to 
each other. This is the fourth operation; it leads 
to the final conclusions of history, and crowns the 
work of historical construction from the scientific 
point of view. 

But as historical knowledge, which is by nature 
complex and unwieldy, is exceptionally difficult to 
communicate, we still have to look for the methods 
of expounding historical results in appropriate form. 

VII. This series of operations, easy to conceive 
in the mind, has never been more than imperfectly 
performed. It is beset by material difficulties which 
theories of methodology do not take into account, 
but which it would be better to face, with the 
purpose of discovering whether they are after all 
insurmountable. 

The operations of history are so numerous, from 
the first discovery of the document to the final for- 
mula of the conclusion, they require such minute 
precautions, so great a variety of natural gifts and 
acquired habits, that there is no man who can 
perform by himself all the work on any one point. 
History is less able than any other science to dispense 
with the division of labour ; but there is no other 
science in which labour is so imperfectly divided. 
We find specialists in critical scholarship writing 

229 



Synthetic Operations 

general histories in which they let their imagination 
guide them in the work of construction ; 1 and, on the 
other hand, there are constructive historians who use 
for their work materials whose value they have not 
tested. 2 The reason is that the division of labour 
implies a common understanding among the workers, 
and in history no such understanding exists. Except 
in the preparatory operations of external criticism, 
each worker follows the guidance of his own private 
inspiration ; he is at no pains to work on the same 
lines as the others, nor does he pay any regard to 
the whole of which his own work is to form a part. 
Thus no historian can feel perfectly safe in adopting 
the results of another's work, as may be done in the 
established sciences, for he does not know whether 
these results have been obtained by trustworthy 
methods. The most scrupulous go so far as to admit 
nothing until they have done the work on the docu- 
ments over again for themselves. This was the 
attitude adopted by Fustel de Coulanges. It is 
barely possible to satisfy this exacting standard in 
the case of little-known periods, the documents re- 
lating to which are confined to a few volumes ; and 
yet some have gone so far as to maintain the dogma 
that no historian should ever work at second hand. 3 
This, indeed, is what an historian is compelled to 
do when the documents are too numerous for him 

1 Curtius in his "History of Greece," Mommsen in his "History 
of Rome " (before the Empire), Lamprecht in his "History of 
Germany." 

2 It will be enough to mention Augustin Thierry, Michelet, and 
Carlyle. 

3 See P. Guiraud, Fustel dc Coulanges (Paris, 1896, i2mo), p. 164, 
for some very judicious observations on this subject. 

23O 



Conditions of Historical Construction 

to be able to read them all ; but he does not say so, 
to avoid scandal. 

It would be better to acknowledge the truth 
frankly. So complex a science as history, where 
facts must ordinarily be accumulated by the million 
before it is possible to formulate conclusions, cannot 
be built up on this principle of continually beginning 
afresh. Historical construction is not work that 
can be done with documents, any more than history 
can be " written from manuscripts," and for the same 
reason — the shortness of time. In order that science 
may advance it is necessary to combine the results 
of thousands of detail-researches. 

But how are we to proceed in view of the fact 
that most researches have been conducted upon 
methods which, if not defective, are at least open to 
suspicion ? Universal confidence would lead to error 
as surely as universal distrust would make progress 
impossible. One useful rule, at any rate,may be 
stated, as follows : The works of historians should be 
read with the same critical precautions which are 
observed in the reading of documents. A natural 
instinct impels us to look principally for the con- 
clusions, and to accept them as so much established 
truth ; we ought, on the contrary, to be continually 
applying analysis, we ought to look for the facts, the 
proofs, the fragments of documents — in short, the 
materials. We shall be doing the author's work 
over again, but we shall do it very much faster than 
he did, for that which takes up time is the collec- 
tion and combination of the materials ; and we shall 
accept no conclusions but those we consider to have 
been proved. 

231 



CHAPTER II 

THE GROUPING OF FACTS 

I. The prime necessity for the historian, when con- 
fronted with the chaos of historical facts, is to limit 
the field of his researches. In the ocean of universal 
history what facts is he to choose for collection ? 
Secondly, in the mass of facts so chosen he will 
have to distinguish between different groups and 
make subdivisions. Lastly, within each of these 
subdivisions he will have to arrange the facts one 
by one. Thus all historical construction should 
begin with the search for a principle to guide in the 
selection, the grouping, and the arrangement of facts. 
This principle may be sought either in the external 
conditions of the facts or in their intrinsic nature. 

The simplest and easiest mode of classification 
is that which is founded on external conditions. 
Every historical fact belongs to a definite time and 
a definite place, and relates to a definite man or 
group of men : a convenient basis is thus afforded 
for the division and arrangement of facts. We 
have the history of a period, of a country, of a 
nation, of a man (biography) ; the ancient historians 
and those of the Renaissance used no other type. 
Within this general scheme the subdivisions are 
formed on the same principle, and facts are arranged 
in chronological and geographical order, or accord- 

232 



The Grouping of Facts 

ing to the groups to which they relate. As to the 
selection of facts to be arranged in this scheme, for 
a long time it was made on no fixed principle ; his- 
torians followed their individual fancy, and chose 
from among the facts relating to a given period, 
country, or nation all that they deemed interesting 
or curious. Livy and Tacitus mingle accounts of 
floods, epidemics, and the birth of monsters with 
their narratives of wars and revolutions. 

Classification of facts by their intrinsic nature 
was introduced very late, and has made way but 
slowly and imperfectly. It took its rise outside 
the domain of history, in certain branches of study 
dealing with special human phenomena— language, 
literature, art, law, political economy, religion ; studies 
which began by being dogmatic, but gradually as- 
sumed an historical character. The principle of this 
mode of classification is to select and group together 
those facts which relate to the same species of 
actions ; each of these groups becomes the subject- 
matter of a special branch of history. The totality 
of facts thus comes to be arranged in compartments 
which may be constructed a 'priori by the study of 
the totality of human activities ; these correspond 
to the set of general questions of which we have 
spoken in the preceding chapter. 

In the following table we have attempted to 
provide a general scheme for the classification 1 of 

1 The classification of M. Lacombe (Be I'histoire considere'e comme 
science, chap, vi.), founded on the motives of actions and the wants 
they are intended to satisfy, is very judicious from the philoso- 
phical point of view, but does not meet the practical needs of 
historians ; it rests on abstract psychological categories (economic, 
reproductive, sympathetic, ambitious, &c), and ends by classing 

233 



Synthetic Operations 

historical facts, founded on the nature of the condi- 
tions and of the manifestations of activity. 

I. Material Conditions, (i) Study of the body: A. 
Anthropology (ethnology), anatomy, and physiology, ano- 
malies and pathological peculiarities. B. Demography 
(number, sex, age, births, deaths, diseases). (2) Study of 
the environment: A. Natural geographical environment 
(orographic configuration, climate, water, soil, flora, and 
fauna). B. Artificial environment, forestry (cultivation, 
buildings, roads, implements, &c). 

II. Intellectual Habits (not obligatory). (1) Language 
(vocabulary, syntax, phonetics, semasiology). Handwriting. 
(2) Arts: A. Plastic arts (conditions of production, con- 
ceptions, methods, works). B. Arts of expression, music, 
dance, literature. (3) Sciences (conditions of production, 
methods, results). (4) Philosophy and Morals (conceptions, 
precepts, actual practice). (5) Religion (beliefs, practices). 1 

III. Material Customs (not obligatory). (1) Material 
life : A. Food (materials, modes of preparing, stimulants). 
B. Clothes and personal adornment. C. Dwellings and 
furniture. (2) Private life: A.< Employment of time 
(toilette, care of the person, meals). B. Social ceremonies 
(funerals and marriages, festivals, etiquette). 0. Amuse- 
ments (modes of exercise and hunting, games and spectacles, 
social meetings, travelling). 

IV. Economic Customs, (i) Production : A. Agriculture 
and stock-breeding. B. Exploitation of minerals. (2) Trans- 
formation, Transport awl industries : 2 technical processes, 
division of labour, means of communication. (3) Commerce: 

together very different species of phenomena (military institutions 
along with economics). 

1 Ecclesiastical institutions form part of the government ; in 
German manuals of antiquities they are found among institutions, 
while religion is classed with the arts. 

2 Modes of transport, which are often put under commerce, form 
a species of industry. 

234 



The Grouping of Facts 

exchange and sale, credit. (4) Distribution : system of 
property, transmission, contracts, profit-sharing. 

V. Social Institutions, (i) The family : A. Constitution, 
authority, condition of women and children. B. Economic 
organisation.! Family property, succession. (2) Education 
and instruction (aim, methods, personnel). (3) Social classes 
(principle of division, rules regulating intercourse)., 

VI. Public Institutions (obligatory). (1) Political 
institutions : A. Sovereign (personnel, procedure). B. Admin- 
istration, services (war, justice, finance, &c). G. Elected 
authorities, assemblies, electoral bodies (powers, procedure). 
(2) Ecclesiastical institutions (the same divisions). (3) 
International institutions: A. Diplomacy. B. War (usages 
of war and military arts). C. Private law and commerce. 

This grouping of facts according to their nature is 
combined with the system of grouping by time and 
place ; we thus obtain chronological, geographical, or 
national sections in each branch. The history of a 
species of activity (language, painting, government) 
subdivides into the history of periods, countries, and 
nations (history of the ancient Greek language, his- 
tory of the government of France in the nineteenth 
century). 

The same principles aid in determining the order 
in which the facts are to be arranged. The neces- 
sity of presenting facts one after another obliges us 
to adopt some methodical rule of succession. We 
may describe successively either all the facts which 
relate to a given place, or those which relate to a 
given country, or all the facts of a given species. 
All historical matter can be distributed in three 
different kinds of order : chronological order, geogra- 

1 Property is an institution of mixed character, being at once 
economic, social, and political. 

23S 



Synthetic Operations 

pliical order, that kind of order which is governed 
by the nature of actions and is generally called 
logical order. It is impossible to use any of these 
orders exclusively : in every chronological exposition 
there necessarily occur geographical or logical cross- 
divisions, transitions from one country to another, or 
from one species of facts to a different species, and 
conversely. But it is always necessary to decide 
which shall be the main order into which the others 
enter as subdivisions. 

It is a delicate matter to choose between these 
three orders ; our choice will be decided by different 
reasons according to the subject, and according to 
the public for whom we are working. That is to 
say, it will depend on the method of exposition ; it 
would take up too much space to give the theory of it. 

II. When we come to the selection of historical 
facts for classification and arrangement, a question 
is raised which has been disputed with considerable 
warmth. 

Every human action is by its nature an individual 
transient phenomenon which is confined to a definite 
time and a definite place. Strictly speaking, every 
fact is unique. But every action of a man resembles 
other actions of the same man, or of other mem 1 3rs 
of the same group, and often to so great a degree 
that the whole group of actions receives a common 
name, in which their individuality is lost. These 
groups of similar actions, which the human mind is 
irresistibly impelled to form, are called habits, usages, 
institutions. These are merely constructions of the 
mind, but they are imposed so forcibly on our in- 
tellect that many of them must be recognised and 

236 



The Grouping of Facts 

constantly employed ; habits are collective facts, 
possessing extension in time and space. Historical 
facts may therefore be considered under two different 
aspects: we may regard either the individual, par- 
ticular, and transient elements in them, or we may 
look for what is collective, general, and durable. 
According to the first conception, history is a con- 
tinuous narrative of the incidents which have hap- 
pened among men in the past ; according to the 
second, it is the picture of the successive habits of 
humanity. 

On this subject there has been a contest, especially 
in Germany, between the partisans of the history of 
civilisation (Kulturgeschichte) 1 and the historians who 
remain faithful to ancient tradition; in France we 
have had the struggle between the history of insti- 
tutions, manners, and ideas, and political history, 
contemptuously nicknamed " battle-history " by its 
opponents. 

This opposition is explained by the difference 
between the documents which the workers on either 
side were accustomed to deal with. The historians, 
principally occupied with political history, read of 
individual and transient acts of rulers in which it 
was difficult to detect any common feature. In 
the special histories, on the contrary (except that of 
literature), the documents exhibit none but general 
facts, a linguistic form, a religious rite, a rule of law; 
an effort of imagination is required to picture the 
man who pronounced the word, who performed the 
rite, or who applied the rule in practice. 

1 For the history and biography of this movement see Bernheim, 
Lehrbuch, pp. 45-55. 

237 



Synthetic Operations 

There is no need to take sides in this controversy. 
Historical construction in its completeness implies 
the study of facts under both aspects. The repre- 
sentation of men's habits of thought, life, i*nd action 
is obviously an important part of history. And yet, 
supposing we had brought together all the acts of 
all individuals for the purpose of extracting what 
is common to them, there would still remain a 
residue which we should have no right to reject, for 
it is the distinctively historical element — the cir- 
cumstance that a particular action was the action of 
a given man, or group of men, at a given moment. 
In a scheme of classification which should only 
recognise the general facts of political life there 
would be no place for the victory of Pharsalia or 
the taking of the Bastille — accidental and transient 
facts, but without which the history of Roman and 
French institutions would be unintelligible. 

History is thus obliged to combine with the study 
of general facts the study of certain particular facts. 
It has a mixed character, fluctuating between a 
science of generalities and a narrative of adventures. 
The difficulty of classing this hybrid under one of 
the categories of human thought has often been 
expressed by the childish question : Is history a 
science or an art ? 

III. The general table given above may be used 
for the determination of all the species of habits 
(usages or institutions) of which the history may be 
written. But before applying this general scheme 
to the study of any particular group of habits, lan- 
guage, religion, private usages, or political institu- 
tions, there is always a preliminary question to be 

238 



The Grouping of Facts 

answered : Whose were the habits we are about to 
study ? They Avere common to a great number of 
individuals ; and a collection of individuals with the 
same habits is what we call a group. The first con- 
dition, then, for the study of a habit is the deter- 
mination of the group which has practised it. At 
this point we must beware of the first impulse ; it 
leads to a negligence which may ruin the whole of 
our historical construction. 

The natural tendency is to conceive the human 
group on the model of the zoological species — as a 
body of men who all resemble each other. We take 
a group united by a very obvious common char- 
acteristic, a nation united by a common official 
government (Romans, English, French), a people 
speaking the same language (Greeks, ancient Ger- 
mans), and we proceed as if all the members of this 
group resembled each other at every point and had 
the same usages. 

As a matter of fact, no real group, not even a 
centralised society, is a homogeneous whole. For a 
great part of human activity — language, art, science, 
religion, economic interests — the group is constantly 
fluctuating. What are we to understand by the 
group of those who speak Greek, the Christian 
group, the group of modern science ? And even 
those groups to which some precision is given by 
an official organisation, States and Churches, are 
but superficial unities composed of heterogeneous 
elements. The English nation comprises Welsh, 
Scotch, and Irish ; the Catholic dhurch is composed 
of adherents scattered over the whole world, and 
differing in everything but religion. There is no 

239 



Synthetic Operations 

group whose members have the same habits in 
every respect. The same man is at the same time 
a member of several groups, and in each group he 
has companions who differ from those he has in the 
others. A French Canadian belongs to the British 
Empire, the Catholic Church, the group of French- 
speaking people. Thus the different groups overlap 
each other in a way that makes it impossible to 
divide humanity into sharply distinct societies exist- 
ing side by side. 

In historical documents we find the contemporary 
names of groups, many of them resting on mere 
superficial resemblances. It must be made a rule 
not to adopt popular notions of this kind without 
criticising them. We must accurately determine 
the nature and extent of the group, asking : Of what 
men was it composed ? What bond united them ? 
What habits had they in common ? In what 
species of activity did they differ ? Not till after 
such criticism shall we be able to tell what are the 
habits in respect of which the group in question 
may be used as a basis of study. In order to study 
intellectual habits (language, religion, art, science) 
we shall not take a political unit, the nation, but 
the group consisting of those who shared the habit 
in question. In order to study economic facts we 
shall choose a group united by a common economic 
interest ; we shall reserve the political group for 
the study of social and political facts, and we shall 
discard race 1 altogether. 

1 It is no longer necessary to demonstrate the nullity of the 
notion of race. It used to be applied to vague groups, formed by 
a nation or a language ; for race as understood by historians (Greek, 

24O 



The Grouping of Facts 

Even in those points in which a group is homo- 
geneous it is not entirely so ; it is divided into sub- 
groups, the members of which differ in secondary 
habits ; a language is divided into dialects, a re- 
ligion into sects, a nation into provinces. Con- 
versely, one group resembles other groups in a way 
that justifies its being regarded as contiguous with 
them ; in a general classification we may recognise 
" families " of languages, arts, and peoples. We 
have, then, to ask : How was a given group sub- 
divided ? Of what larger group did it form a 
part? 

It then becomes possible to study methodically 
a given habit, or even the totality of the habits 
belonging to a given time and place, by following 
the table given above. The operation presents no 
difficulties of method in the case of those species 
of facts which appear as individual and voluntary 
habits — language, art, sciences, conceptions, private 
usages ; here it is enough to ascertain in what each 
habit consisted. It is merely necessary to distin- 
guish carefully between those who originated or 
maintained habits (artists, the learned, philosophers, 
introducers of fashions) and the mass who accepted 
them. 

But when we come to social or political habits 
(what we call institutions), we meet with new 
conditions which produce an inevitable illusion. 

Roman, Germanic, Celtic, Slavonic races) has nothing but the 
name in common with race in the anthropological sense — that is, 
a group of men possessing the same hereditary characteristics. It 
has been reduced to an absurdity by the abuse Taine made of it. A 
very good criticism of it will be found in Lacombe (ibid., chap, xviii.), 
and in Robertson ("The Saxon and the Celt," London, 1897, 8vo), 

24I Q 



Synthetic Operations 

The members of the same social or political group 
do not merely habitually perform similar actions ; 
they influence each other by reciprocal actions, they 
command, coerce, pay each other. Habits here take 
the form of relations between the different members ; 
when they are of old standing, formulated in official 
rules, imposed by a visible authority, maintained 
by a special set of persons, they occupy so impor- 
tant a place in life, that, to the persons under their 
influence, they appear as external realities. The 
men, too, who specialise in an occupation or a 
function which becomes the dominating habit of 
their lives, appear as grouped in distinct categories 
(classes, corporations, churches, governments); and 
these categories are taken for real existences, or 
at least for organs of various functions in a real 
existence, namely, society. We follow the analogy 
of an animal's body so far as to describe the 
" structure " and the " functions " of a society, even 
its " anatomy " and " physiology." These are pure 
metaphors. By the structure of a society we mean 
the rules and the customs by which occupations 
and enjoyments are distributed among its members; 
by its functions we mean the habitual actions by 
which each man enters into relations with the 
others. It may be convenient to use these terms, 
but it should be remembered that the underlying 
reality is composed entirely of habits and customs. 

The study of institutions, however, obliges us 
to ask special questions about persons and their 
functions. In respect of social and economic in- 
stitutions we have to ask what was the principle 
of the division of labour and of the division into 

242 



The Grouping of Facts 

classes, what were the professions and classes, how 
were they recruited, what were the relations between 
the members of the different professions and classes. 
In respect of political institutions, which are sanc- 
tioned by obligatory rules and a visible authority, 
two new series of questions arise. ( I ) Who were the 
persons invested with authority ? When authority 
is divided we have to study the division of func- 
tions, to analyse the personnel of government into its 
different groups (supreme and subordinate, central 
and local), and to distinguish each of the special 
bodies. In respect of each class of men concerned 
in the government we shall ask : How were they 
recruited ? What was their official authority ? What 
were their real powers ? (2) What were the official 
rules ? What was their form (custom, orders, law, 
precedent) ? What was their content (rules of law) ? 
What was the mode of application (procedure) ? 
And, above all, how did the rules differ from the 
practice (abuse of power, exploitation, conflicts be- 
tween executive agents, non-observance of rules) ? 

After the determination of all the facts which 
constitute a society, it remains to find the place 
Avhich this society occupies among the total number 
of the societies contemporary with it. Here we 
enter upon the study of international institutions, 
intellectual, economic, and political (diplomacy and 
the usages of war) ; the same questions apply as 
in the study of political institutions. A study 
should also be made of the habits common to 
several societies, and of those relations which do 
not assume an official form. This is one of the 
least advanced parts of historical construction 

243 



Synthetic Operations 

IV. The outcome of all this labour is a tabulated 
view of human life at a given moment ; it gives us 
the knowledge of a state of society (in German, 
Zustand). But history is not limited to the study 
of simultaneous facts, taken in a state of rest, to 
what we may call the statics of society. It also 
studies the states of society at different moments, 
and discovers the differences between these states. 
The habits of men and the material conditions 
under which they live change from epoch to epoch ; 
even when they appear to be constant they do not 
remain unaltered in every respect. There is there- 
fore occasion to investigate these changes ; thus 
arises the study of successive facts. 

Of these changes the most interesting for the 
work of historical construction are those which tend 
in a common direction, 1 so that in virtue of a series of 
gradual differentiations a usage or a state of society is 
transformed into a different usage or state, or, to speak 
without metaphor, cases where the men of a given 
period practise a habit very different from that of 
their predecessors without any abrupt change having 
taken place. This is evolution. 

Evolution occurs in all human habits. In order 
to investigate it, therefore, it is enough to turn once 
more to the series of questions which we used in 
constructing a tabulated view of society. In respect 
of each of the facts, conditions, usages, persons in- 
vested with authority, official rules, the question is to 
be asked : What was the evolution of this fact ? 

1 There is no general agreement on the proper place in history of 
retrograde changes, of those oscillations which bring things back 
to the point from which they started. 

244 



The Grouping of Facts 

This study will involve several operations : ( i ) 
the determination of the fact whose evolution is to 
be studied ; (2) the fixing of the duration of the 
time during which the evolution took place (the 
period should be so chosen that while the transfor- 
mation is obvious, there yet remains a connecting 
link between the initial and the final condition); (3) 
the establishing of the different stages of the evolu- 
tion ; (4) the investigation of the means by which it 
was brought about. 

V. A series, even a complete series, of all the states 
of all societies and of all their evolutions would not 
be enough to exhaust the subject-matter of history. 
There remains a number of unique facts which we 
cannot pass over, because they explain the origin 
of certain states of society, and form the starting- 
points of evolutions. How could we study the in- 
stitutions or the evolution of France if we ignored 
the conquest of Gaul by Caesar and the invasion of 
the Barbarians ? 

This necessity of studying unique facts has caused 
it to be said that history cannot be a science, for 
every science has for its object that which is general. 
History is here in the same situation as cosmography, 
geology, the science of animal species : it is not the 
abstract knowledge of the general relations between 
facts, it is a study which aims at explaining reality. 
Now, reality exists but once. There has been but 
a single evolution of the world, of animal life, of 
humanity. In each of these evolutions the succes- 
sive facts have not been the product of abstract laws, 
but of the concurrence, at each moment, of several 
circumstances of different nature. This concurrence, 

2 45 



Synthetic Operations 

sometimes called chance, has produced a series of 
accidents which have determined the particular 
course taken by evolution. 1 Evolution can only 
be understood by the study of these accidents ; 
history is here on the same footing as geology or 
paleontology. 

Thus scientific history may go back to the acci- 
dents, or events, which traditional history collected 
for literary reasons, because they struck the imagina- 
tion, and employ them for the study of evolution. 
We may thus look for the facts which have influenced 
the evolution of each one of the habits of humanity. 
Each event will be arranged under its date in the 
evolution which it is supposed to have influenced. 
It will then suffice to bring together the events of 
every kind, and to arrange them in chronological 
and geographical order, to have a representation of 
historical evolution as a whole. 

Then, over and above the special histories in 
which the facts are arranged under purely abstract 
categories (art, religion, private life, political insti- 
tutions), we shall have constructed a concrete general 
history, which will connect together the various 
special histories by exhibiting the main stream 
of evolution which has dominated all the special 
evolutions. None of the species of facts which 
we study apart (religion, art, law, constitutions) 
forms a closed world within which evolution takes 
place in obedience to a kind of internal impulse, as 
specialists are prone to imagine. The evolution of 

1 The theory of chance as affecting history has been expounded in 
a masterly manner by M. Cournot, Considerations sur la marche cles 
idies et des dv&nements dans les temps modernes (Paris, 1872, 2 vols. 8vo). 

246 



The Grouping of Facts 

a usage or of an institution (language, religion, 
church, state) is only a metaphor; a usage is an 
abstraction, abstractions do not evolve; it is only 
existences that evolve, in the strict sense of the 
word. 1 When a change takes place in a usage, 
this means that the men who practise it have 
changed. Now, men are not built in water-tight 
compartments (religious, juridical, economic) within 
which phenomena can occur in isolation; an event 
which modifies the condition of a man changes his 
habits in a great variety of respects. The invasion 
of the Barbarians influenced alike language, private 
life, and political institutions. We cannot, there- 
fore, understand evolution by confining ourselves to 
a special branch of history ; the specialist, even for 
the purpose of writing the complete history of his 
own branch, must look beyond the confines of his 
own subject into the field of general events. It is 
the merit of Taine to have asserted, with reference 
to English literature, that literary evolution depends, 
not on literary events, but on facts of a general 
character. 

The general history of individual facts was de- 
veloped before the special histories. It contains 
the residue of facts which have .not found a place 
in the special histories, and has been reduced in 
extent by the formation and detachment of special 
branches. As general facts are principally of a 

1 Lamprecht, in a long article, Was ist Kulturgeschichte, published 
in the Deutsche Zeitschrift fiir Geschichtswissenschafi, New Series, 
vol. i., 1896, has attempted to base the history of civilisation on 
the theory of a collective soul of society producing " social-psychic" 
phenomena common to the whole society, and differing from period 
to period. This is a metaphysical hypothesis. 

247 



Synthetic Operations 

political nature, and as it is more difficult to orga- 
nise these into a special branch, general history has 
in practice been confounded with political history 
(Staatengeschichte)} Thus political historians have 
been led to make themselves the champions of 
general history, and to retain in their constructions 
all the general facts (migrations of peoples, religious 
reforms, inventions, and discoveries) necessary for 
the understanding of political evolution. 

In order to construct general history it is neces- 
sary to look for all the facts which, because they 
have produced changes, can explain either the 
state of a society or one of its evolutions. We 
must search for them among all classes of facts, 
displacements of population, artistic, scientific, re- 
ligious, technical innovations, changes in the per- 
sonnel of government, revolutions, wars, discoveries 
of countries. 

That which is important is that the fact should 
have had a decisive influence. We must therefore 
resist the natural temptation to divide facts into 
great and small. It goes against the grain to admit 
that great effects may have had small causes, that 
Cleopatra's nose may have made a difference to the 
Roman Empire. .This repugnance is of a metaphy- 
sical order; it springs from a preconceived opinion 
on the government of the world. In all the sciences 
which deal with an evolution we find individual facts 
which serve as starting-points for series of vast trans- 
formations. A drove of horses brought by the Spanish 

1 The expression national history, introduced in the interests 
of patriotism, denotes the same thing. The history of the nation 
means practically the history of the State. 

248 



The Grouping of Facts 

has stocked the whole of South America. In a flood 
a branch of a tree may dam a current and transform 
the aspect of a valley. 

In human evolution we meet with great transfor- 
mations which have no intelligible cause beyond an 
individual accident. 1 In the sixteenth century Eng- 
land changed its religion three times on the death 
of a sovereign (Henry VIIL, Edward VI., Mary). 
Importance is not to be measured by the initial fact, 
but by the facts which resulted from it. We must 
not, therefore, deny a priori the action of individuals 
and discard individual facts. We must examine 
whether a given individual was in a position to 
make his influence strongly felt. There are two 
cases in which we may assume that he was : ( i ) 
when his action served as an example to a mass 
of men and created a tradition, a case frequent 
in art, science, religion, and technical matters; (2) 
when he had power to issue commands and direct 
the actions of a mass of men, as is the case with 
the heads of a state, an army, or a church.. The 
episodes in a man's life may thus become important 
facts. 

Accordingly, in the scheme of historical classifi- 
cation a place should be assigned for persons and 
events. 

VI. In every study of successive facts it is 
necessary to provide a number of halting-places, 
to distinguish beginnings and ends, in order that 
chronological divisions may be made in the enor- 
mous mass of facts. These divisions are periods; 
the use of them is as old as history. We need 

1 See Cournot, ibid., i. p. iv. 
249 



Synthetic Operations 

them, not only in general history, but in the special 
branches of history as well, whenever we study an 
extent of time long enough for an evolution to be 
sensible. It is by means of events that we fix 
their limits. 

In the special branches of history, after having 
decided what changes of habits are to be considered 
as reaching deepest, we adopt them as marking dates 
in the evolution ; we then inquire what event pro- 
duced them. The event which led to the formation 
or the change of a habit becomes the beginning or 
the end of a period. Sometimes these boundary 
events are of the same species as the facts whose 
evolution we are studying — literary facts in the his- 
tory of literature, political facts in political history. 
But more often they belong to a different species, 
and the special historian is obliged to borrow them 
from general history. 

In general history the periods should be divided 
according to the evolution of several species of phe- 
nomena; we look for events which mark an epoch 
simultaneously in several branches (the Invasion of 
the Barbarians, the Reformation, the French Revo- 
lution). We may thus construct periods which are 
common to several branches of evolution, whose 
beginning and whose end are each marked by a 
single event. It is thus that the traditional division 
of universal history into periods has been effected. 
The sub-periods are obtained by the same process, 
by taking for limits events which have produced 
consequences of secondary importance. 

The periods which are thus constructed according 
to the events are of unequal duration. We must 

250 



The Grouping of Facts 

not be troubled by this want of symmetry ; a period 
ought not to be a fixed number of years, but the 
time occupied by a distinct phase of evolution. 
Now, evolution is not a regular movement ; some- 
times a long series of years passes without notable 
change, then come moments of rapid transformation. 
On this difference Saint-Simon has founded a dis- 
tinction between organic periods (of slow change) and 
critical periods (of rapid change). 



251 



CHAPTER III 

CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING 

I. The historical facts supplied by documents are 
never enough to fill all the blanks in such schemes 
of classification and arrangement as we have been 
considering. There are many questions to which 
no direct answer is given by the documents ; many 
features are lacking without which the complete 
picture of the various states of society, of evolutions 
and events, cannot be given. We are irresistibly 
impelled to endeavour to fill up these gaps. 

In the sciences of direct observation, when a fact 
is missing from a series, it is sought for by a new 
observation. In history, where we have not this 
resource, we seek to extend our knowledge by the 
help of reasoning. Starting from facts known to 
us from the documents, we endeavour to reach new 
facts by inference. If the reasoning be correct, this 
method of acquiring knowledge is legitimate. 

But experience shows that of all the methods of 
acquiring historical knowledge, reasoning is the most 
difficult to employ correctly, and the one which has 
introduced the most serious errors. It should not 
be used without the safeguard of a number of pre- 
cautions calculated to keep the danger continually 
before the mind. 

(i) Reasoning should never be combined with 
252 



Constructive Reasoning 

the analysis of a document. The reader who allows 
himself to introduce into a text what the author 
has not expressly put there ends by making him say 
what he never intended to say. 1 

(2) Facts obtained by the direct examination of 
documents should never be confused, with the results 
obtained by reasoning. When we state a fact known 
to us by reasoning only, we must not allow it to be 
supposed that we have found it in the documents ; 
we must disclose the method by which we have 
obtained it. 

(3) Unconscious reasoning must never be allowed; 
there are too many chances of error. It will be 
enough to make a point of putting every argument 
into logical form ; in the case of bad reasoning the 
major premiss is generally monstrous to an appalling 
degree. 

(4) If the reasoning leaves the least doubt, no 
attempt must be made to draw a conclusion ; the 
point treated must be left in the conjectural stage, 
clearly distinguished from the definitively established 
results. 

(5) It is not permissible to return to a conjec- 
ture and endeavour to transform it into a certainty. 
Here the first impression is most likely to be right. 
By reflection upon a conjecture we familiarise 
ourselves with it, and end by thinking it better 
established ; while the truth is, we are merely more 
accustomed to it. This is a frequent mishap with 
those who devote themselves to long meditation on 
a small number of texts. 

There are two ways of employing reasoning, one 

1 We have already (p. 143) treated of this fault of method. 
253 



Synthetic Operations 

negative, the other positive ; we shall examine them 
separately. 

II. The negative mode of reasoning, called also 
the " argument from silence," is based on the absence 
of indications with regard to a fact. 1 From the cir- 
cumstance of the fact not being mentioned in any 
document it is inferred that there was no such fact ; 
the argument is applied to all kinds of subjects, 
usages of every description, evolutions, events. It 
rests on a feeling which in ordinary life is expressed 
by saying : " If it were true, we should have heard 
of it ; " it implies a general proposition which may 
be formulated thus : " If an alleged event really had 
occurred, there would be some document in existence 
in which it would be referred to." 

In order that such reasoning should be justified 
it would be necessary that every fact should have 
been observed and recorded in writing, and that all 
the records should have been preserved. Now, the 
greater part of the documents which have been 
written have been lost, and the greater part of the 
events Avhich happen are not recorded in writing. 
In the majority of cases the argument would be 
invalid. It must therefore be restricted to the cases 
where the conditions implied in it have been fulfilled. 

(i) It is necessary not only that there should be 
now no documents in existence which mention the 
fact in question, but that there should never have 
been any. If the documents are lost we can conclude 

1 The discussion of this argument, which was formerly much 
used in religious history, was a favourite subject with the earlier 
writers who treated of methodology, and still occupies a consider- 
able space in the rrincipes de In critique historique of Pere de Smedt. 

2 54 



Constructive Reasoning 

nothing. The argument from silence ought, there- 
fore, to be employed the more rarely the greater the 
number of documents that have been lost ; it is of 
much less use in ancient history than in dealing 
with the nineteenth century. Some, desiring to free 
themselves from this restriction, are tempted to 
assume that the lost documents contained nothing 
interesting ; if they were lost, say they, the reason 
was that they were not worth preserving. But the 
truth is, every manuscript is at the mercy of the 
least accident ; its preservation or destruction is a 
matter of pure chance. 

(2) The fact must have been of such a kind that 
it could not fail to be observed and recorded. Be- 
cause a fact has not been recorded it does not follow 
that it has not been observed. Any one who is 
concerned in an organisation for the collection of a 
particular species of facts knows how much com- 
moner those facts are than people think, and how 
many cases pass unnoticed or without leaving any 
written trace. It is so with earthquakes, cases of 
hydrophobia, whales stranded on the shore. Besides, 
many facts, even those which are well known to 
those who are contemporary with them, are not re- 4 
corded, because the official authorities prevent their 
publication ; this is what happens to the secret acts 
of governments and the complaints of the lower 
classes. This silence, which proves nothing, greatly 
impresses unreflecting historians ; it is the origin 
of the widespread sophism of the "good old times." 
No document relates any abuse of power by officials 
or any complaints made by peasants ; therefore, 
everything was regular and nobody was suffering. 

255 



Synthetic Operations 

Before we argue from silence we should ask : Might 
not this fact have failed to be recorded in any of 
the documents we possess ? That which is conclu- 
sive is not the absence of any document on a given 
fact, but silence as to the fact in a document in 
which it would naturally be mentioned. 

The negative argument is thus limited to a few 
clearly denned cases, (i) The author of the docu- 
ment in which the fact is not mentioned had the 
intention of systematically recording all the facts of 
the same class, and must have been acquainted with 
all of them. (Tacitus sought to enumerate the 
peoples of Germany ; the Notitia dignitatum men- 
tioned all the provinces of the Empire ; the absence 
from these lists of a people or a province proves 
that it did not then exist.) (2) The fact, if it was 
such, must have affected the author's imagination 
so forcibly as necessarily to enter into his concep- 
tions. (If there had been regular assemblies of the 
Frankish people, Gregory of Tours could not have 
conceived and described the life of the Frankish 
kings without mentioning them.) 

III. The positive mode of reasoning begins with 
a fact established by the documents, and infers some 
other fact which the documents do not mention. 
It is an application of the fundamental principle 
of history, the analogy between present and past 
humanity. In the present we observe that the 
facts of humanity are connected together. Given 
one fact, another fact accompanies it, either because 
the first is the cause of the second, or because the 
second is the cause of the first, or because both are 
effects of a common cause. We assume that in the 

256 



Constructive Reasoning 

past similar facts were connected in a similar 
manner, and this assumption is corroborated by the 
direct study of the past in the documents. From 
a given fact, therefore, which we find in the past, 
we may infer the existence of the other facts which 
were connected with it. 

This reasoning applies to facts of all kinds, usages, 
transformations, individual incidents. We may 
begin with any known fact and endeavour to infer 
unknown facts from it. Now the facts of humanity, 
having a common centre, man, are all connected 
together, not merely facts of the same class, but 
facts belonging to the most widely different classes. 
There are connections, not merely between the dif- 
ferent facts relating to art, to religion, to manners, 
to politics, but between the facts of religion on the 
one hand and the facts of art, of politics, and of 
manners on the other; thus from a fact of one 
species we may infer facts of all the other species. 

To examine those connections between facts on 
which reasonings may be founded would mean tabu- 
lating all the known relations between the facts of 
humanity, that is, giving a full account of all the 
empirical laws of social life. Such a labour would 
provide matter for a whole book. 1 Here we shall 
content ourselves with indicating the general rules 
governing this kind of reasoning, and the precautions 
to be taken against the most common errors. 

The argument rests on two propositions: one is 
general, and is derived from experience of human 

1 This is what Montesquieu attempted in his Esprit des Lois. In 
a course of lectures at the Sorbonne, I have endeavoured to give a 
sketch of such a comprehensive account. — [Oh. S.j 

257 B 



Synthetic Operations 

affairs; the other is particular, and is derived from 
the documents. In practice, we begin with the 
particular proposition, the historical fact : Salamis 
bears a Phoenician name. We then look for a 
general proposition : the language of the name of 
a city is the language of the people which founded 
it. And we conclude : Salamis, bearing a Phoenician 
name, was founded by the Phoenicians. 

In order that the conclusion may be certain, two 
conditions are neeessar}'. 

(i) The general proposition must be accurately 
true ; the two facts which it declares to be connected 
must be connected in such a way that the one is 
never found without the other. If this condition 
were completely satisfied we should have a law, in 
the scientific sense of the word ; but in dealing with 
the facts of humanity — apart from those physical con- 
ditions whose laws are established by the regular 
sciences — we can only work with empirical laws 
obtained by rough determinations of general facts 
which are not analysed in such a manner as to educe 
their true causes. These empirical laws are approxi- 
mately true only when they relate to a numerous 
body of facts, for we can never quite know how far 
each is necessary to produce the result. The pro- 
position relating to the language of the name of a 
city does not go enough into detail to be always 
true. Petersburg is a German name, Syracuse in 
America bears a Greek name. Other conditions must 
be fulfilled before we can be sure that the name is 
connected with the nationality of the founders. We 
should, therefore, only employ such propositions as 
go into detail. 

258 



Constructive Reasoning 

(2) In order to employ a general proposition 
which goes into detail, we must have a detailed 
knowledge of the particular fact ; for it is not till 
after this fact has been established that we look for 
an empirical general law on which to found an argu- 
ment. We shall begin, then, by studying the parti- 
cular conditions of the case (the situation of Salamis, 
the habits of the Greeks and Phoenicians) ; we shall 
not work on a single detail, but on an assemblage of 
details. 

Thus, in historical reasoning it is necessary to have 
(1) an accurate general proposition; (2) a detailed 
knowledge of a past fact. It is bad workmanship 
to assume a false general proposition — to suppose, 
for example, as Augustin Thierry did, that every 
aristocracy had its origin in a conquest. It is 
bad workmanship, again, to found an argument 
on an isolated detail (the name of a city). The 
nature of these errors indicates the precautions to 
be taken. 

(1) The spontaneous tendency is to take as a 
basis of reasoning those " common-sense truths " 
which form nearly the whole of our knowledge of 
social life. Now, the greater part of these are to 
some extent false, for the science of social life is 
still imperfect. And the chief danger in them lies 
in the circumstance that we use them unconsciously. 
The safest precaution will be always to formulate the 
supposed law on which we propose to base an argu- 
ment. In every instance where such and such a 
fact occurs, it is certain that such and such another 
fact occurs also. If this proposition is obviously 
false, we shall at once see it to be so ; if it is too 

259 



Synthetic Operations 

general, we shall inquire what new conditions may 
be introduced to make it accurate. 

(2) A second spontaneous impulse leads us to 
draw consequences from isolated facts, even of the 
slightest kind (or rather, the idea of each fact 
awakens in us, by association, the idea of other 
facts). This is the natural procedure in the history 
of literature. Each circumstance in the life of an 
author supplies material for reasoning ; we construct 
by conjecture all the influences which could have 
acted upon him, and we assume that they did act 
upon him. All the branches of history which study 
a single species of facts, isolated from every other 
species (language, arts, private law, religion), are ex- 
posed to the same danger, because they deal with 
fragments of human life, not with comprehensive 
collections of phenomena. But few conclusions are 
firmly established except those which rest on a 
comprehensive body of .data. We do not make a 
diagnosis from a single symptom, but from a number 
of concurrent symptoms. The precaution to be 
taken will be to avoid Avorking with an isolated 
detail or an abstract fact. We must have before 
our minds actual men, as affected by the principal 
conditions under which they lived. 

We must be prepared to realise but rarely the 
conditions of a certain inference ; we are too little 
acquainted with the laws of social life, and too 
seldom know the precise details of an historical 
fact. Thus most of our reasonings will only afford 
presumptions, not certainties. But it is with reason- 
ings as with documents. 1 When several presump- 

1 See p. 204. 
260 



Constructive Reasoning 

tions all point in the same direction they confirm 
each other, and end by producing a legitimate 
certitude. History fills up some of its gaps by an 
accumulation of reasonings. Doubts remain as to 
the Phoenician origin of various Greek cities, but 
there is no doubt about the presence of the 
Phoenicians in Greece. 



261 



CHAPTER IV 

THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULAE 

I. Suppose we had methodically arranged all the 
historical facts established by the analysis of 
documents, or by reasoning; we should possess a 
system atised inventory of the whole of history, 
and the work of construction would be complete. 
Ought history to stop at this point ? The question 
is warmly debated, and we cannot avoid giving 
an answer, for it is a question with a practical 
bearing. 

Critical scholars, who are accustomed to collect 
all the facts relating to their speciality, without 
any personal preference, are inclined to regard a 
complete, accurate, and objective collection of facts 
as the prime requisite. All historical facts have 
an equal right to a place in history ; to retain some 
as being of greater importance, and reject the rest 
as comparatively unimportant, would be to introduce 
the subjective element of choice, variable according 
to individual fancy ; history cannot sacrifice a single 
fact. 

Against this very reasonable view there is nothing 
to be urged except a material difficulty ; this, how- 
ever, is enough, for it is the practical motive of all 
the sciences : we mean the impossibility of acquiring 
or communicating complete knowledge. A body of 

262 



The Construction of General Formula 

history in which no fact was sacrificed would have 
to contain all the actions, all the thoughts, all the 
adventures of all men at all times. It would form 
a total which no one could possibly make himself 
master of, not for want of materials, but for want 
of time. This, indeed, applies, as things are, to 
certain voluminous collections of documents : the 
collected reports of parliamentary debates contain 
the whole history of the various assemblies, but to 
learn their history from these sources would require 
more than a lifetime. 

Every science must take into consideration the 
practical conditions of life, at least so far as it 
claims to be a real science, a science which it is 
possible to know. Any ideal which ends by making 
knowledge impossible impedes the establishment of 
the science. 

Science is a saving of time and labour, effected 
by a process which provides a rapid means of learn- 
ing and understanding facts ; it consists in the slow 
collection of a quantity of details and their conden- 
sation into portable and incontrovertible formulae. 
History, which is more encumbered with details 
than any other science, has the choice between 
two alternatives : to be complete and unknowable, 
or to be knowable and incomplete. All the other 
sciences have chosen the second alternative ; they 
abridge and they condense, preferring to take the 
risk of mutilating and arbitrarily combining the facts 
to the certainty of being unable either to understand 
or communicate them. Scholars have preferred to 
confine themselves to the periods of ancient history, 
where chance, which has destroyed nearly all the 

263 



Synthetic Operations 

sources of information, has freed them from the 
responsibility of choosing between facts by depriving 
them of nearly all the means of knowing them. 

History, in order to constitute itself a science, 
must elaborate the raw material of facts. It must 
condense them into manageable form by means of 
descriptive formulae, qualitative and quantitative. 
It must search for those connections between facts 
which form the ultimate conclusions of every 
science. 

II. The facts of humanity, with their complex and 
varied character, cannot be reduced like chemical 
facts to a few simple formulae. Like the other 
sciences which deal with life, history needs descrip- 
tive formulae in order to express the nature of the 
different phenomena. 

In order to be manageable, a formula must be 
short ; in order to give an exact idea of the facts, it 
must be precise. Now, in the knowledge of human 
affairs, precision can only be obtained by attention 
to characteristic details, for these alone enable us to 
understand how one fact differed from others, and 
what there was in it peculiar to itself. There is 
thus a conflict between the need of brevity, which 
leads us to look for concrete formulae, and the neces- 
sity of being precise, which requires us to adopt 
detailed formulae. Formulae which are too short 
make science vague and illusory, formulae which are 
too long encumber it and make it useless. This 
dilemma can only be evaded by a, perpetual com- 
promise, the principle of which is to compress the 
facts by omitting all that is not necessary for the 
purpose of representing them to the mind, and to 

264 



The Construction of General Formulae 

stop at the point where omission would suppress 
some characteristic feature. 

This operation, which is difficult in itself, is still 
further complicated by the state in which the facts 
which are to be condensed into formulae present 
themselves. According to the nature of the docu- 
ments from which they are derived, they come to us 
in all the different degrees of precision : from the 
detailed narrative which relates the smallest episodes 
(the battle of Waterloo) down to the barest mention 
in a couple of words (the victory of the Austrasians 
at Testry). On different facts of the same kind we 
possess an amount of details which is infinitely vari- 
able according as the documents give us a complete 
description or a mere mention. How are we to 
organise into a common whole, items of knowledge 
which differ so widely in point of precision ? When 
facts are known to us from a vague word of general 
import, we cannot reduce them to a less degree of 
generality and a greater degree of precision ; we do 
not know the details. If we add them conjecturally 
we shall produce an historical novel. This is what 
Augustin Thierry did in the case of his BAcits initro- 
vingiens. When facts are known in detail, it is 
always easy to reduce them to a greater degree of 
generality by suppressing characteristic details ; this 
is what is done by the authors of abridgements. 
But the result of this procedure would be to reduce 
history to a mass of vague generalities, uniform for 
the whole of time except for the proper names 
and the dates. It would be a dangerous method 
of introducing symmetry, to bring all facts to a 
common degree of generality by levelling them all 

265 



Synthetic Operations 

to the condition of those which are the most im- 
perfectly known. In those cases, therefore, where 
the documents give details, our descriptive formulae 
should always retain the characteristic features of 
the facts. 

In order to construct these formulae we must 
return to the set of questions which we employed 
in grouping the facts, we must answer each question, 
and compare the answers. We shall then combine 
them into as condensed and as precise a formula 
as possible, taking care to keep a fixed sense for 
every word. This may appear to be a matter of 
style, but what we have in view here is not merely 
a principle of exposition, necessary for the sake of 
being intelligible to the reader, it is a precaution 
which the author ought to take on his own account. 
The facts of society are of an elusive nature, and 
for the purpose of seizing and expressing them, fixed 
and precise language is an indispensable instrument ; 
no historian is complete without good language. 

It will be well to make the greatest possible use 
of concrete and descriptive terms : their meaning 
is always clear. It will be prudent to designate 
collective groups only by collective, not by abstract 
names (royalty, State, democracy, Reformation, Revo- 
lution), and to avoid personifying abstractions. We 
think we are simply using metaphors, and then we 
are carried away by the force of the words. Cer- 
tainly abstract terms have something very seductive 
about them, they give a scientific appearance to a 
proposition. But it is only an appearance, behind 
which scholasticism is apt to be concealed ; the 
word, having no concrete meaning, becomes a purely 

266 



The Construction of General Formula 

verbal notion (like the soporific virtue of which 
Moliere speaks). As long as our notions on social 
phenomena have not been reduced to truly scientific 
formulae, the most scientific course will be to express 
them in terms of every-day experience. 

In order to construct a formula, we should know 
beforehand what elements ought to enter into it. 
We must here make a distinction between general 
facts (habits and evolutions) and unique facts 
(events). 

III. General facts consist in actions which are 
often repeated, and are common to a number of 
men. We have to determine their character, extent, 
and duration. 

In order to formulate their character, we combine 
all the features which constitute a fact (habit, insti- 
tution) and distinguish it from all others. We 
unite Under the same formula all the individual 
cases which greatly resemble each other, by neglect- 
ing the individual differences. 

This concentration is performed without effort 
in the case of habits which have to do with forms 
(language, handwriting), and in the case of all 
intellectual habits ; those who practised these habits 
have already given them expression in formulae, 
which we have only to collect. The same holds 
of these institutions which are sanctioned by ex- 
pressly formulated rules (regulations, laws, private 
statutes). Accordingly the special branches of his- 
tory were the first to yield methodical formulae. On 
the other hand, these special branches do not go 
beyond superficial and conventional facts, they do 
not reach the real actions and thoughts of men : 

267 



Synthetic Operations 

in language they deal with written words, not the 
real pronunciation ; in religion with official dogmas 
and rites, not with the real beliefs of the mass of 
the people ; in morals with avowed precepts, not 
with the effective ideals ; in institutions with official 
rules, not with the real practice. On all these 
subjects the knowledge of conventional forms must 
some day be supplemented by a parallel study of 
the real habits. 

It is much more difficult to embrace in a single 
formula a habit which is composed of real actions, 
as is the case with economic phenomena, private 
life, politics ; for we have to find in the different 
actions those common characteristics which consti- 
tute the habit; or, if this work has already been 
done in the documents, and condensed into a 
formula (the most common case), we must criticise 
this formula in order to make sure that it really 
represents a homogeneous habit. 

The same difficulty occurs in constructing the 
formula for a group ; we have to describe the char- 
acteristic common to all the members of the group 
and to find a collective name which shall exactly 
designate it. In documents there is no lack of 
names of groups; but, as they have their origin 
in usage, many of them correspond but ill to the 
real groups ; we have to criticise these names to 
fix their precise meaning, sometimes to correct their 
application. 

This first operation should yield formulae expres- 
sive of the conventional and real characteristics of 
all the habits of the different groups. 

In order to fix the precise extent of a habit we 
268 



The Construction of General Formula 

shall seek the most distant points where it appears 
(this will give the area of distribution), and the 
region where it is most common (the centre). 
Sometimes the operation takes the form of a map 
(for example the map of the tumuli and the dolmens 
of France). It will also be necessary to indicate 
the groups of men who practised each habit, and 
the sub-groups in which it was most pronounced. 

The formula should also indicate the duration of 
the habit. We shall look for the extreme cases, 
the first and the last appearance of the form, the 
doctrine, the usage, the institution, the group. But 
it will not be enough to note the two isolated cases, 
the earliest and the most recent ; we must ascertain 
the period in which it was really active. 

The formula of an evolution ought to indicate the 
successive variations in the habit, giving in each 
case precise limits of extent and duration. Then, by 
comparing all the variations, it will be possible to 
determine the general course of the evolution. The 
general formula will indicate when and where the 
evolution began and ended, and the nature of the 
change which it effected. All evolutions present 
common features which enable them to be divided 
into stages. Every habit (usage or institution) be- 
gins by being the spontaneous act of several indi- 
viduals; when others imitate them it becomes a 
usage. Similarly social functions are in the first 
instance performed by persons who undertake them 
spontaneously, when these persons are recognised by 
others they acquire an official status. This is the 
first stage ; individual initiative followed by general 
imitation and recognition. The usage becomes tradi- 

269 



Synthetic Operations 

tional and is transformed into an obligatory custom 
or rule ; the persons acquire a permanent status and 
are invested with powers of material or moral con- 
straint. This is the stage of tradition and authority ; 
very often it is the last stage, and continues till the 
society is destroyed. The usage is relaxed, the 
rules are violated, the persons in authority cease 
to be obeyed ; this is the stage of revolt and decom- 
position. Finally, in certain civilised societies, the 
rule is criticised, the persons in authority are cen- 
sured, by the action of a part of the , subjects a 
rational change is effected in the composition of 
the governing body, which is subjected to super- 
vision ; this is the stage of reform and of checks. 

IV. In the case of unique facts we cannot expect 
to bring several together under a common formula, 
for the nature of these facts is to occur but once. 
However, it is imperatively necessary to abridge, 
we cannot preserve all the acts of all the members 
of an assembly or of all the officers of a state. Many 
individuals and many facts must be sacrificed. 

How are we to choose ? Personal tastes and 
patriotism give rise to preferences for congenial 
characters and for local events ; but the only prin- 
ciple of selection which can be employed by all 
historians in common is that which is based on the 
part played in the evolution of human affairs. We 
ought to retain those persons and those events which 
have visibly influenced the course of an evolution. 
We may recognise them by our inability to describe 
the evolution without mentioning them. The men 
are those who have modified the state of a society 
either by the creation or the introduction of a habit 

270 



The Construction of General Formula 

(artists, men of science, inventors, founders, apostles), 
or as directors of a movement, heads of states, of 
parties, of armies. The events are those which have 
brought about changes in the habits or the state of 
societies. 

In order to construct a formula descriptive of an 
historical person, we must take particulars from his 
biography and his habits. From his biography we 
shall take those facts which determined his career, 
formed his habits, and occasioned the actions by 
which he influenced society. These comprise physio- 
logical conditions (physique, temperament, state of 
health), 1 the educational influences, the social con- 
ditions to which he was subject. The history of 
literature has accustomed us to researches of this 
kind. 

Among the habits of a man it is necessary to 
determine his fundamental conceptions relating to 
the class of facts in which his influence was felt, 
his conception of life, his knowledge, his predomi- 
nating tastes, his habitual occupations, his principles 
of conduct. From these details, in which there is 
infinite variety, an impression is formed of the 
man's " character," and the collection of these char- 
acteristic features constitutes his " portrait," or, to 
use a favourite phrase of the day, his " psychology." 
This exercise, which is still held in great esteem, 
dates from the time when history was still a branch 
of literature ; it is doubtful whether it can ever be- 

1 Michelet has discredited the study of physiological influences 
by the abuse which he has made of it in the last part of his " His- 
tory of France " ; it is, however, indispensable for the understanding 
of a man's career. 

27I 



Synthetic Operations 

come a scientific process. There is perhaps no sure 
method of summing up the character of a man, 
even in his lifetime, still less when we can only 
know him indirectly through the medium of docu- 
ments. The controversies relative to the interpreta- 
tion of the conduct of Alexander are a good example 
of this uncertainty. 

If, however, we take the risk of seeking a for- 
mula to describe a character, there are two natural 
temptations against which we must guard : ( i ) We 
must not construct the formula out of the person's 
assertions in regard to himself. (2) The study of 
imaginary personages (dramas and novels) has ac- 
customed us to seek a logical connection between 
the various sentiments and the various acts of a 
man; a character, in literature, is constructed logi- 
cally. This search for coherency must not be 
transferred to the study of real men. We are less 
likely to do so in the case of those whom we 
observe in their lifetime, because we see too many 
characteristics in them which could not enter into 
a coherent formula. But the absence of documents, 
by suppressing those characteristics which would 
have checked us, encourages us to arrange the very 
small number of those which remain in the form 
of a stage-character. This is why the great men 
of antiquity seem to us to have been much more 
logical than our contemporaries are. 

How are we to construct a formula for an event? 
The imperative need of simplification causes us to 
combine under a single name an enormous mass of 
minute facts which are perceived in the lump, and 
between which we vaguely feel that there is a con- 

272 



The Construction of General Formula 

nection (a battle, a war, a reform). The facts which 
are thus combined are such facts as have conduced 
to a common result. That is how the common 
notion of an event arises, and there is no more 
scientific conception to put in its place. Facts, then, 
are to be grouped according to their consequences ; 
those which have had no visible consequences dis- 
appear, the others are fused into a certain number of 
aggregates which we call events. 

In order to describe an event, it is necessary to 
give precise indications (i) of its character, (2) of 
its extent. 

(1) By the character of an event we mean the 
features which distinguish it from every other event, 
not merely the external conditions of date and 
place, but the manner in which it occurred, and its 
immediate causes. The following are the items of 
information which the formula should contain. One 
or more men, in such and such mental states (con- 
ceptions, motives of the action), working under such 
and such material conditions (locality, instrument), 
performed such and such actions, which had for 
their result such and such a modification. For the 
determination of the motives of the actions, the only 
method is to compare the actions, firstly, with the 
declarations of those who performed them ; secondly, 
with the interpretation of those who witnessed their 
performance. There is often a doubt remaining : 
this is the field of party polemics; every one attri- 
butes noble motives to the actions of his, own party 
and discreditable motives to those of the opposite 
party. But actions described without any indication 
of motive would be unintelligible. 

273 s 



Synthetic Operations 

(2) The extension of the event will be indicated 
both in space (the place where it happened, and the 
region in which its immediate effects were felt) and 
in time, the moment when its realisation began, and 
the moment when the result was brought about. 

V. Descriptive formulas relating to characters, 
being merely qualitative, only give an abstract idea of 
the facts ; in order to realise the place they occupied 
in reality, quantity is necessary. It is not a matter 
of indifference whether a given usage was practised 
by a hundred men or by millions. 

For the purpose of introducing quantity into 
formulae we have at our disposal several methods, 
of various degrees of imperfection, which help us 
to attain the end in view with various degrees of 
precision. Arranged in descending order of pre- 
cision they are as follows : — 

(1) Measurement is a perfectly scientific procedure, 
for equal numbers represent absolutely identical 
values. But a common unit is necessary, and that 
can only be had for time and for physical pheno- 
mena (lengths, surfaces, weights). Figures relating 
to production and sums of money are the essential 
elements in the statement of economic and financial 
facts. But facts of the psychological order remain 
inaccessible to measurement. 

(2) Enumeration, which is the process employed 
in statistics, 1 is applicable to all the facts which 

1 On the subject of statistics, a method which is now perfected, 
a good summary with a bibliography will be found in the Hand- 
v'orterbuch der Staatswissenschaftcn, Jena, 1S90-94, la. 8vo. and two 
good methodical treatises, J. von. Mayr, Theoretische Statistik and 
Bcvolkerungsstatistik, in the collection of Marquardsen and Seydel, 
Freiburg, 1895 an( * 1897, la. 8vo. 

2 74 



The Construction of General Formula 

have in common a definite characteristic which can 
be made use of for counting them. The facts which 
are thus comprehended under a single number do 
not all belong to the same species, they may have 
in common but a single characteristic, abstract 
(crime, lawsuit) or conventional (workman, lodg- 
ing) ; the figures merely indicate the number of cases 
in which a given characteristic is met with ; they 
do not represent a homogeneous whole. A natural 
tendency is to confuse number with measurement, 
and to suppose that facts are known with scientific 
precision because it has been possible to apply 
number to them ; this is an illusion to be guarded 
against, we must not take the figures which give 
the number of a population or an army for the 
measure of its importance. 1 Still, enumeration yields 
results which are necessary for the construction of 
formulae relating to groups. But the operation is 
restricted to those cases in which it is possible to 
know all the units of a given species lying within 
given limits, for it is performed by first ticking off, 
then adding. Before undertaking a retrospective 
enumeration, therefore, it will be well to make sure 
that the documents are complete enough to exhibit 
all the units which are to be enumerated. As to 
figures given in documents, they are to be distrusted. 
(3) Valuation is a kind of incomplete enumera- 
tion applying to a portion of the field, and made on 
the supposition that the same proportions hold good 
through the whole of the field. It is an expedient to 

1 As is dene by Boardeau {V Histoire ct les Historiens, Paris, 1888, 
8vo), who proposes to reduce the whole of history to a series of 
statistics. 

275 



Synthetic Operations 

which, in history, it is often necessary to have recourse 
when documents are unequally abundant for the 
different divisions of the subject. The result is open 
to doubt, unless we are sure that the portion to 
which enumeration was applied was exactly similar 
to the remainder. 

(4) Sampling is a process of enumeration restricted 
to a few units taken at different points in the field 
of investigation ; we calculate the proportion of cases 
(say 90 per cent.) where a given characteristic occurs, 
we assume that the same proportion holds through- 
out, and if there are several categories we obtain the 
proportion between them. In history this procedure 
is applicable to facts of every kind, for the purpose 
of determining either the proportion between the 
different forms or usages which occur within a given 
region or period, or the proportion which obtains, 
within a heterogeneous group, between members 
belonging to different classes. This procedure gives 
us an approximate idea of the frequency of facts 
and the proportion between the different elements 
of a society ; it can even show what species of facts 
are most commonly found together, and are there- 
fore probably connected. But in order that the 
method may be employed correctly it is necessary 
that the samples should be representative of the 
whole, and not of a part which might possibly be 
exceptional in character. They should therefore be 
chosen at very different points, and under very dif- 
ferent conditions, in order that the exceptions may 
compensate each other. It is not enough to take 
them at points which are distant from each other ; 
for example, on the different frontiers of a country, 

276 



The Construction of General Formula 

for the very circumstance of situation on a frontier 
is an exceptional condition. Verification may be 
had by following the methods by which anthropolo- 
gists obtain averages. 

(5) Generalisation is only an instinctive process 
of simplification. As soon as we perceive a certain 
characteristic in an object, we extend this charac- 
teristic to all other objects which at all resemble it. 
In all human concerns, where the facts are always 
complex, we make generalisations unconsciously ; we 
attribute to a whole people the habits of a few indi- 
viduals, or those of the first group forming part of 
the people which comes within our knowledge ; we 
extend to a whole period habits which are ascertained 
to have existed at a given moment. This is the 
most active of all the causes of historical error, and 
one whose influence is felt in every department, in 
the study of usages and of institutions, even in the 
appreciation of the morality of a people. 1 Gene- 
ralisation rests on a vague idea that all facts which 
are contiguous to each other, or which resemble each 
other in some point, are similar at all points. It is 
an unconscious and ill-performed process of sampling. 
It may therefore be made correct by being subjected 
to the conditions of a well-performed process of 
sampling. We must examine the cases on which 
we propose to found a generalisation and ask our- 
selves, What right have we to generalise ? That is, 
what reason have we for assuming that the charac- 
teristic discovered in these cases will occur in the 
remaining thousands of cases ? that the cases chosen 

1 A good example will be found in Lacombe, De VHistoire Con- 
tidirie, Comme Science, p. 146. 

277 



Synthetic Operations 

resemble the average ? The only valid reason would 
be that these cases are representative of the whole. 
We are thus brought back to the process of 
methodical" sampling. 

The right method of conducting the operation is 
as follows : ( i ) We must fix the precise limits of 
the field within which we intend to generalise (that 
is, to assume the similarity of all the cases), we must 
determine the country, the group, the class, the period 
as to which we are to generalise. Care must be 
taken not to make the field too large by confusing 
a part with the whole (a Greek or Germanic people 
with the whole Greek or Germanic race). (2) We 
must make sure that the facts lying within the field 
resemble each other in the points on which we wish 
to generalise, and therefore we have to distrust those 
vague names under which are comprehended groups 
of very different character (Christians, French, Aryans, 
Romans). (3) We must make sure that the facts 
from which we propose to generalise are representa- 
tive samples, that they really belong to the field of 
investigation, for it does happen sometimes that men 
or facts are taken as specimens of one group when 
they really belong to another. Nor must they be 
exceptional, as is to be presumed in all cases when 
the conditions are exceptional ; authors of documents 
tend to record by preference those facts which sur- 
prise them, hence exceptional cases occupy in docu- 
ments a space which is out of proportion to their 
real number; this is one of the chief sources of 
error. (4) The number of samples necessary to 
support a generalisation is the greater the less 
ground there is for supposing a resemblance between 

278 



The Construction of General Formula 

all the cases occurring within the field of investiga- 
tion. A small number may suffice in treating of 
points in which men tend to bear a strong resem- 
blance to each other, either by imitation and con- 
vention (language, rites, ceremonies), or from the 
influence of custom and obligatory regulations (social 
institutions, political institutions in countries where 
the authorities are obeyed). A large number is 
requisite for facts where individual initiative plays 
a more important part (art, science, morality), and 
sometimes, as in respect of private conduct, all 
generalisation is as a rule impossible. 

VI. Descriptive formulae are in no science the 
final result of the work. It still remains to group 
the facts in such a way as to bring out their 
collective import, it still remains to search for their 
mutual relations ; these are the general conclusions. 
History, by reason of the imperfection of its mode 
of acquiring knowledge, needs, in addition, a pre- 
liminary operation for determining the bearing of 
the knowledge acquired. 1 

The work of criticism has supplied us with 

1 We have thought it useless to discuss here the question 
whether history ought, in accordance with the ancient tradition, 
to fulfil yet another function, whether it ought to pass judgment 
on men and events, that is to supplement the description of facts 
by expressions of approbation or censure, either from the point 
of view of a moral ideal, general or particular (the ideal of a 
sect, a party, or a nation), or from the practical point of view, by 
examining, as Polybius did, whether historical actions were well 
or ill adapted to their purpose. An addition of this kind could 
be made to any descriptive study : the naturalist might express 
his sympathy with or his admiration for an animal, he might 
condemn the ferocity of the tiger, and praise the devotion of the 
hen to her chickens. But it is obvious that in history, as in every 
other subject, judgments of this kind are foreign to science. 

279 



Synthetic Operations 

nothing but a number of isolated remarks on the 
value of the knowledge which the documents have 
permitted us to acquire. These must be combined. 
We shall therefore take a whole group of facts 
entered under a common heading — a particular 
class of facts, a country, a period, an event — and 
we shall summarise the results yielded by the 
criticism of particular facts so as to obtain a 
general formula. We shall have to take into con- 
sideration: (i) the extent, (2) the value of our 
knowledge. 

(1) We shall ask ourselves what are the blanks 
left by the documents. By working through the 
scheme used for the grouping of facts it is easy 
to discover what are the classes of facts on which 
we lack information. In the case of evolution, we 
notice which links are missing in the chain of 
successive modifications ; in the case of events, what 
episodes, what groups of actors are still unknown 
to us ; what facts enter or disappear from the field 
of our knowledge without our being able to trace 
their beginning or end. We ought to construct, 
mentally at any rate, a tabulated scheme of the 
points on which we are ignorant, in order to keep 
before our minds the distance separating the know- 
ledge we have from a perfect knowledge. 

(2) The value of our knowledge depends on the 
value of our documents. Criticism has given us 
indications on this point in each separate case, these 
indications, so far as relating to a given body of 
facts, must be summarised under a few heads. Does 
our knowledge come originally from direct observa- 
tion, from written tradition, or from oral tradition ? 

280 



The Construction of General Formula 

Do we possess several traditions of different bias, 
or a single tradition? Do we possess documents 
of different classes or of one single class ? Is our 
information vague or precise, detailed or summary, 
literary or positive, official or confidential ? 

The natural tendency is to forget, in construc- 
tion, the results yielded by criticism, to forget the 
incompleteness of our knowledge and the elements 
of doubt in it. An eager desire to increase to 
the greatest possible extent the amount of our 
information and the number of our conclusions 
impels us to seek emancipation from all negative 
restrictions, We thus run a great risk of using 
fragmentary and suspicious sources of information 
for the purpose of forming general impressions, just 
as if we were in possession of a complete record. 
It is easy to forget the existence of those facts 
which the documents do not describe (economic 
facts, slaves in antiquity), it is easy to exaggerate 
the space occupied by facts which are known to 
us (Greek art, Roman inscriptions, mediaeval monas- 
teries). We instinctively estimate the importance 
of facts by the number of the documents which 
mention them. We forget the peculiar character 
of the documents, and, when they all have a 
common origin, we forget that they have all 
subjected the facts to the same distortions, and 
that their community of origin renders verifi- 
cation impossible; we submissively reproduce the 
bias of the tradition (Roman, orthodox, aristo- 
cratic). 

In order to resist these natural tendencies, it is 
enough to pass in review the whole body of facts 

281 



Synthetic Operations 

and the whole body of tradition, before attempting 
to draw any general conclusion. 

VII. Descriptive formulae give the particular cha- 
racter of each small group of facts. In order to 
obtain a general conclusion, we must combine these 
detailed results into a general formula. We must 
not compare together isolated details or secondary 
characteristics, 1 but groups of facts which resemble 
each other in a whole set of characteristics. 

We thus form an aggregate (of institutions, of 
groups of men, of events). Following the method 
indicated above, we determine its distinguishing 
characteristics, its extent, its duration, its quantity 
or importance. 

As we form groups of greater and greater gene- 
rality we drop, with each new degree of generality, 
those characteristics which vary, and retain those 
which are common to all the members of the new 
group. We must stop at the point where nothing 
is left except the characteristics common to the 
whole of humanity. The result is the condensation 
into a single formula of the general character of 
an order of facts, of a language, a religion, an 
art, an economic organisation, a society, a govern- 
ment, a complex event (such as the Invasion or the 
Reformation). 

As long as these comprehensive formulae remain 
isolated the conclusion is incomplete. And as it is 
no longer possible to fuse them into higher gene- 

1 Comparison between two facts of detail belonging to very dif- 
ferent aggregates (for example the comparison of Abd-el-Kader with 
Jagurtha, of Napoleon with Sforza) is a striking method of exposi- 
tion, but not a means of reaching a scientific conclusion. 

282 



The Construction of General Formula 

ralisations, we feel the need of comparing them for 
the purpose of classification. This classification may 
be attempted by two methods. 

( i ) We may compare together similar categories 
of special facts, language, religions, arts, governments, 
taking them from the whole of humanity, and classi- 
fying together those which most resemble each other. 
We obtain families of languages, religions, and gov- 
ernments, which we may again classify and arrange 
among themselves. This is an abstract kind of clas- 
sification ; it isolates one species of facts from all 
the others, and thus renounces all claim to exhibit 
causes. It has the advantage of being rapidly per- 
formed and of yielding a technical vocabulary which 
is useful for designating facts. 

(2) We may compare real groups of real indivi- 
duals, we may take societies which figure in history 
and classify them according to their similarities. 
This is a concrete classification analogous to that 
of zoology, in which, not functions, but whole animals 
are classified. It is true that the groups are less 
clearly marked than in zoology; nor is there a 
general agreement as to the characteristics in respect 
of which we are to look for resemblances. Are we 
to choose the economic or the political organisation 
of the groups, or their intellectual condition ? No 
principle of choice has as yet become obligatory. 

History has not yet succeeded in establishing 
a scientific system of comprehensive classification. 
Possibly human groups are not sufficiently homo- 
geneous to furnish a solid basis of comparison, and 
not sharply enough divided to be treated as com- 
parable units. 

283 



Synthetic Operations 

VIII. The study of the relations between simul- 
taneous facts consists in a search for the connections 
between all the facts of different species which occur 
in a given society. We have a vague consciousness 
that the different habits which are separated by 
abstraction and langed under different categories 
(art, religion, political institutions), are not isolated 
in reality, that they have common characteristics, 
and that they are closely enough connected for a 
change in one of them to bring about a change in 
another. This is a fundamental idea of the Esprit 
des Lois of Montesquieu. This bond of connection, 
sometimes called consensus, has received the name of 
Zusammenhang from the German school. From this 
conception has arisen the theory of the Volksgeist 
(the mind of a people), a counterfeit of which has 
within the last few years been introduced into France 
under the name of " ame nationale." This concep- 
tion is also at the bottom of the theory regarding 
the soul of society which Lamprecht has expounded. 

After the rejection of these mystical conceptions 
there remains a vague but incontrovertible fact, the 
" solidarity " which exists between the different habits 
of one and the same people. In order to study it 
with precision it would be necessary to analyse it, 
and a connecting bond cannot be analysed. It is 
thus quite natural that this part of social science 
should have remained a refuge for mystery and 
obscurity. 

By the comparison of different societies which 
resemble or differ from each other in a given de- 
partment (religion or government), with the object 
of discovering in what other departments they re- 

284 



The Construction of General Formulas 

semble or differ from each other, it is possible that 
interesting empirical results might be obtained. But, 
in order to explain the consensus, it is necessary to 
work back to the facts which have produced it, the 
common causes of the various habits. We are thus 
obliged to undertake the investigation of causes, and 
we enter the province of what is called philosophical 
history, because it investigates what was formerly 
called the philosophy of facts — that is to say, their 
permanent relations. 

IX. The necessity of rising above the simple 
determination of facts in order to explain them by 
their causes, a necessity which has governed the 
development of all the sciences, has at length been 
felt even in the study of history. Hence have arisen 
systematic philosophies of history, and attempts to 
discover historical laws and causes. We cannot here 
enter into a critical examination of these attempts, 
which the nineteenth century has produced in so 
. great number ; we shall merely indicate what are 
the ways in which the problem has been attacked, 
and what obstacles have prevented a scientific solu- 
tion from being reached. 

The most natural method of explanation consists 
in the assumption that a transcendental cause, Pro- 
vidence, guides the whole course of events towards 
an end which is known to God. 1 This explanation 
can be but a metaphysical doctrine, crowning the 
work of science ; for the distinguishing feature of 

1 This system is still followed by several contemporary authors, 
the Belgian jurist Laurent in his Etudes sur Vhistoire de I'humanite, 
the German Rocholl, and even Flint, the English historian of the 
philosophy of history. 

285 



Synthetic Operations 

scieDce is that it only studies efficient causes. The 
historian is not called upon to investigate the first 
cause or final causes any more than the chemist or 
the naturalist. And, in fact, few writers on history 
nowadays stop to discuss the theory of Providence 
in its theological form. 

But the tendency to explain historical facts by 
transcendental causes survives in more modern 
theories in which metaphysic is disguised under 
scientific forms. The historians of the nineteenth 
century have been so strongly influenced by their 
philosophical education that most of them, some- 
times unconsciously, introduce metaphysical formulae 
into the construction of history. It will be enough 
to enumerate these systems, and point out their 
metaphysical character, so that reflecting historians 
may be warned to distrust them. 

The theory of the rational character of history 
rests on the notion that every real historical fact is 
at the same time " rational " — that is, in conformity 
with an intelligible comprehensive plan ; ordinarily 
it is tacitly assumed that every social fact has its 
raison d'etre in the development of society — that is, 
that it ends by turning to the advantage of society ; 
hence the cause of every institution is sought for in 
the social need it was originally meant to supply. 1 
This is the fundamental idea of Hegelianism, if not 
with Hegel, at least with the historians who have 
been his disciples (Ranke, Mommsen, Droysen, in 
France Cousin, Taine, and Michelet). This is a lay 

1 Thus Taine, in Les origines de la France Contemporaine, explains 
the origin of the privileges of the ancien regime by the seryices 
formerly rendered by the privileged classes. 

286 



The Construction of General Formula 

disguise of the old theological theory of final causes 
which assumes the existence of a Providence occu- 
pied in guiding humanity in the direction of its 
interests. This is a consoling, but not a scientific 
a priori hypothesis ; for the observation of historical 
facts does not indicate that things have always hap- 
pened in the most rational way, or in the way most 
advantageous to men, nor that institutions have had 
any other cause than the interest of those who estab- 
lished them ; the facts, indeed, point rather to the 
opposite conclusion. 

From the same metaphysical source has also 
sprung the Hegelian theory of the ideas which are 
successively realised in history through the medium 
of successive peoples. This theory, which has been 
popularised in France by Cousin and Michelet, has 
had its day, even in Germany, but it has been re- 
vived, especially in Germany, in the form of the 
historical mission (Bene/) which is attributed to 
peoples and persons. It will here be enough to 
observe that the very metaphors of "idea" and 
" mission " imply a transcendental anthropomorphic 
cause. 

From the same optimistic conception of a rational 
guidance of the world is derived the theory of the 
continuous and necessary progress of humanity. 
Although it has been adopted by the positivists, 
this is merely a metaphysical hypothesis. In the 
ordinary sense of the word, " progress " is merely a 
subjective expression denoting those changes which 
follow the direction of our preferences. But, even 
taking the word in the objective sense given to 
it by Spencer (an increase in the variety and co- 

287 



Synthetic Operations 

ordination of social phenomena), the study of his- 
torical facts does not point to a single universal and 
continuous progress of humanity, it brings before 
us a number of partial and intermittent progressive 
movements, and it gives us no reason to attribute 
them to a permanent cause inherent in humanity 
as a whole rather than to a series of local accidents. 1 
Attempts at a more scientific form of explanation 
have had their origin in the special branches of 
history (of languages, religion, law). By the separate 
study of the succession of facts of a single species, 
specialists have been enabled to ascertain the regular 
recurrence of the same successions of facts, and these 
results have been expressed in formulae which are 
sometimes called laws (for example, the law of the 
tonic accent) ; these are never more than empirical 
laws which merely indicate successions of facts with- 
out explaining them, for they do not reveal the 
efficient cause. But specialists, influenced by a 
natural metaphor, and struck by the regularity of 
these successions, have regarded the evolution of 
usages (of a word, a rite, a dogma, a rule of law), 
as if it were an organic development analogous to 
the growth of a plant; we hear of the "life of 
words," of the " death of dogmas/' of the " growth 
of myths." Then, in forgetfulness of the fact that 
all these things are pure abstractions, it has been 
tacitly assumed that there is a force inhering in the 
word, the rite, the rule, which produces its evolution. 
This is the theory of the development {Entwickelung) 
of usages and institutions ; it was started in Ger- 

1 A good criticism of the theory of progress will be found in 
P. Lacombe, De Vhhtoire Considiree Comme Science. 

288 



The Construction of General Formulae 

many by the " historical " school, and has dominated 
all the special branches of history. The history of 
languages alone has succeeded in shaking off its 
influence. 1 Just as usages have teen treated as if 
they were existences possessing a separate life of 
their own, so the succession of individuals compos- 
ing the various bodies within a society (royalty, 
church, senate, parliament) has been personified by 
the attribution to it of a will, which is treated as an 
active cause. A world of imaginary beings has thus 
been created behind the historical facts, and has 
replaced Providence in the explanation of them. 
For our defence against this deceptive mythology 
a single rule will suffice : Never seek the causes of 
an historical fact without having first expressed it 
concretely in terms of acting and thinking indi- 
viduals. If abstractions are used, every metaphor 
must be avoided which would make them play the 
part of living beings. 

By a comparison of the evolutions of the different 
species of facts which coexist in one and the same 
society, the " historical " school was led to the dis- 
covery of solidarity (Zusammenhang). 2 But, before 
attempting to discover its causes by analysis, the 
adherents of this school assumed, the existence of a 
permanent general cause residing in the society itself. 
And, as it was customary to personify society, a 
special temperament was attributed to it, the peculiar 
genius of the nation or the race, manifesting itself. 



1 See the very clear declarations of one of the principal represen- 
tatives of linguistic science in France, V. Henry, Antinomies Unguis- 
tiques, Paris, 1896, 8vo. 

2 See above, p. 284. 

289 T 



Synthetic Operations 

in the different social activities and explaining their 
solidarity. 1 This was simply an hypothesis suggested 
by the animal world, in which each species has 
permanent characteristics. It would have been in- 
adequate, for in order to explain how a given society 
comes to change its character from one epoch to 
another (the Greeks between the seventh and the 
fourth centuries, the English between the fifteenth 
and the nineteenth), it would have been necessary 
to invoke the aid of external causes. And the theory 
is untenable, for all the societies known to history 
are groups of men without anthropological unity and 
without common hereditary characteristics. 

In addition to these metaphysical or metaphorical 
explanations, attempts have been made to apply to 
the investigation of causes in history the classical 
procedure of the natural sciences : the comparison of 
parallel series of successive phenomena in order to 
discover those which always appear together. The 
"comparative method " has assumed several different 
forms. Sometimes the subject of study has been a 
detail of social life (a usage, an institution, a belief, 
a rule), defined in abstract terms ; its evolutions in 
different societies have been compared with a view 
to determine the common evolution which is to be 
attributed to one and the same general cause. Thus 
have arisen comparative philology, mythology, and 

1 Lamprecht, in the article quoted, p. 247, after having compared 
the artistic, religious, and economic evolutions of mediaeval Ger- 
many, and after having shown that they can all be divided into 
periods of the same duration, explains the simultaneous transforma- 
tions of the different usages and institutions of a given society by 
the transformations of the collective "social soul." This is only 
another form of the same hypothesis. 

29O 



The Construction of General Formula 

law. It has been proposed (in England) to give 
precision to the comparative method by applying 
" statistics " ; this would mean the systematic com- 
parison of all known societies and the enumeration 
of all the cases where two usages are found together. 
This is the principle of Bacon's tables of agreement ; 
it is to be feared that it will be no more fertile in 
results. The defect of all such methods is that they 
apply to abstract and partly arbitrary notions, some- 
times merely to verbal resemblances, and do not 
rest on a knowledge of the whole of the conditions 
under which the facts occur. 

We can conceive a more concrete method which, 
instead of comparing fragments, should compare 
wholes, that is entire societies, either the same 
society at different stages of its evolution (England 
in the sixteenth, and again in the nineteenth century), 
or else the general evolution of several societies, con- 
temporary with each other (England and France), 
or existing at different epochs (Rome and England). 
Such a method might be useful negatively, for the 
purpose of ascertaining that a given fact is not the 
necessary effect of another, since they are not always 
found together (for example, the emancipation of 
women and Christianity). But positive results are 
hardly to be expected of it, for the concomitance of 
two facts in several series does not show whether 
one is the cause of the other, or whether both are 
joint effects of a single cause. 

The methodical investigation of the causes of a 
fact requires an analysis of the conditions under 
which the fact occurs, performed so as to isolate 
the necessary condition which is its cause ; it pre- 

291 



Synthetic Operations 

supposes, therefore, the complete knowledge of these 
conditions. But this is precisely what we never 
have in history. We must therefore renounce the 
idea of arriving at causes by direct methods such as 
are used in the other sciences. 

As a matter of fact, however, historians often do 
employ the notion of cause, which, as we have 
shown above, is indispensable for the purpose of 
formulating events and constructing periods. They 
know causes partly from the authors of documents 
who observed the facts, partly from the . analogy of 
the causes which we all observe at the present day. 
The whole history of events is a chain of obviously 
and incontrovertibly connected incidents, each one 
of which is the determining cause of another. The 
lance- thrust of Montgomery is the cause of the death 
of Henry II. ; this death is the cause of the accession 
to power of the Guises, which again is the cause of 
the rising of the Protestants. 

The observation of causes by the authors of 
documents is limited to the interconnection of 
the accidental facts observed by them; these are, 
in truth, the causes which are known with the 
greatest certainty. Thus history, unlike the other 
sciences, is better able to ascertain the causes of 
particular incidents than those of general transfor- 
mations, for the work is found already done in the 
documents. 

In the investigation of the causes of general 
facts, historical construction is reduced to the ana- 
logy between the past and the present. What- 
ever chance there is of finding the causes which 
explain the evolution of past societies must lie in the 

292 



The Construction of General Formulae 

direct observation of the transformations of present 
societies. 

This is a branch of study which is not yet 
firmly established; here we can only state the 
principles of it. 

(i) In order to ascertain the causes of the soli- 
darity between the different habits of one and the 
same society, it is necessary to look beyond the 
abstract and conventional form which the facts 
assume in language (dogma, rule, rite, institution), 
and attend to the real concrete centres, which are 
always thinking and acting men. Here only are 
found together the different species of activity 
which language separates by abstraction. Their 
solidarity is to be sought for in some dominating 
feature in the character or the environment of 
the men which influences all the different mani- 
festations of then activity. We must not expect 
the same degrees of solidarity in all the species 
of activity ; there will be most of it in those species 
where each individual is in close dependence on 
the actions of the mass (economic, social, political 
life); there will be less of it in the intellectual 
activities (arts, sciences), where individual initiative 
has freer play. 1 Documents mention most habits 
(beliefs, customs, institutions) in the lump, without 
distinguishing individuals ; and yet, in one and the 
same society, habits vary considerably from one 
man to another. It is necessary to take account 
of these differences, otherwise there is a danger of 

1 The historians of literature, who began by searching for the 
connection between the arts and the rest of social life, thus gave 
the first place to the most difficult question. 

293 



Synthetic Operations 

explaining the actions of artists and men of science 
by the beliefs and the habits of their prince or their 
tradesmen. 

(2) In order to ascertain the causes of an evolu- 
tion, it is necessary to study the only beings which 
can evolve — men. Every evolution has for its cause 
a change in the material conditions or in the habits 
of certain men. Observation shows us two kinds 
of change. In the one case, the men remain the 
same, but change their manner of acting or thinking, 
either voluntarily through imitation, or by compul- 
sion. In the other, the men who practised the old 
usage disappear and are replaced by others who do 
not practise it ; these may be strangers, or they may 
be the descendants of the first set of men, but 
educated in a different manner. This renewing of 
the generations seems, in our day, to be the most 
active cause of evolution. It is natural to suppose 
that the same holds good of the past ; evolution has 
been slower, the more exclusively each generation has 
been formed by the imitation of its forerunners. 

There is still one more question to ask. Are men 
all alike, differing merely in the conditions under 
which they live (education, resources, government), 
and is evolution produced solely by changes in these 
conditions ? Or are there groups of men with heredi- 
tary differences, born with tendencies to different 
activities and with aptitudes leading to different 
evolutions, so that evolution may be the product, 
in part at least, of the increase, the diminution, and 
the displacement of these groups ? Taking the 
extreme cases, the white, black, and yellow races of 
mankind, the differences in aptitude are obvious ; no 

294 



The Construction of General Formulae 

black people has ever developed a civilisation. It is 
thus probable that smaller hereditary differences may 
have had their share in the determination of events. 
If so, historical evolution would be partly produced 
by physiological and anthropological causes. But his- 
tory provides us with no sure means of determining 
the action of these hereditary differences between 
men ; it goes no further than the conditions of their 
existence. The last question of history remains 
insoluble by historical methods. 



295 



CHAPTER V 

EXPOSITION 

We have still to study a question whose practical 
interest is obvious : What are the forms in which 
historical works present themselves ? These forms 
are, in fact, very numerous. Some of them are anti- 
quated ; not all are legitimate ; the best have their 
drawbacks. We should ask, therefore, not only what 
are the forms in which historical works appear, but 
also which of these represent truly rational types of 
exposition. 

By " historical works " we mean here all those 
which are intended to communicate results obtained 
by the labour of historical construction, whatever 
may be the nature, the extent, and the bearing of 
these results. The critical elaboration of docu- 
ments, which is treated of in Book II., and which 
is preparatory to historical construction, is naturally 
excluded. 

Historians may differ, and up to the present have 
differed, on several essential points. They have not 
always had, nor have they all now, the same concep- 
tion of the end aimed at by historical work ; hence 
arise differences in the nature of the facts chosen, 
the manner of dividing the subject, that is, of co- 
ordinating the facts, the manner of presenting them, 
the manner of proving them. This would be the 

296 



Exposition 

place to indicate how " the mode of writing history " 
has evolved from the beginning. But as the history of 
the modes of writing history has not yet been written 
well, 1 we shall here content ourselves with some very 
general remarks on the period prior to the second 
half of the nineteenth century, confining ourselves 
to what is strictly necessary for the understanding of 
the present situation. 

I. History was first conceived as the narration 
of memorable events. To preserve the memory 
and propagate the knowledge of glorious deeds, or 
of events which were of importance to a man, a 
family, or a people; such was the aim of history 
in the time of Thucydides and Livy. In addition, 
history was early considered as a collection of pre- 
cedents, and the knowledge of history as a practical 
preparation for life, especially political life (military 
and civil). Polybius and Plutarch wrote to instruct, 
they claimed to give recipes for action. Hence in 
classical antiquity the subject-matter of history 
consisted chiefly of political incidents, wars, and 
revolutions. The ordinary framework of historical 
exposition (within which the facts were usually 
arranged in chronological order) was the life of 

1 For the earlier epochs, consult good histories of Greek, Kornan, 
and mediaeval literature which contain chapters devoted to "his- 
torians." For the modern period, consult the Introduction of M. 
G. Monod to vol. i. of the Revue historique; the work by F. X. v. 
Wegde, Geschichte der deutschen Histo7'iographie (1885), relates only to 
Germany, and is mediocre. Some "Notes on History in France in 
the Nineteenth Century " have been published by C. Jullian as an 
Introduction to his Extraits des historiens francais da xlx e Steele (Paris, 
1897, i2mo). The history of modern historiography has still to be 
written. See the partial attempt by E. Bernheim, Lehrb'uck, pp. 13 
sqq. 

297 



Synthetic Opeeations 

a person, the whole life of a people, or a particular 
period in it ; there were in antiquity but few essays 
in general history. As the aim of the historian was 
to please or to instruct, or to please and instruct 
at the same time, history was a branch of litera- 
ture : there were not too many scruples on the score 
of proofs ; those who worked from written docu- 
ments took no care to distinguish the text of such 
documents from their own text ; in reproducing 
the narratives of their predecessors they adorned 
them with details, and sometimes (under pretext 
of being precise) with numbers, with speeches, with 
reflections, and elegances. We can in a manner see 
them at work in every instance where it is possible 
to compare Greek and Roman historians, Ephorus 
and Livy, for example, with their sources. 

The writers of the Renaissance directly imitated 
the ancients. For them, too, history was a literary 
art with apologetic aims or didactic pretensions. In 
Italy it was too often a means of gaining the favour 
of princes, or a theme for declamations. This state 
of affairs lasted a long time. Even in the seven- 
teenth century we find, in Mezeray, an historian of 
the ancient classical pattern. 

However, in the historical literature of the Renais- 
sance, two novelties claim our attention, in which 
the mediaeval influence is incontrovertibly manifest. 
On the one hand we see the retention of a form 
of exposition which was unusual in antiquity, which 
was created by the Catholic historians of the later 
ages (Eusebius, Orosius), and which enjoyed great 
favour in the Middle Ages, — that which, instead 
of embracing only the history of a single man, 

298 



Exposition 

family, or people, embraces universal history. On 
the other hand there was introduced a mechanical 
artifice of exposition, having its origin in a practice 
common in the mediaeval schools (the gloss), which 
had far-reaching consequences. The custom arose 
of adding notes to printed books of history. 1 Notes 
have made it possible to distinguish between the 
historical narrative and the documents which sup- 
port it, to give references to sources, to disencumber 
and illustrate the text. It was in collections of 
documents, and in critical dissertations, that the 
artifice of annotation was first employed ; thence 
it penetrated, slowly, into historical works of other 
classes. 

A second period begins in the eighteenth century. 
The " philosophers " then began to conceive history 
as the study, not of events for their own sakes, but 
of the habits of men. They were thus led to take 
an interest, not only in facts of a political order, 
but in the evolution of the arts, the sciences, of in- 
dustry, and in manners. Montesquieu and Voltaire 
personified these tendencies. The Essai sur les 
mceurs is the first sketch, and, in some respects, the 
masterpiece of history thus conceived. The detailed 
narration of political and military events was still 
regarded as the main work of history, but to this 
it now became customary to add, generally by way 
of supplement or appendix, a sketch of the "progress 
of the human mind." The expression "history of 

1 It would be interesting to find out what are the earliest printed 
books furnished with notes in the modern fashion. Bibliophiles 
whom we have consulted are unable to say, their attention never 
having been drawn to the point. 

299 



Synthetic Operations 

civilisation" appears before the end of the eighteenth 
century. At the same time German university 
professors, especially at Gottingen, were creating, in 
order to supply educational needs, the new form 
of the historical " manual," a methodical collection 
of carefully justified facts, with no literary or other 
pretensions. Collections of historical facts, made 
with a view to aid in the interpretation of literary 
texts, or out of mere curiosity in regard to the 
things of the past, had existed from ancient times ; 
but the medleys of Athengeus and Aulus Gellius, 
or the vaster and better arranged compilations of 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, are by no 
means to be compared with the "scientific manuals" 
of which the German professors then gave the 
models. These professors, moreover, contributed 
towards the clearing up of the vague, general notion 
which the philosophers had of " civilisation," for they 
applied themselves to the organisation of the history 
of languages, of literatures, of the arts, of religions, 
of law, of economic phenomena, and so on, as so 
many separate branches of study. Thus the domain 
of history was greatly enlarged, and scientific, that 
is, simple and objective, exposition began to com- 
pete with the rhetorical or sententious, patriotic or 
philosophical ideals of antiquity. 

This competition was at first timid and obscure, 
for the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
marked by a literary renaissance -which renovated 
historical literature. Under the influence of the 
romantic movement historians sought for more vivid 
methods of exposition than those employed by their 
predecessors, methods better adapted to strike the 

300 



Exposition 

imagination and rouse the emotions of the public, by 
filling the mind with poetical images of vanished 
realities. Some endeavoured to preserve the peculiar 
colouring of the original documents, which they 
adapted : " Charmed with the contemporary narra- 
tives," says Barante, " I have endeavoured to write a 
consecutive account which should borrow from them 
their animation and interest." This leads directly 
to the neglect of criticism, and to the reproduction 
of whatever is effective from the literary point of 
view. Others declared that the facts of the past 
ought to be recounted with all the emotions of a 
spectator. " Thierry," says Michelet, praising him, 
"in telling us the story of Klodowig, breathes the 
spirit and shows the emotion of recently invaded 
France . . ." Michelet "stated the problem of his- 
tory as the resuscitation of integral life in the inmost 
parts of the organism." With the romantic historians 
the choice of subject, of plan, of the proofs, of the 
style, is dominated by an engrossing desire to pro- 
duce an effect — a literary, not a scientific ambition. 
Some romantic historians have slid down this in- 
clined plane to the level of the " historical novel." 
We know the nature of this species of literature, 
which flourished so vigorously from the Abbe Bar- 
thelemy and Chateaubriand down to Merimee and 
Ebers, and which some are now vainly attempting 
to rejuvenate. The object is to "make the scenes 
of the past live again " in dramatic pictures artisti- 
cally constructed with " true " colours and details. 
The obvious object of the method is that it does not 
provide the reader with any means of distinguishing 
between the elements borrowed from the documents 

301 



Synthetic Operations 

and the imaginary elements, not to mention the fact 
that generally the documents used are not all of the 
same origin, so that while the colour of each stone 
may be " true " that of the mosaic is false. Dezobry's 
Rome au sUch d'Auguste, Augustin Thierry's Rdcits 
mtrovingiens, and other " pictures " produced at the 
same epoch were constructed on the same principle, 
and are subject to the same drawbacks as the his- 
torical novels properly so-called. 1 

We may summarise what precedes by saying that, 
up to about 1850, history continued to be, both for 
historians and the public, a branch of literature. An 
excellent proof of this lies in the fact that up till 
then historians were accustomed to publish new 
editions of their works, at intervals of several years, 
without making any change in them, and that the 
public tolerated the practice. Now every scientific 
work needs to be continually recast, revised, brought 
up to date. Scientific workers do not claim to give 
their works an immutable form, they do not expect 
to be read by posterity or to achieve personal immor- 
tality; it is enough for them if the results of their 
researches, corrected, it may be, and possibly trans- 
formed by subsequent researches, should be incor- 
porated in the fund of knowledge which forms the 
scientific heritage of mankind. No one reads Newton 
or Lavoisier ; it is enough for their glory that their 
labours should have contributed to the production 

1 It is clear that the romantic methods which are used for the 
purpose of obtaining effects of local colour and "revising" the 
past, often puerile in the hands of the ablest writers, are altogether 
intolerable when they are employed by any others. See a good 
example (criticism of a book of M. Mourin by M. Monod) in the 
Revue Critique, 1874, ii. pp. 163 sqq. 

302 



Exposition 

of works by which their own have been superseded, 
and which will be, sooner or later, superseded in 
their turn. It is only works of art that enjoy per- 
petual youth. And the public is well aware of the 
fact ; no one would ever think of studying natural 
history in Buffon, whatever his opinion might be of 
the merits of this stylist. But the same public is 
quite ready to study history in Augustin Thierry, in 
Macaulay, in Carlyle, in Michelet, and the books of 
the great writers who have treated historical subjects 
are reprinted, fifty years after the author's death, in 
their original form, though they are manifestly no 
longer on a level with current knowledge. It is 
clear that, for many, form counts before matter in 
history, and that an historical work is primarily, if 
not exclusively, a work of art. 1 

II. It is within the last fifty years that the 
scientific forms of historical exposition have been 
evolved and settled, in accordance with the general 
principle that the aini of history is not to please, nor 
to give practical maxims of conduct, nor to arouse 
the emotions, but knowledge pure and simple. 

We begin by distinguishing between (i) mono- 
graphs and (2) works of a general character. 

1 It is a commonplace, and an error all the same, to maintain 
the exact opposite of the above, namely, that the works of critical 
scholars live, while the works of historians grow antiquated, so that 
scholars gain a more solid reputation than historians do : " Pere 
Daniel is now read no longer, and Pere Anselme is always read." 
Eut the works of scholars become antiquated too, and the fact that 
not all the parts of the work of Pere Anselme have yet been super- 
seded (that is why he is still read), ought not to deceive us : the 
great majority of the works written by scholars, like those of 
researchers in the sciences proper, are provisional and doomed to 
oblivion. 

303 



Synthetic Operations 

(i) A man writes a monograph when he pro- 
poses to elucidate a special point, a single fact, or 
a limited body of facts, for example the whole or 
a portion of the life of an individual, a single event 
or a series of events between two dates lying near 
together. The types of possible subjects of a mono- 
graph cannot be enumerated, for the subject-matter 
of history can be divided indefinitely, and in an 
infinite number of ways. But all modes of division 
are not equally judicious, and, though the reverse 
has been maintained, there are, in history as in all 
the sciences, subjects which it would be stupid to 
treat in monographs, and monographs which, though 
well executed, represent so much useless labour, 1 
Persons of moderate ability and no great mental 
range, devoted to what is -called " curious " learning, 
are very ready to occupy themselves with insignificant 
questions; 2 indeed, for the purpose of making a first 
estimate of an historian's intellectual power, a fairly 
good criterion may be had in the list of the mono- 
graphs he has written. 3 It is the gift of seeing the 

1 " It is in vain that those professionally concerned try to deceive 
themselves on this point ; not everything in the past is interesting. 
" Supposing we were to write the Life of the Duke of Angouleme," 
says Pecuchet. "But he was an imbecile I" answers Bouvard; 
"Never mind; personages of the second order often have an 
enormous influence, and perhaps he was able to control the march 
of events." — G. Flaubert, Bouvard et P6cuchet,-p. 157. 

2 As persons of moderate ability have a tendency to prefer in- 
significant subjects, there is active competition in the treatment of 
such subjects. We often have occasion to note the simultaneous 
appearance of several monographs on the same subject. It is not 
rare for the subject to be altogether devoid of importance. 

3 Interesting subjects for monographs are not always capable 
of being treated : there are some which the state of the sources 
puts out of the question. This is why beginners, even those 

304 



Exposition 

important problems, and the taste for their treat- 
ment, as well as the power of solving them, which, 
in all the sciences, raise men to the first rank. But 
let us suppose the subject has been rationally chosen. 
Every monograph, in order to be useful — that is, 
capable of being fully turned to account — should 
conform to three rules : ( i ) in a monograph every 
historical fact derived from documents should only 
be presented accompanied by a reference to the 
documents from which it is taken, and an estimate 
of the value of these documents; 1 (2) chronological 
order should be followed as far as possible, because 
this is the order in which we know that the facts 
occurred, and by which we are guided in searching 
for causes and effects ; (3) the title of the monograph 
must enable its subject to be known with exacti- 

who have ability, experience so much embarrassment in choosing 
subjects for their first monographs, when they are not aided by 
good advice or good fortune, and often lose themselves in attempt- 
ing the impossible. It would be very severe, and very unjust, to 
judge any one from the list of his first monographs. 

1 In practice it is proper to give at the beginning a list of the 
sources used in the whole of the monograph (with appropriate 
bibliographical information as to the printed works, and in the 
case of manuscripts, a mention of the nature of the documents 
and their shelf -marks) ; besides, each special statement should be 
accompanied by its proof : the exact text of the supporting docu- 
ment should be quoted, if possible, so that the reader may be in a 
position to verify the interpretation ; otherwise an analysis of it 
should be given in a note, or, at the least, the title of the docu- 
ment, with its shelf-mark, or with a precise indication of the place 
where it was published. The general rule is to put the reader in a 
position to know the exact reasons for which such and such con- 
clusions have been adopted at each stage of the analysis. 

Beginners, resembling ancient authors in this respect, naturally 
do not observe all these rules. Frequently, instead of quoting the 
text or the titles of documents, they refer to these by their shelf- 
mark, or by the title of the general collection in which they are 
printed, from which the reader can learn nothing as to the nature 

305 U 



Synthetic Operations 

tude : we cannot protest too strongly against those 
incomplete or fancy titles which so unnecessarily 
complicate bibliographical searches. A fourth rule 
has been laid down ; it has been said " a monograph 
is useful only when it exhausts the subject " ; but it 
is quite legitimate to do temporary work with docu- 
ments which one has at one's disposal, even when 
there is reason to believe that others exist, provided 
always that precise notice is given as to what docu- 
ments have been employed. 

Any one who has tact will see that, in a mono- 
graph, the apparatus of demonstration, while need- 
ing to be complete, ought to be reduced to what 
is strictly necessary. Sobriety is imperative ; all 
parading of erudition which might have been spared 
without inconvenience is odious. 1 In history it often 
happens that the best executed monographs furnish 
no other result than the proof that knowledge is 
impossible. It is necessary to resist the desire which 
leads some to round off with subjective, ambitious, 
and vague conclusions monographs which will no,t 

of the text adduced. The following is another mistake of the 
crudest kind, and yet of frequent occurrence : Beginners, and 
persons of little experience, do not always understand why the 
custom has been introduced of inserting footnotes ; at the bottom 
of the pages of the books they have they see a fringe of notes ; 
they think themselves bound to fringe their own books in the same 
way, but their notes are adventitious and purely ornamental ; they 
do not serve either to exhibit the proof or to enable the reader to 
verify the statements. All these methods are inadmissible, and 
should be vigorously denounced. 

1 Almost all beginners have an unfortunate tendency to wander 
off into superfluous digressions, to amass reflections and pieces of 
information which have no relevance to the main subject ; they 
would recognise, if they reflected, that the causes of this tendency 
are bad taste, a kind of naive vanity, sometimes mental confusion. 

.306 



Exposition 

bear them. 1 The proper conclusion of a good mono- 
graph is the balance-sheet of the results obtained by 
it and the points left doubtful. A monograph made 
on these principles may grow antiquated, but it will 
not fall to pieces, and its author will never need to 
blush for it. 

(2) Works of a general character are addressed 
either to students or to the general public. 

A. General works intended principally for students 
and specialists now appear in the form of "reper- 
tories," " manuals," and " scientific histories." In a 
repertory a number of verified facts belonging to a 
given class are collected and arranged in an order 
which makes it easy to refer to them. If the facts 
thus collected have precise dates, chronological order 
is adopted : thus the task has been undertaken of 
compiling " Annals " of German history, in which 
the summary entry of the events, arranged by 
dates, is accompanied by the texts from which the 
events are known, Avith accurate references to the 
sources and the works of critics ; the collection of 
the Jahrbiicher der deuUchen Geschichte has for its 
object the elucidation, as far as is possible, of the 
facts of German history, including all that is suscep- 
tible of scientific discussion and proof, but omitting 
all that belongs to the domain of appreciation and 
general views. When the facts are badly dated, or 

1 We meet with declarations like the following : " I have been 
long familiar with the documents of this period and this class. I 
have an impression that such and such conclusions, which I cannot 
prove, are true." Of two things one : either the author can give 
the reasons for his impression, and then we can judge them, or he 
cannot give them, and we may assume that he has none of serious 
value. 

307 



Synthetic Operations 

are simultaneous, alphabetical arrangement must be 
employed ; thus we have Dictionaries ■ dictionaries 
of institutions, biographical dictionaries, historical 
encyclopedias, such as the Bealencyclopcedie of Pauly- 
Wissowa. These alphabetical repertories are, in 
theory, just as the Jahrbilcher, collections of proved 
facts ; if, in practice, the references in them are less 
rigorous, if the apparatus of texts supporting the 
statements is less complete, the difference is without 
justification. 1 Scientific manuals are also, properly 
speaking, repertories, since they are collections in 
which established facts are arranged in systematic 
order, and are exhibited objectively, with their proofs, 
and without any literary adornment. The authors 
of these " manuals," of which the most numerous 
and the most perfect specimens have been composed 
in our days in the German universities, have no 
object in view except to draw up minute inventories 
of the acquisitions made by knowledge, in order that 
workers may be enabled to assimilate the results of 
criticism with greater ease and rapidity, and may 
be furnished with starting-points for new researches. 
Manuals of this kind now exist for most of the special 
branches of the history of civilisation (languages, 
literature, religion, law, Alterthilmer, and so on), for 
the history of institutions, for the different parts of 

1 This difference has a tendency to disappear. The most recent 
alphabetical collections of historical facts (the Realencyclopcedie der 
classischen Alterthumswissenscha/t of Pauly-Wissowa, the Diction- 
naire des antiquites of Daremberg and Saglio, the Dictionary of 
National Biography of Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee) are furnished 
with a sufficiently ample apparatus. It is principally in biographical 
dictionaries that the custom of giving no proofs tends to persist ; see 
the Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, &c. 

308 



Exposition 

ecclesiastical history. It will suffice to mention the 
names of Schcemann, of Marquardt and Mommsen, 
of Gilbert, of Krumbacher, of Harnack, of M oiler. 
These works are not marked by the dryness of the 
majority of the primitive "manuals," which were 
published in Germany a hundred years ago, and 
which were little more than tables of subjects, with 
references to the books and documents to be con- 
sulted ; in the modern type the exposition and dis- 
cussion are no doubt terse and compact, but yet not 
abbreviated beyond a point at which they may be 
tolerated, even preferred by cultivated readers. They 
take away the taste for other books, as G. Paris very 
well says : l " When one has feasted on these sub- 
stantial pages, so full of facts, Avhich, with all their 
appearance of impersonality, yet contain, and above 
all suggest, so many thoughts, it is difficult to read 
books, even books of distinction, in which the subject 
is cut up symmetrically to fit in with a preconceived 
system, is coloured by fancy, and is, so to speak, pre- 
sented to us in disguise, books in which the author 
continually comes between us and the spectacle 
which he claims to make intelligible to us, but which 
he never allows us to see." The great historical 
" manuals," uniform with the treatises and manuals 
of the other sciences (with the added complication 
of authorities and proofs), ought to be, and are, con- 
tinually improved, emended, corrected, brought up 
to date : they are, by definition, works of science and 
not of art. 

The earliest repertories and the earliest scientific 
" manuals " were composed by isolated individuals. 

1 Revue Critique, 1874, i. p. 327. 

3°9 



Synthetic Operations 

But it was soon recognised that a single man cannot 
correctly arrange, or have the proper mastery over a 
vast collection of facts. The task has been divided. 
Repertories are executed, in our days, by collaborators 
in association (who are sometimes of different nation- 
alities and write in different languages). The great 
manuals (of I. von Midler, of G. Grober, of H. Paul, 
and others) are collections of special treatises each 
written by a specialist. The principle of collabora- 
tion is excellent, but on condition (i) that the col- 
lective work is of a nature to be resolved into great 
independent, though co-ordinated, monographs; (2) 
that the section entrusted to each collaborator has a 
certain extent ; if the number of collaborators is too 
great and the part of each too limited, the liberty 
and the responsibility of each are diminished or 
disappear. 

Histories, intended to give a narrative of events 
which happened but once, and to state the general 
facts which dominate the whole course of special 
evolutions, still have a reason for existence, even 
after the multiplication of methodical manuals. But 
scientific methods of exposition have been introduced 
into them, as into monographs and manuals, and 
that by imitation. The reform has consisted, in 
every case, in the renunciation of literary ornaments 
and of statements without proof. Grote produced 
the first model of a " history " thus defined. At the 
same time certain forms which once had a vogue 
have now fallen into disuse : this is the case with 
the " Universal Histories " with continuous narrative, 
which were so much liked, for different reasons, in 
the Middle Ages and in the eighteenth century ; in 

310 



Exposition 

the present century Schlosser and Weber in Ger- 
many, Cantii in Italy, have produced the last speci- 
mens of them. This type has been abandoned for 
historical reasons, because we have ceased to regard 
humanity as a whole, bound together by a single 
evolution; and for practical reasons, because we 
have recognised the impossibility of collecting so 
overwhelming a mass of facts in a single work. The 
Universal Histories which are still published in col- 
laboration (the Oncken collection is the best type 
of them), are, like the great manuals, composed of 
independent sections, each treated by a different 
author; they are publishers' combinations. His- 
torians have in our days been led to adopt the 
division by states (national histories) and by epochs. 1 
B. There is in theory no reason why historical 
works intended principally for the public should not 
be conceived in the same spirit as works designed 
for students and specialists, nor why they should 
not be composed in the same manner, apart from 
simplifications and omissions which readily suggest 
themselves. And, in fact, there are in existence 
succinct, substantial, and readable summaries, in which 
no statement is advanced which is not tacitly sup- 
ported by solid references, in which the acquisitions 

1 The custom of appending to " histories," that is to narratives 
of political events, summaries of the results obtained by the special 
historians of art, literature, &c, still persists. A "History of 
France " would not be considered complete if it did not contain 
chapters on the history of art, literature, manners, &c, in France. 
However, it is not the summary account of special evolutions, de- 
scribed at second hand from the works of specialists, which is in its 
proper place in a scientific " History " ; it is the study of those 
general facts which have dominated the special evolutions in their 
entirety. 

3" 



Synthetic Opeeations 

of science are precisely stated, judiciously explained, 
their significance and value clearly brought out. The 
French, thanks to their natural gifts of tact, dexterity, 
and accuracy of mind, excel, as a rule, in this depart- 
ment. There have been published in our country 
review-articles and works of higher popularisation 
in which the results of a number of original works 
have been cleverly condensed, in a way that has won 
the admiration of the very -specialists who, by their 
heavy monographs, have rendered these works pos- 
sible. Nothing, however, is more dangerous than 
popularisation. As a matter of fact, most works of 
popularisation do not conform to the modern ideal 
of historical exposition ; we frequently find in them 
survivals of the ancient ideal, that of antiquity, the 
Benaissance, and the romantic school. 

The explanation is easy. The defects of the 
historical works designed for the general public — 
defects which are sometimes enormous, and have, 
with many able minds, discredited popular works 
as a class — are the consequences of the insufficient 
preparation or of the inferior literary education of 
the " popularisers." 

A populariser is excused from original research ; 
but he ought to know everything of importance 
that has been published on his subject, he ought 
to be up to date, and to have thought out for 
himself the conclusions reached by the specialists. 
.If he has not personally made a special study of 
the subject he proposes to treat, he must obviously 
read it up, and the task is long. For the pro- 
fessional populariser there is a strong temptation 
to study superficially a few recent monographs, to 

312 



Exposition 

hastily string together or combine extracts from 
them, and, in order to render this medley more 
attractive, to deck it out, as far as is possible, with 
" general ideas " and external graces. The tempta- 
tion is all the stronger from the circumstance that 
most specialists take no interest in works of popu- 
larisation, that these works are, in general, lucrative, 
and that the public at large is not in a position 
to distinguish clearly between honest and sham 
popularisation. In short, there are some, absurd 
as it may seem, who do not hesitate to summarise 
for others what they have not taken the trouble 
to learn for themselves, and to teach that of 
which they are ignorant. Hence, in most works 
of historical popularisation, there inevitably appear 
blemishes of every kind, which the well-informed 
always note with pleasure, but with a pleasure in 
which there is some touch of bitterness, because 
they alone can see these faults: unacknowledged 
borrowings, inexact references, mutilated names 
and texts, second-hand quotations, worthless hypo- 
theses, imprudent assertions, puerile generalisa- 
tions, and, in the enunciation of the most false 
or the most debatable opinions, an air of tranquil 
anthority. 1 

On the other hand, men whose information is all 
that could be desired, whose monographs intended 

1 It is hard to imagine what it is possible for the most interest- 
ing and best established results of modern criticism to become, in 
the hands of negligent and unskilful popularisers. The persons 
who know most of these possibilities are those who have occasion 
to read the improvised "compositions" of candidates in history 
examinations : the ordinary defects of inferior popularisation are 
here pushed sometimes to an absurd length. 

3 X 3 



Synthetic Operations 

for specialists are full of merit, sometimes show 
themselves capable, when they write for the public, 
of grave offences against scientific method. The 
Germans are habitual offenders: consider Mommsen, 
Droysen, Curtius, and Lamprecht. The reason is 
that these authors, when they address the public, 
wish to produce an effect upon it. Their desire to 
make a strong impression leads them to a certain 
relaxation of scientific rigour, and to the old re- 
jected habits of ancient historiography. These men, 
scrupulous and minute as they are when they are 
engaged in establishing details, abandon themselves, 
in their exposition of general questions, to their 
natural impulses, like the common run of men. 
They take sides, they censure, they extol ; they 
colour, they embellish ; they allow themselves to 
be influenced by personal, patriotic, moral, or meta- 
physical considerations. And, over and above all this, 
they apply themselves, with their several degrees 
of talent, to the task of producing works of art ; in 
this endeavour those who have no talent make 
themselves ridiculous, and the talent of those who 
have any is spoilt by their preoccupation with the 
effect they wish to produce. 

Not, let it be well understood, that " form " is 
of no importance, or that, provided he makes him- 
self intelligible, the historian has a right to employ 
incorrect, vulgar, slovenly, or clumsy language. A 
contempt for rhetoric, for paste diamonds and paper 
flowers, does not exclude a taste for a pure and 
strong, a terse and pregnant style. Fustel de Cou- 
langes was a good writer, although throughout his 
life he recommended and practised the avoidance of 

3H 



Exposition 

metaphor. On the contrary we see no harm in re- 
peating 1 that the historian, considering the extreme 
complexity of the phenomena he undertakes to 
describe, is under an obligation not to write badly. 
But he should write consistently well, and never 
bedeck himself with finery. 

1 Cf. supra, p. 266. 



31s 



CONCLUSION 

I. History is only the utilisation of documents. 
But it is a matter of chance whether documents 
are preserved or lost. Hence the predominant part 
played by chance in the formation of history. 

The quantity of documents in existence, if not of 
known documents, is given ; time, in spite of all the 
precautions which are taken nowadays, is continually 
diminishing it ; it will never increase. History has 
at its disposal a limited stock of documents ; this 
very circumstance limits the possible progress of 
historical science. When all the documents are 
known, and have gone through the operations which 
fit them for use, the work of critical scholarship will 
be finished. In the case of some ancient periods, 
for which documents are rare, we can now see that 
in a generation or two it will be time to stop. His- 
torians will then be obliged to take refuge more and 
more in modern periods. Thus history will not 
foil the dream which, in the nineteenth century, 
inspired the romantic school with so much enthu- 
siasm for the study of history : it will not penetrate 
the mystery of the origin of societies ; and, for want 
of documents, the beginnings of the evolution of 
humanity will always remain obscure. 

The historian does not collect by his own obser- 
316 



Conclusion 

vation the materials necessary for history as is done 
in the other sciences : he works on facts the know- 
ledge of which has been transmitted by former 
observers. In history knowledge is not obtained, 
as in the other sciences, by direct methods, it is 
indirect. History is not, as has been said, a science 
of observation, but a science of reasoning. 

In order to use facts which have been observed 
under unknown conditions, it is necessary go apply 
criticism to them, and criticism consists in a series 
of reasonings by analogy. The facts as furnished 
by criticism are isolated and scattered ; in order 
to organise them into a structure it is necessary to 
imagine and group them in accordance with their 
resemblances to facts of the present day, an opera- 
tion which also depends on the use of analogies. 
This necessity compels history to use an exceptional 
method. In order to frame its arguments from 
analogy, it must always combine the knowledge of 
the particular conditions under which the facts of 
the past occurred with an understanding of the 
general conditions under which the facts of humanity 
occur. Its method is to draw up special tables of 
the facts of an epoch in the past, and to apply to 
them sets of questions founded on the study of the 
present. 

The operations which must necessarily be per- 
formed in order to pass from the inspection of docu- 
ments to the knowledge of the facts and evolutions 
of the past are very numerous. Hence the necessity 
of the division and organisation of labour in history. 
It is requisite, on the one hand, that those specialists 
who occupy themselves with the search for docu- 

3 J 7 



Conclusion 

ments, their restoration and preliminary classification, 
should co-ordinate their efforts, in order that the 
preparatory work of critical scholarship may be 
finished as soon as possible, under the best conditions 
as to accuracy and economy of labour. On the other 
hand, authors of partial syntheses (monographs) de- 
signed to serve as materials for more comprehensive 
syntheses ought to agree among themselves to work 
on a common method, in order that the results of 
each may be used by the others without preliminary 
investigations. Lastly, workers of experience should 
be found to renounce personal research and devote 
their whole time to the study of these partial syn- 
theses, in order to combine them scientifically in 
comprehensive works of historical construction. And 
if the result of these labours were to bring out clear 
and certain conclusions as to the nature and the 
causes of social evolution, a truly scientific "philo- 
sophy of history " would have been created, which 
historians might acknowledge as legitimately crowning 
historical science. 

Conceivably a day may come when, thanks to the 
organisation of labour, all existing documents will 
have been discovered, emended, arranged, and all the 
facts established of which the traces have not been 
destroyed. When that day comes, history will be 
established, but it will not be- fixed : it will continue 
to be gradually modified in proportion as the direct 
study of existing societies becomes more scientific 
and permits a better understanding of social pheno- 
mena and their evolution ; for the new ideas which 
will doubtless be acquired on the nature, the causes, 
and the relative importance of social facts will con- 

318 



Conclusion 

tinue to transform the ideas which will be formed of 
the societies and events of the past. 1 

II. It is an obsolete illusion to suppose that 
history supplies information of practical utility in 
the conduct of life (Historia magistra vitce), lessons 
directly profitable to individuals and peoples; the 
conditions under which human actions are per- 
formed are rarely sufficiently similar at- two different 
moments for the " lessons of history " to be directly 
applicable. But it is an error to say, by way of 
reaction, that " the distinguishing feature of history is 
to be good for nothing." 2 It has an indirect utility. 

History enables us to understand the present in 
so far as it explains the origin of the existing state 
of things. Here we must admit that history does 
not offer an equal interest through the whole extent 
of time which it covers ; there are remote genera- 

1 We have spoken above of the element of subjectivity which it 
is impossible to eliminate from historical construction, and which 
has been misinterpreted to the extent of denying history the 
character of a science : this element of subjectivity which troubled 
Pe"cuchet (G. Flaubert, Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 157) and Sylvestre 
Bonnard (A. France, Le crime de Silvestre Bonnard, p. 310), and 
which causes Faust to say : 

" Die Zeiten der Vergangenheit 
Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln. 
Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst, 
Das ist im Grand der Herren eigner Geist, 
In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln." 

["Past times are to us a book with seven seals. What you call the 
spirit of the times is at bottom your own spirit, in which the times 
are mirrored."— Goethe, Faust, i. 3.] 

2 A saying attributed to a "Sorbonne professor" by M. de la 
Blanchere {Revue Critique, 1895, i. p. 176). Others have declaimed 
on the theme that the knowledge of history is mischievous and 
paralyses. See F. Nietzsche, Unzcitgemasse Betrachtungen, II. Nut- 
zen und Nachtkeil der Historiefilr das Leben, Leipzig, 1874, 8vo. 

319 



Conclusion 

tions whose traces are no longer visible in the world 
as it now is; for the purpose of explaining the 
political constitution of contemporary England, for 
example, the study of the Anglo-Saxon witangemot 
is without value, that of the events of the eigh- 
teenth and nineteenth centuries is all-important. 
The evolution of the civilised societies has within 
the last hundred years been accelerated to such a 
degree that, for the understanding of their present 
form, the history of these hundred years is more 
important than that of the ten preceding centuries. 
As an explanation of the present, history would 
almost reduce to the study of the contemporary 
period. 

History is also indispensable for the completion 
of the political and social sciences, which are still in 
process of formation ; for the direct observation of 
social phenomena (in a state of rest) is not a suffi- 
cient foundation for these sciences — there must be 
added a study of the development of these pheno- 
mena in time, that is, their history. 1 This is why 
all the sciences which deal with man (linguistic, law, 
science of religions, political economy, and so on) 
have in this century assumed the form of historical 
sciences. 

But the chief merit of history is that of being an 
instrument of intellectual culture ; it is so in several 

1 History and the social sciences are mutually dependent on each 
other ; they progress in parallel lines by a continual interchange of 
services. The social sciences furnish a knowledge of the present, 
required by history for the purpose of making representations of 
the facts and reasoning from documents. History gives the infor- 
mation about evolutions which is necessary in order to understand 
the present. 

320 



Conclusion 

ways. Firstly, the practice of the historical method 
of investigation, of which the principles have been 
sketched in the present volume, is very hygienic for 
the mind, which it cures of credulity. Secondly, 
history, by exhibiting to us a great number of differ- 
ing societies, prepares us to understand and tolerate 
a variety of usages ; by showing us that societies 
have often been transformed, it familiarises us with 
variation in social forms, and cures us of a morbid 
dread of change. Lastly, the contemplation of past 
evolutions, which enables us to understand how the 
transformations of humanity are brought about by 
changes of habits and the renewal of generations, 
saves us from the temptation of applying biological 
analogies (selection, struggle for existence, inherited 
habits, and so on) to the explanation of social evolu- 
tion, which is not produced by the operation of the 
same causes as animal evolution. 



321 



APPENDICES 



APPENDIX I 

THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY 
IN FRANCE 

I. The teaching of history is a recent addition to secondary 
education. Formerly history was taught to the sons of 
kings and great persons, in order to give them a preparation 
in the art of governing, according to the ancient tradition, 
but it was a sacred science reserved for the future rulers 
of states, a science for princes, not for subjects. The 
secondary schools which have been organised since the 
sixteenth century, ecclesiastical or secular, Catholic or Pro- 
testant, did not admit history into their plan of study, 
or only admitted it as an appendage to the study of the 
ancient languages. This was the tradition of the Jesuits in 
France ; it was adopted by the University of Napoleon. 

History was only introduced into secondary education in 
the nineteenth century, under the pressure of public opinion ; 
and although it has been allotted more space in France than 
in England, or even in Germany, it has continued to be a 
subsidiary subject, not taught in a special class (as philosophy 
is), nor always by a special professor, and counting for very 
little in examinations. 

Historical instruction has for a long time felt the effects 
of the maimer in which it was introduced. The subject 
was imposed by the authorities on teachers trained exclu- 
sively in the study of literature, and could find no suitable 
place in a system of classical education based on the study 
of forms, and indifferent to the knowledge of social pheno- 

325 



Appendix I 

mena. History was taught because it was prescribed by the 
programme; but this programme, the sole motive aud guide 
of the instruction, was always an accident, and varied with 
the preferences, or even the personal studies of those who 
framed it. History formed part of the social conventions ; 
there are, it was said, names and facts " of which it is not 
permissible to be ignorant " ; but the things of which ignor- 
ance was not permitted varied greatly, from the names of 
the Merovingian kings and the battles of the Seven Years' 
War to the Salic Law and the work of Saint Vincent de Paul. 
The improvised staffs which, in order to carry out the 
programme, had to furnish impromptu instruction in history, 
had no clear idea either of the reasons for such instruction, 
or of its place in general education, or of the technical 
methods necessary for giving it. With this lack of tradi- 
tion, of pedagogic preparation, and even of mechanical aids, 
the professor of history found himself carried back to the 
ages before printing, when the teacher had to supply the 
pupil with all the facts which formed the subject-matter of 
instruction, and he adopted the mediaeval procedure. Armed 
with a note-book in which he had written down the list of 
facts to be taught, he read it out to the pupils, sometimes 
making a pretence of extemporising; this was the "lesson," 
the corner-stone of historical instruction. The whole series 
of lessons, determined by the programme, formed the 
"course." The pupil was expected to write as he listened 
(this was called " taking notes ") and to compose a written 
account of what he had heard (this was the redaction). 
But as the pupils were not taught how to take notes, nearly 
all of them were content to write very rapidly, from the 
professor's dictation, a rough draft, which they copied out 
at home in the form of a redaction, without any endeavour 
to grasp the meaning either of what they heard or what 
they transcribed. To this mechanical labour the most 
zealous added extracts copied from books, generally with 
just as little reflection. 

326 



Appendix I 

In order to get the facts judged essential into the pupils' 
heads, the professor used to make a very short version of 
the lesson, the "summary" or "abstract," which he dictated 
openly, and caused to be learnt by heart. Thus of the two 
written exercises which occupied nearly the whole time of 
the class, one (the summary) was an overt dictation, the 
other (the redaction) an unavowed dictation. 

The only means adopted to check the pupils' work was to 
make them repeat the summary word for word, and to ques- 
tion them on the redaction, that is to make them repeat 
approximately the words of the professor. Of the two 
oral exercises one was an overt, the other an unavowed 
repetition. 

It is true the pupil was given a book, the Precis d'histoire, 1 
but this book had the same form as the professor's course, 
and instead of serving as a basis for the oral instruction, 
merely duplicated it, and, as a rule, duplicated it badly, for 
it was not' intelligible to the pupil. The authors of these 
text-books, 2 adopting the traditional methods of "abridg- 
ments," endeavoured to accumulate the greatest possible 
number of facts by omitting all their characteristic details 
and summarising them in the most general, and therefore 
vague, expressions. In the elementary books nothing was 
left but a residue of proper names and dates connected by 
formulae of a uniform type ; history appeared as a series of 
wars, treaties, reforms, revolutions, which only differed in 
the names of peoples, sovereigns, fields of battle, and in 
the figures giving the years. 3 

Such, down to the end of the Second Empire, was histori- 

1 The same institution has been adopted in German-speaking coun- 
tries under the name of Leitfaden (guiding-thread), and in English- 
speaking countries under the name of Text-book. 

2 We must make an exception of Michelet's Pr4cis de Vhistoire 
modcrne, and do Duruy the justice to acknowledge that in his school- 
books, even in the first editions, he has endeavoured, often successfully, 
to make his narratives both interesting and instructive. 

3 For a criticism of this method, see above, p. 265. 

327 



Appendix I 

cal instruction in all French institutions, both secular and 
ecclesiastical — with a few exceptions, whose merit is measured 
by their rarity, for in those days a professor of history 
needed a more than common share of energy and initiative 
to rise above the routine of redaction and summary. 

IT. In recent times the general movement of educational 
reform, which began in the Department and the Faculties, 
has at last extended to secondary instruction. The professors 
of history have been emancipated from the jealous super- 
vision which weighed on their teaching under the govern- 
ment of the Empire, and have taken the opportunity to 
make trial of new methods. A system of historical peda- 
gogy has been devised. It has been revealed with the 
approbation of the Department in the discussions of the 
society for the study of questions of secondary education, in 
the Revue de Venseignement secondaire, and in the Revue 
universitaire. It has received official sanction in the Instruc- 
tions appended to the programme of 1890; the report on 
history, the work of M. Lavisse, has become the charter 
which protects the professors who favour reform in their 
struggle against tradition. 1 

Historical instruction will no doubt issue from this crisis 
of renovation organised and provided with a rational peda- 
gogic and technical system, such as is possessed by the older 
branches of instruction in languages, literature, and philo- 
sophy. But it is only to be expected that the reform should 
be much slower than in the case of the higher instruction. 
The personnel is much more numerous, and takes longer to 
train or to renew; the pupils are less zealous and less in- 
telligent ; the routine of the parents opposes to the new 
methods a force of inertia which is unknown to the Faculties; 
and the Baccalaureate, that general obstacle to all reform, is 

1 The most complete, and probably the most accurate, account of 
the state of the secondary teaching of history after the reforms has- 
been given by a Spaniard, It. Altaniira, La IvuseTianza de la historia, 
2nd edition, Madrid, 1895, 8vo. 

328 



Appendix I 

particularly mischievous in its effect on historical instruction, 
which it reduces to a set of questions and answers. 

III. It is now possible, however, to indicate what is the 
direction in which historical instruction is likely to develop 
in France- 1 and the questions which will need to be solved 
for the purpose of introducing a rational technical system. 
Here we shall endeavour to formulate these questions in a 
methodical table. 

(i) General Organisation. — What object should historical 
instruction aim at? What services can it render to the 
culture of the pupil 1 What influence can it have upon his 
conduct ? What facts ought it to enable him to understand ? 
And, consequently, what principles ought to guide the 
choice of subjects and methods ? Ought the instruction to 
be spread over the whole duration of the classes, or should 
it be concentrated in a special class ? Should it be given in 
one-hour or two-hour classes ? Should history be distributed 
into several cycles, as in Germany, so as to cause the pupil 
to return several times to the same subject at different 
periods of his studies? Or should it be expounded in a 
single continuous course, beginning with the commencement 
of study, as in France ? Should the professor give a com- 
plete course, or should he select a few questions and leave 
the pupil to study the others by himself ? Should he ex- 
pound the facts orally, or should he require the pupils to 
learn them in the first instance from a book, so as to make 
the course a series of explanations ? 

(2) Choice of Subjects. — What proportion should be ob- 
served between home and foreign history ? between ancient 
and contemporary history? between the special branches of 
history (art, religion, customs, economics) and general his- 

1 We are here treating only of France. But, in order to dispel an 
illusion of the French public, we may remark that historical pedagogy 
is still less advanced in English-speaking countries, where the methods 
used are still mechanical, and even in German-speaking countries, 
where it is hampered by the conception of patriotic teaching. 

329 



Appendix I 

tory? between institutions or usages, and events 1 between 
the evolution of material usages, intellectual history, social 
life, political life ? between the study of particular incidents, 
of biography, of dramatic episodes, and the study of the 
interconnection of events and general evolutions? What 
place should be assigned to proper names and dates ? Should 
we profit by the opportunities afforded by legends to arouse 
the critical spirit ? or should we avoid legends ? 

(3) Order. — In what order should the subjects be at- 
tacked 1 Should instruction begin with the most ancient 
periods and the countries with the most ancient civilisa- 
tions in order to follow chronological order and the order 
of evolution? or should it begin with the periods and the 
countries which are nearest to us so as to proceed from the 
better known to the less known ? In the exposition of each 
period, should the chronological, geographical, or logical 
order be followed ? Should the teacher begin by describing 
conditions or by narrating events? 

(4) Methods of Instruction. — Should the pupil be given 
general formulae first or particular images ? Should the 
professor state the formulae himself or require the pupil to 
search for them ? Should formulae be learnt by heart ? In 
what cases ? How are images of historical facts to be pro- 
duced in the pupils' minds ? What use is to be made of 
engravings ? of reproductions and restorations ? of imaginary 
scenes ? What use is to be made of narratives and descrip- 
tions? of authors' texts? of historical novels? To what 
extent ought words and formulae to be quoted? How are facts 
to be localised ? What use is to be made of chronological 
tables? of synchronical tables? of geographical sketches? 
of statistical and graphic tables ? What is the way to make 
comprehensible the character of events and customs? the 
motives of actions? the conditions of customs? How are 
the episodes of an event to be chosen? and the examples 
of a custom ? How is the interconnection of facts and the 
process of evolution to be made intelligible ? What use is to 

330 



Appendix I 

be made of comparison ? What style of language is to be 
employed? To what extent should concrete, abstract, and 
technical terms be used ? How is it to be verified that the 
pupil has understood the terms and assimilated the facts? 
Can exercises be organised in which the pupil may do 
original work on the facts? What instruments of study 
should the pupil have ? How should school-books be com- 
piled, with a view to giving the pupil practice in original 
work ? 

For the purpose of stating and justifying the solutions of 
all these problems, a special treatise would not be too much. x 
Here we shall merely indicate the general principles on 
which a tolerable agreement seems to have been now reached 
in France. 

We no longer go to history for lessons in morals, nor for 
good examples of conduct, nor yet for dramatic or picturesque 
scenes. We understand that for all these purposes legend 
would be preferable to history, for it presents a chain of 
causes and effects more in accordance with our ideas of 
justice, more perfect and heroic characters, finer and more 
affecting scenes. 'Nov do we seek to use history, as is done 
in Germany, for the purpose of promoting patriotism and 
loyalty; we feel that it would be illogical for different per- 
sons to draw opposite conclusions from the same science 
according to their country or party ; it would be an invitation 
to every people to mutilate, if not to alter, history in the 
direction of its preferences. We understand that the value 
of every science consists in its being true, and we ask from 
history truth and nothing more. 2 

1 I have endeavoured, in a course of lectures at the Sorbonne, to do 
a part of this work. — [Ch. S.] 

2 Let it be noted, however, that to the question put to the candidates 
for the modern Baccalaureate in July 1897, " What purpose is served 
by the teaching of history ? " eighty per cent, of the candidates 
answered, in effect, either because they believed it, or because they 
thought it would please, "To promote patriotism."— [0. V. L.] 

33* 



Appendix I 

The function of history in education is perhaps not yet 
clearly apparent to all those who teach it. But all those 
who reflect are agreed to regard it as being principally an 
instrument of social culture. The study of the societies 
of the past causes the pupil to understand, by the help of 
actual instances, what a society is ; it familiarises him with 
the principal social phenomena and the different species of 
usages, their variety and their resemblances. The study of 
events and evolutions familiarises him with the idea of the 
continual transformation which human affairs undergo, it 
secures him against an unreasoning dread of social changes ; 
it rectifies his notion of progress. All these acquisitions 
render the pupil fitter for public life ; history thus appears 
as an indispensable branch of instruction in a democratic 
society. 

The guiding principle of historical pedagogy will therefore 
be to seek for those subjects and those methods which are 
best calculated to exhibit social phenomena and give an 
understanding of their evolution. Before admitting a fact 
into the plan of instruction, it should be asked first of all 
what educational influence it can exercise ; secondly, whether 
there are adequate means of bringing the pupil to see and 
understand it. Every fact should be discarded which is 
instructive only in a low degree, or which is too complicated 
to be understood, or in regard to which we do not possess 
details enough to make it intelligible. 

IY. To make rational instruction a reality it is not enough 
to develop a theory of historical pedagogy. It is necessary 
to renew the material aids and the methods. 

History necessarily involves the knowledge of a great 
number of facts. The professor of history, with no resources 
but his voice, a blackboard, and abridgments which are 
little better than chronological tables, is in much the same 
situation as a professor of Latin without texts or dictionary. 
The pupil in history needs a repertory of historical facts 
as the Latin pupil needs a repertory of Latin words; he 

332 



Appendix I 

needs collections of facts, and the school text-books are 
mostly collections of words. 

There are two vehicles of facts, engravings and books. 
Engravings exhibit material objects and external aspects, 
they are useful principally for the study of material civilisa- 
tion. It is some time since the attempt was first made in 
Germany to put in the hands of the pupil a collection of 
engravings arranged for the purposes of historical instruc- 
tion. The same need has, in France, produced the Album 
historique, which is published under the direction of M. 
Lavisse. 

The book is the chief instrument. It ought to contain 
all the characteristic features necessary for forming mental 
representations of the events, the motives, the habits, the 
institutions studied ; it will consist principally in narratives 
and descriptions, to which characteristic sayings and formulae 
may be appended. For a long time it was endeavoured to 
construct those books out of extracts selected from ancient 
authors; they were compiled in the form of collections of 
texts. 1 Experience seems to indicate that this method must 
be abandoned ; it has a scientific appearance, it is true, but 
is not intelligible to children. It is better to address pupils 
in contemporary language. It is in this spirit that, pur- 
suant to the Instructions of 1890, 2 collections of Historical 
Headings have been compiled, of which the most important 
has been published by the firm of Hachette. 

The pupils' methods of work still bear witness to the late 
introduction of historical teaching. In most historical classes 
methods still prevail which only Exercise the pupils' recep- 
tivity : the course of lectures, the summary, reading, ques- 
tioning, the redaction, the reproduction of maps. It is as 

1 This is what has been produced in Germany under the name of 
Quellenbuch. 

2 The same pedagogic theory will be found in the preface to my 
Histoire narrative et descriptive des anciens peuples de I 'Orient, Supple- 
ment for the use of professors, Paris, 1890, 8vo. — [Ch. S.] 

333 



Appendix I 

if a Latin pupil were to confine himself to repeating gram- 
mar-lessons and extracts from authors, without ever doing 
translation or composition. 

In order that the teaching may make an adequate im- 
pression, it is necessary, if not to discard all these passive 
methods, at least to supplement them "by exercises which 
call out the activity of the pupil. Some such exercises 
have already been experimented with, and others might 
be devised. 1 The pupil may be set to analyse engravings, 
narratives, and descriptions in such a way as to bring out 
the character of the facts : the short written or oral analysis 
will guarantee that he has seen and understood, it will be 
an opportunity to inculcate the habit of using only precise 
terms. Or the pupil may be asked to furnish a drawing, 
a geographical sketch, a synchronical table. He may be 
required to draw up tables of comparison between different 
societies, and tables showing the interconnection of facts. 

A book is needed to supply the pupil with the materials 
for these exercises. Thus the reform of methods is connected 
with the reform of the instruments of work. Both reforms 
will progress according as the professors and the public 
perceive more clearly the part played by historical instruction 
in social education. 

1 I have treated this question in the Revue universitairc, 1896, vol. i. 
— [Ch. S.] 



33+ 



APPENDIX II 

THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY 
IN FRANCE 

The higher teaching of history has been in a great measure 
transformed, in our country, within the last thirty years. 
The process has been gradual, as it ought to have been, and 
has consisted in a succession of slight modifications. But 
although a rational continuity has been observed in the steps 
taken, the great number of these steps has not failed, in 
these last days, to astonish, and even to offend, the public. 
Public opinion, to -which appeal has been made in favour 
of reforms, has been somewhat surprised by being appealed 
to so often, and perhaps it is not superfluous to indicate here, 
once more, the general significance and the inner logic of the 
movement which we are witnessing. 

I. Before the last years of the Second Empire, the higher 
teaching of the historical sciences was organised in France 
on no coherent system. 1 

There were chairs of history in different institutions, of 
different types : at the College de France, in the Faculties 
of Letters, and in the "special schools," such as the Ecole 
normale supeneure and the ffcole des chartes. 

The College de France was a relic of the institutions of 
the ancien regime. It was founded in the sixteenth century 

1 On the organisation of higher education in France at this epoch 
and on the first reforms, see the excellent work of M. L. Liard. 
V Enseignement supdrieur en France, Paris, 1888-94, 2 vols. 8vo. 

335 



Appendix II 

in opposition to the scholastic Sorbonne, to be a refuge for 
the new sciences, and had the glorious privilege of represent- 
ing historically the higher speculative studies, the spirit of 
free inquiry, and the interests of pure science. Unfortu- 
nately, in the domain of the historical sciences, the College 
de France had allowed its traditions to be obliterated up to 
a certain point. The great men who taught history in this 
illustrious institution (J. Michelet, for example), were not 
technical experts, nor even men of learning, in the proper 
sense of the word. The audiences which they swayed by 
their eloquence were not composed of students of history. 

The Faculties of Letters formed part of a system estab- 
lished by the Napoleonic legislator. This legislator, in 
creating the Faculties, by no means entertained the design 
of encouraging scientific research. He had no great love for 
science. The Faculties of Law, of Medicine, and so on, were 
intended by him to be professional schools supplying society 
with the lawyers, physicians, and so on, which it needs. 
But three of the five Faculties were unable, from the be- 
ginning, to perform the part allotted them, while the other 
two, Law and Medicine, successfully performed theirs. The 
Faculties of Catholic Theology did not train the priests 
needed by society, because the State consented to the edu- 
cation of the priests being conducted in the diocesan semi- 
naries. The Faculties of Sciences and of Letters did not 
train the professors for secondary education, the engineers, 
and so on, needed by society, because they were here met 
by the triumphant competition of "special schools" previ- 
ously instituted : the Ecole normale, the Ecole polytechnique. 
The Faculties of Catholic Theology, of Sciences, and of 
Letters were therefore obliged to justify their existence by 
other modes of activity. In particular, the professors of 
history in the Faculties of Letters could not undertake the 
instruction of the young men who were destined to teach 
history in the lycees. Deprived of these special pupils, they 
found themselves in a situation analogous to that of those 

336 



Appendix II 

charged with historical instruction at the College de France. 
They too were not, as a rule, technical experts. For half a 
century they carried on the work of higher popularisation 
in lectures delivered to large audiences of leisured persons 
(since much abused), who were attracted by the force, the 
elegance, and the pleasing style of their diction. 

The function of training the future teachers for secondary 
education was reserved for the Ecole normale sup^rieure. 
Now at this epoch it was an admitted principle that to be 
a good secondary teacher it is necessary for a man to know, 
and sufficient to know perfectly, the subject he is charged 
to teach. The one is certainly necessary, but the other- is 
not sufficient : knowledge of a different, of a higher, order 
is no less indispensable than the regular " scholastic " equip- 
ment. At the icole there was never any question of such 
higher knowledge, but, in accordance with the prevailing 
theory, preparation was made for secondary teaching simply 
by imparting it. However, as the Ecole normale has always 
been excellently recruited, the system in vogue has not pre- 
vented it from numbering among its former pupils men of 
the first order, not only as professors, thinkers, or writers, 
but even as critical scholars. But it must be recognised 
that they made their way for themselves, in spite of the 
system, not thanks to it, after, not during, their pupilage, 
and principally when they had the advantage, during a stay 
at the French School at Athens, of the wholesome contact 
with documents which they had not enjoyed at the Rue 
d'Ulm. " Does it not seem strange," it has been said, " that 
so many generations of professors should have been turned 
out by the £cole normale incapable of utilising documents ? 
. '. . Formerly, in short, students of history, on leaving the 
Ecole, were not prepared either to teach history, which they 
had learned in a great hurry, or to investigate difficult 
questions." 1 

As for the Ecole des chartes, which was founded under 
1 E. Lavisae, Questions d'enseignement national, p. 12. 

337 y 



Appendix II 

the Restoration, it was, from a certain point of view, a 
special school like the others, designed in theory to train 
those useful functionaries, archivists and librarians. But 
professional instruction was early reduced to a strict mini- 
mum, and the Ecole des chartes was organised on a very 
original plan, with a view to provide a rational and complete 
apprenticeship for the young men who proposed to study 
mediaeval French history. The pupils of the Ecole des 
chartes did not follow any course of "mediaeval history," 
but they learnt all that is necessary for doing work on the 
solution of the still open questions of mediseval history. 
Here alone, in virtue of an accidental anomaly, the subjects 
which are preliminary and auxiliary to historical research 
were systematically taught. We have already had occasion 
to note the effects of this circumstance. l 

This was the state of affairs when, towards the end of the 
Second Empire, a vigorous reform movement set in. Some 
young Frenchmen had visited Germany ; they had been struck 
by the superiority of the German university system over the 
Napoleonic system of Faculties and special schools. Cer- 
tainly France, with its defective organisation, had produced 
many men and many works, but it now began to be held 
that "in all kinds of enterprises the least possible part 
should be left to chance," and that " when an institution 
proposes to train professors of history and historians, it 
ought to supply them with the means of becoming what 
it intends them to be." 

M. V. Duruy, minister of Public Education, supported 
the partisans of a renaissance of the higher studies. But he 
did not think it practicable to interfere, for the purpose either 
of remodelling, of fusing, or of suppressing them, with the 
existing institutions, — the College de France, the Faculties 
of Letters, the Ecole normale superieure, the Ecole des 
chartes, all of which were consecrated by the services they 
had rendered, and by the lustre they received from the 

1 Cf. supra, p. 55. 

338 



Appendix II 

eminent men who had been, or were, connected with them. 
He changed nothing, he added. He crowned the somewhat 
heterogeneous edifice of existing institutions by the creation 
of an "Ecole pratique des hautes etudes," which was estab- 
lished at the Sorbonne in 1868. 

The Ecole pratique des hautes etudes (historical and 
philological section) was intended by those who founded it 
to prepare young men for research of a scientific character. 
It was not meant to be subservient to the interests of the 
professions, and there was to be no popularisation. Students 
were not to go there to learn the results obtained by science, 
but, for the same purpose which takes the chemical student 
to the laboratory, to be initiated into the technical methods 
by which new results can be obtained. Thus the spirit of 
the new institution was not without some analogy to that 
of the primitive tradition of the College de France. It was 
endeavoured to do there, for all the branches of universal 
history and philology, what had long been done at the 
Ecole des chartes for the limited domain of French mediaeval 
history. 

II. As long as the Faculties of Letters were satisfied to 
be as they were (that is, without students), and as long as 
their ambition did not go beyond their traditional functions 
(the holding of public lectures, the conferring of degrees), 
the organisation of the higher teaching of the historical 
sciences in France remained in the condition which we have 
described. When the Faculties of Letters began to seek 
a new justification for their existence and new functions, 
changes became inevitable. 

This is not the place to explain why and how the 
Faculties of Letters were led to desire to work more 
actively, or rather in other ways than in the past, for the 
promotion of the historical sciences. M. V. Duruy, in 
inaugurating the Ecole des hautes etudes at the Sorbonne, 
had declared that this young and vigorous plant would 
thrust asunder the old stones ; and, without a doubt, the 

339 



Appendix II 

spectacle of the fruitful activity of the Ecole des hautes 
etudes has contributed not a little to awaken the conscience 
of the Faculties. On the other hand the liberality of the 
public authorities, which have increased the personnel of the 
Faculties, which have built palaces for them, and liberally 
endowed them with the materials required by their work, 
has imposed new duties on these privileged institutions. 

It is about twenty-five years since the Faculties of Letters 
began to transform themselves, and during this period their 
progressive transformation has occasioned changes in the 
whole fabric of the higher teaching of historical science in 
France, which up to that time had remained unshaken, even 
by the ingenious addition of 1868. 

III. The first care of the Faculties was to provide them- 
selves with students. This was not, to be sure, the main 
difficulty, for the Ecole normale superieure (in which twenty 
pupils are admitted every year, chosen from among hundreds 
of candidates) was no longer sufficient for the recruiting of 
the now numerous body of professors engaged in secondary 
education. Many young men who had been candidates 
(along with the pupils of the Ecole normale superieure) 
for the degrees which give access to the scholastic profes- 
sion, were thrown on their own resources. Here was an 
assured supply of students. At the same time the military 
laws, by attaching much-prized immunities to the title of 
licencie es lettres, were calculated to attract to the Faculties, 
if they prepared students for the licentiate, a large and very 
interesting clas° of young men. Lastly, the foreigners (so 
numerous at the Ecole des hautes etudes), who come to 
France to complete their scientific education, and who up 
to that time were surprised to have no opportunity of pro- 
fiting by the Faculties, were sure to go to them as soon as 
they found there something analogous to what they had 
been accustomed to find in the German universities, and the 
kind of instruction they wanted. 

Before students in any great number could be taught the 

340 



Appendix II 

way to the Faculties, great efforts were necessary and several 
years passed ; but it was after the Faculties obtained the 
students they desired that the real problems presented 
themselves for solution. 

The great majority of the students in the Faculties of 
Letters have been originally candidates for degrees, for 
the licentiate, and for agregation, who entered with the 
avowed intention of "preparing" for the licentiate and 
for agregation. The Faculties have not been able to 
escape the obligation of helping them in this " preparation." 
But, twenty years ago, examinations were still conceived in 
accordance with ancient formulae. The licentiate was an 
attestation of advanced secondary study, a kind of " higher 
baccalaureate " ; for the agregation in the classes of history 
and geography (which became the real Ucsntia docendi), the 
candidates were required to show that they " had a very good 
knowledge of the subjects they would be charged to teach." 
Henceforth there was a danger lest the teaching of the 
Faculties, which must, like that of the Ecole normale 
superieure, be preparatory for the examinations for the 
licentiate and for agregation, should be compelled by the 
force of circumstances to assume the same character. Note 
that a certain emulation could not fail to arise between the 
pupils of the icole normale and those of the Faculties in the 
competitions for agregation. The agregation programmes 
being what they were, this emulation seemed likely to have 
the result of engaging the rival teachers and students more 
and more in school work, not of a scientific kind, equally 
devoid of dignity and real utility. 

The danger was very serious. It was perceived from 
the first by those clear-sighted promoters of the reform of 
the Faculties, MM. A. Dumont, L. Liard, E. Lavisse. M. 
Lavisse wrote in 1884: "To maintain that the Faculties 
have for their chief object the preparation for examinations 
is to substitute drill for scientific culture : this is the serious 
grievance which able men have against the partisans of 

341 



Appendix II 

innovation. . . . The partisans of innovation reply that they 
have seen the drawbacks of the new departure from the 
beginning, but that they are convinced that a modification 
of the examination-system will follow the reform of higher 
education ; that a reconciliation will be found between 
scientific work and the preparation for examinations; and 
that thus the only grievance their opponents have against 
them will fall to the ground." It is only doing justice to 
the foremost champion of reform to acknowledge that he 
was never tired of insisting on the weak point; and in order 
to convince oneself that the examination question has always 
been considered the key-stone of the problem of the organisa- 
tion of higher education in France, it is only necessary to 
look through the speeches and the articles entitled " Educa- 
tion and Examinations," " Examinations and Study," " Study 
and Examinations," &c, which M. Lavisse has collected in 
his three volumes published at intervals of five years from 
1885 onwards: Questions tVenseignement national, Etudes et 
etudiants, A propos de nos ecoles. 

Thus the question of the reform of the examinations 
connected with higher education (licentiate, agregation, 
doctorate) has been placed on the order of the day. It was 
there in 1884; it is still there in 1897. But, during the in- 
terval, visible progress has been made in the direction which 
we consider the right one, and now a solution seems near. 

IV. The old examination-system required candidates for 
degrees to show that they had received an excellent secondary 
education. As it condemned those candidates, students 
receiving higher instruction, to exercises of the same kind 
as those of which they had already had their fill in the 
lycees, it was a simple matter to attack it. It was defended 
feebly, and has been demolished. 

But how was it to be replaced ? The problem was very 
complex. Is it any wonder that it was not solved at a 
stroke 1 

First of all, it was important to come to an agreement on 
342 



Appendix II 

this preliminary question : What are the capacities and what 
is the knowledge students should be required to give proof 
of possessing 1 General knowledge 1 Technical knowledge 
and the capacity of doing original research (as at the Ecole 
des chartes and the Ecole des hautes etudes) 1 Pedagogic 
capacity? It came gradually to be recognised that, con- 
sidering the great extent and variety of the class from 
which the students are drawn, it is necessary to draw 
distinctions. 

From candidates for the licentiate it is enough to require 
that they should give proof of good general culture, per- 
mitting them at the same time, if they wish, to show that 
they have a taste for, and some experience in, original 
research. 

From the candidates for aggregation (licenlia doceuoli) who 
have already obtained the licentiate, there will be required 
(i) formal proof that they know, by experience, what it is 
to study an historical problem, and that they have the 
technical knowledge necessary for such studies; (2) proof 
of pedagogic capacity, which is a professional necessity for 
this class. 

The students who are not candidates for anything, neither 
for the licentiate nor for agregation, and who are simply 
seeking to obtain scientific initiation — the old programmes 
did not contemplate the existence of such a class of students 
— will merely be required to prove that they have profited 
by the tuition and the advice they have received. 

This settled, a great stride has been made. For programmes, 
as we know, regulate study. By virtue of the authority of 
the programmes historical studies in the Faculties will now 
have the threefold character which it is desirable that they 
should have. General culture will not cease to be held in 
honour. Technical exercises in criticism and research will 
have their legitimate place. Lastly, pedagogy (theoretical 
and practical) will not be neglected. 

The difficulties begin when it is attempted to determine 

343 



Appendix II 

the tests which, in each department, are the "best, that 
is, the most conclusive. On this subject opinions differ. 
Though no one now contests the principles, the modes of 
application which have hitherto been tried or suggested do 
not meet with unanimous approval. The organisation of 
the licentiate has been revised three times; the statute 
relating to the agregation in history has been reformed or 
amended five times. And this is not the end. New sim- 
plifications are imperative. But what is the importance of 
this instability — of which, however, complaints begin to be 
heard l — if it is established, as we believe it is, that progress 
towards a better state of things has been continuous through 
all these changes, without any notable retrogression 1 

There is no need to explain here in detail the different 
transitory systems which have been put into practice. We 
have had occasion to criticise them elsewhere. 2 Now that 
most of what we objected to has been abolished, what is 
the use of reviving old controversies 1 We shall not even 
mention the points in which the present system seems to 
us to be still capable of improvement, for there is reason to 
hope that it will soon be modified, and in a very satisfactory 
manner. Let it suffice to say that the Faculties now confer 
a new diploma, the Diplome d'etudes superieures, which all 
the students have a right to seek, but which the candidates 
for agregation, are obliged to obtain. This diploma of higher 
studies, analogous to that of the ifccole des hautes etudes, 
the brevet of the Ecole des chartes, and the doctorate in 
philosophy at the German universities, is given to those 
students of history who, qualified by a certain academical 
standing, have passed an examination in which the principal 
tests are, besides questions on the ''sciences" auxiliary to 
historical research, the composition and the defence of an 

1 Revue historique, lxiii. (1897), p. 96. 

3 See the Revue Internationale d'enseignernent, Feb. 1S93 > the Revue 
universitaire, June 1892, Oct. and Nov. 1894, July 1895 > aQ d the 
Political Science Quarterly, Sept. 1894. 

344 



Appendix II 

original monograph. Every one now recognises that "the 
examination for the diploma of studies will yield excellent 
fruit, if the vigilance and conscientiousness of examiners 
maintain it at its proper value." l 

V. To sum up, the attractions of preparation for degrees 
have brought the Faculties a host of students. But, under 
the old system of examinations for the licentiate and for 
aggregation, preparation for degrees was a task which did not 
harmonise very well with the work which the Faculties 
deemed suitable for themselves, useful to their pupils, 
and advantageous to science. The examination-system has 
therefore been perseveringly reformed, not without difficulty, 
into conformity with a certain ideal of what the higher 
teaching of history ought to be. The result is that the 
Faculties have taken rank among the institutions which 
contribute to the positive progress of the historical sciences. 
An enumeration of the works which have appeared under 
their auspices during the last few years would, if necessary, 
bear witness to the fact. 

' This evolution has already produced satisfactory results, 
and will produce more if it goes on as well as it has begun. 
To begin with, the transformation of historical instruction in 
the Faculties has brought about a corresponding transforma- 
tion at the Ecole normale superieure. The Ecole normale 
has also, for two years, been awarding a "Dipldme aV etudes " ; 
original researches, pedagogic exercises, and general culture 
are encouraged there in the same degree as by the new 
Faculties. It now differs from the Faculties only in being 
a close institution, recruited under certain precautions; 
practically it is a Faculty like the others, but with a small 
number of select students. Secondly, the Ecole des 
hautes etudes and the Ecole des chartes, both of which 
will be installed at the end of 1819 7, in the renovated 

1 Revue, historique, I.e. p. 98. I have developed elsewhere what I 
have here contented myself with stating. See the Revue Internationale 
de Venseignement, Nov. 1897. — [C. V. L.] 

345 ' 



Appendix II 

Sorbonne, have still their justification for existence ; for 
many specialists are represented at the Ecole des hautes 
etudes which are not, and doubtless never will be, repre- 
sented in the Faculties; and, in the case of the studies 
bearing on medieval history, the body of converging in- 
struction given at the Ecole des chartes will always be 
incomparable. But the old antagonism between the Ecole 
des hautes etudes and the Ecole des chartes on the one 
hand, and the Faculties on the other, has disappeared. All 
these institutions, lately so dissimilar, will henceforth co- 
operate for the purpose of carrying on a common work in 
a common spirit. Each of these retains its name, its auto- 
nomy, and its traditions ; but together they form a whole : 
the historical section of an ideal University of Paris, much 
vaster than the one which was sanctioned by the law in 
1896. Of this " greater " University, the Ecole des chartes, 
the £cole des hautes etudes, the Ecole normale sup^rieure, 
and the whole body of historical instruction given by the 
Faculty of Letters, are now practically so many independent 
" instituts." 



346 



INDEX OF PROPER NAMES 



Abd-el-Kader, 282 
Airao, 158 

Alexander the Great, 272 
Alphonse of Poitiers, 227 
Altamira, R., 328 
Anselme, Pere, 303 
Ariovistus, 222 
Aristophanes, 171 
Aristotle, 44 
Athenseus, 300 

Bacon, Francis, 291 

Bancroft, H. H., 19, 20, 22, 31 

Barthelemy, Abb6, 301 

Bast, F. J., 78 

Bedier, J., 85, 112 

Bernheim, E., 6, 7, IO, 13, 38, 

56, 74, 91, 99, ico, 156, 182, 

198, 237, 297 
Blanchere, R. de la, 319 
Blass, F., 74, 78, 79, 89, 92 
Bodin, Jean, 44 
Boeckh, A., 107, 152 
Bohmer, J. F., 106 
Bollandists, Society of, 35 
Bonaventura, St., 88, 90 
Bouche-Leclercq, A., 158 
Boucherie, A., 113 
Bourdeau, L., 275 
Boutaric, E., 227 
Boyce, W. B., I 
Brequigny, L. G. 0. F. de, 106 
Broglie, E. de, 29 



Brugiere de Barante, A. G. P., 

301 
Brunetiere, F., 113 
Buchez, P. J. B., I 
Buhler, G., 56 

Cesar, Julius, 44, 194, 197, 218, 

220, 222, 245 
Cagnat, R., 57 
Cantu, C, 311 

Carlyle, Thomas, 132, 230, 303 
Chanipollion, F., 48 
Charles IX. of France, 168, 186 
Cbasles, M., 88 

Chateaubriand, F. A. de, 72, 301 
Chemosh, the god, 212 
Cherot, H., 7 
Chevalier, U., 5, 7 
Chladenius, J. M., 6 
Cicero, 44, 108 
Cleopatra, 88, 248 
Clovis, 158, 220, 223, 301 
Cobet, C. C, 78 
Coulanges, Fustel de, 1, 9, 10, 64, 

140, 144, 148, 149, 150, 158, 

170, 215, 216, 230 
Cournot, A. A., 246, 249 
Cousin, V., 286, 287 
Curtius, G., 230, 314 

Daniel, Pere, 303 
Daremberg, C. V., 308 
Darius Hystaspes, 15 1 



347 



Index of Proper Names 



Daunou, P. C. F., 5, 6, 43, 

54,55 
Delisle, L., 23, 97 
Deloche, J. E. M., 148 
Demosthenes, 171 
Dezobry, C. L., 302 
Droysen, J. G., 3, 5, 7, 10, 1 

156, 158, 286, 314 
Du Cange, C. du F., 105, 136, 
Dumont, A., 341 
Duruy, V., 327, 338, 339 

Ebers, G., 301 

Edward VI. of England, 249 

Egger, E., 108 

Eginhard, 94 

Ephorus, 298 

Eusebius, 298 

Feillet, A., 162 
Feugere, L., 105, 136 
Fisher, H. A. L., 125 
Flaubert, G., 5, 32, 304, 319 
Flint, R., 2, 6, 8, 285 
France, A., 319 
Fredegonda, 197 
Freeman, E. A., 5, 7, 10, 46 
Froissart, Jean, 19 
Froude, J. A., 125, 126 

Geiger, W., 56 
Gellius, Aulu.8,.300 
Georgisch, P., 106 
Giannone, Pietro, 104 
Gibbon, E., 44 
Gilbert, Gustav, 309 
Giry, A., 57 
Glasson, E., 149 
Goethe, J. W. von, 19, 319 
Grow, J., 75 
Graux, C, 123 
Gregory of Corinth, 78 
Gregory of Tours, 144, 146, 
180, 198, 256 



47, 



06, 
148 



158, 



Grober, G., 57, 310 
Grote, G., 183, 310 
Grotius, Hugo, 44 
Guicciardini, Francesco, 44 
Guiraud, P., 230 

Hagen, H., 78 

Hardouin, Pere, 99 

Harnack, A. , 309 

Havet, Julien, 12, 56, 97, 123, 

128 
Havet, Louis, 12 
Haureau, B., 84, in, 1 18, 123 
Hegel, G. W. F., 286 
Henry VIII. of England, 249 
Henry II. of France, 292 
Henry, V., 289 
Herodotus, 44, 171, 179, 197 
Horace, 99 
Hoveden, John, 88 
Hroswitha, 99 
Hugo, Victor, 88, 89 
Hume, D., 44 

Jaffe, P., 106 

Jameson, J. F., 136 

Jerome, St., 112 

Jesus Christ, 188 

Joan of Arc, 188 

John, King of England, 187 

Jullian, C, 297 

Krumbacher, K., 309 
Kuhn, E., 56 

Lacombe, T., 2, 233, 241, 277, 288 
Lamprecht, K., 230, 247, 284, 290, 

314 
Langlois, Ch. V., 19, 38, ill, 135, 

192, 345 
Lasch, B,, 68 
Laurent, F., 285 
Lavisse, E., 134, 328, 333, 337, 

34i, 342 



348 



Index of Proper Names 



Lavoisier, A. L., 302 

Leibnitz, G. W., 121, 122 

Lee, Sidney, 308 

Le Moyne, Pere, 7 

Lenglet de Fresnoy, N., 6 

Leonardo da Vinci, 88, 89 

Liard, L., 335, 341 

Lindner, T., 81 

Lindsay, W. M., 78, 79, 84 

Livy, 44, 178^ 180, 233, 297, 

298 
Locke, John, 44 
Loebell, J. W., 180 
Lorenz, O., 10 
Loudun, the nuns of, 208 
Louis VIII. of France, 187 
Louis of Granada, 88 
Luard, H. R., 98 
Luther, Martin, 203 . 

Mably, G. B. de, 43, 44 

Macaulay, Lord, 303 

Macchiavelli, N., 44 

Madvig, J. N., 78 

Mariani, L., 4 

Marquardt, J., 309 

Marselli, N., 2 

Mary Magdalene, St. , 88 

Mary, Queen, 249 

Matthew of Paris, 98 

Matthew of Westminster, 97 

Mayr, J. von, 274 

Me'rime'e, P., 301 

Mesha Inscription, the, 212 

Meusel, H., 148 

Meyer, E., 158 

Meyer, P., 29 

M^zeray, F. E. de, 298 

Michelet, J., 230, 271, 286, 287, 

301, 303, 327, 336 
Moller, W., 309 
Mommsen, T., 108, 118, 230, 286, 

309, 3H 
Monod, G., 100, 144, 297, 302 



Montesquieu, C. de S., 44, 257, 

284, 299 
Montfaucon, Pere Bernard de, 29 
Montgomery, Gabriel de, 292 
Mortet, Ch. and V., 1 1 
Mourin, E., 302 
Miiller, I. von, 56, 74, 310 
Mylaeus, 6 

Napoleon I., 26, 282 
Newton, Isaac, 302 
Niebuhr, B. G., 158, 182 
Nietzsche, F., 319 
Nitzsch, C. W., 180 

Oncken, W., 311 
Orosius, 298 
Ossian, 91 
Otto I., 175 

Paris, G., 309 
Patrizzi, Francesco, 6 
Pattison, Mark, 1 15 
Paul, H., 75, 310 
Pauly, A., 308 
Pausanias, 74 
Peckham, John, 88 
Peiresc, N. F. 0. de, 22 
j Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, 10, 130 
Philippi, A., 129 
Piaget, A., 91 
Pisistratus, 207 
Plato, 153 
Plutarch, 44, 297 
Polybius, 44, 279, 297 
Potthast, A., 106 
Prou, M., 57 

Ranke, L., 140, 286 

Raynal, J., 44 

Reinach, S., 75, 79 

Renan, E., 9, 29, 30, 40, 105, 1 14, 

119, 122, 132, 134, 183 
Retz, Cardinal de, 44, 162, 169 



349 



Index of Pkoper Names 



Rilliet, A., 162 
Robertson, J. M., 115, 241 
Robertson, W., 44 
Rocholl, R., 285 
Rousseau, J. J., 44 
Rulhiere, C. C. de, 44 

SaCxLIO, E., 30S 

Saint-Simon, C. H. de, 251 

Sallust, 44 

Sanchoniathon, 91 

Schiller, J. C. F. von, 162 

Sehlosser, F. C, 31 1 

Schcemann, G. F., 309 

Seguier, J. F., 109 

Seignobos, Ch., II, 66, 196, 257, 

333. 334 
Seneca, 78 

Sforza, Ludovico, 282 
Sickel, T. von, 56 
Shnmel, G., 217 
Smedt, Pere de, 10, 156, 207, 

254 
Spencer, Herbert, 287 
Stephen, Leslie, 308 
Stubbs, W M 10 
Suetonius, 94 
Suger, Abbot, 170 
Suidas, 158 
Sully, M., 169 
Surville, Clotilde de, 91 

Tacitus, 44, 141, 144, 171, 177, 

194, 233, 256 
Taine, H. A 140, 143, 247, 286 



Tardif, A., 5, 7, 156 

Taylor, J., 75 

Thierry, Augustin, 98, 140, 230, 

259, 265, 301, 302, 303 
Thomas, A., J^ 
Thucydides, 19, 44, 158, 183, 197, 

297 
Tobler, A., 75 
Tschudi, J. H., 162, 171 
Turenne, H. de la T. d'A., 162 

Vercingetorix, 88 
Vergil, 84, 99 
Vertot, R. A. de, 44 
Villeraarque", H. de, 181 
Vincent de Paul, St., 326 
Voltaire, F. M. A. de, 44, 299 
Vrain-Lucas, 88 

Waitz, G., 1 10, 118 
Wallace, A. R., 207 
Waltzing, J, P., 108 
Wattenbach, W., 73 
Wauters, A. C, 106 
Weber, G., 311 
Wegele, F. X. von, 122, 297 
Wendover, Roger de, 98 
Wissowa, G., 308 
Wittekind, 175 
Wright, T., 84 

Xenophon, 44 

Zumpt, A. W., 108 



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